# Singasan Sharma v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 177
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-17
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar, Swarupama Chaturvedi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/singasan-sharma-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52818
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

12 All. Singasan Sharma Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
177

10. Accordingly, the special appeal is
dismissed as not maintainable.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 177
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE SWARUPAMA CHATURVEDI, J.

Special Appeal No. 530 of 2025

Singasan Sharma ...Appellant
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
(1) Legality of IInd stage enquiry of re-opening
the
issue
regarding
validation
of
an
appointment, the validity of which was earlier
adjudicated by the High Court and affirmed upto
the Supreme Court.
(2) Entitlement of the employee or their legal
representative to get salary and consequential
retiral benefits, in case the IInd stage enquiry of
re-opening the issue of validity of appointment
was found impermissible.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Stoppage of salary -
Appellants were appointed as Assistant
Teachers
in
1970s
and
continuously
discharged duties and paid salary for
several
decades
-
Validity
of
their
appointments and entitlement to salary
was
conclusively
adjudicated
vide
judgment dated 26.11.1998, which was
affirmed in Special Appeal by Division
Bench
and
further
in Special
Leave
Petition by the Supreme Court - Issue of
validity of appointment attained finality -
However,
approval
letter
was
found
doubtful in later enquiry held in pursuance
of an order passed in Public Interest
Litigation - Legality of stoppage of salary
challenged in writ petition, which was
dismissed by writ court - Validity of writ
order
challenged
-
Entitlement
of
employee to get salary and consequential
retiral benefits felt into consideration. (E1)
Held : Subsequent administrative inquiries,
including those arising out of a Public Interest
Litigation, could not have the effect of
reopening issues already settled by binding
judicial pronouncements. Once judicial finality
had been reached, the Director of Education
lacked jurisdiction to negate the appointments
or to stop salary on the basis of a general
inquiry report - Any doubt on their appointment
letter, even if got raised in the report after
decades of their service, is not attributable to
the appellants but arose due to a dispute in the
management. In such circumstances, denial of
salary and retiral benefits to the appellants is
wholly unsustainable in law - Equity, good
conscience, and settled service jurisprudence
mandates that salary dues, pension and gratuity
benefits for services of Singasan, Girija and Ram
Kumar Ram is required to be considered as they
have completed more than 3 years continuous
service for gratuity and more than 25 years of
service for pension benefits as per Rule. [Paras
16, 19 and 28]

Case Law Cited
Radhey Shyam Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Others, (2024) 11 SCC 770; Kunhayammed
and others Vs State of Kerala and another,
(2000) 6 SCC 359; Usha Rani vs. State of U.P.
and
6
Others,
Neutral
Citation
No.-
2019:AHC:180910; Guru Charan vs. State of
U.P. and Others, 2022 SCC OnLine All 515 -
referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India - Article 136; U.P. Junior
High Schools (Payment of Salaries of Teachers
and Other Employees) Act, 1978; Rules for
Grant of Gratuity to the Teachers of Aided
Educational Institutions, 1960 - Rule 17; U.P.
School and College Teachers Gratuity Fund -
Rule 5 and 6; Uttar Pradesh State Aidededucational Institution Employee's Contributory
Provident Fund-Insurance-Pension Rules - Rule
17 and 19.

List of Keywords
Subsequent administrative enquiry; Stoppage of
salary; Grant of gratuity; Died in harness;
Termination;
Suspension;
Conclusive
adjudication; Procedural lapse; Rival Committee
178 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of Management; Equity, fairness and good
conscience; Consequential service and retiral
benefit; Ex gratia; Matter of charity; Long and
continuous service.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 28.04.2025 passed
by the Single Judge dismissing the writ petitions
arising out of stoppage of salary of the
petitioners.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant : Om Prakash Ojha,
Hritudhwaj Pratap Sahi, Prabhakar Awasthi, Sr.
Advs.

Advs. for the Respondents : Tej Bhan
Pandey, Prashant Shukla, Rahul Dubey.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Swarupama
Chaturvedi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Om Prakash Ojha,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Tej
Bhan
Pandey,
learned
Standing
Counsel for the State respondents.

2. All three appeals being Special
Appeal No. 530 of 2025, Special Appeal
No. 608 of 2025 and Special Appeal
(Defective) No. 656 of 2025, have been
preferred against the common judgment
and order dated 28.04.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge in Writ-A No. 49901
of 2016, Savitri Devi and 2 Others vs. State
of U.P. and 3 Others, and the connected
Writ-A No. 50483 of 2016, Girija Shankar
Pandey vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others,
whereby writ petitions filed by appellants
here got dismissed.

