# Shri Krishna Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd v. The Micro Small & Medium Enterprises & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1320
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-30
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 8895 of 2026
- **Bench:** Saral Srivastava, Mrs.Garima Prashad
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shri-krishna-nutrition-india-pvt-ltd-v-the-micro-small-medium-enterprises-anr-54745
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

1320 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (i) The Joint Director of Education, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur, is directed to seek a
nomination from the government within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the
certified copy of this order, in case, till date no Deputy Director of Education has taken charge.

 (ii) Respondent no.1 on receipt of such a request, shall proceed to nominate Regional
Deputy Director of Education, from a neighbouring region as an adhoc Member of the Regional
Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur.

 (iii) On the constitution of the Regional Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal,
Mirzapur as per the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, the Committee shall proceed to decide
the issue within a period of three weeks from the date of aforementioned nomination, after adhering
to the principles of natural justice and notice to all the parties concerned.

 (iv) Respondent no.1 is directed to issue a circular to all the Regional Level Committees,
constituted under the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, prescribing a procedure or a standard
operating procedure (SOP), indicating the procedure to be followed by all the Regional Level
Committees in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in case any one of the Members as contemplated under
the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, is not available and ensure strict compliance of the same,
keeping in mind, the observations and law discussed, herein above.

61. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to send a copy of this order to the respondent no.1Principal Secretary, Ministry of Secondary Education, U.P. at Lucknow for necessary compliance;
and issuance of directives/standard operating procedure, to be followed by Regional Level
Committees in the aforesaid contingencies.

62. Before parting with the judgment, a special mention of Ms. Pratibha Verma (Research
Associate), attached with my chamber is to be made, as she was instrumental in providing research
and deserves appreciation by the Court for the same.

63. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petition stands allowed. However,
no order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1320
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE MRS.GARIMA PRASHAD, J.

Writ C No. 8895 of 2026

Shri Krishna Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
The Micro Small & Medium Enterprises & Anr. ...Respondents
4 All. Shri Krishna Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Micro Small & Medium Enterprises & Anr.
1321
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Matter pertains to whether an arbitral award passed by the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act, 2006 can be challenged in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 on the grounds of absence of
proper service and claim being barred by limitation despite availability of statutory remedy
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

HEADNOTE
Constitution of India, Art.226 - Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006,
s.18 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, s.34 - MSME Council passed award against
petitioner - Petitioner challenged the award in writ jurisdiction on the ground that the award
was passed without due service upon him and that the claim was barred by limitation as the last
supply was made on 18.02.2017 whereas the reference was filed on 03.09.2020 -
Maintainability of writ petition in view of availability of statutory remedy under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Held: Proceedings under Section 18 of the 2006 Act culminate in an arbitral award and the
statute itself provides a remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 -
A party cannot bypass the statutory remedy and invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge such an
award, particularly so as to avoid compliance with the requirement of pre-deposit under Section
19 of the 2006 Act - Court held that interference under Articles 226 and 227 in arbitral matters
is extremely limited and can be exercised only in cases of patent perversity or exceptional
circumstances - Court held that not every plea styled as one of "jurisdiction" can be entertained
in writ jurisdiction - Where adjudication requires appreciation of evidence and determination of
disputed questions of fact, such issues are required to be examined by the forum competent
under the statute - Court held that where disputed questions of fact arise and an alternative
remedy is available, the High Court should ordinarily decline to exercise writ jurisdiction.
Petitioner challenged the arbitral award on two grounds, namely, absence of proper service before the MSME
Council and the claim being barred by limitation - Court held both these issues to be not pure questions of
law but mixed questions of fact and law - Determination of proper service would require examination of mode
of service, acknowledgment, addresses and related material, while plea of limitation would depend upon
factual aspects such as date of supply, invoices, acknowledgments and course of dealings between parties -
In the present case, Court did not find any manifest perversity - Issues raised required factual adjudication
and did not fall within the narrow scope carved out by the Supreme Court - Whether a claim is barred by
limitation depends upon factual determination and cannot be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction - Alleged
improper service and ex parte proceedings are matters to be examined by the competent forum and do not
render the award a nullity on the face of the record - Writ petition held not maintainable and dismissed -
Petitioner left at liberty to avail such other statutory remedies as may be available in law. (E-5)
CASE LAW CITED
India Glycols Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, (2018) 1 SCC 143;
Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 26;
Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC
1467;
Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 206;
Tamil Nadu Cements Corp. Ltd. v. MSEFC, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 4508;
Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, 2023 (12) SCALE 389;
Lajja Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2013) 11 SCC 235;
Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 401;
State Bank of India v. Rajesh Agarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 1.

