# Smt. Chandrakanti Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 395
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-07
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 21482 of 2016
- **Bench:** Manish Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-chandrakanti-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52334
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Law
-
Challenge
to
Withdrawal of Family Pension - where a
provision has been enacted or notified
which is in the nature of a beneficial
provision, widest amplitude is required
to be given to such provision for it to
achieve the object for which it was
notified - Giving a narrow meaning to a
beneficial provision even where two
results are possible, would naturally
defeat the very object for which such a
beneficial provision has been enacted.
(Para -28)
(B)
The
principles
of
statutory
construction - Words occurring in statutes
of liberal import such as 'social welfare
legislation and human rights' legislation
are not to be put in Procrustean beds or
shrunk
to
Lilliputian
dimensions
-
Provisions of a beneficial legislation have
to be construed with a purpose-oriented
approach - exemption clauses in beneficial
or social welfare legislations should be
given strict construction. (Para - 29)

(C) Doctrine of fairness - when a literal
reading
of
the
provision
giving
retrospective effect does not produce
absurdity or anomaly, the same would not
be construed to be only prospective -
When a law is enacted for the benefit of
the community as a whole, even in the
absence of a provision, the statute may be
held to be retrospective in nature. (Para -
35)

(D) Principles of natural justice - must be
followed before taking actions that (i)
Affect
civil
rights
(ii)
Have
adverse
consequences (iii) Deprive livelihood -
Distinction between quasi-judicial and
administrative orders is thin - Reasonable
opportunity to present case is essential -
Procedures
must
be
just,
fair,
and
reasonable - Right to livelihood is part of
right to life (Article 21). (Para - 39)

Petitioner challenges an order withdrawing her
family pension - granted earlier due to her
husband's death in service in 1977 - pension
was initially denied but granted after a writ
petition in 2007 - it was withdrawn following
another writ petition (Phoolmati Devi) and a
judgment (Chandrawati Devi). (Para - 1 to 14)

HELD: - Government Order dated 16.06.1984
applies retrospectively, making 1982 order
applicable to employees who died in service
before rendering 20 years. Petitioner's case
governed by 1982 order, as made retrospective
by 1984 order. Petitioner entitled to family
pension
under
revised
eligibility
criteria.
Impugned order dated 11.05.2016 quashed.
Directed opposite parties to pay petitioner's
family pension as per the 03.09.2007 order
considering the retrospective application of the
396 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1982 order. Make regular payments within 8
weeks. (Para - 18 to 27,40,41)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. Smt. Chandrakanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
395
Tribunal. Considering the aforesaid we do
not find it a fit case for interference in
exercise of our extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. We, accordingly, dismiss the writ
petition.

35. Let a copy of this judgment be
sent by Shri Nishant Shukla, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel to
Legal Remembrancer, U.P. for necessary
and appropriate action.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 395
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 07.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANISH MATHUR, J.

Writ-A No. 21482 of 2016

Smt. Chandrakanti Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Suresh Chandra Srivastava, Sharad Pathak,
Suyash Dwivedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., J.B.S. Rathour, Shailendra Singh
Rajawat

(A)
Service
Law
-
Challenge
to
Withdrawal of Family Pension - where a
provision has been enacted or notified
which is in the nature of a beneficial
provision, widest amplitude is required
to be given to such provision for it to
achieve the object for which it was
notified - Giving a narrow meaning to a
beneficial provision even where two
results are possible, would naturally
defeat the very object for which such a
beneficial provision has been enacted.
(Para -28)
(B)
The
principles
of
statutory
construction - Words occurring in statutes
of liberal import such as 'social welfare
legislation and human rights' legislation
are not to be put in Procrustean beds or
shrunk
to
Lilliputian
dimensions
-
Provisions of a beneficial legislation have
to be construed with a purpose-oriented
approach - exemption clauses in beneficial
or social welfare legislations should be
given strict construction. (Para - 29)

(C) Doctrine of fairness - when a literal
reading
of
the
provision
giving
retrospective effect does not produce
absurdity or anomaly, the same would not
be construed to be only prospective -
When a law is enacted for the benefit of
the community as a whole, even in the
absence of a provision, the statute may be
held to be retrospective in nature. (Para -
35)

