# Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav v. Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 631
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-25
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 1337 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shri-radhey-shyam-yadav-v-presiding-officer-cgit-cum-labour-court-lko-ors-54263
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

2 All. Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs. Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors.
631

8. The petitioners have themselves pleaded that earlier the petitioner no. 1 has been elected as
Pradhan of Village Panchayat- Bambhauri in the elections held in the year 2005. At that time, the
said Village Panchayat comprised of eight villages. Subsequently in the year 2015, a new Village
Panchayat - Kandaari comprising of 3 villages was carved out from Village Panchayat- Bambhauri.
The petitioner was elected as Pradhan of Village Panchayat- Bambhauri in the year 2015 and he
held that Office till the year 2021. In the year 2021, the petitioner lost election for Pradhan of
Village Panchayat- Bambhauri and the opposite party No.4 was elected as Pradhan. The petitioner
claims to have shifted his residence from Village Panchayat- Bambhauri to Shahzadpur, which is a
hamlet of Village Panchayat- Kandaari.

9. The names of the other family members of the petitioners, namely, Jwala Prasad- father of
the petitioner No.-1 and husband of the petitioner no. 2, Usha Devi wife of the petitioner No.1 and
daughter-in-law of the petitioner no. 2, Jyoti Yadav and Manjari Yadav - daughters of the petitioner
No.1 and grand-daughters of the petitioner no. 2 and Devendra Singh and Gyanendra Singh - sons
of the petitioner No.1 and grand-sons of the petitioner no. 2, are recorded in the electoral roll of
Village Panchayat- Bambhauri. Several villagers have stated that the petitioners are not residents of
Village Panchayat- Kandaari and some of them have given affidavits stating that the petitioners are
residents of Village Panchayat- Bambhauri and their names are recorded in the electoral roll of that
Village. Even if the petitioners are absenting themselves temporarily from their place of ordinary
residence in Village Panchayat- Bambhauri, they shall not by reason thereof cease to be ordinarily
residents of Village Panchayat- Bambhauri.

10. The S.D.M. has passed the impugned order holding the petitioners to be ordinary residents
of Village Panchayat- Bambhauri after proper consideration of all the facts of the case, as required
by Explanation (v) appended to Section 9(3) of the Act. The impugned order does not suffer from
any error or illegality warranting interference by this Court.

11. The Writ Petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 631
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ C No. 1337 of 2026

Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors. ...Respondents

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether a belated industrial dispute raised after a long lapse of time can be entertained, although no period
of limitation is prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act.
632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
HEADNOTE
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Delay and laches - No statutory limitation prescribed for raising an industrial
dispute - Belated industrial dispute - Re-engagement claim - Justification:

Held: Although law has not prescribed any period of limitation for raising an industrial dispute, it does not
mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to delay and reasons therefor - Power is
to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and a stale dispute cannot be the subject-matter of
reference - What is a reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case - Submission
of applications after long intervals followed by complete inaction amounts to laches -In the present case,
submission of applications for re-engagement in the years 1997 and 2004 and thereafter complete inaction for
eleven years, and raising of dispute after about 25 years of disengagement, amounts to laches - Claim for reengagement was barred by delay and laches - Tribunal did not committed any illegality or error in rejecting
the claim on the ground of delay. (Paras 10, 12, 21) (E-5)

CASE LAW CITED
S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (2003) 4 SCC 27;
Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty (2000) 2 SCC 455;
Union of India v. N. Murugesan (2022) 2 SCC 25;
SBI v. M.J. James (2022) 2 SCC 301

List of Acts
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947;
Constitution of India.

List of Keyword
Delay and laches; Industrial dispute; Stale claim; Reasonable time; Re-engagement; Casual labour;
Acquiescence; Discretion under Article 226.

CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Lucknow.

Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Manju Nagaur, Sushila Pandey.
Advs For Respondents: A.S.G.I.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Smt. Manju Nagaur, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Dev Rishi Kumar,
the learned counsel for the opposite parties.

