# Shyam Lal Dhadhaniya v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 12 ILRA 13
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-12-11
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 10823 of 2024
- **Bench:** Manish Kumar Nigam
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shyam-lal-dhadhaniya-v-state-of-u-p-anr-51162
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

14 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Criminal
Law-
Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973 - Section 482 -Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420, 467, 468,
471, 323, 504 & 506 - Quashing of
criminal
proceedings
-
Compromise
between parties - Offences under IPC -
Some offences compoundable, others not
-
Dispute
private
in
nature
-
Continuance of trial found to be futile in
view of verified compromise - Entire
proceedings
quashed-Application
allowed. (Paras 14 to 17)

HELD:
While considering the question with regard to
the inherent powers of the High Court in
quashing the criminal proceedings against an
offender who has settled his dispute with the
victim of the crime but the crime in which, he is
allegedly involved, is not compoundable under
Section 320 of the Code, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Para 57 of the judgment in case of Gian
Singh (supra) has held that quashing of offence
or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is
not the same thing as compounding of offence,
they are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a Court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise
of
its
inherent
jurisdiction.
In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal
court
is
circumscribed
by
the
provisions
contained in Section 320 and the Court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the
High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether
the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power although the ultimate consequences may
be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. (Para 14)

From the perusal of record, it appears that the
real dispute between the parties is relating to
property dispute, which is private in nature. The
present criminal proceedings arose between the
parties is not a formal consequence of the real
occurrence. The present criminal prosecution
arose incidentally between the parties and is not
a natural consequence of the real occurrence. It
is apparent that the parties have entered into a
compromise and they further appear to have
settled their dispute amicably. The opposite
party no.2 who would be a key prosecution
witness, if the trial were to proceed, has
declared his unequivocal intent to turn hostile at
the trial. In these circumstances, it is apparent
that the merits and truth apart, the proceedings
in trial, if allowed to continue, may largely be a
waste of precious time by the learned court
below. (Para 15)

The court cannot remain oblivious to the hard
reality that the facts of the present case and
other similar cases present where, though the
allegations made in the FIR do appear to
contain the ingredients of a criminal offence,
however, in view of settlement having been
reached, the chances of conviction are not only
bleak but, if such trials are allowed to continue
along with all other trials which are piled up,
practically in all criminal courts in the St., the
continuance of trials in cases such as the instant
case may only work to the huge disadvantage of
other cases where litigants are crying for justice.
(Para 16)

Thus, looking at the prevalent tendencies in the
society, a more pragmatic, and less technical
approach commends to the court to let some
criminal prosecutions such as the present case
be dropped, for the sake of more effective,
efficient and proper trial in other cases where
the litigants appear to be serious about their
rights and more consistent in their approach.
(Para 17)

Application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

12 All. Shyam Lal Dhadhaniya Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
13
firm has no individual identity. It is
always associated with its proprietor and
in
case
of
proprietorship
concern,
question of vicarious liability does not
arise
and
only
proprietor
of
the
proprietorship concern will be liable,
whether
proprietorship
concern
is
arrayed as accused through it proprietor
or proprietor himself is arrayed as a
party. In both the cases there will be
individual liability of the proprietor and
proprietorship concern has no different
identity. It is used only for the business
purposes;
the
real
identity
is
its
proprietor.

18. In view of the reason mentioned in
the forgoing paragraph, it is not necessary
to implead the applicant separately as
accused.
He
can
be
prosecuted
by
impleading his firm on whose behalf the
cheque in question was issued. Therefore,
the first submission of the applicant that the
impugned proceeding is bad in the eyes of
law as he was not impleaded as party is
misconceived, hence, rejected.

19. So far as the second issue raised
by counsel for the applicant that on
bouncing of the cheque of part of liability
of Rs.4 Lakh, the applicant has filed the
complaint No. 4501 of 2021 and for
entire amount of Rs.29,50,000/-, the
impugned proceeding has been initiated
is concerned, the applicant appears to be
correct, but this ground can be raised by
the applicant before the trial court and
on that ground the present proceeding
cannot be quashed.