List of Acts
1322 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Constitution of India;
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006;
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
List of Keywords
MSME Council; Arbitral award; Section 18 proceedings; Ex parte award; Proper service; Principles of natural
justice; Limitation; Mixed questions of fact and law; Alternative remedy; Section 34 application; Writ
jurisdiction; Patent perversity; Exceptional circumstances; Pre-deposit under Section 19; Maintainability of writ
petition; Execution proceedings.
CASE ARISING FROM
Award dated 15.07.2021 passed by the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council, Kanpur
under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 directing the petitioner
to pay Rs.24,15,835/- including interest.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: Nitin Chandra, Sudekchhit Pandey
Advs. for the Respondents:
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs.Garima Prashad, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the award dated 15.07.2021 passed
by the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Facilitation Council, Kanpur (hereinafter referred to
as the MSME Council) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the 2006 Act), whereby the petitioner has
been directed to pay a sum of Rs. 9,62,610/- along with interest of Rs. 14,53,225/-, totaling to Rs.
24,15,835/-.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned award has been passed ex
parte and without due service upon the petitioner. It is stated that the petitioner came to know of the
award only in the third week of April, 2025. Thereafter, the petitioner approached the Executing
Court. An application was filed seeking recall of the order dated 13.03.2023, whereby the
execution proceedings were directed to proceed ex parte. It is further stated that objections to the
execution proceedings were filed on 13.06.2025. The said applications are presently pending
adjudication.

4. It is further submitted that despite the pendency of the recall application and objections,
the Executing Court is proceeding ahead with the execution proceedings without deciding the said
applications, compelling the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
4 All. Shri Krishna Nutrition India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Micro Small & Medium Enterprises & Anr.
1323
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the MSME Council lacked jurisdiction
as the claim was barred by limitation, the last supply having been made on 18.02.2017 and the
reference having been filed on 03.09.2020. It is further contended that the proceedings before the
MSME Council were conducted in violation of principles of natural justice as no proper service
was effected and the award has been passed ex parte without affording opportunity of hearing.

6. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance upon several decisions, which shall be dealt with hereinbelow, one by one. On the strength
of the said authorities, it is sought to be contended that where arbitral proceedings suffer from a
fundamental jurisdictional infirmity or are vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice, the
High Court may, in appropriate cases, exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India.

7. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and
perused the record.

8. The challenge raised by the petitioner essentially rests on two grounds, namely, absence
of proper service before the MSME Council and the claim being barred by limitation. Both these
issues are not pure questions of law but are mixed questions of fact and law. Determination of
proper service would require examination of mode of service, acknowledgment, addresses and
related material, while the plea of limitation would depend upon factual aspects such as date of
supply, invoices, acknowledgments and course of dealings between the parties.

9. It is well settled that not every plea styled as one of jurisdiction can be entertained in
writ jurisdiction. Where adjudication requires appreciation of evidence and determination of
disputed questions of fact, such issues are required to be examined by the forum competent under
the statute.

10. Proceedings under Section 18 of the 2006 Act culminate in an arbitral award and the
statute itself provides a remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The
Supreme Court in India Glycols Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council,
(2018) 1 SCC 143 has categorically held that a party cannot bypass the statutory remedy and
invoke writ jurisdiction to challenge such an award, particularly so as to avoid compliance of the
requirement of pre-deposit under Section 19 of the 2006 Act.

11. The reliance placed upon Serosoft Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Dexter Capital Advisors
Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 26 is misplaced. The said judgment reiterates that interference
under Articles 226 and 227 in arbitral matters is extremely limited and can be exercised only in
cases of patent perversity or exceptional circumstances. In the present case, no such manifest
perversity is demonstrated on the face of the record. The issues raised require factual adjudication
and do not fall within the narrow scope carved out in Serosoft (supra).

