# Shyam Deo Yadav & Ors. (In Jail) v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2019) 4 ILRA 406
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-11-21
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 450 of 1998
- **Bench:** Chandra Dhari Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shyam-deo-yadav-ors-in-jail-v-state-of-u-p-44997
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - The Schedule Castes And
The
Schedule
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities )Act , 1989 - Section 3(1) (X) -
offences
are
punishable
but
noncompoundable
in
nature-parties
compromised the matter amicably - Held -
if the said compromise is allowed , the
parties can lead a cordial life hereinafter -
The
said
alleged
offences
are
not
punishable with death or imprisonment for
life and both the complainants and the
accused are intending to join their hands
and compound the offence and no injuries
have also been caused to the body of the
complainant - more than 25 years have
lapsed after the incident took place - the
sentenced awarded by the trial court
under Section 3(1)(X) of the SC & ST Act is
quashed. (Para 13)

In the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab
and another , wherein it has been observed
that the Court can exercise the power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and
compound
the
offence
-
The
criminal
proceedings in a non- compoundable case be
quashed when there is a settlement between
the parties.(Para 10,11 & 12)

Criminal appeal allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

406 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ahmad Kazmi and Others Vs. State of
U.P. and Others (supra) and Supreme
Court upheld such re-entry. We have
already discussed above judgment in
detail above, and it is not necessary to
repeat the same. Therefore question (x) is
also answered against petitioners.

173. It is admitted case of petitioners
that land in question has already been
taken in possession by respondents. Since,
we have not found resumption, contrary
to law, hence nothing further is required
to be done.

174. In view of above discussion,
writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. No
costs.

175. Let a copy of this judgment be
forwarded to Chief Secretary, U.P.
Lucknow and Principal Secretary, Urban
Development,
U.P.
Lucknow,
for
reconsidering policy of freehold in the
light of observations made in paras 160 to
161 of judgment and take appropriate
decision.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A406

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 450 of 1998

Shyam Deo Yadav & Ors.
 Appellants(In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri A.K. Awasthi, Sri Manish Tiwari, Sri
V.C. Tiwary
Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - The Schedule Castes And
The
Schedule
Tribes
(Prevention
of
Atrocities )Act , 1989 - Section 3(1) (X) -
offences
are
punishable
but
noncompoundable
in
nature-parties
compromised the matter amicably - Held -
if the said compromise is allowed , the
parties can lead a cordial life hereinafter -
The
said
alleged
offences
are
not
punishable with death or imprisonment for
life and both the complainants and the
accused are intending to join their hands
and compound the offence and no injuries
have also been caused to the body of the
complainant - more than 25 years have
lapsed after the incident took place - the
sentenced awarded by the trial court
under Section 3(1)(X) of the SC & ST Act is
quashed. (Para 13)

In the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab
and another , wherein it has been observed
that the Court can exercise the power under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. depending upon the
facts and circumstances of each case and
compound
the
offence
-
The
criminal
proceedings in a non- compoundable case be
quashed when there is a settlement between
the parties.(Para 10,11 & 12)

Criminal appeal allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1. J.Ramesh Kamath and Others Vs. Mohana
Kurupt and Others, (2016) 12 SCC 179

2.Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another,
(2012) 10 SCC 303

3.Narinder Singh and others Vs. State of
Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Dhari
Singh, J.)

1. Present Criminal Appeal is
directed against the judgment and order
4 All. Shyam Deo Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
407
dated 04.03.1998 passed by IInd Additional
Sessions Judge, Ghazipur in S.T. No.150 of
1996, by which the appellants-accused were
convicted for offence punishable under
Section 3(1) (X) of S.C. & S.T. Act. He was
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for four
years' R.I. and pay fine of Rs.2000/-, in
default of payment of fine, the appellants
have to undergo additional imprisonment
for three months.