20. So far as the third issue raised by
the
counsel
for
the
applicant
that
admittedly the demand notice was served
upon the applicant on 9.3.2021, but the
complaint was filed on 22.3.2021 is
concerned, that appears to be correct
because for taking cognizance the
complaint should have been filed after
expiry of 15 days from the service of
demand notice. In the present case
admittedly the demand notice was
served upon the applicant on 9.3.2021.
Therefore, the complaint could have
been filed after 24.3.2021 but the
complaint was filed on 22.3.2021.
Therefore,
the
complaint
is
premature.

21. In view of the above, the present
application is partly allowed only on the
ground that the complaint is premature,
therefore, the proceeding of Complaint
Case No. 4501 of 2021 is hereby
quashed.

22. However, opposite party No.2 is
at liberty to file fresh complaint in
accordance with law.

23. With the aforesaid observation,
the application is disposed of.
---------
(2024) 12 ILRA 13
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.12.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH KUMAR NIGAM, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 10823 of 2024

Shyam Lal Dhadhaniya ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Abhishek Tripathi

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.
14 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Criminal
Law-
Criminal
Procedure
Code,1973 - Section 482 -Indian Penal
Code, 1860 - Sections 409, 420, 467, 468,
471, 323, 504 & 506 - Quashing of
criminal
proceedings
-
Compromise
between parties - Offences under IPC -
Some offences compoundable, others not
-
Dispute
private
in
nature
-
Continuance of trial found to be futile in
view of verified compromise - Entire
proceedings
quashed-Application
allowed. (Paras 14 to 17)

HELD:
While considering the question with regard to
the inherent powers of the High Court in
quashing the criminal proceedings against an
offender who has settled his dispute with the
victim of the crime but the crime in which, he is
allegedly involved, is not compoundable under
Section 320 of the Code, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Para 57 of the judgment in case of Gian
Singh (supra) has held that quashing of offence
or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is
not the same thing as compounding of offence,
they are different and not interchangeable.
Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of
offences given to a Court under Section 320 is
materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise
of
its
inherent
jurisdiction.
In
compounding of offences, power of a criminal
court
is
circumscribed
by
the
provisions
contained in Section 320 and the Court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the
High Court for quashing a criminal offence or
criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is
guided by the material on record as to whether
the ends of justice would justify such exercise of
power although the ultimate consequences may
be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. (Para 14)

From the perusal of record, it appears that the
real dispute between the parties is relating to
property dispute, which is private in nature. The
present criminal proceedings arose between the
parties is not a formal consequence of the real
occurrence. The present criminal prosecution
arose incidentally between the parties and is not
a natural consequence of the real occurrence. It
is apparent that the parties have entered into a
compromise and they further appear to have
settled their dispute amicably. The opposite
party no.2 who would be a key prosecution
witness, if the trial were to proceed, has
declared his unequivocal intent to turn hostile at
the trial. In these circumstances, it is apparent
that the merits and truth apart, the proceedings
in trial, if allowed to continue, may largely be a
waste of precious time by the learned court
below. (Para 15)

The court cannot remain oblivious to the hard
reality that the facts of the present case and
other similar cases present where, though the
allegations made in the FIR do appear to
contain the ingredients of a criminal offence,
however, in view of settlement having been
reached, the chances of conviction are not only
bleak but, if such trials are allowed to continue
along with all other trials which are piled up,
practically in all criminal courts in the St., the
continuance of trials in cases such as the instant
case may only work to the huge disadvantage of
other cases where litigants are crying for justice.
(Para 16)

Thus, looking at the prevalent tendencies in the
society, a more pragmatic, and less technical
approach commends to the court to let some
criminal prosecutions such as the present case
be dropped, for the sake of more effective,
efficient and proper trial in other cases where
the litigants appear to be serious about their
rights and more consistent in their approach.
(Para 17)