3. Since common questions of law and
fact arise in all appeals, all the appeals were
heard together and are being decided by
this common judgment. For the sake of
clarity, the factual matrix of all connected
matters has been considered conjointly, as
the dispute emanates from rival groups
within the management of the same
institution and the facts are inextricably
intertwined.
While
the
common
background has been narrated together, the
cases of the individual teachers have been
examined with reference to their respective
dates of appointment, approvals, and
service particulars. The present common
judgment shall, therefore, govern all the
connected matters, however, its application
to each case shall operate independently
and subject to the decision rendered on the
individual merits of each matter.

4. The Junior High School in question
was established in 1962-63 under the aegis
of Shiksha Pracharani Sabha, Srinagar,
Ballia, a society registered on 22.04.1963.
The institution initially had temporary
recognition up to 1976 and was granted
permanent recognition in 1977. Singasan
Sharma, Ram Kumar Ram and Girja
Shankar Pandey, all three were appointed
as Assistant Teachers in 1972, possessing
the
requisite
qualifications.
The
appointment of Singasan Sharma was
approved by the District Basic Education
Officer
on
20.12.1978,
while
the
appointments of Ram Kumar Ram and
Girja Shankar Pandey were approved on
18.04.1983. The institution was brought
under the U.P. Junior High Schools
(Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other
Employees) Act, 1978 in July 1984, and
thereafter salary was paid from the State
exchequer.

5. In the year 1982, disputes arose
between rival Committees of Management,
leading to various petitions being filed
regarding the validity of the management
and entitlement of teachers appointed by
rival
committees.
The
controversy
culminated in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
12 All. Singasan Sharma Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
179
Nos. 44607 of 1993, 15032 of 1995 and
25438 of 1996, which were decided by this
Court by a detailed judgment dated
26.11.1998,
holding
one
set
of
appointments to be valid and issuing
specific directions for payment of salary
from the State exchequer. The judgment
was affirmed by dismissal of Special
Appeal No. 1082 of 1998 on 21.05.2003,
and the Special Leave Petition (C) No. 902
of 2007 was also dismissed by the Hon?ble
Supreme Court on 05.02.2007. Despite this,
salary was again withheld, leading to
contempt
proceedings
and
further
administrative inquiries. Meanwhile, the
recognition
of
the
institution
was
withdrawn in March 2014, which got
challenged separately.

6. In the year 2014, Public Interest
Litigation No. 25033 of 2014 was filed.
This PIL was related to scholarship and
mid-day meal distribution. Pursuant to the
PIL, an inquiry was conducted by a sixmember committee. The committee also
examined appointment-related documents
and submitted its report dated 25.03.2015.
On the basis of the report, the Director,
Basic Education passed an order dated
27.03.2015, directing stoppage of salary.
Being
aggrieved
by
the
order,
the
appellants filed Writ-A No. 49901 of 2016
and Writ-A No. 50483 of 2016. Both the
writ petitions were dismissed by the
learned Single Judge by judgment dated
28.04.2025.

7. In the impugned order, the learned
Single Judge noted that the petitioners
relied upon Rule 17 of the Rules for Grant
of Gratuity to the Teachers of Aided
Educational Institutions, 1960, contending
that since the husband of original petitioner
no.1 died in harness and petitioner no.3
retired after rendering service, their salary
prior to withdrawal of recognition was
payable and they were also entitled to
family pension or pension. However, the
learned Single Judge, relying upon the
submissions of the State and the impleaded
respondent no.5 in writ petition, found that
the appointments of the petitioners and
other employees were doubtful, as no
appointment or approval documents were
produced
by
the
Committee
of
Management. It was observed that after
withdrawal of recognition, its consequences
would also fall upon the employees and the
State exchequer could not be burdened with
payment of pension or family pension to
employees of a non-existent institution.
The learned Single Judge further held that
the approval letters issued by the concerned
Basic Shiksha Adhikari in favour of the
husband
of
Savitri
Devi
and
other
employees were found to be doubtful in
later enquiry report, and therefore, learned
Single Judge concluded that the petitioners
were not entitled to any relief.

