# Smt. Anjana Rana v. Navin Singh

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 1198
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-12
- **Case number:** Transfer Application (Civil) No. 6 of 2026
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-anjana-rana-v-navin-singh-53985
- **Pages:** 6

## Text

1198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

45. One-sided, unfair clauses in a contract or a agreement amount to an unfair trade practice
under Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter
of Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Govindan Raghavan (supra) has held as under :-

"6.8. A term of a contract will not be final and binding if it is shown that the flat
purchasers had no option but to sign on the dotted line, on a contract framed by the builder. The
contractual terms of the agreement dated 8-5-2012 are ex facie one-sided, unfair and
unreasonable. The incorporation of such one-sided clauses in an agreement constitutes an unfair
trade practice as per Section 2(1)(r) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 since it adopts unfair
methods or practices for the purpose of selling the flats by the builder."
(emphasis added)

Conclusion

46. In view of the above discussions and considering the judgements referred above, this Court
has no hesitation in holding that the private settlement or an agreement cannot circumvent or
supersede the obligations imposed on the parties by the provisions of the statute and also hold that
an agreement or settlement arrived at any level of duress or is against the provisions of statute, such
agreement would be void.

47. In response to the question of law proposed above, it is found that no private
contract/settlement can have overriding effect on the rights and obligations created by statutory
provisions of law.

48. Considering the aforesaid facts and cirumstances, this Court does not find any illegality or
irregularity in the impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal.

49. Hence, the impugned judgement and order dated 01.04.2025 passed by learned Tribunal is
hereby upheld and affirmed.

50. Accordingly, the instant appeal sans merit and is dismissed at the admission stage.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 1198
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Transfer Application (Civil) No. 6 of 2026

Smt. Anjana Rana ...Appellant
Versus
Navin Singh ...Respondent
1 All. Smt. Anjana Rana Vs. Navin Singh
1199
Issue for Consideration
The applicant has sought transfer on divorce proceedings on the ground that the applicant has instituted
proceedings under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 on 24.01.2025 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad, as well as proceedings under
Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking maintenance before the Principal Judge,
Family Court, Firozabad on 17.04.2025, which are stated to be pending.

Head Notes
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 24; The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955-Section 13- The
concept of "balance of convenience" is a relevant consideration; however, it cannot be confined
to the convenience of one party alone and must encompass the convenience of both parties,
witnesses, the suitability of the forum having regard to the nature of evidence, and the doctrine
of forum conveniens- The jurisdiction to transfer a case must be exercised with extreme care,
caution, and circumspection. Mere inconvenience or relative hardship, though relevant, may not
by itself constitute a decisive ground for transfer. The burden squarely lies upon the applicant to
establish sufficient, cogent, and compelling grounds demonstrating that refusal of transfer
would result in denial of justice.
Held- The applicant has also not placed any material on record to show any other extraordinary circumstance
which may necessitate the transfer of the divorce petition. In absence of such material, the Court is of the
considered view that no exceptional or compelling ground has been made out for exercise of discretionary
power of transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure- Application dismissed. (Para 9, 10 & 21)
(E-15)

Case Law Cited
Smt. Sudha Sharma vs. Ram Naresh Jaiswal AIR 1990 MP 320; Satyasri Fertilisers vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd
AIR 2003 AP 312; P. Sadayandi Nadar vs. Venugopala Chetty AIR 1960 Ker 91; Fatema vs. Jafri Syed Husain
@ Syed Parvez Jafferi AIR 2009 SC 1773; Anjali Ashok Sadhwani vs. Ashok Kishinchand Sadhwani AIR 2009
SC 1374; Kulwinder Kaur @ Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh Vs. Kandi Friends Education Trust and Others (2008)
3 SCC 659; Subramaniam Swamy vs. Ramakrishna Hegde (1990) 1 SCC 4; Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and
Another Vs. Rani Jethmalani 1979 (4) SCC 167

List of Acts
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; The Hindu Marriage Act,1955

List of Keywords
Doctrine of forum conveniens ; Mere inconvenience or relative hardship; may not by itself constitute a decisive
ground for transfer; Burden to establish sufficient, cogent, and compelling ground

Case Arising From
Case No. 1226of 2023 (Navin vs. Anjana), instituted under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The
Applicant seeks transfer of the said proceedings from the Court of the Principal Judge, Family Court, Agra, to
the Court of competent Family Court at Firozabad

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Raghuraj Singh, Vijay Pal
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) :

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Raghuraj Singh, learned counsel for the applicant.
1200 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. The present transfer application has been filed by the applicant, under Section 24 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking transfer of Case No. 1226 of 2023 (Navin vs. Anjana),
instituted under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, pending before the Court of Principal
Judge, Family Court, Agra, to the competent Family Court at Firozabad.