Application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Narindra Singh & anr. Vs St. of Pun. & anr.
reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466

2. Parbatbhai Aahir Vs St. of Guj. reported in
(2017) 9 SCC 641

3. St. of M.P. Vs Laxmi Narayan & ors. reported
in (2019) 5 SCC 688

4. Sanesh Thakur & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & anr.
passed in Application u/s 482 No. 20982 of 2017
decided on 17.03.2023.
12 All. Shyam Lal Dhadhaniya Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
15
5. Gian Singh Vs St. of Punj. & anr. reported in
(2012) 10 SCC 303

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Kumar
Nigam, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicant, learned A.G.A. for the Staterespondents and perused the record.

2. This application under Section 482
has
been
filed
challenging
further
proceedings of Case No. 1888 of 2015
(State of U.P. v. Ram Kishan Dhahaniya
and others) arising out of Case Crime No.
255 of 2014, under Section 409, 420, 467,
468, 471, 323, 504 & 506 of I.P.C., Police
Station Fazalganj, District Kanpur Nagar,
pending before Metropolitan Magistrate,
Court No. II, Kanpur Nagar including the
charge sheet No. 47 of 2015 submitted on
20.05.2015 as well as cognizance and order
issuing bailable warrant dated 01.06.2015
passed by Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Court No. VIII, Kanpur Nagar.

3. Brief facts of the case are that on
05.12.2014, opposite party no. 2 lodged
First
Information
Report
against
the
applicant and six others for offenses
punishable under Section 409, 420, 467,
468, 471, 323, 504 & 506 I.P.C. at Police
Station Fazalganj, District Kanpur Nagar in
Case Crime No. 255 of 2014.

4.
After
investigation,
police
submitted the charge sheet No. 47 of 2015
under Section 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 323,
504 & 506 I.P.C. against Ram Krishna
Dhadhaniya, Gopi Kishan, Shyamlal, Amit
& Vinit. Thereafter, cognizance was taken
by the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate,
Kanpur Nagar and the accused persons
were summoned including the applicant.

5. On 04.08.2023, a compromise has
been taken place between the applicant and
opposite party no. 2. The compromise was
filed before the court below at Kanpur
Nagar
where
the
case
is
pending.
Thereafter, the present application under
Section 482 has been filed to quash the
proceedings against the applicant on the
basis of compromise taken between the
parties.

6. This Court by order dated
12.04.2024, has directed for verification of
the compromise and for submission of
report on the aforesaid compromise by the
court below.8. In compliance of the
aforesaid order passed by this Court, Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate, Court No. 2,
Kanpur Nagar has submitted its report
dated 05.07.2024 wherein compromise
between the parties has been verified.

7. It is pertinent to mention here that
father of the present applicant i.e. Ram
Kishna Dhadhaniya, one of the co-accused
filed application under Section 482 No.
30532 of 2015 (Ram Kishan Dhadhaniya v.
State of U.P. and another) wherein this
Court by order dated 09.10.2015 stayed
further proceedings of the case against the
father
applicant
i.e.
Ram
Kishna
Dhadhaniya and later on Ram Kishan
Dhadhaniya
died
consequently,
the
Application U/s 482 No. 30532 of 2015 has
been abated. The other co-accused namely
Amit, Gopi Kishan and Vinit filed another
Application under Section 482 No. 31704
of 2015 (Amit and two others v. State of
U.P. and another). In the aforesaid
application, further proceedings of Case
No. 1888 of 2015 was directed to be stayed
by order dated 27.10.2015 and by order
dated 02.11.2023 the application has been
allowed and the proceedings have been
quashed.
16 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

8. Since the two other applications
under Section 482 regarding the same case
and F.I.R. qua the co-accused persons, have
already been decided, no purpose would be
served in keeping this petition pending
after verification of compromise.