12. Insofar as reliance upon Sonali Power Equipments Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman,
Maharashtra State Electricity Board, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1467 is concerned, the said
judgment merely lays down that the Limitation Act applies to arbitration proceedings under Section
1324 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
18 of the 2006 Act by virtue of Section 43 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. However,
whether a claim is barred by limitation depends upon factual determination and cannot be
adjudicated in writ jurisdiction. The said decision does not permit bypassing of the statutory
remedy under Section 34.

13. The judgment in Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2021)
19 SCC 206 is clearly distinguishable. In the said case, the Supreme Court found that the MSME
Council had failed to follow the mandatory statutory procedure and had not conducted arbitration
in accordance with law, rendering the award a nullity. In the present case, no such foundational
defect is apparent. The grievance raised pertains to alleged improper service and ex parte
proceedings, which are matters to be examined by the competent forum and do not render the
award a nullity on the face of the record.

14. In Tamil Nadu Cements Corp. Ltd. v. MSEFC, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 4508, it has
been observed that writ jurisdiction is not completely barred. However, the same judgment also
reiterates that where disputed questions of fact arise and an alternative remedy is available, the
High Court should ordinarily decline to exercise writ jurisdiction. The present case falls squarely
within such a category.

15. The reliance upon Union Territory of Ladakh v. Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference, 2023 (12) SCALE 389 to contend that in case of conflict of coordinate Bench
decisions the earlier one must be followed, is of no assistance to the petitioner. There is no conflict
requiring deviation from the law laid down in India Glycols (supra), which directly governs the
issue involved.

16. The judgments in Lajja Ram v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (2013) 11 SCC 235,
Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., (2021) 10 SCC 401 and State Bank of
India v. Rajesh Agarwal, (2023) 6 SCC 1 arise in entirely different statutory contexts. While they
reiterate general principles relating to natural justice, delay and fairness, they do not dilute the
settled position that where a specific statutory remedy is available against an arbitral award, the
writ jurisdiction ought not to be invoked except in exceptional circumstances.

17. Acceptance of the petitioners submission would result in every arbitral award being
subjected to writ scrutiny on allegations of procedural irregularity, thereby rendering the statutory
mechanism under Section 34 redundant, which is impermissible in law.

18. In the present case, the petitioner has already approached the Executing Court and has
filed applications raising the very issues now sought to be urged before this Court. The petitioner
also has a statutory remedy available in law to challenge the award. No exceptional circumstance
has been made out so as to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

19. In view of the aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the writ petition is
not maintainable.

20. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
4 All. Sri Rajendra Prasad Singh Vs. M/S Arch Construction & Ors.
1325
21. It is, however, directed that any applications filed by the petitioner before the Executing
Court shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with law, without being
influenced by any observation made herein.

22. It is further provided that the petitioner shall be at liberty to avail such other statutory
remedies as may be available in law.

23. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 1325
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ C No. 10703 of 2025

Sri Rajendra Prasad Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
M/S Arch Construction & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the High Court under Article 226 can interfere with the interlocutory order passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996?

Whether the High Court, while appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(6), is required to adjudicate the
issue of limitation?

Whether the Arbitral Tribunal erred in law by refusing to adjudicate the petitioner's preliminary objection on
limitation under Section 16?

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226 - Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections
5, 11, 16, 34 - Limitation Act, 1963 - Article 137, Section 22 - Contract Act, 1872 - Section 28 -
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 9: - Writ Petition under Article 226 - for quashing the impugned
order of the Sole Arbitrator - whereby the learned Arbitral Tribunal rejected the petitioner's application moved
under Section 16 of the Act, 1996 seeking termination of arbitration proceeding on the ground of limitation -
partnership dispute - FIR for forgery - invocation of arbitration clause - appointment of arbitrator under
section 11 of the Act, 1963 by High Court - The Arbitral Tribunal declined to decide limitation objection,
holding that only the High Court could examine limitation at Section 11 stage - doctrine of competencecompetence - The petitioner pleaded that limitation is a jurisdictional issue within the Tribunal's domain -
respondents countered that the Section 11 order is final and res judicata - Court finds that, the Tribunal
abdicated its jurisdiction under Section 16, contrary to competence-competence doctrine - referral court under
Section 11 confined to examining existence of arbitration agreement - Tribunal bound to rule on limitation -
court held that, impugned order is patently illegal and perverse - therefore, impugned order quashed - writ
petition allowed with direction to the Tribunal to adjudicate preliminary objections of limitation on merits
expeditiously.