(D) Principles of natural justice - must be
followed before taking actions that (i)
Affect
civil
rights
(ii)
Have
adverse
consequences (iii) Deprive livelihood -
Distinction between quasi-judicial and
administrative orders is thin - Reasonable
opportunity to present case is essential -
Procedures
must
be
just,
fair,
and
reasonable - Right to livelihood is part of
right to life (Article 21). (Para - 39)

Petitioner challenges an order withdrawing her
family pension - granted earlier due to her
husband's death in service in 1977 - pension
was initially denied but granted after a writ
petition in 2007 - it was withdrawn following
another writ petition (Phoolmati Devi) and a
judgment (Chandrawati Devi). (Para - 1 to 14)

HELD: - Government Order dated 16.06.1984
applies retrospectively, making 1982 order
applicable to employees who died in service
before rendering 20 years. Petitioner's case
governed by 1982 order, as made retrospective
by 1984 order. Petitioner entitled to family
pension
under
revised
eligibility
criteria.
Impugned order dated 11.05.2016 quashed.
Directed opposite parties to pay petitioner's
family pension as per the 03.09.2007 order
considering the retrospective application of the
396 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1982 order. Make regular payments within 8
weeks. (Para - 18 to 27,40,41)

Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:

1. Chandrawati Devi (Smt.) Vs St. of U.P. &
anr., (2010) 3 UPLBEC 2520

2. St. of U.P. & ors. Vs Smt. Shyam Kali & anr.,
2011 SCC OnLine All 50

3. K.H. Nazar Vs Mathew K. Jacob & ors.,
(2020) 14 SCC 126

4. X. Vs Principal Secy., HFWD, Govt. of NCT of
Delhi & anr., (2023) 9 SCC 433

5. Vijay Vs St. of Maha. & ors., (2006) 6 SCC
289

6. D.K. Yadav Vs J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3
SCC 259

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manish Mathur, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Sharad Pathak, learned
counsel for petitioner, Mr. Pradeep Kumar
Pandey, learned State Counsel for opposite
parties no. 1 & 2, Mr. Ran Vijay Singh,
learned counsel for opposite party no. 3 and
Mr. S.S. Rajawat, learned counsel for
opposite parties no. 4 & 5.

2. Petition has been filed challenging
order dated 11.05.2016 whereby family
pension granted earlier to petitioner vide
order dated 03.09.2007 was withdrawn. It
is submitted that petitioner's husband late
Sudhakar
Pandey
was
employed
as
Assistant Teacher in Primary School
concerned on 16.12.1973 and passed away
while in service on 10.01.1977 having
rendered service of just about three years.

3. Since petitioner was not granted
benefit of family pension, she filed Writ
Petition No. 6068 (S/S) of 2004 which was
disposed of vide order dated 07.12.2007
directing
the
concerned
authority
to
consider and decide petitioner's claim for
grant of family pension. It is in pursuance
thereof that family pension was granted to
petitioner vide order dated 03.09.2007. It is
submitted that in the meantime one Smt.
Phoolmati Devi who was similarly situated
as petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 5993
(S/S) of 2015 claiming family pension. The
said petition was disposed of vide order
dated 12.10.2015 however, indicating the
submission of learned counsel for parties
that family pension has been granted to
other persons as well though they were not
covered by the Family Pension Scheme
vide Government order dated 17.12.1965.
The Director Basic Education was therefore
directed to hold an inquiry into the matter
and pass appropriate orders and take
necessary
action
where
the
pension
payment orders had been wrongly issued
and payments had been made.

4. It is in pursuance of the aforesaid
directions that the impugned order has been
passed withdrawing family pension to a
number of such dependents who had been
granted family pension in pursuance of
Government order dated 17.12.1965.

5. Learned counsel for petitioner has
submitted that earlier a triple benefit
scheme
was
notified
by
the
State
Government on 17.12.1965 and as per
Clause 24 thereof, it was provided that
family pension would be granted for a
period of 10 years to the family of an
employee who dies either while in service
or after retirement upon completion of not
less than 20 years of qualifying service. It
is submitted that subsequently the State
Government issued another Government
order dated 31.03.1982 whereby a new
8 All. Smt. Chandrakanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
397
scheme for family pension was introduced.
The said scheme came into effect from
01.10.1981 in which substantive change
made was in paragraph 3 (ka) whereby it
was provided that in case of such
employees who passed away while in
service after rendering even only one year
of continuous service, the dependents
thereof would be entitled for family
pension.

6. It is further submitted that by
means
of
subsequent
order
dated
06.06.1984,
issued
by
the
State
Government, the aforesaid notification was
made applicable even in those cases where
the employee had passed away prior to
01.10.1981.

