# Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd., Jaipur (Rajasthan) v. Asif & Ors

- **Citation:** FAFO No. 2434 of 2018
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-02-18
- **Case number:** FAFO No. 2434 of 2018
- **Bench:** Vivek Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shriram-general-insurance-co-ltd-jaipur-rajasthan-v-asif-ors-46347
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A.Civil Law- Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 -
Section
163-A
-
Future
Prospects
-
Compensation in terms of a claim under Section
163-A will not include future prospects - For the
purpose of computation of the total amount of
compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor
Vehicles Act, the future prospects may not be of
much relevance - Compensation is to be
awarded on structured formula basis. (Para 23)
Appeal disposed off (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

1490 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
memorandum before competent authority
as per section 8 (i)(a) of Act, 2006. Thus,
Section 8 of Act, 2006 has wrongly been
relied upon in case of Claimant-Opposite
Party. It was next submitted that Section 8
of Act, 2006 grants freedom to Small Scale
Industries to present or not to present their
memorandum. Therefore, Section 2(n) of
Act, 2006 is not to be read alongwith
Section 8 of Act, 2006 but independent of
the same. Apart from above, Government
of India has issued notification bearing No.
2/311123007-MSNE POL (PL), whereby
filing
of
Industrial
Entrepreneur's
Memorandum has been made discretionary.
Therefore, in veiw of above, it cannot be
said that claimant-opposite party was not
under a legal obligation to file Industrial
Enterpreneur's Memorandum before the
Competent Authority as per mandate of
Section 8 of Act, 2006. Consequently,
claimant-opposite party is a supplier within
the meaning of section 2 (n) of Act, 2006.

83. We have carefully analyzed the
submissions urged by learned counsel for
parties. It is an undisputed fact that Court
below has relied upon the notification
bearing No. 2/311123007-MSNE POL (PL)
to arrive at conclusion that it is not
mandatory for an Industrial undertaking to
file
its
Industrial
Entrepreneur's
Memorandum. Since this was the only
ground relied upon by Uttar Pradesh State
Micro and Small Industrial Facilitation
Council, Kanpur, the finding so recorded
by Council was rightly set aside by Court
below. In the absence of any such materials
to establish that filing of Industrial
Entrepreneur's Memorandum is mandatory,
we uphold the finding recorded by the
Court below.

84. For all the reasons given herein
above, we do not find any good ground to
interfere with the judgement and order
impugned in present First Appeal from
Order. Court below by means of impugned
judgement and award has set aside award
and remitted the matter before Arbitral
Tribunal for adjudication afresh, which is
perfectly in accordance with law. Court
while deciding objections under section 34
of Act, 1996, cannot substitute the award
by its own judgement. Since the matter has
been remanded to Micro and Small
Industrial
Facilitation
Council,
Uttar
Pradesh for decision afresh, we have it
open to appellant to raise all objections
regarding merits of claim raised by
claimant-opposite party, except the plea of
limitation that the claim as a whole is
barred by limitation and secondly, that
claimant-opposite party is not covered
within the meaning of term 'Supplier' as
defined under section 2 (n) of Act, 2006.

85. In view of above, present appeal
fails and is liable to be dismissed . It is,
accordingly, dismissed with cost which we
quantify at Rs. 50,000/- payable by
appellant to claimant-opposite party within
a period of one month from today.
----------
(2020)03-05ILR A1490
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK AGARWAL, J.

