# Smt. Farooqi Begum v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 1782
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-05
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 813 of 1975
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-farooqi-begum-v-state-of-u-p-50263
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Civil Law-The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950-Suit
for declaration that it is the owner of the
disputed grove and for a permanent
injunction
restraining
the
defendantappellant
from
interfering
in
its
possession-the grant was made only for
the user and benefit of Farooqi Begum and
only for the life time of Farooqi Begum
and
was
not
heritable-Defendantappellants have not filed any record of
rights duly maintained in their favour
under the revenue laws or rules of
erstwhile St.of Rampur noting their names
as intermediary-Farooqi Begum had user
and enjoyment right only for her life and
nothing more- She is not found to be
having any rights under old revenue laws
of St. of Rampur which could be converted
as bhumidhari or other right under U.P.
Z.A. & L.R. Act. (Para 14, 19 & 20)

Appeal dismissed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

Mohsin Ali Vs St.of M.P. & ors.(1975) 2 SCC

## Text

_Characters 0–39,199 of 47,913. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39199 for what follows._

1782 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
restored and consequently Original Suit
No. 13 of 1978 stands decreed.

40. Parties shall bear their own costs.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 1782
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Second Appeal No. 813 of 1975

Smt. Farooqi Begum ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Sunil Gupta, Sri Amit Krishna, Sri Anil
Krishna, Sri K.P. Upadhyaya, Sri M.K.
Pandey, Sri Murlidher, Sri R.P. Singh, Sri
Ravi Kant, Sri S.C. Agarwal, Sri S.P. Gupta,
Sri S.P. Singh, Sri V.D. Ojha, Sri Ashwath
Sitaraman, Ms. Pragya Pandey, Sri Mehul,
Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan (Sr. Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Civil Law-The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act,1950-Suit
for declaration that it is the owner of the
disputed grove and for a permanent
injunction
restraining
the
defendantappellant
from
interfering
in
its
possession-the grant was made only for
the user and benefit of Farooqi Begum and
only for the life time of Farooqi Begum
and
was
not
heritable-Defendantappellants have not filed any record of
rights duly maintained in their favour
under the revenue laws or rules of
erstwhile St.of Rampur noting their names
as intermediary-Farooqi Begum had user
and enjoyment right only for her life and
nothing more- She is not found to be
having any rights under old revenue laws
of St. of Rampur which could be converted
as bhumidhari or other right under U.P.
Z.A. & L.R. Act. (Para 14, 19 & 20)

Appeal dismissed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

Mohsin Ali Vs St.of M.P. & ors.(1975) 2 SCC
122.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan,
learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri
Ashwath Sitaraman, Ms. Pragya Pandey,
Mr. Mehul learned counsel for the
appellant,
Sri
Sanjay
Kumar
Singh
Additional Chief Standing Counsel along
with Sri Rishi Kant, Standing Counsel and
perused the record.