2. Brief facts of the case are that on
22.07.1995 at about 9:30 A.M., accused
persons Dashrath, Shyamdev, Channer
and Mukkhu were grazing their buffaloes
in the filed of sugarcane of Vikram,
informant. When mother of the informant
saw, she opposed them for grazing their
buffaloes. On her objection, all the
accused persons started quarrelling with
the mother of the informant and they
started beating her with their respective
weapons like lathi and danda. After
hearing hue and cry of his mother, he and
his brother Vishwanath came at the place
of incident and tried to save their mother
then all the accused persons had also
beaten them. Thereafter after hearing hue
and cry many people of their village
came. All the accused persons had gone
giving threat. The informant belongs to
Scheduled
Caste
community.
The
informant lodged a first information
report about the incident on the same day
at 11:10 P.M. at police station. The
informant
Vikram,
his
brother
Vishwanath and his mother Barti Devi
were medically examined by Doctor on
22.07.1995 at 1:00 P.M. After completing
investigation a chargesheet was filed
against all the accused persons before
court concerned.

3. The Second Additional Sessions
Judge, Ghazipur framed charges for
commission of offence under Sections
323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)
(X) of S.C.& S.T. Act. All the accused
persons denied charges levelled against
them and pleaded for trial.

4. For proving the charges against
the appellants the prosecution examined
Vikram, the informant, P.W.1, Barti Devi
P.W.2, Vishwanath P.W.3, Sofi P.W.4,
Mohit P.W.5 as witnesses of facts.

5. The trial court has examined
prosecution
witnesses,
statements
of
accused persons under Section 313
Cr.P.C. and evidences.

6. After examining the prosecution
witnesses, statements of accused persons
and perusing the evidences on record, the
trial court has given finding that offences
under Section 323 and 504 I.P.C. and
Section 3(1) (X) S.C. & S.T. Act are
proved but on the compromise as the
offences punishable under Sections 323
and
504
I.P.C.
are
compoundable,
therefore, all the appellants-accused were
acquitted from the charges under Sections
323 and 504 I.P.C. The trial court has also
given finding that since offence under
Section 3(1) (X) S.C. & S.T. Act is not
compoundable,
therefore,
all
the
appellants-accused
persons
were
convicted under Section 3(1) (10) S.C.&
S.T. Act and they were sentenced for four
years R.I. with fine of Rs.2000/- from
each appellants. In default of payment of
fine of Rs.2000/- to undergo additional
imprisonment for three months to each
appellants. The trial court had given
compensation of Rs.1000/- to all the
injured persons.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants
has submitted that the court below has not
408 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
considered the facts that main offence has
been compromised and all the appellants
were acquitted from the charges charges
under Sections 323 and 504 I.P.C. on the
ground that the parties entered into
compromise then offence Section 3(1) (X)
S.C. & S.T. Act ought to have been
compromised.
Therefore,
conviction
under Section 3(1) (X) S.C. & S.T. Act is
bad in law.

8. Admittedly and undisputedly,
appellants
were
charge-sheeted
and
charges were framed against them for
offences punishable under Section 323,
504 IPC read with Section 3(1)(X)of SC
& ST Act. An application under Section
320(2) was filed by the complainant for
compounding the offence punishable
under Section 323, 504 IPC read with
Section 3(1)(X) of SC & ST Act on the
basis of a compromise entered into
between the complainant and the accused
appellants.
The
Additional
Sessions
Judge, Ghazipur after considering the
application and the compromise entered
into betwen the parties allowed the said
application vide order dated 04.03.1998
after
satisfying
himself
that
the
application for compounding the offence
has been made voluntarily and bona fidely
and, therefore, it deserves to be granted
but the court concerned refused to
compound the sentence punishable under
Section 3(1)(X) of SC & ST Act
considering the provisions of Section 320
(8) of Cr.P.C., which provides that the
composition of an offence shall have the
effect of an acquittal of the accused with
whom the offence has been compounded.
The
effect
is
automatic.
Wherever
composition of an offence takes place it
has instantaneous effect of statutory
acquittal of the accused. Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Rajinder Singh Vs.
State; 1980 SC 1200 held that once
permission is granted to compound the
offence, effect would be acquittal of
accused
in
respect
of
offence
compounded, by virtue of Section 320(8)
of Cr.P.C.