9. Learned counsel for the applicants
submitted that as the dispute has been
settled amicably and compromise entered
into the parties has been verified before the
court below, the present application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. be allowed and the
proceedings of Case No. 1888 of 2015
(State of U.P. v. Ram Kishan Dhahaniya
and others) arising out of Case Crime No.
255 of 2014, under Section 409, 420, 467,
468, 471, 323, 504 & 506 of I.P.C., Police
Station Fazalganj, District Kanpur Nagar,
be quashed.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant
had relied upon the judgment of Supreme
Court in case of Narindra Singh and
another Vs. State of Punjab and another
reported
in
(2014)
6
SCC
466,
Parbatbhai Aahir Vs. State of Gujarat
reported in (2017) 9 SCC 641, State of
Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan
and others reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688
and the judgment of this Court in case of
Sanesh Thakur and 3 others Vs. State of
U.P. and another passed in Application
u/s 482 No. 20982 of 2017 decided on
17.03.2023.

11. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the
prayer made in the application but could
not deny the fact that the offence under
Sections 323, 504 & 506 of I.P.C. are
compoundable and Section 420 I.P.C. is
compoundable with the permission of the
court in view of the table appended to
Section 320 (2) of Cr.P.C. It is further
submitted by learned A.G.A. that Sections
409, 467, 468 & 471 I.P.C. are not
compoundable,
and
therefore,
present
application cannot be decided on the basis
of compromise between the parties.

12. In reply, it has been contended by
learned Counsel for the applicant that there
is no impediment in exercise of powers of
the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
in quashing criminal proceedings where the
parties have settled their dispute amicably.

13. It is correct that Sections 409, 467,
468 & 471 I.P.C. are not compoundable
offences mentioned in either of the tables
referred in Section 320 Cr.P.C. In case of
Gian Singh Vs. State of Panjab and
another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
Section 320 of the Code articulates the
public policy with regard to compounding
of offences. It catalogues the offences
punishable under IPC which may be
compounded
by
the
parties
without
permission of the Court and certain
offences can be compounded only with the
permission
of
Court.
The
offences
punishable under the special statutes are
not covered by Section 320.

14. While considering the question
with regard to the inherent powers of the
High Court in quashing the criminal
proceedings against an offender who has
settled his dispute with the victim of the
crime but the crime in which, he is
allegedly involved, is not compoundable
under Section 320 of the Code, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Para 57 of the judgment
in case of Gian Singh (supra) has held that
quashing
of
offence
or
criminal
proceedings on the ground of settlement
between an offender and victim is not the
same thing as compounding of offence,
they are different and not interchangeable.
12 All. Shyam Lal Dhadhaniya Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
17
Strictly
speaking,
the
power
of
compounding of offences given to a Court
under Section 320 is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings
by the High Court in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of
offences, power of a criminal court is
circumscribed by the provisions contained
in Section 320 and the Court is guided
solely and squarely thereby while, on the
other hand, the formation of opinion by the
High Court for quashing a criminal offence
or
criminal
proceeding
or
criminal
complaint is guided by the material on
record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power
although the ultimate consequences may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

15. From the perusal of record, it
appears that the real dispute between the
parties is relating to property dispute,
which is private in nature. The present
criminal proceedings arose between the
parties is not a formal consequence of the
real occurrence. The present criminal
prosecution arose incidentally between the
parties and is not a natural consequence of
the real occurrence. It is apparent that the
parties have entered into a compromise and
they further appear to have settled their
dispute amicably. The opposite party no.2
who would be a key prosecution witness, if
the trial were to proceed, has declared his
unequivocal intent to turn hostile at the
trial. In these circumstances, it is apparent
that the merits and truth apart, the
proceedings in trial, if allowed to continue,
may largely be a waste of precious time by
the learned court below.

16. The court cannot remain oblivious
to the hard reality that the facts of the
present case and other similar cases present
where, though the allegations made in the
FIR do appear to contain the ingredients of
a criminal offence, however, in view of
settlement
having
been
reached,
the
chances of conviction are not only bleak
but, if such trials are allowed to continue
along with all other trials which are piled
up, practically in all criminal courts in the
state, the continuance of trials in cases such
as the instant case may only work to the
huge disadvantage of other cases where
litigants are crying for justice.