2. The facts of the case, as per the
plaint averments are that 20 Bighas, 10
Biswas (Pukhta) of Bagh Huzoor Pasand
situated in village-Thotar, Tehsil Sadar,
District Rampur was given as a grant to
Farooqi Beguam, defendant-appellant, one
of the begums of H.H. Nawab Hamid Ali
Khan, Nawab of Rampur State, by a deed
dated 17.04.1924. Similar grants were
made in favour of other begums of Nawab.
The said grants were resumable at pleasure
and after death of Nawab Hamid Ali Khan
in 1930, his successor Nawab Raza Ali
Khan resumed all grants in favour of all
widows of his father, including that in
favour of Farooqi Begum. The possession
was taken over by the State authorities and
the same was duly recorded in the relevant
papers and thus, the grove concerned stood
recorded in the name of State (Shamil
Khalasa). Farooqi Begum and her servants,
through collusion with revenue officers, got
her name entered in the Patwari's record,
though, she was out of possession and an
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1783
entry thereof was already effected in the
register muafiat, specially maintained by
erstwhile Rampur State for this purpose.
The land ultimately got vested in State of
U.P. at the time of merger and horticulture
department of the State of U.P. has been
selling its bahar. The defendant-appellant,
on the basis of her name illegally entered in
the revenue record, started interfering in the
possession of the State and was claiming its
ownership. The State of U.P. took steps for
correction of the revenue records but it was
declined on the ground that it is not
possible in summary proceedings as it is a
long standing entry. Thus, the State of U.P.
filed the present suit for declaration that it
is the owner of the disputed grove and for a
permanent
injunction
restraining
the
defendant-appellant from interfering in its
possession. It also claimed damages/mesne
profit and in the alternate it prayed for
possession, if it is found out of possession.
Farooqi Begam, the sole defendant, filed
written
statement
denying
the
plaint
allegations, except that proceedings before
the Revenue Court culminated in her
favour and claimed that she is continuously
in possession since 1924. She also claimed
ownership prior to extension of U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Act, 1950 (U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act) on the
basis of deed of 1924. Further, after its
extension to Rampur State she claimed to
have acquired rights of a bhumidhar. She
also claimed that proceedings for ejectment
against Laddan Khan were initiated by her,
and since State was a party, thus is barred
by estoppel from filing the said suit. She
also raised other formal pleas. The suit was
decreed by the Trial Court. The appeal filed
against the same was remanded for fresh
trial by the appellate court, by order dated
08.09.1971, after allowing application to
amend the written statement. The Trial
Court again heard the suit and decreed the
same on 01.05.1973. Civil Appeal filed
against the same was dismissed by
judgment dated 06.03.1975. Second Appeal
No.813 of 1975 filed by the defendantappellant before this Court was also
dismissed by judgment dated 21.07.2006.
Against the same an SLP was filed in
Supreme Court which was granted and
converted in Civil Appeal No.1534 of
2009, and finally the second appeal was
remanded back to the High Court by the
Supreme Court by its judgment dated
12.07.2022. Thus, the present second
appeal is before this Court. Farooqi Begum
expired during pendency of second appeal
and her only daughter, who was substituted,
also expired and now daughter's sons are
appellants before this Court.

3. Ms. Nitya Ramkrishnan, learned
Senior Advocate for the appellant has
raised three legal submissions before this
Court for challenging the judgments of
Trial Court and Appellate Court. The same
are:-

(i) The deed dated 17.04.1924 is a
gift-deed
under
Mohammadan
Law
(Hibanama) executed by a husband in
favour of his wife, and is irrevocable.

(ii) Even presuming the deed is a
grant by the State of Rampur, since the
same was never resumed, the suit is liable
to fail.

(iii) After U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act
was extended to State of Rampur, Farooqi
Begum
became
Bhumidhar
with
transferable rights of the grove in dispute
and thus appellants, having inherited
bhumidhari rights, cannot be acquitted
thereafter.

4. Since, first and second submissions
of defendant-appellant relate to the nature
of deed dated 17.04.1924, hence, they are
1784 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
being considered together. Learned counsel
for the defendant-appellant emphatically
argued that the deed dated 17.04.1924 is in
fact a gift-deed under Mohammadan Law
(Hibanama) executed by a husband in
favour of his wife and is an irrevocable
document. In the alternative, she submits
that presuming that the first submission is
not accepted and the deed is treated to be a
grant, even then, the same was never
revoked by any of the Nawabs or the State
Government and, hence, continues to be in
force till date.

5. The defendant-appellant initially
had
filed
the
written
statement
on
13.02.1964. At that time, no case of the
deed being a Hibanama was setup. Later
the written statement was amended vide
order dated 08.09.1971 and following
paragraphs were added in the written
statement:-

"5-A That the property in dispute
was mafi La Khira 'revenue free grant' of
the defendant. The allegations in the plaint
that the defendant was the rent free grantee
of the grove was not correct.

5-B. That the grove in suit was
gifted to the defendant absolutely by the
then Ruler of the erstwhile Rampur State on
17.4.1924 through the Sanad Mafi without
imposing any restriction or condition for its
resumption or otherwise. Therefore, it was
not resumable and could not be resumed,
and it was not resumed at any time.

5-C. That in case the court is of
opinion that the grove in suit was rent free
grant (which the defendant does not admit),
even in such case the grant was not
resumable under the law by the successors
of the grantor and as such could not be
resumed, the right to resume if any being
lost long before 1930. The suit of the
plaintiff is not maintainable."

6. A perusal of the written statement,
as
it
stood
initially
or
even
after
amendment, shows that no case of the said
deed being a Hibanama is pleaded by the
defendant-appellant. The best case pleaded
in the amended paragraph-5B by the
defendant-appellant is that it was a gift to
the defendant-appellant by the then ruler of
erstwhile Rampur State through Sanad
Mafi without imposing any restriction or
condition and was thus not resumable, and
it was not resumed at any time. There is no
pleading that the deed was a Hibanama
under personal law or a gift by a husband to
his wife under personal law. In absence of
such a pleading it is not open for the
defendant-appellant to argue at this stage
that the deed is a Hibanama. Even
otherwise following issues were framed
between the parties:-

"1. Whether the grant in favour
of the defendant was resumed in 1930 as
alleged in para no.3 of the plaint?