9. In the instant case, the trial court
has refused to compound the offence
punishable under Section 3(1)(X) of SC &
ST Act on the ground that the said offence
is not compoundable. At this juncture, it
is worth to mention here itself a decision
of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
J.Ramesh Kamath and Others Vs.
Mohana Kurupt and Others, reported in
(2016) 12 SCC 179, wherein the Hon'ble
Apex Court has laid down certain
principles as to under what circumstances
the Court can quash the proceedings or
compound the offences even in respect of
a non-compoundable offences, wherein it
has been held as under:

"Held, power vested in High
Court under S.482 is not limited to
quashing proceedings within ambit and
scope of S.320 of Cr.P.C., - In Gian
Singh, (2012) 10 SCC 303, it was clearly
expounded that quashing of criminal
proceedings under S.482 of Cr.P.C.,
could also be based on settlements
between private parties, and could also be
on a compromise between the offender
and victim - Only that, the above power
did not extend to crimes against the
society - Further, jurisdiction vested in
High Court under S.482 Cr.P.C., for
quashing criminal proceedings was held
to be exercisable in criminal cases having
an overwhelming and predominatingly
civil flavour, particular offences arising
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
civil,
partnership,
or
such
like
transactions, or even offences arising out
4 All. Shyam Deo Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
409
of matrimony relating to dowry, etc., or
family disputes where wrong is basically
private or personal. In all such cases,
parties should have resolved their entire
dispute by themselves, mutually."

10. The Hon'ble Apex Court has
reiterated the principles of law laid down
in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and another reported in (2012)
10 SCC 303, wherein it has been observed
that the Court can exercise the power
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. depending
upon the facts and circumstances of each
case and compound the offence. In the
case of Narinder Singh and others Vs.
State of Punjab and another reported in
(2014) 6 SCC 466, it has been observed
as under:

"8. We find that there are cases
where the power of the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the
proceedings in those offences which are
uncompoundable has been recognized.
The only difference is that under Section
320(1) of the Code, no permission is
required from the Court in those cases
which are compoundable though the
Court has discretionary power to refuse
to compound the offence. However,
compounding under Section 320(1) of the
Code is permissible only in minor
offences or in non-serious offences.
Likewise,
when
the
parties
reach
settlement
in
respect
of
offences
enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code,
compounding
is
permissible
but
it
requires the approval of the Court.
Insofar as serious offences are concerned,
quashing of criminal proceedings upon
compromise is within the discretionary
powers of the High Court. In such cases,
the power is exercised under Section 482
of the Code and proceedings are quashed.
Contours of these powers were described
by this Court in B.S. Joshi Vs. State of
Haryana which has been followed and
further explained/elaborated in so many
cases thereafter, which are taken note of
in the discussion that follows hereinafter.

9. At the same time, one has to
keep in mind the subtle distinction
between the power of compounding of
offences given to the Court under Section
320 of the Code and quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court in exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction conferred upon
it under Section 482 of the Code. Once it
is found that compounding is permissible
only if a particular offence is covered by
the provisions of Section 320 of the Code
and the Court in such cases is guided
solitarily and squarely by the compromise
between the parties, insofar as power of
quashing under Section 482 of the Code is
concerned, it is guided by the material on
record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power,
although the ultimate consequence may
be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
Such a distinction is lucidly explained by
a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab. Lodha, J.
speaking for the Court, explained the
difference between the two provisions in
the following manner: (SCC pp.340-41,
paras 57 & 59).

"57. Quashing of offence or
criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim
is not the same thing as compounding of
offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given
to a court under Section 320 is materially
different from the quashing of criminal
proceedings by the High Court in exercise
of
its
inherent
jurisdiction.
In
compounding of offences, power of a
410 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
criminal court is circumscribed by the
provisions contained in Section 320 and
the court is guided solely and squarely
thereby while, on the other hand, the
formation of opinion by the High Court
for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal
proceeding
or
criminal
complaint is guided by the material on
record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power
although the ultimate consequence may
be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

59.
B.S.Joshi,
Nikhil
Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji do
illustrate the principle that the High Court
may quash criminal proceedings or FIR or
complaint in exercise of its inherent power
under Section 482 of the Code and Section
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the
High Court under Section 482. Can it be said
that by quashing criminal proceedings in
B.S.Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma
and Shiji this Court has compounded the
non-compoundable offences indirectly? We
do not think so. There does exist the
distinction between compounding of an
offence under Section 320 and quashing of a
criminal case by the High Court in exercise
of inherent power under Section 482. The
two powers are distinct and different
although the ultimate consequence may be
the same viz. acquittal of the accused or
dismissal of indictment."