2. By means of the instant petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the validity of a judgment and order dated 09.04.2025 passed by the
Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Lucknow in ID Casc No.71 of 2015
whereby the claim of the petitioner-workman under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, has been
rejected on the ground that the cause of action had accrued to the workman on 30.06.1990 and he
raised the Industrial Dispute in the year 2015. The reference was made on 09.11.2015 and a Claim
Petition was filed on 25.01.2016. During pendency of the case, the petitioner has attained the age of
retirement and for these reasons, he is not entitled for any relief.
2 All. Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs. Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors.
633

3. Assailing validity of the aforesaid order, Smt. Manju Nagaur, the learned counsel for the
petitioner has submitted that the Industrial Disputes Act does not lay down any period of limitation
for raising an industrial dispute and the provisions of the Limitation do not apply to the proceedings
under the Industrial Disputes Act. She has placed reliance on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the cases of Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. MKTG.-cum-Processing Service Society
Ltd.: (1999) 6 SCC 82, Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr.: (2015) 4 SCC 458,
U.P.P.C.L. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Faizabad and another: 2020 SCC OnLine All
1288, Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P.: 2020 SCC OnLine All 253 and Prem Sagar
Vishwakarma v. Presiding Officer, Court, Central Industrial Government: 2023:AHCLKO:85351.

4. In Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Co-op. MKTG.-cum-Processing Service Society Ltd. (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"10. ...the provisions of Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 are not
applicable to the proceedings under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the
workman merely on the ground of delay. The plea of delay if raised by the employer is required to
be proved as a matter of fact by showing the real prejudice and not as a merely hypothetical
defence. No reference to the Labour Court can be generally questioned on the ground of delay
alone. Even in a case where the delay is shown to be existing, the tribunal, labour court or board,
dealing with the case can appropriately mould the relief by declining to grant back wages to the
workman till the date he raised the demand regarding his illegal retrenchment/ termination or
dismissal. The court may also in appropriate cases direct the payment of part of the back wages
instead of full back wages..."

5. The aforesaid law was followed in Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana and Anr.: (supra)
and U.P Power Corp. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer (supra).

6. In Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court set aside an
order rejecting an application for condonation of delay in filing an application for substitution of a
deceased petitioner by holding that:

"6. The purpose of laws of limitation is to ensure that the parties may remain vigilant to
their cause and institute their claim in good time. Laws of limitation are statutes of repose. They
are usually triggered in cases of inordinate delay caused by apathy of litigants. The mandate of
laws of limitation is not to shut the doors of justice to the parties or decline adjudication on merits.
On the contrary it should be the constant endeavour the courts of law to adjudicate issues on merits
and dispense justice on a substantive basis.

7. There is good authority to say that the courts should adopt a liberal, pragmatic and a
justice oriented approach matters of condonation of delay. Equally the courts should avoid a
pedantic view and eschew servitude to procedure in such matters."

7. Vijay Pal Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) was altogether on a different point which is not
involved n the present case and, therefore, it is not relevnt for adjudication of the present case.
634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. In Prem Sagar Vishwakarma (supra), the question before a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court
was regarding the effect and applicability of Section 2-A(3) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act,
which was inserted by Act No. 24 of 2010 with effect from 15.09.2010 and it provided as follows: -

"2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial
dispute.-

(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1)."

9. The industrial dispute in the present case was not instituted on an application under Section
2-A, rather it was instituted on a reference under Section 10 of the Act. Therefore, Prem Sagar
Vishwakarma (supra) is not applicable to the present case.