2.
Whether
the
plaintiff's
predecessor, the Rampur State entered into
possession of the grove in suit after
resuming the grant?

3. Whether the suit is within
time?

4. Whether the suit has been overvalued?

5.
Whether
this
court
has
jurisdiction to try this suit?

6. Whether the suit is barred by
order 21 rule 103 CPC?

7. Whether the suit is barred by
Section 42 of Specific Relief Act?

8. What is the correct amount of
damages, if any, recoverable from the
defendant?

9.
Whether
the
defendant
acquired Bhumidari rights in the grove in
suit on enforcement of the U.P. Zamindari
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1785
Abolition and Land Reforms Act in this
area, and is not liable to ejectment?

10. To what relief, if any, is the
plaintiff entitled?

11. Whether the property in suit
was revenue free grant (Muafi Lakheraj) of
the defendant?

12. Whether the grove in suit was
gifted to the defendant absolutely on
17.4.24 by the then ruler of Rampur State
through Sanad Muafi without imposing any
restriction or condition for its resumption?

13. Whether the grant in any case
was not resumable under the law by the
successor of the grantor and the right to
resume if any, has been lost before 1930.

14.
Is
the
suit
barred
by
estoppel?" (emphasis added)

7. There is no issue framed with
regard to any gift deed under Personal Law.
Nearest issue on gift framed is issue no.12.
The same is not claiming a gift under
Personal Law but a gift by the ruler through
Sanad Muafi. Further, only evidence given
by defendant-appellant with regard to
hibanama is in her second oral statement
made on 29.03.1973, after amendment of
written statement, wherein she states -

"ब्याि स्कया स्क मुकदमें वाले बाग की मैं मास्लक
ह ूँ। मेरे शौहर हास्मद अली खाुं िे स्हबा स्कया। मैिे अपिे बहिोई
करिल मुहम्मद अली खाुं से कहा स्क आप इसका इन्िेजाम करे।
िवाब साहब िे िूर जहाुं बेगम को अब्बास वाला बाग स्दया िा।
हमिे कहा आपिे हमें कुछ िहीं स्दया िो कहा स्क हम हुजूर पसुंद
बाग आपको स्हबा करिे है। मैिें स्हबा कबूल स्कया और अपिे
बहिोई के इन्िेजाम में दे स्दया। िवाब साहब िे कुछ िहरीर स्लख
कर दी जो फाइल में दास्खल कर दी। िूर जहाुं बेगम हमारी सौि
िी स्जिका इन्िकाुंल हो गया। जब से बाग पर मेरा कब्जा रहा मै
खेिी करािी रही और करािी ह ूँ। जब िक किषल मुहम्मद अली
खाुं हयाि रहे मेरी िरफ से इन्िेजाम करिे रहे। उिके इन्िकाल के
बाद से मै इन्िेजाम कर रही ह ूँ। बाग में मेरा डेरा बिा हुआ है।

स्जस वक्त िवाब साहब िे कहा स्क हमिे बाग हुजूर
पसुंद िुम्हारे िाम स्हबा स्कया उस वक्त िा कुछ कहा, फरमाि
जारी स्कया गया। िवाब साहब के फरमाि गजट में होिे िे। यह
फरमाि गजट में िही छपा इसकी वजह मै कुछ िही बिा
सकिी।"

8. In the oral statement it is claimed
by defendant-appellant that an oral gift
was made by a husband to his wife,
followed by deed executed by the
husband, which was filed. As already
found above, neither any case of oral gift
is setup in the pleadings nor any such
issue is framed. Law does not permit any
evidence beyond the pleadings and
issues. The
oral
statement
is
also
incorrect and unreliable, as the deed
dated 17.04.1924 is executed by the chief
secretary of Rampur State and not by
Nawab Sahab, as claimed in the oral
statement. No other hibanama executed
by Nawab Sahab is filed. Relevant
portion of the deed dated 17.04.1924 in
vernacular
along
with
its
english
translation as produced by the appellant
and not disputed by the State reads:-

"Bagh Huzur Pasand Farooqui
Begum Sahiba ko ata kiya jata hai. Qubza
bagh par karnel commandant Mohammad
Ali Khan Bahadur Brigade commander ko
dila diye jaye kyonke ye bagh unke zere
intezam rahega. Is bagh me 130 bigha
aarazi khaam hai magar Farooqui Begum
Sahiba ko 82 bigha aarazi khaam us men
se di jata hai. Ye is liye ke baagh Abbas
khan wala ke masaawi rahe jo haal men
Nur Jahan Begum Saahiba ko ata hua hai.
Baqiya aaraazi Baaghe-e mazkur ki ba
intezaam sarishta-e-baaghaat ba dastur
rahe gi. Sanad Daarul Insha se di jaye.
Ahkaam-e-zaabita jaari hon.