7. It is therefore submitted that once
Government order dated 31.03.1982 has
been made retrospective in operation even
upon those employees who passed away
prior to 01.10.1981, it is the notification
dated
31.03.1982
which
would
be
applicable upon petitioner and since her
case would be covered by paragraph 3 (ka),
petitioner is entitled for grant of family
pension.

8. It is further submitted that the
impugned order has been passed in the light
of judgment rendered in the Case of
Chandrawati Devi (Smt.) versus State of
U.P. and another reported in (2010) 3
UPLBEC 2520 whereby grant of such
pensionary benefits was rejected.

9. It is submitted that even in the case of
Smt. Phoolmati Devi (supra), directions
have been issued on the basis of the aforesaid
judgment in the case of Chandrawati Devi
(Smt.) (supra) but the aspect that aforesaid
judgment of Chandrawati Devi (Smt.)
(supra) had been overruled by Division
Bench of this Court in the case of State of
U.P. and others versus Smt. Shyam Kali
and another reported in 2011 SCC OnLine
All 50 has been completely lost sight of.

10. It is submitted that the scheme
being beneficial in nature, widest amplitude
is required to be given to the provisions
thereof.

11. Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of opposite parties have refuted
submissions advanced by learned counsel for
petitioner with the submission that since
petitioner's husband passed away in January,
1977, the case of petitioner would be covered
by Clause 24 of Government order dated
17.12.1965. It is submitted that although
Government order dated 31.03.1982 has been
made retrospective in nature by means of
order dated 16.06.1984 but the condition
indicated therein is that even for respective
application of Government order dated
31.03.1982, the employee or his dependents
should otherwise have been eligible for such
grant of family pension. It is therefore
submitted that since it is Government order
dated 17.12.1965 which would be applicable
upon petitioner and petitioner not being
covered under paragraph 24 thereof, the
retrospective application of Government
order dated 31.03.1982 would not benefit the
petitioner.

12. It is also submitted that neither in
Government order dated 31.03.1982 nor
even in the order dated 16.06.1984 has the
earlier Government order dated 17.12.1965
been rescinded or superseded and would
therefore continue to govern such cases
where
death
of
the
employee
has
occasioned prior to 01.10.1981.

13.

Upon
consideration
of
submissions advanced by learned counsel
398 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for parties and perusal of material on
record, the factual aspects as indicated
hereinabove are admitted.

14. The only question requiring
adjudication in this petition would therefore
be whether by operation of order dated
16.06.1984, would petitioner be entitled for
grant of family pension in terms of
Government order dated 31.03.1982 or
Government order dated 17.12.1965?

15. With regard to aforesaid question,
it is quite evident that had the order dated
16.06.1984 not been issued by the State
Government, Government order dated
31.03.1982
would
not
have
been
retrospective and would necessarily have
applied only to those employees who
passed away after 01.10.1981 and in such a
situation, petitioner would necessarily have
been governed by Government order dated
17.12.1965.

16. However, a perusal of order dated
16.06.1984 clearly indicates that in view of
confusion
arising
with
regard
to
retrospective applicability of Government
Order
dated
31.08.1982,
the
State
Government has taken a conscious decision
for implementation of Government Order
dated 31.03.1982 to those employees who
passed away even prior to 01.10.1981. It is
the construction of the wordings 'यदद्‌
प्रधानाध्यापक्‌
के्‌
दानयत्ि्‌
को्‌
अन्यर्था्‌
पाररिाररक्‌ पेंशन्‌ देय्‌ हो' as indicated in
Government
Order
dated
16.06.1984,
which is creating a hurdle in grant of
Family Pension to petitioner.

17. It is the stated case of opposite
parties that aforesaid wordings can be
construed only to mean that persons such as
petitioner would be entitled to grant of Family
Pension only in case they were otherwise
eligible for such benefit and since it is only
Government Order dated 17.12.1965 which is
applicable upon petitioner, the otherwise
eligibility of petitioner has to be seen only in
terms of Government Order dated 17.12.1965
and since petitioner was ineligible for grant of
Family
Pension
in
terms
of
aforesaid
Government Order, retrospective applicability
of the subsequent Government Order dated
31.03.1982 would be inconsequential.