FAFO No. 2434 of 2018

Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd., Jaipur
(Rajasthan) ...Appellant
Versus
Asif & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri
Pawan
Kumar
Singh
3-5 All. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd., Jaipur (Rajasthan) Vs. Asif & Ors.
1491
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Ram Singh

A.Civil Law- Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 -
Section
163-A
-
Future
Prospects
-
Compensation in terms of a claim under Section
163-A will not include future prospects - For the
purpose of computation of the total amount of
compensation under Section 163-A of the Motor
Vehicles Act, the future prospects may not be of
much relevance - Compensation is to be
awarded on structured formula basis. (Para 23)
Appeal disposed off (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Deepal Girishbhai Soni & ors. Vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroada; AIR
2004 SC 2107
2. M.A.C. Appeal No. 898 of 2006; United
India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Kaushalya Devi
& ors. decided by High Court of Delhi on
14.03.2007;
3. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs.
Sunil Kumar & ors. 2018 (1) TAC 3 (SC);
4. Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs.
Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram & ors. as
reported in 2019 (132) ALR 745 (SC);
5. National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Smt. Gayatri Devi & ors. 2015 (1) AICC 580;
6. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
Sadhna & ors. 2015 (2) AICC 1089;
7. R.K. Malik and another Vs. Kiran Pal &
ors. 2009 TAC (3) 1 (SC);
8. Ramkhiladi & ors. Vs. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & ors. AIR 2020 SC 527;
9. M.A. No. 476 of 2012; United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajkumari & ors. s
decided by Madhya Pradesh High Court on
25.02.2019

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri Pawan Kumar Singh,
learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Ram
Singh, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. This appeal has been filed by the
insurance company being aggrieved by award
dated 21.08.2014 passed by learned Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District
Judge, Court No. 1, Aligarh on the following
grounds namely:-

(i) That claim petition was filed
under the provisions of Section 163-A of the
Motor Vehicles Act and therefore, tribunal
was bound to follow the provisions contained
in schedule 2 of the Act.

(ii) That learned claims tribunal
arbitrarily made a deduction of 1/5th from the
income of the deceased whereas as per the
second schedule only 1/3rd deduction is
permissible.

(iii) That learned claims tribunal has
added 50% towards future prospects whereas
no future prospect could have been awarded in
a case filed under Section 163-A.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant-
insurance company has place reliance on
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case ofDeepal Girishbhai Soni and
others vs. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd., Baroadaas reported inAIR 2004 SC
2107wherein it has been held that by reason
of Section 163-A, compensation is required
to be determined on the basis of a
structured formula whereas in terms of
Section 140, only a fixed amount is to be
given.It has been further held that a
provision
of
law
providing
for
compensation is presumed to be final in
nature unless a contra is indicated, in the
statutes either expressly or by necessary
implication. Similarly, reliance has been
placed on the judgment ofUnited India
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kaushalya Devi
and othersdecided by High Court of Delhi
in M.A.C. Appeal No. 898 of 2006 decided
on 14.03.2007 and as reproduced from
MANU/DE/7345/2007 wherein it has been
1492 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
held that the tribunal cannot assess
compensation in excess of annual income
of Rs. 40,000/- as stipulated in the second
schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Reliance is also placed on the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case ofUnited
Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sunil
Kumar and othersas reported in2018 (1)
TAC 3 (SC)wherein it has been held that
grant of compensation under Section 163-A
on the basis of structured formula is in
nature of final award and adjudication
thereunder is required to be made without
any requirement of any proof of negligence
of driver/owner of vehicle involved.

4. Sri Ram Singh, learned counsel for
the respondent-claimants, on the other
hand, submits that he is not pressing para-1
of his cross-objection, but in the light of the
law laid down in case ofMagma General
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Nanu Ram @
Chuhru Ram and othersasreported in2019
(132) ALR 745 (SC), each of the claimants
is entitled to loss of consortium and learned
claims tribunal has erred in not awarding
consortium to each of the claimants. It is
also submitted that claims tribunal erred in
reducing the income from Rs. 3,500/- per
month to Rs. 3,000/- per month and in fact,
it should have restricted the income to Rs.
40,000/- because even if minimum wages
are taken into consideration on the date of
the accident i.e., 28.01.2012, then for a
truck driver, minimum wages were to the
tune of more than Rs. 4,000/- per month.
He supports remaining award and submits
that no further indulgence is required. He
further submits that even in a claim petition
under Section 163-A, future prospects can
be awarded and in support of his
contention, he places reliance on Division
Bench's judgment of this Hon'ble Court in
case ofNational Insurance Company Ltd.
vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi and othersas
reported in2015 (1) AICC 580, wherein
Insurance Company had challenged the
award, wherein Division bench of this
Court held that even in a claim under
Section 163-A, future prospects can be
awarded in as much as it is open to the
tribunal to consider granting compensation
under other heads as specified under Rule
220-A of the U.P. Rules, 1998.

