# Shyam Narayan & Ors v. The Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1454
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-11-27
- **Case number:** Special Appeal Defective No. 995 of 2014
- **Bench:** Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J. Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shyam-narayan-ors-v-the-union-of-india-ors-43038
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.-226-Service
law-termination
of
contractual
employee-appointment
for
specific
purpose-in
particular
project-claiming
engagement as per previous terms-heldno right to continue-so for appraisal of
work or stigmatic concern-not availablelearned Single Judge rightly declined to
interfere.
Held: Para-5
In this view of the matter, the appellants
being
purely
temporary
employees
appointed
under
a
contract
of
engagement, the learned Single Judge
could
not
have
ordered
specific
performance which is essentially what the
writ
petition
sought.
The
second
submission is that the termination is
stigmatic because the letter of termination
dated 7 August
2014 states that the
performance of the appellants was not
found to be satisfactory in the trade test
and similarly the appraisal was also
unsatisfactory. This appraisal for the
purpose
of
determining
whether
a
contractual employee should be continued
any further, cannot result in an order being
regarded as a punishment or of a stigmatic
nature. Where an employee is engaged for
a specified period or for a specified project,
the employer is under the terms of the
contract entitled to consider whether the
continued engagement of the employee is
in
the
interests
of
the
satisfactory
completion of the project mode. Such a
power is implicit in the very nature of the
engagement itself. Consequently, where
the employer proceeds to terminate such a
contract
on
the
ground
that
the
performance is not satisfactory, the order
cannot be regarded as being stigmatic so
as to require the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings. There is no termination for
misconduct in the present case.

## Text

1454
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and order. Hence, we clarify that the
correctness of the judgment is left open to
be considered by the Learned Single
Judge. However, in terms of the earlier
order dated 22 April 2014 of the Division
Bench, we continue the operation of the
stay of the judgment dated 8 November
2013 till the matter is finally disposed of
on merits by the learned Single judge.
12. The special appeal is allowed in
the aforesaid terms. There shall be no
order as to costs.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. DHANANJAYA YESHWANT
CHANDRACHUD, C.J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH
BAGHEL, J.
Special Appeal Defective No. 995 of 2014
Shyam Narayan & Ors.
 Appellants
Versus
The Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Rajeev Misra, Sri Prashant Kumar
Tripathi
Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Vaibhav Kaushik, Sri Shesh
Mani Misra
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Service
law-termination
of
contractual
employee-appointment
for
specific
purpose-in
particular
project-claiming
engagement as per previous terms-heldno right to continue-so for appraisal of
work or stigmatic concern-not availablelearned Single Judge rightly declined to
interfere.
Held: Para-5
In this view of the matter, the appellants
being
purely
temporary
employees
appointed
under
a
contract
of
engagement, the learned Single Judge
could
not
have
ordered
specific
performance which is essentially what the
writ
petition
sought.
The
second
submission is that the termination is
stigmatic because the letter of termination
dated 7 August
2014 states that the
performance of the appellants was not
found to be satisfactory in the trade test
and similarly the appraisal was also
unsatisfactory. This appraisal for the
purpose
of
determining
whether
a
contractual employee should be continued
any further, cannot result in an order being
regarded as a punishment or of a stigmatic
nature. Where an employee is engaged for
a specified period or for a specified project,
the employer is under the terms of the
contract entitled to consider whether the
continued engagement of the employee is
in
the
interests
of
the
satisfactory
completion of the project mode. Such a
power is implicit in the very nature of the
engagement itself. Consequently, where
the employer proceeds to terminate such a
contract
on
the
ground
that
the
performance is not satisfactory, the order
cannot be regarded as being stigmatic so
as to require the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings. There is no termination for
misconduct in the present case.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya
Yeshwant Chandrachud, C.J.)
1. The appellants had moved a writ
petition seeking three reliefs (i) the setting
aside of an order dated 7 August 2014 by
which
their
services
as
contractual
employees were terminated on 7 August
2014 by the Director of the Indian
Institute of Information Technology, the
fourth respondent; (ii) the payment of
salary for the months of July 2014 and for
the period of 1 August to 7 August 2014;
(iii) a direction that the appellants be
permitted to perform their duties as before
3 All].
 Shyam Narayan & Ors. Vs. The Union of India & Ors.
1455
in a project of digitization of the IIIT,
Allahabad at the High Court of Judicature
at Allahabad.
2. The learned Single Judge by the
impugned
judgment
recorded
the
statement of the respondents that the
petitioners-appellants had produced a no
objection certificate and consequently
directed that the balance of their salary for
the previous month together with one
month's salary be released to them within
24 hours. The petition was disposed of.
The original petitioners are in appeal.