18. Upon consideration of the wordings
of Government Order dated 16.06.1984, it is
quite evident that retrospective applicability of
Government Order dated 31.03.1982 has been
made subject to employee or his dependents
being otherwise eligible for grant of such
benefits.

19. It is quite evident that Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 has not rescinded the
earlier Government Order dated 17.12.1965.
Nonetheless, it is also evident from a perusal of
Government Orders dated 31.03.1982 and
16.06.1984 that the State Government was
conveyed a quandary regarding applicability of
Family Pension Scheme to persons who were
not coming within purview of the same in view
of extant Government Orders and service
conditions.

20. Government Order dated 16.06.1984
has clearly adverted to such a quandary
whereafter it indicates that State Government
has taken a conscious decision for retrospective
applicability of Government Order dated
31.03.1982. It is noticeable that Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 has been made
retrospective in its entirety and not with regard
to any particular portion thereof.

21. The provisions of Clause 24 of
Government Order dated 17.12.1965 relied
upon by opposite parties are as follows:-
8 All. Smt. Chandrakanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
399

"24. (1) A family pension not
exceeding the amount specified in sub-rule
(2) below may be granted for a period of 10
years to the family of an employee who dies
either while still in service or after
retirement, after completion of not less than
twenty year of qualifying service:

Provided that the period of
payment of family pension shall in no case
extend beyond a period of five years from
the date on which the deceased employee
would
have
attained
the
age
of
superannuation.

Note.
(In
case
where
the
qualifying
service
is
less
than
the
prescribed minimum the deficiency should
not be condoned"

22. It is relevant that Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 in paragraph 3
thereof, has done away with the minimum
prescribed service period of 20 years and
has in fact indicated that dependents of
deceased employees would be entitled for
grant of Family Pension where the
employee has rendered at least one year's
continuous service.

23. Relevant portion of the order is as
follows:-

"(क)्‌ पररिार्‌ पेंशन्‌ सेिा्‌ में्‌ रहते्‌
हुये्‌ या्‌ सेिाननिृत्त्‌ के्‌ बाद्‌ मृत्यु्‌ होने्‌ पर्‌
उस्‌
दशा्‌
में्‌
अनुमन्य्‌
होर्ी्‌
जब्‌
सेिा्‌
ननिृवत्त्‌
के्‌
बाद्‌
मृत्यु्‌
होने्‌
की्‌
दशा्‌
में्‌
भशक्षक्‌
मृत्यु्‌
के्‌
समय्‌
कोई्‌
प्रनतकर्‌
अशक्तता्‌ सेिा्‌ ननिृवत्त्‌ या्‌ अचधिषग्‌ पेंशन्‌
पा्‌ रहा्‌ हो्‌ या्‌ पा्‌ रहा्‌ होता्‌ और्‌ सेिाकाल्‌
में्‌ मृत्यु्‌ हो्‌ जाने्‌ की्‌ दशा्‌ में्‌ यदद्‌ उसने्‌
कम्‌ से्‌ कम्‌ एक्‌ िषग्‌ की्‌ लर्ातार्‌
सेिा्‌
ण्जसमें्‌ भत्ता्‌ रदहत्‌ छु्टी्‌ की्‌ अिचध, ड्यूटी्‌
के्‌ रूप्‌ में्‌ न्‌ माना्‌ र्या्‌ ननलम्बन्‌ तर्था्‌ 20
िषग्‌
की्‌
आयु्‌
से्‌
पहले्‌
की्‌
र्यी्‌
अिचध्‌
सण्म्मभलत्‌ नहीं्‌ है्‌ पूरी्‌ कर्‌ ली्‌ हो।"

24.

Paragraph
4
of
aforesaid
Government Order dated 31.03.1982 reads
as follows:-

"(4) सेिारत्‌
रहते्‌
हुये्‌
मृत्यु्‌
हो्‌
जाने्‌ की्‌ दशा्‌ में्‌ यदद्‌ मृतक्‌ ने्‌ कम्‌ से्‌
कम्‌ सात्‌ िषग्‌ की अचधक्‌ सेिा्‌ प्रदान्‌ की्‌ हो्‌
तो्‌ मृत्यु्‌ की्‌ नतचर्थ्‌ के्‌ बाद्‌ की्‌ नतचर्थ्‌ से्‌
प्रारण्म्भक्‌ सात्‌ िषग्‌ या्‌ उस्‌ नतचर्थ्‌ तक्‌ उसे्‌
जीवित्‌ रहने्‌ की्‌ दशा्‌ में्‌ 65 िषग्‌ की्‌ आयु्‌
प्रापत्‌ कर्‌ ली्‌ होती, जो्‌ भी्‌ पहले्‌ समापत्‌
हो, पाररिाररक्‌ पेंशन्‌ मूल्‌ िेतन्‌ की्‌ आधी्‌
अर्थिा्‌ इस्‌ योजना्‌ के्‌ अधीन्‌ अन्यर्था्‌ देय्‌
धनराभश्‌
का्‌
दुर्ुना, जो्‌
भी्‌
कम्‌
हो्‌
के्‌
बराबर्‌ होर्ी।"