5. Similarly, reliance has been placed
on another Division Bench judgment of this
Court in case of the Oriental Insurance
Company Ltd. vs. Sadhna and others as
reported in 2015 (2) AICC 1089 where
Hon'ble Division Bench of this High Court
held that schedule was amended more than
two
decades
ago
and
tribunal
has
determined monthly income to be Rs.
4,000/- which is justified in holding that
there is no scope for interference and
dismissed the appeal. Referring to the
judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case
of R.K. Malik and another vs. Kiran Pal
and others as reported in 2009 TAC (3) 1
(SC) which is a case of 29 school children
dying in an accident. It is held that it is
appropriate to grant Rs. 75,000/- to each of
the claimants as compensation for future
prospect of the children over and above
awarded by the High Court.

6. A perusal of judgment in case of
R.K. Malik (supra) noted that compensation
has been awarded by the tribunal as well as
the High Court on the basis of second
schedule and relevant multiplier under the
Act. Thereafter, Supreme Court noted that
as far as non-pecuniary damages are
concerned, the tribunal had not awarded
any compensation under the head of nonpecuniary damages, however, in appeal,
High Court elaborately discussed this
aspect of the matter and awarded nonpecuniary
damages
of
Rs.
75,000/-.
3-5 All. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd., Jaipur (Rajasthan) Vs. Asif & Ors.
1493
However, in para 16, it is observed as
under:-

"...........16. Then, how does one
calculate pecuniary compensation for loss
of future earnings and loss of dependency
of the parents, grand parents etc. in the
case of non-working student? Under the
Second Schedule of the Act in case of a non
earning person, his income is notionally
estimated at Rs. 15,000/- per annum. The
Second Schedule is applicable to claim
petitions filed under Section 163 A of the
Act. The Second Schedule provides for the
multiplier to be applied in cases where the
age of the victim was less than 15 years
and between 15 years but not exceeding 20
years. Even when compensation is payable
under Section 166 read with 168 of the Act,
deviation from the structured formula as
provided in the Second Schedule is not
ordinarily
permissible,
except
in
exceptional cases. [see Abati Bezbaruah v.
Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of
India, (2003) 3 SCC 148); 2003 (2) T.A.C.
18; United India Insurance Company Ltd.
vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6 SCC
281: 2002 (2) T.A.C. 335 and U.P. State
Road Transport Corp. v. Trilok Chandra,
(1996) 4 SCC 362 : 1996 (2) T.A.C. 286.

7. In First Appeal From Order No.
199 of 2017, National Insurance Co. Ltd.,
Lucknow vs. Luvkush and others, the
Division Bench of this Hon'ble High Court
has visited the aspect of rule making
wherein Rule 220-A of U.P. Rules, 1998
too has been discussed.

8. Relying on different sections of the
Motor Vehicles Act, it has been pointed out that
each of the section of the Motor Vehicles Act
confers power of making rules upon State
Government for the purpose of carrying into
effect provisions of particular chapter/ chapters.
In this regard, Section 28 confers power of
making rules upon State Government for the
purpose of carrying into effect provisions of
Chapter II other than the matters specified in
Section 27. Chapter II, contemplates provisions
of licensing of drivers of motor vehicles. In subsection (2) of Section 28 certain specific
subjects are mentioned but the same are also in
the context of licensing of connected matters
therewith.

9. Similarly, Section 38 confers power
upon State Government to make rules for the
purpose of carrying into effect provisions of
Chapter III. Sub-section (2) specifies certain
subjects which also relates to matters concerned
with Chapter III which deals with provisions of
licensing of conductors of stage carriages.