8. In Special Appeal No. 1082 of
1998, the fact was that Shri Lallan Tiwari,
was appointed on 01.07.1977, which was
approved
on
22.05.1980.
Since
the
institution was brought under the grant-inaid scheme in 1984, and the respondent
received salary from the State from
01.07.1984 to 21.01.1985. His services
were terminated on 22.01.1985, and the
termination was approved on 28th August
1985. Aggrieved, by this, he filed Writ
Petition No. 11013 of 1985, wherein
interim orders dated 10.09.1985 and
12.02.1988 directed payment of salary.
Thereafter, Writ Petition No. 36951 of
1994 was decided on 21.11.1994, directing
the District Basic Education Officer to
decide the dispute relating to termination.
Pursuant thereto, the DBEO passed an
order dated 19.07.1995 revoking the
180 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
respondent?s suspension. Meanwhile, the
dispute
regarding
the
Committee
of
Management was finally decided by this
Hon?ble Court by order dated 26.11.1998.
The Special Appeal No. 1082 of 1998 filed
against the said order was dismissed, and
the challenge thereto was also rejected on
21.05.2003. The respondent has now
sought
recall
of
the
orders
dated
26.11.1998 and 21.05.2003, alleging that
his termination was illegal.

9. In the background of aforesaid
facts,
learned
counsel
for
appellants
submits
that
once
the
validity
of
appointments and entitlement to salary had
been conclusively adjudicated by this Court
in its judgment dated 26.11.1998, affirmed
in Special Appeal and further upheld by
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition on
merits, the issue attained finality and could
not
be
reopened
by
administrative
authorities or by the learned Single Judge.

10. To further support his contention,
learned counsel for the appellants relies on
the decision of the Supreme Court in
Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others, (2024) 11 SCC 770,
wherein Supreme Court examined the
question
whether
a
teacher,
whose
appointment had been approved by the
competent
authority
and
who
had
discharged duties for a considerable length
of time, could be denied salary and service
benefits
on
the
ground
of
alleged
irregularities in appointment. In this case
the Supreme Court held that once an
appointment is approved and the teacher
has worked for years, salary cannot be
withheld merely on the basis of procedural
lapses or alleged irregularities attributable
to the management or the authorities. It was
further held that the State cannot be
permitted to take advantage of its own
lapse, or that of its officers, in granting
approval and thereafter deny salary and
service benefits. The Court emphasised that
a teacher who is not at fault cannot be
penalised for alleged mistakes of the
management,
especially
when
the
employee has in fact rendered service and
the employer has enjoyed the benefit
thereof.

11.
Learned
Standing
Counsel
appearing for the respondent State, on the
other
hand,
supports
the
impugned
judgment and submits that subsequent
inquiries and findings justified the action
taken by the authorities. He further submits
that the dismissal of Special leave petition
cannot be seen as finality of the issue to
opine that the High Court cannot review it.

12. Further, learned counsel for
respondents
placed
reliance
upon
judgement
of
the
Apex
Court
in
Kunhayammed and others Vs State of
Kerala and another, (2000) 6 SCC 359,
where Supreme Court has examined the
legal implications and the impact of an
order rejecting a petition seeking grant of
special leave to appeal under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India has arisen. It was
held by the Supreme Court that the
jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
Constitution is divisible into two stages.
First stage is upto the disposal of prayer for
special leave to file an appeal. The second
stage commences if and when the leave to
appeal is granted and special leave petition
is converted into an appeal.

13. After hearing parties, following
issues arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the issue of validity of
appointment and entitlement to salary
could be reopened after dismissal of
12 All. Singasan Sharma Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
181
special leave petition by the Supreme
Court? And

(ii) Whether the appellants or
their legal representatives are entitled to
salary and consequential retiral benefits
like gratuity and pension in the facts and
circumstances of the case?

14. After going through pleadings and
careful perusal of records, it appears that
the appellant in Special Appeal No. 530 of
2025, Singasan Sharma, was appointed as
Assistant Teacher on 10.07.1972 and joined
on 15.07.1972, and his appointment was
approved on 20.12.1978. Ram Kumar Ram
(who died on 11.02.2013), are represented
by his widow Savitri Devi, and one Girja
Shankar Pandey, represented by his son
Vineet Pandey, were both appointed on
11.08.1972, and their appointments were
approved
on
18.04.1983.
Upon
the
institution
being
brought
under
the
Payment of Salaries Act, all three were
paid salary from the State exchequer.
Salary was stopped intermittently between
September 1992 to August 2007, and again
after February 2009.