10. In S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager: (2003) 4 SCC 27, the Hon?ble Supreme
Court referred to some precedents on the point of belated industrial disputes and held as follows: -

"17. ...It is true, as held in Shalimar Works Ltd. v. Workmen [AIR 1959 SC 1217] that
merely because the Industrial Disputes Act does not provide for a limitation for raising the
dispute, it does not mean that the dispute can be raised at any time and without regard to the
delay and reasons therefor. There is no limitation prescribed for reference of disputes to an
Industrial Tribunal; even so it is only reasonable that the disputes should be referred as soon as
possible after they have arisen and after conciliation proceedings have failed, particularly so when
disputes relate to discharge of workmen wholesale. A delay of 4 years in raising the dispute after
even re-employment of most of the old workmen was held to be fatal in Shalimar Works Ltd. v.
Workmen. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty [(2000) 2 SCC 455] a delay of 7 years
was held to be fatal and disentitled the workmen to any relief. In Ratan Chandra Sammanta v.
Union of India [1993 Supp (4) SCC 67] it was held that a casual labourer retrenched by the
employer deprives himself of remedy available in law by delay itself; lapse of time results in losing
the remedy and the right as well. The delay would certainly be fatal if it has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost and rendered not available..."

(Emphasis added)

11. In Nilajkar case (supra), considering the facts of the case, it was held that the delay in the
case had not been so culpable as to disentitle the appellants to any relief. The Hon?ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"Although the High Court has opined that there was a delay of 7 to 9 years in raising the
dispute before the Tribunal but we find the High Court factually not correct. The employment of the
appellants was terminated sometime in 1985-86 or 1986-87. Pursuant to the judgment in Daily
Rated Casual Labour v. Union of India [(1988) 1 SCC 122] the Department was formulating a
scheme to accommodate casual labourers and the appellants were justified in awaiting the outcome
thereof. On 16-1-1990 they were refused to be accommodated in the Scheme. On 28-12-1990 they
initiated the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act followed by conciliation proceedings
2 All. Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs. Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors.
635
and then the dispute was referred to the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. We do not think
that the appellants deserve to be non-suited on the ground of delay."

12. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty: (2000) 2 SCC 455, it was held that: -

"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its
powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time
and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a
rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has
exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the
respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be
even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of
reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend
on the facts and circumstances of each case. ...."

(Emphasis added)

13. In Union of India v. N. Murugesan: (2022) 2 SCC 25, the Hon?ble Supreme Court
explained the principles of delay, latches and acquiescence, in the following words: -

"20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and
interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct
elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species.
Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may
be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law
principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which
restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain
circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court
than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one
of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court.

Laches

21. The word "laches" is derived from the French language meaning "remissness and
slackness". It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an
equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do
an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party
getting relief or remedy.

22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts
done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party
approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be
unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his
acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a
particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the
court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a
remedy.
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question
as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of
fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the
existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the
concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of
estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can
succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be
amenable to acquiescence.

Acquiescence

24. We have already discussed the relationship between acquiescence on the one hand
and delay and laches on the other.

25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance. It is implied and reluctant
consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when
acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge
comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to
perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed
to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take
place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a
situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the
original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the
distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become
laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be seen on a
case-to-case basis."

14. In SBI v. M.J. James: (2022) 2 SCC 301, the Hon?ble Supreme Court held that: -

"36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially
codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A
right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as
acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities
belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the
present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years
and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory
explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a
reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was
not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if
he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would
not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which
has been also noticed in the impugned judgment [SBI v. James, 2008 SCC OnLine Ker 759]. This is
highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge. We would,
subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the
present case."
2 All. Shri Radhey Shyam Yadav Vs. Presiding Officer CGIT-cum-Labour Court Lko. & Ors.
637

15. In the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Sri. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari: (2013) 12 SCC
179, the Hon?ble Supreme Court held that a mere submission of representation to the competent
authority does not arrest time.