3. From a perusal of the affidavit filed in support of the application, it transpires that divorce
suit bearing Case No.1226 of 2023, under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was
instituted by the opposite party on 16.05.2023 before the court of Family Judge, Agra.

4. The principal ground urged in support of the transfer application is that the applicant has
instituted proceedings under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 on 24.01.2025 before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad, as
well as proceedings under Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking
maintenance before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Firozabad on 17.04.2025, which are stated
to be pending.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant has, however, not disputed that the aforestated
proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and under the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 were instituted much subsequent to the institution of the
divorce petition pending before the Family Court, Agra.

6. It is well settled that while considering an application for transfer of matrimonial
proceedings, the Court is required to examine whether a genuine hardship, grave inconvenience, or
exceptional circumstance has been established warranting transfer in the interest of justice. Mere
inconvenience or preference of one party, without substantiating circumstances, does not ipso facto
justify transfer of proceedings.

7. The power of transfer vested in this Court under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure
is discretionary in nature and enables the Court, either on the application of a party or suo motu, to
transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal, or other proceeding pending before a subordinate court.
However, such power is not to be exercised mechanically or as a matter of routine, but only upon
due and careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case.

8. It is a settled principle of law that the plaintiff, being dominus litis, has the right to choose
the forum for institution of proceedings, and such choice ought ordinarily to be respected.
Interference with the forum selected by the plaintiff is an exception and not the rule. While
considering a prayer for transfer, the Court is required to balance this right against the competing
obligation to ensure a fair trial and proper dispensation of justice.

9. The concept of "balance of convenience" is a relevant consideration; however, it cannot be
confined to the convenience of one party alone and must encompass the convenience of both
parties, witnesses, the suitability of the forum having regard to the nature of evidence, and the
doctrine of forum conveniens.
1 All. Smt. Anjana Rana Vs. Navin Singh
1201

10. The jurisdiction to transfer a case must be exercised with extreme care, caution, and
circumspection. Mere inconvenience or relative hardship, though relevant, may not by itself
constitute a decisive ground for transfer. The burden squarely lies upon the applicant to establish
sufficient, cogent, and compelling grounds demonstrating that refusal of transfer would result in
denial of justice.

11. The criteria for transfer of a case were examined by the Supreme Court in the context of a
perition seeking transfer of a criminal case, in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi and Another Vs. Rani
Jethmalani. The cardinal principle in this regard was laid down by observing that: "Assurance of a
fair trial is the first imperative of the dispensation of justice and the central criterion for the court
to consider when a motion for transfer is made is not the hypersensitivity or relative convenience of
a party or easy availability of legal services or like mini grievances. Something more substantial,
more compelling, more imperiling, from the point of view of public justice and its attendant
environment, is necessitous if the Court is to exercise its power of transfer. This is the cardinal
principle although the circumstances may be myriad and vary case to case."

12. It was emphasized that transfer cannot be ordered on the basis of mere inconvenience or
subjective apprehension, unless the same has a direct bearing on the fairness of the trial.

13. In Subramaniam Swamy vs. Ramakrishna Hegde, while dealing with the power of
transfer under Section 25 CPC, the Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine of dominus litis and held
that though convenience is a relevant consideration, the paramount test remains whether
continuance of proceedings in the chosen forum would result in denial of justice. The Court
categorically observed: "The mere convenience of the parties or any one of them may not be
enough for the exercise of power but it must also be shown that trial in the chosen forum will result
in denial of justice."

14. It was further clarified that transfer is justified only when it becomes imperative to meet
the ends of justice, even if such transfer causes some inconvenience to the plaintiff.

15. The factors to be taken into account for transfer of a case were again considered in
Kulwinder Kaur @ Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh Vs. Kandi Friends Education Trust and
Others, and it was observed that keeping in mind the various judicial pronouncements, certain
broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by courts.
Some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of suit, appeal or
other proceeding were enumerated as follows: (i) balance of convenience or inconvenience to the
plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; (ii) convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of
trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; (iii) issues raised by
the parties; (iv) reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in
the court in which the suit is pending; (v) important questions of law involved or a considerable
section of public interested in the litigation; (vi) interest of justice demanding for transfer of case,
etc. are some of the instances which are germane. It was, however, cautioned that these instances
are merely illustrative and not exhaustive.
1202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

16. In the context of cases relating to matrimonial matters, convenience of the wife may
be a relevant factor, as held in Anjali Ashok Sadhwani vs. Ashok Kishinchand Sadhwani
and Fatema vs. Jafri Syed Husain @ Syed Parvez Jafferi. However, even in such cases,
there would be requirement to demonstrate existence of real hardship, such as inability to
travel long distance, absence of escort, or circumstances rendering participation in
proceedings practically impossible.