15. The disputes originated solely due to
rival Committees of Management formed in
1982, which led to competing claims and
multiple rounds of litigation. The controversy
was finally adjudicated by this Court by
judgment dated 26.11.1998, which upheld the
appointments of one set of teachers and
directed payment of salary. The said
judgment was affirmed in Special Appeal on
21.05.2003, and the Special Leave Petition
was dismissed on 05.02.2007. Thus, the issue
of validity of appointment and entitlement to
salary attained finality.

16.
Subsequent
administrative
inquiries, including those arising out of a
Public Interest Litigation, could not have
the effect of reopening issues already
settled by binding judicial pronouncements.
Once judicial finality had been reached, the
Director of Education lacked jurisdiction to
negate the appointments or to stop salary
on the basis of a general inquiry report
although High Court having jurisdiction
can examine all such actions which was
required to be seen for the adjudication.

17. We considered the judgement of
Supreme Court in Kunhayammed and
others (supra) where Supreme Court has
examined the effect of dismissal of the
special leave petition at different stages and
held that:

"A petition seeking grant of
special leave to appeal may be rejected for
several reasons. For example, it may be
rejected

(i) as barred by time, or (ii) being
a defective presentation,

(iii) the petitioner having no
locus standi to file the petition,

(iv) the conduct of the petitioner
disentitling him to any indulgence by the
Court, (iv) the question raised by the
petitioner for consideration by this Court
being not fit for consideration or deserving
being dealt with by the apex court of the
country and so on. The expression often
employed by this Court while disposing of
such petitions are - heard and dismissed,
dismissed, dismissed as barred by time and
so on.

May be that at the admission
stage itself the opposite party appears on
caveat or on notice and offers contest to the
maintainability of the petition. The Court
182 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
may apply its mind to the meritworthiness
of the petitioners prayer seeking leave to
file an appeal and having formed an
opinion may say dismissed on merits. Such
an order may be passed even ex-parte, that
is, in the absence of the opposite party. In
any case, the dismissal would remain a
dismissal by a non-speaking order where
no reasons have been assigned and no law
has been declared by the Supreme Court.
The dismissal is not of the appeal but of the
special leave petition. Even if the merits
have been gone into, they are the merits of
the special leave petition only. In our
opinion neither doctrine of merger nor
Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted
to such an order. Grounds entitling
exercise of review jurisdiction conferred by
Order 47 Rule 1 of the C.P.C. or any other
statutory provision or allowing review of
an order passed in exercise of writ or
supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court
(where also the principles underlying or
emerging from Order 47 Rule 1 of the
C.P.C.
act
as
guidelines)
are
not
necessarily the same on which this court
exercises discretion to grant or not to grant
special leave to appeal while disposing of a
petition for the purpose. Mere rejection of
special leave petition does not take away
the jurisdiction of the court, tribunal or
forum whose order forms the subject matter
of petition for special leave to review its
own order if grounds for exercise of review
jurisdiction are shown to exist."

18. In Kunhayammed and others
(supra) Supreme Court has thoroughly
examined all possible stages of hearing and
consequently passed orders in the special
leave petition and after detail deliberation,
it was held that:

"To merge means to sink or
disappear in something else; to become
absorbed or extinguished; to be combined
or be swallowed up. Merger in law is
defined as the absorption of a thing of
lesser importance by a greater, whereby
the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is
not increased; an absorption or swallowing
up so as to involve a loss of identity and
individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum,
Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-1068) We may look at
the issue from another angle. The Supreme
Court cannot and does not reverse or
modify the decree or order appealed
against while deciding a petition for
special leave to appeal. What is impugned
before the Supreme Court can be reversed
or modified only after granting leave to
appeal and then assuming appellate
jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned
before the Supeme Court cannot be
reversed or modified at the SLP stage
obviously that order cannot also be
affirmed at the SLP stage."