16. The aforesaid decision has been relied upon by the Hon?ble Supreme Court in State of
West Bengal v. Debabrata Tiwari: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 219, where after submitting an
application in the year 2005-2006 the petitioners did nothing further to pursue the matter for a
period of ten years. The Hon?ble Supreme Court held that such prolonged delay in approaching the
High Court may be regarded as a waiver of a remedy and such a delay would disentitle the writ
petitioners to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

17. Although the aforesaid judgments were rendered in context of delay in filing of a Writ
Petition challenging termination of service, the principles will be applicable to filing of claims
under the Industrial Disputes Act also, because no limitation is prescribed either for raising an
Industrial Dispute or for filing a Writ Petition.

18. The public welfare also demands that the parties should avail their legal remedies
promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence has stated that the laws come to the assistance of the
vigilant and not of the sleepy. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in
exercising the courts? discretion. Pursuing stale claims in no manner serves the public interest.

19. In the present case, the petitioner had pleaded in the reference application that he was
appointed as a casual labor on 01.06.1976 and he worked till 30.06.1990. He was awarded
temporary status in the year 1986-87. His service was terminated orally on 01.07.1990. The
petitioner stated that his service was terminated illegally and as per the provisions of law, he should
be treated as continuing in service. There was absolutely no averment regarding the delay in filing
the reference application. The petitioner has annexed a copy of a letter dated 14.07.1997 written by
the Divisional Railway Manager (Personal) to the General Manager, North Eastern Railway
rejecting the petitioner?s request for re-employment stating that the petitioner is out of service since
01.07.1990. The D.R.M. has referred to a Circular dated 22.11.1984 issued by the Railway Board,
which provides that the names of casual labours who have not worked for two years, will be struck
off the live register. The Divisional Railway Manager stated that as some persons junior to the
petitioner were working, permission be granted for engagement of the petitioner. Apparently, this
request was not accepted and the petitioner did not challenge the rejection of the request.

20. On 10.08.2004, the petitioner gave an application for re-engagement in service and this
request was turned down by means of a letter dated 10.12.2004 sent by the Divisional Railway
Manager (Personal), stating that the petitioner was out of service for the past fourteen years and his
application had been forwarded to the Head Office which was pending consideration. Apparently,
the petitioner did not take any action to seek re-engagement in service for more than a decade after
receipt of this letter. He raised an industrial dispute in the year 2015, when he had already remained
out of service for about 25 years and he had attained the age of 55 years. By the time the reference
was decided, the petitioner attained the age of 65 years.
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts in light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the cases of S.M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (supra) and Nedungadi Bank
Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty (supra), I am of the considered view that although the law has not
prescribed any period of Limitation, the petitioner ought to have filed his claim for re-engagement
in service with reasonable promptness. Submission of two applications for re-engagement ? first in
the year 1997, i.e., seven years after his dis-engagement and the second in the year 2004, fourteen
years since his dis-engagement and thereafter complete inaction for eleven years, amounts to
latches and the claim for re-engagement in service filed twenty five years after his dis-engagement,
is barred by delay and latches as per the principles laid down in the cases of Union of India v. N.
Murugesan (supra) and SBI v. M.J. James (supra).

22. In these circumstances, the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has
not committed any illegality or error in dismissing the petitioner's claim on the ground of delay.

23. The Writ Petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed at the admission stage.
----------
(2026) 2 ILRA 638
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE KUNAL RAVI SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 3630 of 2026

Sarvesh Kumar & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
 (a) Whether the Court can exercise its discretionary power u/Art. 226, when there is inordinate delay in filing
the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final?
(b) Whether petitioners are entitled for the compensation at the current circle rate?

Headnotes
A. Land Reform Law - Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 4 r/w Section 17(4) and Section 6 r/w
Section 17(1) - The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer
any right. The action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void,
if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of
fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be
exercised in a reasonable manner. (Para 12)

Where the Court quashes the acquisition on the grounds personal to individual objectors-such as vitiated
consideration of their specific objections u/s 5A, the relief operates "in personam" and benefits only those
parties, who contested the matter before the judicial forum. (Para 16)