25. Upon a conjoint reading of
paragraph 3 (ka) and paragraph 4 thereof, it
is evident that while eligibility for grant of
Family Pension has been made available to
such employees who have rendered at least
one year's continuous service, paragraph 4
pertains to the methods and procedure
regarding calculation for grant of such
benefits.

26. Thus, it is quite evident that a
material change was effected by State
Government by notification of Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 by bringing down
the eligibility of service from twenty years
to one year.
400 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

27. So far as the case of petitioner is
concerned,
since
petitioner's
husband
passed away in January, 1977, evidently
petitioner's case was required to be seen in
light
of
Government
Order
dated
17.12.1965 but it is only due to subsequent
Government Order dated 16.06.1984 when
Government Order dated 31.03.1982 has
been made retrospective in application that
her case may be required to be seen in that
context.

28. It is settled law that where a
provision has been enacted or notified
which is in the nature of a beneficial
provision, widest amplitude is required to
be given to such provision for it to achieve
the object for which it was notified. Giving
a narrow meaning to a beneficial provision
even where two results are possible, would
naturally defeat the very object for which
such a beneficial provision has been
enacted.

29. Regarding such a proposition,
Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
K.H. Nazar versus Mathew K. Jacob and
others reported in (2020) 14 SCC 126 has
held as follows:-

"11. Provisions of a beneficial
legislation have to be construed with a
purpose-oriented approach. The Act should
receive a liberal construction to promote
its objects. Also, literal construction of the
provisions of a beneficial legislation has to
be avoided. It is the court's duty to discern
the intention of the legislature in making
the law. Once such an intention is
ascertained, the statute should receive a
purposeful or functional interpretation.

12. In the words of O. Chinnappa
Reddy, J., the principles of statutory
construction of beneficial legislation are as
follows: (Workmen case SCC p. 76, para 4)

"4. The principles of statutory
construction are well settled. Words
occurring in statutes of liberal import such
as 'social welfare legislation and human
rights' legislation are not to be put in
Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian
dimensions. In construing these legislations
the imposture of literal construction must
be avoided and the prodigality of its
misapplication must be recognised and
reduced.
Judges
ought
to
be
more
concerned with the "colour", the "content"
and the "context" of such statutes (we have
borrowed
the
words
from
Lord
Wilberforce's
opinion
in
Prenn
v.
Simmonds. In the same opinion Lord
Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to
be left behind in some island of literal
interpretation but is to enquire beyond the
language, unisolated from the matrix of
facts in which they are set; the law is not to
be interpreted purely on internal linguistic
considerations. In one of the cases cited
before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma
v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cumLabour Court, we had occasion to say:
(Surendra Kumar Verma case, SCC p. 447,
para 6)

'6. ... Semantic luxuries are
misplaced in the interpretation of "bread
and butter" statutes. Welfare statues must,
of necessity, receive a board interpretation.
Where legislation is designed to give relief
against certain kinds of mischief, the court
is not to make inroads by making
etymological excursions.' "

13. While interpreting a statute,
the problem or mischief that the statute was
designed to remedy should first be
identified and then a construction that
suppresses the problem and advances the
remedy should be adopted. It is settled law
that exemption clauses in beneficial or
social welfare legislations should be given
strict construction. It was observed in
8 All. Smt. Chandrakanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
401
Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram
Kowshik that the exclusionary provisions in
a beneficial legislation should be construed
strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to
the principal object of the legislation and to
prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds.
Similarly, in Minister Administering the
Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land
Council, Kirby, J. held that the principle of
providing
purposive
construction
to
beneficial
legislations
mandates
that
exceptions in such legislations should be
construed narrowly."