19. After perusal of the records, and
after hearing learned counsel representing
all parties, and upon giving anxious
consideration to the facts of the present
case, we are of the view that the
appointments of the appellants were
approved by the competent authority and
that they continued to discharge their duties
for decades, during which period their
salaries were paid from the State exchequer
after the institution was brought within the
purview of the Payment of Salaries Act.
The record further establishes that the
appellants actually worked and the State
derived the benefit of their services for a
substantial length of time. Any doubt on
their appointment letter, even if got raised
in the report after decades of their service,
is not attributable to the appellants but
arose due to a dispute in the management.
In such circumstances, denial of salary and
retiral benefits to the appellants is wholly
12 All. Singasan Sharma Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
183
unsustainable in law and runs contrary to
the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra).
The State, having accepted their services
and paid them for decades, cannot now be
permitted to deny retiral benefits by
reopening settled issues or by placing
reliance
on
subsequent
administrative
inquiries.
Equity,
fairness
and
good
conscience
clearly
demand
that
the
appellants are held entitled to their
consequential service and retiral benefits.

20. After going through Supreme
Court judgement in Radhey Shyam Yadav
(supra), and examining complete facts and
circumstances of the appeals, we find the
judgement is applicable of the facts of these
appeals. Following paragraph demonstrates
it clearer:

"19. In the inquiry, the appellants
were not given any opportunity. Even in the
inquiry held behind the back of the
appellants, there were no findings of
collusion or blameworthiness against them
for the alleged manipulation. Even as on
date,
the
appointment
order
dated
25.06.1999 and the approval order of
09.06.1999 have not been revoked. With no
finding of guilt against the appellants and
with no material against them, their
salaries had been stopped and they have
been prevented to sign on the regular
attendance
register,
admittedly
from
October, 2005. The contention of the
appellants is that they continued with their
teaching work up till 30.03.2016 entering
their names on a separate attendance
register."

21.
For
the
reasons
discussed
hereinabove, this Court is of the considered
view that the learned Single Judge was not
legally precluded from examining the
issues raised before him merely on the
ground that the Special Leave Petition
against
the
earlier
judgment
stood
dismissed. Dismissal of a Special Leave
Petition, particularly by a non-speaking
order, does not by itself operate as a
declaration of law, nor does it completely
denude the High Court of its jurisdiction to
examine subsequent actions, especially
where such actions arise from fresh causes,
administrative orders, or statutory inquiries.
To that extent, the learned Single Judge
was justified in examining the legality of
the subsequent administrative orders and
the material placed before him.

22. However, having regard to the
undisputed
factual
position
that
the
appellants were appointed in the early
1970s, their appointments were duly
approved by the competent authority, and
that they continuously discharged duties
and were paid salary from the State
exchequer for several decades, the denial of
retiral benefits cannot be sustained. The
long and uninterrupted service rendered by
the appellants, coupled with payment of
salary under the Payment of Salaries Act,
constitutes a substantial and settled service
record, which could not have been ignored
while adjudicating their salary dues and
entitlement to retiral benefits.

23. Even assuming that the authorities
were entitled to scrutinize the validity of
appointments at a certain stage, such
scrutiny could not have the effect of
effacing
decades
of
service
already
rendered and accepted by the State, nor
could
it
retrospectively
deprive
the
appellants or their legal representatives of
retiral benefits that flow from such service.
Following
table
demonstrate
service
duration of three appellants in these
appeals:
184 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Particulars
Singasan
Sharma
Ram
Kumar
Ram
(Pradeep
Kumar)
Girija
Shakar
Pandey
(Vineet
Pandey)
Date
of
Appointme
nt
10.07.197
2
11.08.197
2
11.08.197
2
Date
of
Approval
by DBEO
20.12.197
8
18.04.197
2
18.04.198
3
1st
Salary
Stop
Septembe
r, 1992 till
02.08.200
7
Septembe
r,
1992
till
02.08.200
7
Septembe
r 1992 till
02.08.200
7
2nd Salary
Stop
1st March
2009
1st March
2009
1st March
2009
End
of
service
21.03.201
4
(when
recognitio
n
was
withdraw
n)
11.02.201
3 (death)
21.03.201
4
(when
recognitio
n
was
withdraw
n)
Total time
for
which
service
recorded

(i)From
date
of
appointmen
t

(ii)
From
Grant
in
Aid

41 years;
8 months
and
11
days

30years
and
20
days.

40 years
and
6
months

28 years;
7 months
and
10days

41 years:
7 months
and
10
days

29 years;
8 months
and
20
days.