11. As to under what circumstances
the criminal proceedings in a non-
compoundable case be quashed when
there is a settlement between the parties,
the
Court
provided
the
following
guidelines: (Gian Singh case, SCC
pp.340-41. para 58):

"58. Where the High Court
quashes a criminal proceeding having
regard to the facts that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has
been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion,
continuation
of
criminal
proceedings will be an exercise in futility
and justice in the case demands that the
dispute between the parties is put to an
end and peace is restored; securing the
ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which
have harmful effect on the public and
consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of
the society and it is not safe to leave the
crime-doer only because he and the victim
have settled the dispute amicably or that
the victim has been paid compensation,
yet certain crimes have been made
compoundable in law, with or without the
permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. or other offences of mental
depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the
Preventionof Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, the
settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However,
certain
offences
which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear
civil flavour having arisen out of civil,
mercantile,
commercial,
financial,
partnership or such like transactions or
the offences arising out of matrimony,
particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender
and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of
the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may
within the framework of its inherent
power, quash the criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied
4 All. Shyam Deo Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of U.P.
411
that on the face of such settlement, there
is hardly any likelihood of the offender
being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be
defeated. The above list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Each case will depend on
its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed."

12. Thereafter, the Court summed up
the legal position in the following words:
(Gian Singh case, SCC pp.342-43, para
61)

"61. The position that emerges
from the above discussion can be
summarized thus: the power of the High
Court in quashing a criminal proceeding
or FIR or a complaint in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the
offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plentitude with
no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guidelines
engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure
the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse
of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding
or complaint or FIR may be exercised
where the offender and the victim have
settled their dispute, would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and
no category can be prescribed. However,
before exercise of such power, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.
cannot be fittingly quashed even though
the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act, or the
offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, etc.,
cannot provide for any basis for quashing
criminal
proceedings involving
such
offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil
flavour stand on a different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the
offences
arising
from
commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where
the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of
cases, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the
offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of the criminal case would
put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the
criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court
must consider whether it would be unfair
or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding
or
continuation
of
the
criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the
wrongdoer and whether to secure the
ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the
answer to the above question(s) is in the
412 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
affirmative, the High Court shall be well
within its jurisdiction to quash the
criminal proceeding."
The Court in
Gian Singh case was categorical that in
respect of serious offences or other
offences of mental depravity or offence of
merely dacoity under special statute, like
the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by Public Servant
while working in that capacity. The mere
settlement between the parties would not
be a ground to quash the proceedings by
the High Court and inasmuch as
settlement of such heinous crime cannot
have imprimatur of the Court."

13. Bearing in mind the above facts
and circumstances and on perusal of the
charge sheet material, though the offences
are punishable under Section 3(1)(X) of
SC & ST Act, the said offences are noncompoundable in nature. But as could be
seen from the records, the parties have
compromised
the
matter
amicably.
Therefore, in my opinion, if the said
compromise is allowed by keeping in
view the above said decision endorsed,
the parties can lead a cordial life
hereinafter. The said alleged offences are
not
punishable
with
death
or
imprisonment for life and both the
complainants
and
the
accused
are
intending
to
join
their
hands
and
compound the offence and no injuries
have also been caused to the body of the
complainant.

14. Therefore, keeping in view the
above said facts and circumstances, I am
of the opinion that the instant criminal
appeal is allowed.

15. For the reasons stated above and
the fact that the incident took place on
12.07.1995 and more than 25 years have
lapsed, the sentenced awarded by the trial
court under Section 3(1)(X) of the SC &
ST Act is quashed.

16. Appellants are on bail. They
need not surrender, in case they are not
wanted in any other case. Their bail bonds
are
hereby
cancelled.
Sureties
are
discharged from their liability.

17. Record of the lower court, if
summoned, shall be remitted back to the
court concerned forthwith along with the
copy of this order.
----------
(2019)12 ILR A412

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH-I, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 792 of 1982

Kallectariya & Anr. ...Appellants (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Keshav Sahai, Sri Brijesh Sahai, Ms. Rashmi
Srivastava (A.C.), Sri Sunil Kumar Yadav.

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Conviction - Under Sections 363
I.P.C. (Punishment for kidnapping) &
366 I.P.C. (Kidnapping, abducting or
inducing woman to compel her marriage,
etc.) - prosecution has been able to
prove its case to the extent that the
accused appellant along with co-accused
had
taken
the
victim
out
of
the
guardianship of her father - she being
less than 18 years was not competent to
give consent to leave her father's house