10. Then comes Section 65 which confers
similar power upon State Government for
framing rules for carrying into effect the
provisions of Chapter IV relating to registration
of motor vehicles.

11. Next is Section 95 which confers
power upon State Government to frame rules as
to Stage Carriages and Contract Carriages and
conduct of passengers in such vehicles. This
Section 95 is part of Chapter V which contains
provisions relating to control of transport
vehicles.

12. Section 96 confers power upon State
Government to frame rules for the purpose of
carrying into effect, provisions of Chapter V.

13. Section 107 confers power to
frame rule for carrying into effect the
provisions of Chapter VI which deals with
special provisions relating to State transport
undertakings.

14. Section 111 confers power upon
State Government to frame rules regulating
1494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
construction, equipment and maintenance
of motor vehicles and Trailers, with respect
to all matters other than the matters
specified in sub-section (1) of Section 110.
This Section 111 is part of Chapter VII
which contains provisions of construction,
equipment and maintenance of motor
vehicles.

15. Section 138 confers power to
frame rules upon State Government for the
purpose
of
carrying
into
effect
the
provisions of Chapter VIII which contains
provisions relating to control of traffic.

16. Section 176 is the only relevant
provision which takes into its ambit
Sections 165 to 174 which are part of
Chapter XII relating to Claims Tribunal.
Section 176 reads as under:

"176. Power of State Government
to make rules.--A State Government may
make rules for the purpose of carrying into
effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174,
and in particular, such rules may provide
for all or any of the following matters,
namely:-

(a) the form of application for
claims
for
compensation
and
the
particulars it may contain, and the fees, if
any, to be paid in respect of such
applications;

(b) the procedure to be followed
by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry
under this Chapter;

(c) the powers vested in a Civil
Court which may be exercised by a Claims
Tribunal;

(d) the form and the manner in
which and the fees (if any) on payment of
which an appeal may by preferred against
an award of a Claims Tribunal; and

(e) any other matter which is to
be, or may be, prescribed."

17. Lastly, it is Section 213 which is
part of Chapter XIV, i.e., "Miscellaneous".
Section 213 confers power upon State
Government to establish a Motor Vehicles
Department and appoint officers therefor as
it thinks fit.

18. Thereafter, Para 82, 83 and 84
reads as under:-

"................82.
A
delegated/
subordinate legislation neither can create
substantive rights and obligations nor can
enhance
efficacy
or
reduce
normal
functional ambit of principal legislation. A
Full Bench of this Court in Chandra Kumar
Sah and another Vs. The District Judge and
others, AIR 1976 All 328 held that when a
rule framing power is conferred upon State
Government to make rules to carry out the
purposes of this Act, it does not give carte
blanche to enact independent legislation.
The expression "to carry out the purposes
of the Act" means to enable its provisions
to
be
effectively
administered.
They
connote that rules are to be confined to the
same field of operation as that marked out
by Act itself. Court further observed in
para 11 as under:

"11. .... This power will authorise
the provision of subsidiary means of
carrying into effect what is incidental to the
execution of its specific provisions. But
such a power will not support attempts to
widen the purposes of the Act, to add new
and different means of carrying them out or
to depart from or vary the plan which the
legislature has adopted to attain its ends
Shanahan v. Scott (96 Com WLR 245). In
other words a subordinate law cannot
substantially modify the scheme or policy
of the Act."
(emphasis added)

83. In Global Energy Limited and
another Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory
3-5 All. Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd., Jaipur (Rajasthan) Vs. Asif & Ors.
1495
Commission, 2009(15) SCC 570, Court in
para 25 of judgment, with regard to power
of delegated legislation, said as under:

"25. It is now a well settled
principle of law that the rule making power
"for carrying out the purpose of the Act" is
a general delegation. Such a general
delegation may not be held to be laying
down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of
such a provision alone, the regulation
making power cannot be exercised so as to
bring into existence substantive rights or
obligations or disabilities which are not
contemplated in terms of the provisions of
the said Act." (emphasis added)

84. In Kunj Behari Lal Butail vs.
State of H.P., 2000(3) SCC 40, a three
Judge Bench of Court, said:

"14. We are also of the opinion
that a delegated power to legislate by
making rules "for carrying out the purposes
of the Act" is a general delegation without
laying down any guidelines; it cannot be so
exercised as to bring into existence
substantive
rights
or
obligations
or
disabilities
not
contemplated
by
the
provisions of the Act itself."