24. It is well settled principle in law
that pension and other retiral benefits are
neither ex gratia nor a matter of charity, but
constitute deferred compensation for long
and continuous service rendered by an
employee. Once the employee has served
till minimum years of eligibility for such
benefits, denial of retiral benefits would be
arbitrary and unjust. For the determination
of gratuity of appellants, Rule 5 and 6 of
the U.P. School and College Teachers
Gratuity Fund' is required to be examined.
For ready reference Rule 5 is reproduced
below:

"5. A gratuity equal to six times
of pay any last drawn by a teacher at the
time of his death while in service provided
he has put in not less than three years
continuous service before his death.

Notes (1) No gratuity will,
however, be admissible to the family of a
teacher whose death takes place after
retirement or of a re-employed pensioner.

(2) 'Continuous Service' means
all whole-time service whether temporary,
officiating or permanent, rendered either in
one or more of the State aided educational
institutions of any of the categories
mentioned in Rule 3 and includes all
periods spent on leave on average pay, or
on medical certificate, but it does not
include leave without pay."

25. Rule 6 of the U.P. School and
College Teachers Gratuity Fund, makes the
provision for the nomination for the
gratuity by employee who fulfils the
criteria for the same. Rule 6 provides as
follows:

"6. A teacher covered by these
rules, shall on completion of three years'
continuous service make a nomination
conferring on one or more members of his
family, the right to receive any gratuity that
may be admissible under these rules. The
nomination shall be made in one of the
attached forms as may be appropriated in
the circumstances of the case."

26. The law is to be interpreted in a
way that it protects legitimate expectations
of an employee who has served the
institution for considerable time period. To
12 All. Singasan Sharma Vs. State Of U.P. & Ors.
185
determine pension eligibility in the facts of
these appeals, Rule 17 of the 'Uttar Pradesh
State
Aided-educational
Institution
Employee's Contributory Provident FundInsurance-Pension Rules' provides that:

"17. An employee shall be
eligible for pension on-

(i) retirement on attaining the age
of superannuation or on the expiry of
extension
granted
beyond
the
superannuation age.

(ii) voluntary retirement after
completing 25 years of qualifying services;

(ii) retirement before the age of
superannuation under a medical certificate
of permanent incapacity for further service;
and

(iv) discharge due to abolition of
post or closure of an institution due to
withdrawal of recognition or other valid
causes.

Note (1) The age of compulsory
retirement of an employee shall be such a
prescribed in the relevant rules applicable
to him.

The date of superannuation shall
be reckoned from the date of birth of an
employee as entered in his Service Book or
other records. In case the year of birth only
is known, but not the month, the first July of
the year shall be taken as the date of birth,
similarly when both the year and the month
of birth are known, but not the date, the
16th of the month shall be taken as the date
of birth.

(2) An employee may retire from
service
volunarily
any
time
after
completing 25 years of qualifying service,
provided that he shall give in this behalf a
notice in writing to the management at
least 3 months before the date on which he
wishes to retire."

27. Rule 19 explains the conditions
under which the employee would not be
entitled for pension.

"19 (a) Service will not count for
pension unless the employee holds a
substantive
post
on
a
permanent
establishment.

(b) Continuous temporary or
officiating
service
followed
without
interruption by confirmation in the same or
another post shall also count as qualifying
service. (See also C.S.R. Para 422).

(c) Leave without allowance,
suspension allowed to stand as a specific
penalty, overstayed of joining time or leave
not subsequently regularised, and period of
breaks in service shall not be reckoned as
qualifying service.

(d) Period of breaks between 2
periods of service due to termination of
service, for no fault of the employee shall
not be treated as interruption involving
forfeiture of post qualifying service. In
other cases breaks due to other causes
shall result in forfeiture of past service
unless condoned by Government.

(e) Time passed on earned leave
shall fully count as qualifying service, but
time passed on other kinds leave with
allowances shall count as qualifying
service as follows:

(i) If the total service is not less
than 13 years, but less than 30 years, one
186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
year of such leave shall count as qualifying
service;

(ii) If the total service is not less
than 30 years, two years of such leave shall
counts as qualifying service.

Notes (1) The term 'Earned
Leave' means leave on full average pay.

(2) In case of a married woman
employee time passed on maternity leave
may be allowed to count as qualifying
service, provided that the period covered
by such leave and also earned leave shall
not
exceed
what
would
have
been
admissible had she availed of the whole of
the earned leave to which she was entitled
under the rules.

(3) Total Service' means total
service
rekoning
from
the
date
of
commencement of service qualifying for
pension and includes periods of leave
referred to above.