30. The aspect of interpretation of a
particular provision as to whether it is to be
given a restrictive or a wider meaning has
also been considered by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in the case of X. versus
Principal Secretary, Health and Family
Welfare Department, Government of
NCT of Delhi and another reported in
(2023) 9 SCC 433. Relevant paragraphs of
the judgment are as under :-

"31. The cardinal principle of the
construction of statutes is to identify the
intention of the legislature and the true
legal meaning of the enactment. The
intention of the legislature is derived by
considering the meaning of the words used
in the statute, with a view to understanding
the purpose or object of the enactment, the
mischief, and its corresponding remedy
that the enactment is designed to actualise.
Ordinarily, the language used by the
legislature is indicative of legislative intent.
In
Kanai
Lal
Sur
v.
Paramnidhi
Sadhukhan, Gajendragadkar, J. (as the
learned Chief Justice then was) opined that
"the first and primary rule of construction
is that the intention of the legislature must
be found in the words used by the
legislature itself". But when the words are
capable
of
bearing
two
or
more
constructions, they should be construed in
light of the object and purpose of the
enactment. The purposive construction of
the provision must be "illumined by the
goal, though guided by the word". Aharon
Barak opines that in certain circumstances
this may indicate giving "an unusual and
exceptional meaning" to the language and
words used.

34. In Principles of Statutory
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, it is
stated that a statute must be read in its
context when attempting to interpret its
purpose. Context includes reading the
statute as a whole, referring to the previous
state of law, the general scope of the
statute, surrounding circumstances and the
mischief that it was intended to remedy.
The treatise explains that:

"For ascertaining the purpose of
a statute one is not restricted to the internal
aid furnished by the statute itself, although
the text of the statute taken as a whole is
the
most
important
material
for
ascertaining
both
the
aspects
of
"intention". Without intending to lay down
a precise and exhaustive list of external
aids, Lord Somervell has stated: "The
mischief against which the statute is
directed and, perhaps though to an
undefined
extent
the
surrounding
circumstances can be considered. Other
statutes in pari materia and the state of the
law at the time are admissible." These
external aids are also brought in by
widening the concept of "context" " as
including
not
only
other
enacting
provisions of the same statute, but its
Preamble, the existing state of the law,
other statutes in pari materia, and the
mischief which the statute was intended to
remedy". In the words of Chinnappa Reddy,
J.:"Interpretation must depend on the text
and the context. They are the bases of
interpretation. One may well say if the text
402 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is the texture, context is what gives colour.
Neither
can
be
ignored.
Both
are
important. That interpretation is best which
makes the textual interpretation match the
contextual. A statute is best interpreted
when we know why it was enacted."

35.
The
rule
of
purposive
interpretation was first articulated in
Heydon case in the following terms: (ER p.
638)

"...for
the
sure
and
true
interpretation of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the common law), four things
are to be discerned and considered:

1st. What was the common law
before the making of the Act.

2nd. What was the mischief and
defect for which the common law did not
provide.

3rd. What remedy Parliament
hath resolved and appointed to cure the
disease of the commonwealth.

And, 4th. The true reason of the
remedy; and then the office of all the
Judges is always to make such construction
as shall suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of
the mischief, and pro privato commodo,
and to add force and life to the cure and
remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico."

7.
A
catena
of
decisions
emanating from this Court, including
Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v.
Fancy Food, Bharat Singh v. New Delhi
Tuberculosis
Centre,
Bombay
Anand
Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., Union of
India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, settle
the proposition that progressive and
beneficial legislation must be interpreted in
favour of the beneficiaries when it is
possible to take two views of a legal
provision."

31. From examination of law
enunciated in paragraph 35 of the judgment
therefore
the
aspect
required
to
be
examined is the law prior to notification of
the Government orders at the defect which
was sought to be rectified. In the present
case, the law prior to notification of the
Government
Order
dated
16.06.1984
clearly excluded the families of all such
persons from family pension, who had
passed away prior to rendering 20 years of
service. The defect therein clearly was with
regard to grant of such beneficial provision
to families of those persons who passed
away prior to rendering such stipulated 20
years of service. The said aspect is clearly
indicated in the Government Order and it is
this defect which has been sought to be
removed in order to protect the livelihood
of families who sole bread earner has
passed away suddenly even prior to
rendering the stipulated years of service.