19. Therefore, it is apparent that Rule
220-A of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1998 has been framed under Section 176 of
the Motor Vehicles Act.

20. Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles
Act deals with the Power of State
Government to make rules for the purpose
of carrying into effect the provisions of
Sections 165 to 174. Thus, Section 163(A),
which is part of Chapter 11 has not been
included in the ambit of rule making under
Section 176 and therefore, Rule 220-A will
not be applicable to the statutory provisions
contained in Section 163-A of the Motor
Vehicles Act which specifically provides
for special provisions as to payment of
compensation on structured formula basis.
It clearly provides that compensation as
indicated in the second schedule is to be
paid.

21. Recently, vide Ministry of Road
and Transport notification dated May 22nd,
2018, Second Schedule under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has
been amended and it has held as under:-

"1. (a) Fatal Accidents:

Compensation payable in case of
Death shall be five lakh rupees.

(b)
Accidents
resulting
in
permanent disability:

Compensation payable shall be =
[Rs. 5,00,000/- × percentage disability as
per
Schedule
I
of
the
Employee's
Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923)] :

Provided
that
the
minimum
compensation
in
case
of
permanent
disability of any kind shall not be less than
fifty thousand rupees.

(c) Accidents resulting in minor
injury:

A fixed compensation of twenty
five thousand rupees shall be payable:

2. On and from the date of 1st
day of January, 2019 the amount of
compensation specified in the clauses (a) to
(c) of paragraph (1) shall stand increased
by 5 per cent annually".

3. This notification shall come
into form on the date of its publication in
the Official Gazette."

22. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of Civil Appeal No. 9393 of 2019,
Ramkhiladi and others vs. United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. and others decided on
07.01.2020 (AIR 2020 SC 527) wherein it
has been held that this amendment in
second schedule is prospective and not
retrospective.
1496 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

23. In view of such facts, it is
apparent that compensation in terms of a
claim under Section 163-A will not include
future prospects and this aspect of the
matter as to the applicability of Rule 220-A
has not been considered in case of National
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Gayatri Devi and
others as well as in case of Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sadhna and others.
As far as judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court is concerned, R.K. Mailik is not a
case decided in reference to Section 163-A.
In fact, Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of
Raj
Rani
and
others
vs.
Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. and others as reported
in MACD 2009 SC 345 in para-12 has
observed that the counsel may be correct to
some extent that for the purpose of
computation of the total amount of
compensation under Section 163-A of the
Motor Vehicles Act, the future prospects
may not be of much relevance. Same is the
ratio of the law laid down by Madhya
Pradesh High Court in case of United India
Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Rajkumari and
others as decided in M.A. No. 476 of 2012
on 25.02.2019. This when read in terms of
para 16 of the judgment of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in case of R.K. Malik vs.
Kiran Pal, then it is crystal clear that
Supreme Court has also observed that in a
claim under Section 163(A) of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988, compensation is to be
awarded on structured formula basis.

24. In view of such facts, this Court is of
the opinion that arguments put-forth by the
learned counsel for the respondent in support of
their entitlement to payment of compensation in
deviation of the provisions contained in second
schedule is not sustainable, it deserves to be
rejected and is rejected.

25. As far as the contention of the counsel
for the claimants that each of the claimant is
entitled to loss of consortium in the light of the
law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in
case ofMagma General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs.
Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram and others(supra)is
concerned, ratio of that judgment will not be
applicable to the facts of the present case
inasmuch as that was a case under the
provisions of Sections 166, 168 and 173 of the
Motor Vehicles Act and not under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act.

