# Shri Ram Kushwaha v. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Meerut & Anr

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1459
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-11-24
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 1060 of 2004
- **Bench:** Tarun Agarwala, Shri Narayan Shukla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shri-ram-kushwaha-v-u-p-state-sugar-corporation-ltd-meerut-anr-43042
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Evidence
Act-Section-74,77-disability
certificate-being
public
document-not
required
to
be
proved-on
40%
permanent disability-petitioners claim
allowed partly-appeal for enhancement
1460
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of compensation-appeal allowed with
direction to the claim Tribunal-take fresh
decision considering the loss of future
earnings.
Held: Para-4
In the light of these decisions, we are of
the opinion that the Tribunal committed
a
manifest
error
in
rejecting
the
disability certificate on the ground that it
was not proved by a witness.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1983 SC 1633; 1989 25 ALR 695; 2007
(67) ALR 580; 2012 (9) ADJ 1 (NOC); 2012 (8)
ADJ 534; 2012 (2) SCC 267.

## Text

3 All]. Shri Ram Kushwaha Vs. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Merrut & Anr.
1459
power of transfer is not an exercise of
original jurisdiction, it is not an exercise
of appellate jurisdiction nor it is an
exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
10. The power of transfer of suit and
other proceedings is an exercise of power
of superintendence. The legal position in
that has been explained by the Madras
High Court in the case of P. Karuppiah
Ambalam Vs. Ayya Nadar reported in
1963 SCC ONLINE Mad. 260; (1965) 78
LW 133 (Mad.) relevant portion of the
judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
"... Section 24 C.P.C., gives power to
two superior courts, viz., the High Court
or the District Court to withdraw any suit,
appeal or other proceedings pending in
any court subordinate to it and either try
and dispose of the same, or transfer the
same for trial or disposal to any Court,
subordinate to it and competent to try or
dispose of the same. In terms S. 24
confers a very wide power, and it is
intended to enable the two superior courts
mentioned in it, in their general power of
superintendent over subordinate courts,
or in the interest of justice to redistribute
all civil work of whatever nature pending
in subordinate courts for the purpose of
disposal. It has also to be used where the
interests of justice require, that a
particular case should be transferred
from one Subordinate Court. The subject
matter of the transfer referred in S. 24
C.P.C.,
as
suit,
appeal
or
other
proceeding, is of the widest kind, and
there is no reason why execution
proceedings should be excluded from the
scope of other proceeding mentioned in
this section. Considering also the general
purpose
of
superintendence,
and
furthering the interests of justice for
which this section is enacted, there is no
reason why execution proceedings should
be excluded from its scope."
11.

