# Shyam Verma v. State of U.P - **Citation:** (2006) 1 ILRA 471 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2006-01-18 - **Case number:** Special Appeal No.46 of 2006 - **Bench:** Ajoy Nath Ray, C.J. Ashok Bhushan - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/shyam-verma-v-state-of-u-p-40764 - **Pages:** 2 ## Headnote Sri S.R. Misra Sri H.R. Misra Sri P.K. Misra S.C. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act 1972Section 20 (4)-Arrear of rent-for more than 4 months-inspite of Notice demanding rent-instead of depositing the same-tenant started raising technical plea about validity of Notice itselfdeposit under Section 30-can not be held proper-unless denial by land lord established-held-benefit of Section 20 (4) can not be given-finding recorded by the Courts below neither controverted nor challenged-ejectment held proper. Held: Para 9 & 14 Since the suit filed in the present case was based exclusively and solely on question of arrears of rent under Section 20 (2)(a) of the Act, a notice to vacate where a tenant was in arrears of more than four months of rent and had failed to deposit within one month from the date of service of notice, would be sufficient. Relying upon the judgment of ## Text 1 All] Shyam Verma V. State of U.P. 471 APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.01.2006 BEFORE THE HON'BLE AJOY NATH RAY, C.J. THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. Special Appeal No.46 of 2006 Sripal Singh ...Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri B.N. Singh Sri G.P. Singh Counsel for the Respondents: Sri H.R. Mishra C.S.C. Constitution of India Art. 226-Service Law-Suspension-Order passed by member secretary-employee of centerlised services-without resolution of administrative committee-order of suspension-held-proper. Held: Para 7 The facts have to be very strong in favour of the writ petitioner under suspension, if he can allege and proof that even possibility of contemplation of an inquiry against him by the District Committee cannot be even thought or imagined to exist in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. If he can show that, then he can also successfully challenge an order of suspension passed by the MemberSecretary. The facts of this case are not so strong in favour of the writ petitionerappellant. As such the order of suspension was passed with jurisdiction. Case law discussed: 1997 (3) UPLBEC-1747 (FB) (Delivered by Hon'ble Ajoy Nath Ray, CJ.) 1. We are in respectful agreement with the order passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge on 30.11.2005 dismissing the writ petition of the appellant, although, with respect, we would like to add certain other reasons than those given by his Lordship. 2. The admitted fact by the appellant-writ petitioner is that he retained Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) of the respondents' money seeking to return it on monthly basis. This appears to have been done on his own unilateral decision. Not unexpectedly he was suspended and that order is dated 28.10.2005; the writ petition was directed against this order. The suspension order was communicated by the MemberSecretary. 3. In the Full Bench decision of Ram Chandra Pandey's case, reported at (1997) 3 UPLBEC 1747, the first answer to the decided questions in paragraph 16 clearly shows that the Member-Secretary can suspend a member of the centralised service even in the absence of a decision of suspension of the District Committee. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on this case and it was he who cited it. His submission was that the Full Bench has also decided that in the absence of the District Committee itself initiating a disciplinary inquiry, the power of suspension or the power of communication in favour of the MemberSecretary does not arise. The Full Bench stated its view both in paragraph 15 and in paragraph 16 (i): "...in the absence of a decision by the District Committee contemplating or initiating disciplinary 472 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2006 inquiry ..." the Member Secretary cannot pass an order of suspension. 5. With the greatest of respect, we have a little difficulty in understanding what can be meant by the phrase "decision by the District Committee contemplating....inquiry". A decision to initiate an inquiry is taken only after the contemplation is over. No Committee ever ''decides' merely to contemplate an inquiry, it simply contemplates it in appropriate circumstances. 6. The above statements are made with the greatest of respect to the Full Bench. In the manner we respectfully understand the decision of the Full Bench, it appears to us that if it can be shown by the writ petitioner that in no view of the facts could it be said that the inquiry or even contemplation of an inquiry was in the mind of the District Committee or could have been in the mind of the District Committee, then and in that event, a decision to suspend taken alone by the Member Secretary cannot stand by itself. 7. The facts have to be very strong in favour of the writ petitioner under suspension, if he can allege and proof that even possibility of contemplation of an inquiry against him by the District Committee cannot be even thought or imagined to exist in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. If he can show that, then he can also successfully challenge an order of suspension passed by the MemberSecretary. The facts of this case are not so strong in favour of the writ petitionerappellant. As such the order of suspension was passed with jurisdiction. The appeal is dismissed. --------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.08.2005 BEFORE THE HON'BLE VIKRAM NATH, J. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 17300 of 1984 Sushil Kumar Srivastava ...Petitioner Versus IVth Addl. District Judge, Gorakhpur, and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Arvind Srivastava Counsel for the Respondents: Sri S.R. Misra Sri H.R. Misra Sri P.K. Misra S.C. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent & Eviction) Act 1972Section 20 (4)-Arrear of rent-for more than 4 months-inspite of Notice demanding rent-instead of depositing the same-tenant started raising technical plea about validity of Notice itselfdeposit under Section 30-can not be held proper-unless denial by land lord established-held-benefit of Section 20 (4) can not be given-finding recorded by the Courts below neither controverted nor challenged-ejectment held proper. Held: Para 9 & 14 Since the suit filed in the present case was based exclusively and solely on question of arrears of rent under Section 20 (2)(a) of the Act, a notice to vacate where a tenant was in arrears of more than four months of rent and had failed to deposit within one month from the date of service of notice, would be sufficient. Relying upon the judgment of