26.

In
view
of
such
legal
pronouncements, I have no hesitation to
hold that tribunal erred in passing the
impugned award by adopting incorrect and
faulty methodology of making 1/5th
deduction and adding 50% towards future
prospects. Similarly, it erred in arbitrarily
treating the income of the deceased at Rs.
3,000/-per month against the submission of
the appellant that the income of the
deceased was to the tune of Rs. 3,5004,000/- per month. Therefore, as per the
provisions contained in schedule 2 of the
Motor Vehicles Act, compensation will be
recomputed as under; annual income Rs.
40,000/-, 1/3rd to be deducted towards
personal expenses, therefore, dependency
will come out to Rs.26,667/- on which a
multiplier of 16 will be applicable as the
victim was between the age of 35-40 years,
taking total compensation to Rs. 4,26,672/-.
Over and above, other claimants are
entitled to a sum of Rs. 2,000/- under the
head of funeral expenses, a sum of Rs.
5,000/- under the head of loss of
consortiumas one of the beneficiary is wife
of the deceased and Rs. 2,500/- towards the
loss of estate. Besides this, claimants are
entitled to a sum of Rs. 10,556/- towards
the amount spent by them on treatment of
the deceased as has been awarded by
learned
claims
tribunal.
Thus,
total
compensation will come out to Rs.
4,46,728/- in place of Rs. 7,21,756/- (seven
3-5 All. Poonam Agarwal & Anr. Vs. The Union India Insurance Company Limited & Anr.
1497
lakhs twenty one thousand seven hundred
and fifty six rupees) awarded by learned
claims tribunal.

27. This amount will be appropriated
in the same ratio as has been directedby
learned claims tribunal. The claim amount
will carry interest @ 7% from the date of
filing of the claim petition till the date of
actual payment.

28. In above terms appeal is disposed
off.
----------
(2020)03-05ILR A1497
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

FAFO No. 4430 of 2012

Poonam Agarwal & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
The United India Insurance Company
Limited & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Abhijit Banerjee, Sri Sudeep Agarwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Vibhuti Narain, Sri Vishesh Kumar
Gupta, Sri Hemant Kumar

A. Civil Law- Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 -
Norms
to
determine
Compensation
-
Consideration of only Basic pay and D.A. not
Medical Allowance and others, while computing
the income of salaried person - Legality - Held,
Computation of income of the deceased for the
purposes of determination of compensation shall
include the basic pay, dearness allowance,
medical allowance, transport allowance and
annual bonus and the deduction could be only
of professional tax as well as the income tax -
However, it is to be borne in mind that there
may be several allowances awarded in a salary
of a particular month which might have been
awarded due but all such allowances may not
constitute monthly salary otherwise. (Para 10)
Appeal allowed (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Sunil Sharma vs. Bachinder Pal, 2011 LAWS
SC 2 73
2. National Insurance Company ltd. vs. Indira
Srivastava 2007 LAWS SC 12
3. Laxmi Devi & ors. v. Mohammad Tabbar &
anr., (2008)
12 SCC 165
4. Sarla Verma & ors. v. Delhi Tranpsort
Corporation & anr. (2009) 6 SCC 121
5. National Insurance Company Ltd.. vs. Pranay
Sethi & ors. (2017) 16 SCC 680

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.
 Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sudeep Agarwal, learned
counsel for the appellants, Sri Vibhuti
Narain, learned counsel for respondent no.
1, Sri Hemant Kumar, Advocate holding
brief of Sri V.K. Gupta, learned counsel for
respondent no. 2 and perused the record.

2. This first appeal from order is
directed against the award dated 29th
September, 2012 passed by the Claim
Tribunal/District
Judge,
Azamgarh
allowing the claim petition of the claimants
bearing no. 840 of 2009 for a compensation
of Rs. 6,89,336/- @ 7% simple interest per
annum, for the purposes of enhancement.

3. Assailing the award on the issue of
computation of compensation, it has been
argued that while making the assessment of
income of the deceased son of the