# Smt. Aaisha Siddique v. Senior Terminal Manager, IOC Terminal and anotherher - **Citation:** (2002) 3 ILRA 874 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2002-10-01 - **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38940 of 2002 - **Bench:** M. Katju, R. Tiwari - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-aaisha-siddique-v-senior-terminal-manager-ioc-terminal-and-anotherher-40027 - **Pages:** 2 ## Headnote Land Acquisition Act- section 3- even assuming that there was some construction on the land in question, this Court cannot interfere with the acquisition because the word 'land' in section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act includes 'Buildings and trees' also. Hence even assuming that the land was abadi or there were constructions on the land in question, in our opinion the said land can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and this Court cannot interfere. Held in para 19 Moreover, we are of the opinion that in fact the land in question was agricultural land and it was only after the notification under Section 4 that the petitioner tried to give a colour that the land was abadi and there were constructions. Case Law referred: AIR 1971 SC 1033, (1986) 4 SCC 251, (1996) 10 SCC 721, 1991 AWC 1210, 1989 AWC 1137, (1991) AWC 341, AIR 1969 SC 255, 1980 ACJ 583 ## Text http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 874 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 1.10.2002 BEFORE THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J. THE HON'BLE R. TIWARI, J. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 38940 of 2002 Smt. Aaisha Siddique ...Petitioner Versus Senior Terminal Manager, IOC Terminal and another ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri W.H. Khan Counsel for the Respondents: Sri P. Padia Constitution of India- 226- Tender submitted beyond 10 minute- Prescribed Period 12-00 No.- whether the Court can extend it by 10 minute ? - "No" if 10 minutes extended , why not 10 hours on ten months- one has to be strict in such matter. Held - para 3 In our opinion, time is of the essence in such matters, otherwise the legal position will be totally chaotic. For example, if in an election on the election day the voting can take place from 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. and a voter reaches the polling station at 4.10 p.m. and states that he be allowed to cast his vote, in our opinion he cannot be allowed to do so, whatsoever may be reason for the delay. Similarly, this Court cannot extend the time for submission of the tenders. If we extend it by 10 minute, then why not for 10 hours or ten days ? Where will the line be drawn. Hence the only correct view can be that one has to be strict in such matters. Since the petitioner did not reach in time her tender it cannot be accepted. (Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has prayed that the respondents be directed to entertain and consider the petitioner's tender in pursuance of the tender notice 29.7.2002. The last date and time of submitting the tender in pursuance of the tender notice dated 29.7.2002 was 21.8.2002 by 12.00 Noon. It has been alleged in paragraph 4 of the writ petition that because of traffic jam the petitioner's driver could not reach at the office of the respondents at 12.00 noon but reached there at 12.10 p.m., that is, he was late by 10 minutes. Although, in paragraphs 6 and 9 of the counter affidavit it has been stated that in fact the petitioner's tender was not given on 21.8.2002 but was given on 22.8.2002, but even assuming that the allegation of the petitioner is correct there is no doubt that the tender was late by 10 minutes. 3. In our opinion, time is of the essence in such matters, otherwise the legal position will be totally chaotic. For example, if in an election on the election day the voting can take place from 8.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. and a voter reaches the polling station at 4.10 p.m. and states that he was late by 10 minutes because of a traffic jam and insists that he be allowed to cast his vote, in our opinion he cannot be allowed to do so, whatsoever may be reason for the delay. Similarly, this Court cannot extend the time for submission of the tenders. If we extend it by10 minutes, then why not for 10 hours or ten days ? Where will the line be drawn. Hence the only correct view can be that one has to be strict in such matters. Since the http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in 3 All] Smt. Aaisha Siddique V. Senior Terminal Manager, IOC Terminal and anotherher 875 petitioner did not reach in time to submit her tender it cannot be accepted. 4. The writ petition is dismissed. --------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD OCTOBER 9, 2002 BEFORE THE HON'BLE M. KATJU, J. THE HON'BLE RAKESH TIWARI, J. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 43250 of 2000 Manveer Singh and another ...Petitioner Versus State of U.P. and others ...Respondents Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri S.G. Hasnain Counsel for the Respondents: Sri B.D. Mandhyan S.C. Land Acquisition Act- section 3- even assuming that there was some construction on the land in question, this Court cannot interfere with the acquisition because the word 'land' in section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act includes 'Buildings and trees' also. Hence even assuming that the land was abadi or there were constructions on the land in question, in our opinion the said land can be acquired under the Land Acquisition Act and this Court cannot interfere. Held in para 19 Moreover, we are of the opinion that in fact the land in question was agricultural land and it was only after the notification under Section 4 that the petitioner tried to give a colour that the land was abadi and there were constructions. Case Law referred: AIR 1971 SC 1033, (1986) 4 SCC 251, (1996) 10 SCC 721, 1991 AWC 1210, 1989 AWC 1137, (1991) AWC 341, AIR 1969 SC 255, 1980 ACJ 583 (Delivered by Hon'ble M. Katju, J.) 1. This writ petition alongwith connected writ petition no. 3301 of 2001 are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 3. The petitioners had challenged the impugned notification dated 21.11.1996 published by public notice dated 24.8.1999 under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act and the notification dated 23.8.2000 published through public notice dated 23.8.2000 under Section 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act vide Annexure 7 and 10 to the writ petition. The petitioners have also prayed for mandamus directing the respondent not to proceed in the matter of acquisition proceedings and not to demolish the constructions on the land in dispute. 4. The petitioner no. 1 claims to be owner of plot no. 30 and the petitioner no. 2 of plot no. 31 in village Wajidpur, paragana and Tahsil Khurja, district Bulandshahr. It is alleged in paragraph 3 of the writ petition that the said land has been used by the petitioners as abadi land. The Khasra entries are Annexure 1 and 2 to the writ petition. In paragraph 4 of the writ petition it is alleged that the petitioners have raised constructions over the said land and then sought permission to change the nature of the land under Section 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. On the application of the petitioner the S.D.M., Khurja after receiving report of