17. Thus, looking at the prevalent
tendencies in the society, a more pragmatic,
and less technical approach commends to
the court to let some criminal prosecutions
such as the present case be dropped, for the
sake of more effective, efficient and proper
trial in other cases where the litigants
appear to be serious about their rights and
more consistent in their approach.

18.
Considering
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case and submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the parties,
regarding the compromise entered into
between the parties and taking all these
factors into consideration cumulatively, the
compromise
between
the
parties
be
accepted and further taking into account the
legal position as laid down by the Apex
Court in case of Gian Singh Vs. State of
Punjab and another (supra), Narindra
Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab and
another (supra), Parbatbhai Ahir Vs.
State of Gujarat (supra), State of
Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan
and others (supra) and Sanesh Thakur
and 3 others Vs. State of U.P. and
another (supra), the entire proceedings of
the entire proceeding of Criminal Case No.
1888 of 2015 (State of U.P. v. Ram Kishan
Dhahaniya and others) arising out of Case
Crime No. 255 of 2014, under Section 409,
420, 467, 468, 471, 323, 504 & 506 of
18 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
I.P.C., Police Station Fazalganj, District
Kanpur Nagar, pending in the court of
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Court No. VIII, Kanpur Nagar, are hereby
quashed.

19. The present Application u/s 482
thus is allowed, subject to payment of cost
to be deposited by the parties before the
High Court Legal Services Committee,
Allahabad. Such cost has to be imposed to
let the parties (in this case) in particular and
the society in general know that the courts
cannot
remain
a
mute
spectator
to
unscrupulous and errant behaviour of
certain persons. A society that will allow its
members to misuse
its
courts, will
ultimately suffer and pay a huge cost.
Litigants, both genuine and bogus, will
always continue to stand in a common
queue. The courts have no mechanism to
pre-identify and distinguish between the
genuine and the bogus litigants. That
differentiation emerges only after the
hearing is concluded in any case and
hearing requires time. In fact, even if the
courts were to take punitive action against a
bogus litigant, then, being bound by rules
of procedure and fairness, such cases are
likely to take more time than a case of two
genuine litigants. Cost in the present case is
quantified to Rs. 5,000/- (2,500 on each
party) to be deposited before the High
Court
Legal
Services
Committee,
Allahabad, within a period of three weeks
from today.
---------
(2024) 12 ILRA 18
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.12.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR SINGH
DESHWAL, J.
Application U/S 482 No. 23721 of 2024
With
Application U/S 482 No. 28869 of 2024

Jitendra Kumar Mangla ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Bhuvnesh Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

A.
Criminal
Law
-Criminal
Procedure
Code.1973-Section
482-Negotiable
Instrument
Act,
1881-
Section
138quashing of proceeding s related to
complaints filed u/s 138 of N.I.Act for
cheque
dishonor-Held,
the
power
of
attorney holder cannot file a complaint
u/s 138 of NI Act in their own name but
can
represent
the
payee-adequate
averments in the complaint established
that the power of attorney holder had
sufficient knowledge of the transaction,
making the proceedings valid-Hence, the
complaint filed by the power of attorney
holder in their own name is legally
untenable-Proceedings
quashed,
with
liberty to file a fresh complaint in
compliance with legal requirements.(Para
1 to 25)

B. Complaint u/s 138 N.I. Act can be filed
by the power of attorney holder of payee
or holder in due course. However, the
Power of Attorney holder cannot depose
or verify on oath as complainant unless
from the averments, including verification
of the affidavit filed in support of the
complaint as well as from the supporting
document, it must be clear that power of
attorney holder has knowledge about the
fact mentioned in the complaint regarding
the transaction. if the accused disputes
the knowledge of the fact of the power of
attorney holder or his authority, the same
can be considered during the trial but the
proceeding cannot be quashed on this
ground. The transaction should be within
the knowledge of the Power of attorney