17. It has been consistently held that mere expense or difficulty does not ipso facto
justify transfer unless such difficulty is of such magnitude as to result in injustice. The
Courts have laid emphasis that the plaintiff has the choice of forum and that very strong
reasons must be shown to deprive the plaintiff of this choice (P. Sadayandi Nadar vs.
Venugopala Chetty; Satyasri Fertilisers vs. E.I.D. Parry (India) Ltd.). It has
repeatedly been emphasized that the Court must ascertain whether reasonable grounds are
made out and not act on bald or vague allegations (Smt. Sudha Sharma vs. Ram Naresh
Jaiswal).

18. In the present case, apart from a general assertion of difficulty in attending the proceeding
at Agra, no specific material has been brought on record to demonstrate that the applicant is unable
to prosecute or defend the proceedings before the Family Court, Agra

19. It is also not in dispute that Firozabad is an adjoining district of Agra and the distance
between the two places is not such which, by itself, can be said to cause insurmountable hardship or
prejudice.

20. Learned counsel for the applicant has not disputed the factual position that the
proceedings under Sections 12, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, instituted on 24.01.2025, as well as the proceedings under
Section 144 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, instituted on 17.04.2025, at
Family Court, Firozabad, were initiated subsequent to the institution of the divorce suit
which were already pending prior in point of time. In such circumstances, the subsequent
institution of proceedings at Firozabad cannot be taken as a valid or legally sustainable
ground for seeking transfer of the earlier instituted matrimonial proceedings, as the forum
chosen first in point of time cannot be displaced merely on account of later proceedings
initiated by the applicant.

21. The applicant has also not placed any material on record to show any other extraordinary
circumstance which may necessitate the transfer of the divorce petition. In absence of such
material, the Court is of the considered view that no exceptional or compelling ground has been
made out for exercise of discretionary power of transfer under Section 24 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.

22. The present transfer application lacks merit.

23. It is, accordingly, rejected.
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1 All. M/s Sharad Enterprises Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1203
(2026) 1 ILRA 1203
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE AMITABH KUMAR RAI, J.

Writ C No. 14386 of 2019

M/s Sharad Enterprises ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue(s) for consideration
 (a) Whether the security money which had been deposited at the time of grant of lease under Rules, 1963
could be forfeited when a lease was determined for the non-payment of royalty, rent or other dues?
(b) Whether once the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract with the respondent-State
by executing a registered lease deed incorporating the condition of forfeiture and agreed to it, can he resile
from it or challenge condition of forfeiture of security in the lease deed?
(c) Whether the petitioner can invoke the writ jurisdiction u/Article 226 of the Constitution of India to wriggle
out of a condition stipulated in the contract?
(d) Whether the matter can be remanded on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice?

Headnotes
A. Mines and Minerals Law - U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963: Rule 58(1), 58(2),
41-H(1), Rule 27 and Schedule-IV; The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act,
1957: Section 15(3) - A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be
attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not
perceived by the court or present to its mind."(Para 54)

In two judgements Ajay Raj Dwivedi (infra) and Smt. Kalpana Karwariya (infra), the Court after considering
Rule 58 and Clause 19(3) of the GO dated 14.08.2017 which provides for consequences of non-payment of
any amount which includes the royalty held that since these provisions do not provide for forfeiture of security
in the event of failure of payment of any amount due from the lessee including royalty, therefore, the State
Government cannot forfeit the security and can recover the amount as arrears of land revenue with
prescribed interest u/Rule 58(2) of the Rules, 1963. (Para 52)

While deciding the two cases i.e. Ajay Raj Dwivedi (infra) and Smt. Kalpana Karwariya (infra), one vital
aspect of the matter was not brought to the notice of the Court that if the MMDR Act or the Rules,
1963 or the GO dated 14.08.2017 do not prohibit the forfeiture of security in part or full in the event of nonpayment of installment amount of the royalty as per the terms and conditions in the lease deed on the due
date whether the incorporation of condition of forfeiture of security (in part or whole) in the lease deed in the
event of violation of any terms and conditions of the lease deed is bad in law for the reason that the State has
no power under MMDR Act or the Rules, 1963 or the GO dated 14.08.2017 to forfeit the security. (Para 56)

B. Whether once the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily entered into a contract with the
respondent-State by executing a registered lease deed incorporating the said condition and
agreed to it, can he resile from it or challenge condition of forfeiture of security in the lease
deed. (Para 57)