# Smt. Anshu Garg & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 7 ILRA 118
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 55173 of 2014
- **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Rajiv Lochan Mehrotra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-anshu-garg-ors-v-state-of-u-p-ors-44326
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

A. Land Acquisition Law - Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 24(2) -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 11
&18 - Compensation - Leeway period of 5
years - Lapse of proceeding initiated
under Act of 1894 - Applicability of S. 24
of Act of 2013 - Relevant factor explained
- Held, for the purpose of calculating the
leeway period of 5 years and for applying
the provisions of lapse, the word 'award'
in Section 11 would be attracted and not
the words 'reference under Section 18' -
The definition clause, which defines 'cost
of acquisition' has no relevance at all so
far as the applicability of provisions of
Section 24 are concerned. (Para 6)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)

## Text

118 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the petitioner of the use and enjoyment of
the subject land. These amounts shall be
paid to the petitioner within one month
from the date of communication of the
instant order, failing which, interest @ 14%
will be payable on the entire sum for the
period in default, till date of actual
payment.

16. In case the petitioner produces
No-Objection
Certificate
along
with
affidavit of the original allottee for release
of 25% of the bid amount deposited by him
as earnest money, the said amount shall
also be released in favour of the petitioner.

17. The petition stands disposed of
accordingly.
----------
(2022)07ILR A118
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.08.2017

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP SAHI, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJIV LOCHAN MEHROTRA, J.

Writ C No. 55173 of 2014

Smt. Anshu Garg & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Krishna Ji Khare, Sri Mrityunjay Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri B. Dayal

A. Land Acquisition Law - Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013 - Section 24(2) -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 11
&18 - Compensation - Leeway period of 5
years - Lapse of proceeding initiated
under Act of 1894 - Applicability of S. 24
of Act of 2013 - Relevant factor explained
- Held, for the purpose of calculating the
leeway period of 5 years and for applying
the provisions of lapse, the word 'award'
in Section 11 would be attracted and not
the words 'reference under Section 18' -
The definition clause, which defines 'cost
of acquisition' has no relevance at all so
far as the applicability of provisions of
Section 24 are concerned. (Para 6)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J.
&
Hon'ble Rajiv Lochan Mehrotra, J.)

1. Heard Sri Krishn Ji Khare, learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners
and
Sri
Bhupeshwar Dayal, learned counsel for the
respondent.

2. The petitioners have come up with
a plea that the provisions of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in
Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013 would be attracted
on the facts of the present case, firstly
because the award will be deemed to have
been finally made only when the final
amount
came
to
be
determined
on
compromise in the proceedings which
according to Sri Khare cannot be termed as
proceedings of reference ending in the
judgment under Section 18 of the 1984 Act.
The second argument of Sri Khare is that
the word compensation is included in the
definition of the words "cost of acquisition"
as defined Section 3(i) of the 2013 Act. The
acquisition proceedings where the earlier
compromise of 2003 was given effect to,
should be read in continuity and therefore
the consequential order will relate back to
the date of the award under Section 11. He
therefore, submits that this will amount to
7 All. Smt. Anshu Garg & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
119
giving of an award and consequently the
provisions of Sub-Section (2) and Section
24 would be attracted as these proceedings
have to be treated as award under the
aforesaid provision for extending the
benefit as prayed for by the petitioner.

3. Section 24 (2) is extracted herein
under:

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), in case of land
acquisition proceedings initiated under the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) , ,
where an award under the said section 11
has been made five years or more prior to
the commencement of this Act but the
physical possession of the land has not
been taken or the compensation has not
been paid the said proceedings shall be
deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate
Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate
the proceedings of such land acquisition
afresh in accordance with the provisions of
this Act:

Provided that where an award has
been made and compensation in respect of
a majority of land holding has not been
deposited
in
the
account
of
the
beneficiaries,
then,
all
beneficiaries
specified in the notification for acquisition
under
section 4 of
the
said
Land
Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the
provisions of this Act."

4. It is an undisputed fact that the
proceedings which have culminated in the
compromise being arrived at was on a
reference made by the Collector under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act. The argument
of Sri Khare that this should not to be
treated to have culminated in a judgment in
reference
therefore,
is
unacceptable
inasmuch as, had the reference not been
made then there would have been no
compromise and consequently this would
be clearly a proceeding of reference under
Section 18 for payment of enhanced
compensation and not an award by the
Collector under Section 11 of the 1984 Act.
A reference is decided by a Court and not
by the Collector who announces the award
under Section 11 of the 1984 Act. The
definition
of
the
phrase
"cost
of
proceedings" cannot add any such meaning
to the word "award" under Section 11 of
the Act.

5. We had framed the following
question vide our order dated 10th August
2017:

"Heard Sri Krishan Ji Khare,
learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri
B.Dayal,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents.

The dispute in the present writ
petition centers around land acquisition
proceedings and about the applicability of
section 24 (2) of The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition,
Rehabilitation
and
Resettlement Act, 2013.

The contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioners appears to be
that the petitioners having accepted the
compensation under protest, they filed a
Reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act
which is stated to have been decided on the
basis of compromise.The amount awarded
in compromise by the Court having not
been paid or deposited would attract
section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.

Sri B. Dayal refutes the aforesaid
contention of the applicability of section
24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
and Section 31 of The Land Acquisition
120 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act, 1894. Both Sections are categorical to
the effect that on making an award under
section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
such proceedings can be taken into account
for staking a claim and not on the basis of
proceedings under reference ending in an
order
of
adjudication
or
further
adjudication
awarding
enhanced
compensation. In both Sections it is the
award under section 11 of the Act, 1894
that
is
the
basis
of
calculation.Consequently, the plea of the
learned counsel for the petitioners cannot
be accepted.

Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners prays for time to study the
matter.

List in the next cause list."

6. We have not been able to find any
answer from Sri Khare to the aforesaid
question framed inasmuch as the words
used in Sub-Section (2 ) of Section 24 are
clearly to the effect that the same would
apply in Land Acquisition proceedings
where an award under Section 11 of
the1894 Act has been made. Thus for the
purpose of calculating the leeway period of
5 years and for applying the provisions of
lapse, the word "award" in Section 11
would be attracted and not the words
"reference
under
Section
18".
The
definition clause relied upon by Sri Khare
which defines "cost of acquisition" has no
relevance at all so far as the applicability of
provisions of Section 24 are concerned.
The
arguments
of
Sri
Khare
are
misconceived, therefore, untenable. The
argument that in the agreement arrived at in
the reference proceedings would relate
back to the date of award is equally
misconceived
inasmuch
as
no
such
contingency has been contemplated under
Section 24 of the Act.

7. The petition lacks merit and is
accordingly rejected.
----------
(2022)07ILR A120
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.07.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SAMEER JAIN, J.

Capital Case No. 12 of 2021
with
Reference No. 09 of 2021

Harendra ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opp. Party

Counsel for the Appellant:
From Jail, Sri Arun K. Singh Deshwal

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

(A) Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 302, 201, 376-AB -Capital
case - reference for confirmation of death
penalty - Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Section
2(I)(d), 3 , 5(m)/6 , 42 - for resting a
conviction
in
case
of
circumstantial
evidence - circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn, should
be fully established - all the facts so
established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused -
circumstances should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency, and they should be
such as to exclude every hypothesis, but
the one proposed to be proved - must be a
chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave
any
reasonable
ground
for
a
conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused - must be such as to show
that within all human probabilities, the act
must
have
been
done
by
the
accused.(Para -36 )