In
our
opinion,
the
judgment/order made on the petition
under Section 24 of the CPC only a
judgment/order of the learned Single
Judge
in
exercise
of
power
of
superintendence and nothing beyond it. In
view of the interpretation of Chapter VIII
Rule 5 of the Rules as above no special
appeal against the judgment/order made
in exercise of power of superintendence
would be maintainable. We hold that the
present special appeal as filed by the
appellant is not maintainable.
12. The present special appeal is
dismissed.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHRI NARAYAN SHUKLA, J.
First Appeal From Order No. 1060 of 2004
Shri Ram Kushwaha
 Appellant
Versus
U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. Meerut
& Anr.
 Opp. Parties
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri K.S. Kushwaha, Sri Manu Khare, Sri
P.V. Singh
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Sri R.K. Srivastava, Sri Pranav Chaudhary,
Sri Rakesh Bagga, Sri S. Bagga
Evidence
Act-Section-74,77-disability
certificate-being
public
document-not
required
to
be
proved-on
40%
permanent disability-petitioners claim
allowed partly-appeal for enhancement
1460
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of compensation-appeal allowed with
direction to the claim Tribunal-take fresh
decision considering the loss of future
earnings.
Held: Para-4
In the light of these decisions, we are of
the opinion that the Tribunal committed
a
manifest
error
in
rejecting
the
disability certificate on the ground that it
was not proved by a witness.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1983 SC 1633; 1989 25 ALR 695; 2007
(67) ALR 580; 2012 (9) ADJ 1 (NOC); 2012 (8)
ADJ 534; 2012 (2) SCC 267.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J.)
1. While travelling in a Tata Sumo,
the claimant was injured on account of an
accident that occurred on the basis of rash
and negligent driving on the part of the
driver. The claimant filed a claim petition,
which was allowed in part and a sum of
Rs. 39,454/- was awarded. The appellant
being aggrieved filed the present appeal
for enhancement of compensation.
2. From a perusal of the award, we
find that the claimant had filed a disability
certificate issued by the Chief Medical
Officer
which
also
contained
the
signatures of the other members of the
Board, who examined the claimant and
found that he has a permanent disability
of 40%. This certificate was rejected by
the Tribunal on the ground that the same
has not been proved by production of any
witness, namely, by a doctor.
3. We are of the opinion that a
certificate issued by a Chief Medical
Officer, being a public document, is not
required to be proved as per the Section
74 and 77 of the Evidence Act. The
contents of a public document is proved
by production of a certified copy under
Section 77 of the Evidence Act.
4. In M.M. Rajappa v. Mal Haha
Uru Bajappa : AIR 1983 SC 1633 and Pt.
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India :
1989 25 ALR 695, the Supreme Court
held that if a document is a certified copy
of a public document, it need not be
proved by calling a witness. A similar
view was also given by a Division Bench
of this Court in Oriental Insurance
Company Limited v. Surendra Umrao and
another : 2007 (67) ALR 580. In the light
of these decisions, we are of the opinion
that the Tribunal committed a manifest
error in rejecting the disability certificate
on the ground that it was not proved by a
witness.
5. Mr. Rakesh Bagga, learned
counsel for the Insurance Company
contended that the disability certificate by
itself will not entitle the claimants to
claim an enhancement compensation until
and unless the claimant proves that the
disability, which he had incurred resulted
in a loss of earning. In this regard, the
learned counsel has placed reliance upon
a decision of this Court in Sunil Kumar v.
Smt. Jasvinder Kaur and another : 2012
(9) ADJ 1 (NOC) and in Om Prakash
Goyal v. Raghvender Vikram Singh and
another : 2012 (8) ADJ 534 as well as a
decision of the Supreme Court in Mohan
Soni v. Ram Avtar Tomar and others :
2012 (2) SCC 267.
6. In the light of the aforesaid facts,
we allow the appeal, set aside the award
and remit the matter back to the Tribunal
concerned, who will reconsider the
disability certificate as well as the loss of
earning capacity of the appellant, if any.
The Tribunal will decide the matter afresh
3 All]. Jalil Ahmad Ansari Vs. State Bank of India & Ors.
1461
within three months from the date of
production of a certified copy of this
order in the light of the observation made
aforesaid.
7. The Registry is directed to remit
the record to the lower court within two
weeks from today.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VINEET SARAN, J.
THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
Special Appeal No. 1061 of 2014
Jalil Ahmad Ansari
 ...Appellant
Versus
State Bank of India & Ors. .Respondents
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Vivek Kumar Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Satish Chaturvedi
High Court Rules, 1952-Chapter 8 Rule
5-Special appeal recovery proceedingliability of principal debtor as well as
guarantor
are
co-extensive-even
on
compromise between parties no full
payment made-debt Tribunal already
fixed liability in the year 2001-appeal
dismissed.
Held: Para-7
The liability of the guarantor is coextensive with that of the principal debtor
as has been clearly held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Industrial Investment
Bank of India Limited (supra). In the
present case either on the ground of
entering into a compromise or on the
ground that the recovery should first be
made from the principal debtor and not
from
the
guarantor,
the
recovery
proceedings
have
been
delayed
and
postponed for over a decade. The law on
this point is absolutely clear that the
liability of the guarantor is co-extensive.
As such in equity also if the principal
debtor as well as the guarantor have been
postponing the recovery for the last more
than a decade firstly by offering to enter
into a compromise and thereafter resiling
and then challenging the recovery on
technical grounds, we are of the firm view
that by doing so, the very purpose of The
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and
Financial Institutions Acts, 1993 is being
defeated. As such, on merits as well as on
equity, we do not find any good ground to
interfere with the order passed by the writ
court.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1998 SC 157; (2010) 7 SCC 678; (2004) 6
SCC 758; (2009) 9 SCC 478; AIR 1969 SC 297
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vineet Saran, J.)
1. Respondents no. 2,3,4,5 and 6 had
taken loan from the respondent-State
Bank of India for which the appellant was
the
guarantor.
The
Debt
Recovery
Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the
Tribunal) passed an order in the year 2001
for recovery of the defaulted amount from
the principal debtors as well as the
appellant
(as
guarantor).
Execution
proceedings were initiated before the
Recovery Officer of the Tribunal in the
year 2002. The matter has been pending
since then. In the year 2009, on the basis
of a compromise made by the principal
debtors and the appellant as the guarantor,
the auction scheduled to be held was
postponed on the ground that the
appellant as well as the principal debtors
would deposit a sum of Rs. 4.5 lacs with
the bank. In response thereto, the
appellant is said to have deposited Rs. 2
lacs with the bank but the full amount was
not deposited by the principal debtors or
the
appellant.
Recovery
proceedings