32. Upon applicability of aforesaid
judgments
in
present
facts
and
circumstances of the case, it is quite
evident that in case Government Order
dated 16.06.1984 is considered to have a
retrospective applicability of Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 only in cases
where the employee or his dependents are
eligible in terms of Government Order
dated 17.12.1965, would give a very
restrictive meaning to such a clause and
would defeat the very purpose for which
Government Order dated 16.06.1984 had
been issued since it would exclude from its
purview all such persons who have passed
away in service without rendering 20 years
of service.

33. It is axiomatic that death of a
person is a fortuitous circumstance and is
not in any individual's hands. There may be
cases as in the present case where benefit
8 All. Smt. Chandrakanti Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
403
of a beneficial provision such as Family
Pension could not be availed of due to
sudden death of the sole bread earner prior
to rendering 20 years of service. It is in
such circumstances where the sole bread
earner has passed away that the provision
of Family Pension has been notified so as
the dependents of such sole bread earner
are not deprived of their livelihood.

34. It is the object and purpose of
grant of such a beneficial provision which
is required to be considered in the light so
as to give maximum benefit of the same.

35. The aspect of retrospectivity of
the Government Orders dated 31.03.1982
and 16.06.1984 can be examined in the
light of judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Vijay versus
State of Maharastra and others reported
in (2006) 6 SCC 289 wherein the following
had been held:-

"12. The appellant was elected in
terms of the provisions of a statute. The right
to be elected was created by a statute and,
thus, can be taken away by a statute. It is now
well settled that when a literal reading of the
provision giving retrospective effect does not
produce absurdity or anomaly, the same
would not be construed to be only
prospective. The negation is not a rigid rule
and varies with the intention and purport of
the legislature, but to apply it in such a case
is a doctrine of fairness. When a law is
enacted for the benefit of the community as a
whole, even in the absence of a provision, the
statute may be held to be retrospective in
nature. The appellant does not and cannot
question the competence of the legislature in
this behalf."

36. In view of aforesaid, in the
considered
opinion
of
this
Court,
Government
Order
dated
16.06.1984
cannot be made restrictive once it has itself
applied
Government
Order
dated
31.03.1982 retrospectively in its entirety.

37. It is also quite evident that
judgment
rendered
in
the
case
of
Chandrawati Devi (Smt.) (supra) has
thereafter been overruled in Smt. Shyam
Kali (supra) and was an aspect which was
not brought to the notice of coordinate
Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.
Phoolmati Devi (supra), which was the
genesis of entire exercise resulting in
passing of the impugned order.

38. A perusal of impugned order also
does not indicate any consideration of
aforesaid
aspects
particularly
the
retrospective application of Government
Order dated 31.03.1982 by means of
subsequent
Government
Order
dated
16.06.2084. The impugned order also does
not indicate any show cause notice having
been given to petitioner prior to passing of
such an order withdrawing a right which
had already vested in petitioner.

39. The aspect of adhering to
principles of natural justice prior to passing
of
an
order
having
adverse
civil
consequences or taking away a right vested
has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of D.K. Yadav versus
J.M.A. Industries Ltd. reported in (1993)
3 SCC 259. Relevant paragraphs of the
judgment are as under :-

"7. The principal question is
whether the impugned action is violative of
principles of natural justice. In A.K.
Kraipak v. Union of India a Constitution
Bench of this Court held that the distinction
between quasi-judicial and administrative
order has gradually become thin. Now it is
404 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
totally eclipsed and obliterated. The aim of
the rule of natural justice is to secure
justice or to put it negatively to prevent
miscarriage of justice. These rules operate
in the area not covered by law validly made
or expressly excluded as held in Col. J.N.
Sinha v. Union of India. It is settled law
that
certified
standing
orders
have
statutory force which do not expressly
exclude the application of the principles of
natural justice. Conversely the Act made
exceptions for the application of principles
of natural justice by necessary implication
from specific provisions in the Act like
Sections 25-F; 25-FF; 25-FFF etc. The
need for temporary hands to cope with
sudden and temporary spurt of work
demands appointment temporarily to a
service of such temporary workmen to meet
such exigencies and as soon as the work or
service is completed, the need to dispense
with the services may arise. In that
situation,
on
compliance
with
the
provisions of Section 25-F resort could be
had
to
retrench
the
employees
in
conformity therewith. Particular statute or
statutory rules or orders having statutory
flavour may also exclude the application of
the principles of natural justice expressly
or by necessary implication. In other
respects the principles of natural justice
would apply unless the employer should
justify its exclusion on given special and
exceptional exigencies.