(4) The service put in by an
employee before he has completed 18 years
of age or after attaining the age of
superannuation
unless
extended
by
competent authority or on re-employment
after retirement shall not qualify for
pension.

(5)
The
entry
relating
to
confirmation of an employee in the service
book shall be countersigned.

(6) In cases not covered by these
rules qualifying service shall be determined
by Government and its decision shall be
final."

28.
Therefore,
equity,
good
conscience,
and
settled
service
jurisprudence mandates that salary dues,
pension and gratuity benefits for services of
Singasan, Girija and Ram Kumar Ram is
required to be considered as they have
completed more than 3 years continuous
service for gratuity and more than 25 years
of service for pension benefits as per Rule,
should principles of the Gratuity Act apply,
otherwise gratuity if payable under the
service rule and where options are
exercised and if not for any special
circumstances, such teachers would be
entitled to gratuity in the light of the
judgment of this Court in the case of Usha
Rani vs. State of U.P. and 6 Others
(Neutral
Citation
No.-
2019:AHC:180910) and Guru Charan vs.
State of U.P. and Others, 2022 SCC
OnLine All 515. The situation of the
appellants in the present case is no different
from the individuals whose appointments
were protected by Supreme Court in
referred case. They were bona fide
applicants who have got selected and
served for decades. It will be a travesty of
justice if relief is denied to the appellants
for something which is done by rival
groups in management committee at some
point of time.

29. The impugned judgment dated
28.04.2025, therefore, is unsustainable upto
the extent it upholds denial of retiral
benefits, as the same has not considered the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey
Shyam Yadav (supra) and also the
admitted fact of long and continuous
service over a prolonged period, which is
much more than minimum required service
years required as per Rules.

30. Accordingly, the conclusion of
learned single judge denying retiral benefits
is held to be not sustainable and require
interference in these appeals and therefore,
12 All. Prabhu Nath Yadav Vs. Union Of India
187
the impugned common judgment and order
dated 28.04.2025 passed by learned Single
Judge in Writ A No. 49901 of 2016 and
connected
case
is
set
aside
and
consequently the special appeals no. 530 of
2025, 608 of 2025 and Special Appeal
Defective No. 656 of 2025 are allowed and
respondents are directed to release all
admissible salary arrears to the appellants
for the period they actually discharged
duties.

31. The respondents are further directed
to compute and pay all consequential retiral
benefits, including gratuity and pension, as
may be admissible in law along with interest,
as may be applicable to the appellants, and in
cases where an employee has died, to their
legal heirs. The entire exercise shall be
completed expeditiously, preferably within a
period of three months from the date of
production of a certified copy of this
judgment.

32. In the matter of Special Appeal
preferred by Lallan Tiwari, the controversy
stood finally concluded as we have
recorded above in the earlier part of the
judgment that his termination of service.
Order came to be finally approved by the
authority and against which writ petition
filed by the petitioner came to be dismissed
on 26.11.1998 which stood further affirmed
in the Special Appeal under the order of the
coordinate Bench on 21.05.2003, review of
which was also dismissed by the Bench
vide order dated 16.12.2005.

33. In the circumstances, therefore, the
case of Lallan Tiwari does not rest on the
same footing as that of other appellants and
hence we find no justification to now allow
highly time barred recall application filed
on 05.09.2012 in respect of the final
judgment of coordinate Bench of this Court
on 21.05.2003. We may further hold that
once the judgment has attained finality and
review application has also been dismissed
by the Division Bench, neither any recall in
respect of the judgment and order of the
learned single judge was maintainable for
the said judgment having been affirmed in
the appeal, nor any recall application in
respect of the order passed by the Division
Bench would be maintainable in view of
the fact that the review application had
stood dismissed.

34. In the circumstances, therefore, we
see neither any justification to condone the
delay after more than nine years inasmuch
as recall itself is not maintainable, hence,
both the applications stand dismissed.

35. Thus all the other intra-court
appeals and miscellaneous applications
therein are disposed of accordingly. There
will be no order as to cost.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 187
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ A No. 1020 of 2006

Prabhu Nath Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
Union Of India ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
(1) Effect of two minor punishment for the
incident not occurred at the work place or
during the working hours on the entitlement of
petitioner to cross the efficiency bar.

Headnotes
(A) Service law - Constable in Central
Industrial Security Force (CISF) - Non