3. The first grievance which has
been raised is that the learned Single
Judge has not dealt with the first and the
third prayers and has disposed of the
petition merely on the basis of the second
prayer. Now, the first and the third
prayers were interrelated. By the first
prayer, the appellants sought the setting
aside of an order of termination of their
contract, while by the third prayer, they
sought a direction to enable them to
continue to perform their duties.
4. The basic issue is as to whether the
appellants have a vested right to continue in
service.
Admittedly,
the
contract
of
appointment indicates that the appointment
was purely on a temporary basis and of a
project mode and could be terminated at any
time without assigning any reason. The IIIT
Allahabad is executing a project of
digitization at the High Court and the
appellants were all project employees who
were appointed purely on a temporary basis.
They have no vested right to continue and
the contract is terminable without assigning
any reason.
5. In this view of the matter, the
appellants
being
purely
temporary
employees appointed under a contract of
engagement, the learned Single Judge could
not have ordered specific performance
which is essentially what the writ petition
sought. The second submission is that the
termination is stigmatic because the letter of
termination dated 7 August 2014 states that
the performance of the appellants was not
found to be satisfactory in the trade test and
similarly
the
appraisal
was
also
unsatisfactory. This appraisal
for the
purpose
of
determining
whether
a
contractual employee should be continued
any further, cannot result in an order being
regarded as a punishment or of a stigmatic
nature. Where an employee is engaged for a
specified period or for a specified project,
the employer is under the terms of the
contract entitled to consider whether the
continued engagement of the employee is in
the interests of the satisfactory completion
of the project mode. Such a power is
implicit in the very nature of the
engagement itself. Consequently, where the
employer proceeds to terminate such a
contract on the ground that the performance
is not satisfactory, the order cannot be
regarded as being stigmatic so as to require
the initiation of disciplinary proceedings.
There is no termination for misconduct in
the present case.
6. The third submission is that the
learned Single Judge had in the cause list
three other petitions which had been
directed to be listed together with the writ
petition of the appellants which was
dismissed. Moreover, it has been pointed
out that on 14 October 2014, the learned
Single Judge had directed, in a companion
petition the petitioners thereto bring on
record no dues certificate.
7. We see no reason to entertain the
submission. The petition filed by the
1456
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioners-appellants was duly heard and
has been finally disposed of by the
impugned judgment and order. In any
event, for the sake of rendering a final and
complete adjudication of the issues raised,
we have considered all the submissions
which have been urged on behalf of the
appellants and find no substance in them.
The special appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed. There shall be no order as to
costs.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.
THE HON'BLE ARVIND KUMAR MISHRA-I, J.
Special Appeal No. 1037 of 2014
Dr. Ajay Chaturvedi
 Appellant
Versus
Smt. Shobhana
...Respondent
Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Suyash Pandey, Sri N.L. Pandey
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Rupak Chaubey
High Court Rules, 1952-Chapter VII-Rule
V-Special
Appeal-maintainability-when
order passed by learned Single Judge u/s
24 C.P.C.-appealable? held-'No'-power of
superintendence-exercised
by
Single
Judge-special appeal not maintainable.
Held: Para-11
In our opinion, the judgment/order
made on the petition under Section 24 of
the CPC only a judgment/order of the
learned Single Judge in exercise of
power of superintendence and nothing
beyond it. In view of the interpretation
of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules as
above no special appeal against the
judgment/order made in exercise of
power of superintendence would be
maintainable. We hold that the present
special appeal as filed by the appellant is
not maintainable.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 2001 SC page 883; 1963 SCC ONLINE
Mad. 260 (1965) 78 LW 133 (Mad.).
(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Tandon, J.)
1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.
2. This special appeal under Chapter
VIII Rule 5 of the High Court Rules, 1952
(hereinafter referred to "as the Rules") is
directed against the order of the learned
Single Judge, dated 28.10.2014 wherein
learned Single Judge in exercise of
powers under Section 24 of the Code of
Civil
Procedure,
1908
(hereinafter
referred to "as the CPC") has been pleased
to direct transfer of Original Suit No.956
of 2010 filed by Dr. Ajay Chaturvedi, the
appellant before this Court, under Section
13 of the Hindu Marriage Act from the
Court of 1st Additional District Judge,
Bulandshahar to the competent Court at
Moradabad.
3. A preliminary objection has been
raised with regard to the maintainability
of the present special appeal. The issue so
raised revolves around the interpretation
of the provisions of Chapter VIII Rule 5
of the Rules. It would be appropriate to
reproduce the Rules which read as
follows:
5. Special Appeal.- An appeal shall
lie to the Court from a judgment (not
being a judgment passed in the exercise of
Appellate Jurisdiction in respect of a
decree or order made by a Court subject
to the Superintendence of the Court and