8. The cardinal point that has to
be borne in mind, in every case, is whether
the person concerned should have a
reasonable opportunity of presenting his
case and the authority should act fairly,
justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not
so much to act judicially but is to act fairly,
namely, the procedure adopted must be
just, fair and reasonable in the particular
circumstances of the case. In other words
application of the principles of natural
justice that no man should be condemned
unheard intends to prevent the authority
from acting arbitrarily affecting the rights
of the concerned person.

11. The law must therefore be
now taken to be well-settled that procedure
prescribed for depriving a person of
livelihood must meet the challenge of
Article 14 and such law would be liable to
be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and the
procedure prescribed by a statute or
statutory rule or rules or orders affecting
the
civil
rights
or
result
in
civil
consequences would have to answer the
requirement of Article 14. So it must be
right, just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. There can be no
distinction
between
a
quasi-judicial
function and an administrative function for
the purpose of principles of natural justice.
The aim of both administrative inquiry as
well as the quasi-judicial inquiry is to
arrive at a just decision and if a rule of
natural justice is calculated to secure
justice or to put it negatively, to prevent
miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see
why it should be applicable only to quasijudicial inquiry and not to administrative
inquiry. It must logically apply to both.

14. It is thus well-settled law that
right to life enshrined under Article 21 of
the Constitution would include right to
livelihood. The order of termination of the
service of an employee/workman visits with
civil consequences of jeopardising not only
his/her livelihood but also career and
livelihood of dependents. Therefore, before
taking any action putting an end to the
tenure of an employee/workman fair play
requires that reasonable opportunity to put
forth his case is given and domestic inquiry
conducted complying with the principles of
natural justice. In D.T.C. v. D.T.C.
Mazdoor Congress the Constitution Bench,
per majority, held that termination of the
8 All. Bhairav Nath Singh & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
405
service of a workman giving one month's
notice or pay in lieu thereof without inquiry
offended Article 14. The order terminating
the service of the employees was set aside."

40. For aforesaid consideration and
discussions,
impugned
order
dated
11.05.2016 is hereby quashed by issuance of
a writ in the nature of Certiorari. A further
writ in the nature of Mandamus is issued
commanding the opposite parties to ensure
payment of Family Pension to petitioner as
provided vide order dated 03.09.2007 and in
continuation thereof. Actual payment thereof
and regular payment thereafter shall be
ensured within a period of eight weeks from
the date a certified copy of this order is
served upon opposite party no.2.

41. Resultantly, the petition succeeds
and is allowed. Parties to bear their own
costs.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 405
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ-A No. 38333 of 2016
With
Other Connected Cases

Bhairav Nath Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Kartikeya Saran

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

(A) Service Law - Regularization of Guest
Lecturers
in
Government
Industrial
Training Institutes - U.P. Government
Industrial Training Institute (Instructors)
Service Rules, 2014 - The Uttar Pradesh
Regularization of Persons Working On
Daily Wages or On Work Charge or On
Contract in Government Departments On
Group-C and Group-D posts (Outside The
Purview of the Uttar Pradesh Public
Service Commission) Rules, 2016 - For
regularization, it is essential for the
petitioners to establish that they have a
right for regularization in service under
any Rule, which provides regularization of
such appointees who have been engaged
under a particular scheme for a particular
period
-
Government
Order
dated
24.02.2016 and Rules of 2016 apply to
daily wage employees, including Guest
Lecturers. (Para - 14, 20,21,23,24,25)

Petitioners worked as Guest Lecturers in
Government Industrial Training Institutes -
Claimed regularization under Government Order
dated 24.02.2016 and Rules of 2016 - Orders
rejecting regularization challenged. (Para - 1 to
21)

HELD: - Petitioners entitled to consideration for
regularization under Government Order dated
24.02.2016 and Rules of 2016. Impugned
orders quashed. Fresh orders to be passed
within three months.(Para - 25,27,28)

Petitions allowed. (E-7)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri Ujjawal Satsangi
Advocate,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioners in Writ A No.8507 of 2024 and
he is holding brief of Shri Kartikeya Saran,
learned counsel for the petitioners in Writ
A Nos.38333 of 2016, 40833 of 2016,
44315 of 2016 & 51565 of 2016 and Smt.
Archana Tyagi, learned Additional Chief
Standing
Counsel
appearing
for
the
respondents.

2. All the aforesaid five writ petitions
have been filed by the petitioners, who are