By Order Sd/- Chief Secretary"
1786 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Its English Translation reads:

"Bagh Huzur Pasand is bestowed
upon (ata) Farooqui Begum Sahiba. Col
Commandant Mohammad All Khan is
handed over this orchard so that this
orchard will be under his management. The
orchard consists of 130 bigha Kham land.
However, Farooqui Begum Sahiba is given
82 bigha Kham land from the same in order
to keep it at par with Bagh Abbas Khan
which has been granted to Noor Jahan
Begum Sahiba recently. The remaining land
of the said orchard will remain under the
management of Horticulture department as
usual. Certificate may be issued as per rule
from the record office.

By Order Sd/- Chief Secretary"

9. A perusal of the same demonstrates
that it is an order passed and signed by the
Chief Secretary of the state in file number
3/28, in a Ijlas (Court or Sitting of
respectable persons). The deed states that
the Bagh Huzoor Pasand is given (ata) to
Farooqi Begum Sahiba and possession is to
be given to Colonel Commandant Mohd.
Ali. Out of 130 Beegha (kham) of Bagh, 82
Beegha (kham) is given and the remaining
land was kept under the management of
Horticulture Department. The deed further
states that the certificate may be issued as
per rule from the record office. The same
cannot by any stretch of imagination be
called a gift deed by a husband to his wife
under personal law. It is an official
document executed by the Chief Secretary
of the state in official proceedings, making
a grant on part of State of Rampur in favour
of Farooqi Begum Sahiba. Claim in the oral
statement that possession of the Bagh was
given after making an oral hiba and the
management of the same was given by the
appellant-defendant to her brother in law is
contrary to the deed, which is admitted and
relied upon by both the parties, and cannot
be
believed.
Thus,
submission
of
defendant-appellant with regard to any oral
or written gift under any personal law is not
found sustainable.

10. The next question is the nature of
the deed dated 17.04.1924. It is already
held above the same cannot be termed as a
Hibanama under the Mohammadan Law.
As already noted above, the deed grants
(ata) 82 Bheegas (kham) out of 130 Bighas
(kham) of grove Huzoor Pasand to Farooqi
Begam Sahiba. The same is signed by the
Chief Secretary of the State in ijlas. The
reason for the grant provided is to maintain
parity, as another grove, namely, Abbas
Khan Wala, was granted (ata) to Noor
Jahan Begum Sahiba. From perusal of the
deed, it appears that for the status of begum
sahibas of Nawab Sahab, (the then ruler of
Rampur State), the Chief Secretary of the
then Rampur State granted different Baghs
to his Begums. The nature of a grant made
by an erstwhile Indian State or its ruler is
considered by a three Judges' Bench of the
Supreme Court in case of 'Mohsin Ali Vs.
State of M.P. and Others', reported in (1975)
2 SCC 122. Even the language of the
document executed in the said case is quite
parallel to the present case. In the said case,
Firman dated 24.10.1934 was issued by the
Nawab of Bhopal State, in appreciation of
life and distinguished service of Sir Liyakat
Ali, by which he gave to the later, in addition
to grant of pensions, the residential use of
house in question as 'Inayat Ata'. The dispute
was of interpretation of the said document.
Hence, it is necessary to have a closer look to
the facts and findings of the said judgment.
Relevant paragraphs of the said judgment
reads:-

"9. The original firman is in
Urdu. As rendered into English by the
courts below, it reads:
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1787

"Hon'ble
Motamid-u-Sultan
Nasir-ul-Mulk Syed Sir Liaqat Ali.

Looking into considerations with
gratitude your valuable services and
faithful sacrifices which you have rendered
for more than 30 years and considering the
economic condition of the State you have
served without remuneration for the last 2
years, your application (for pension) is
granted. You are granted permission to
retire in lieu of your valuable services from
1st October, 1934. You should hand over
charge of Mushir-ul-Muhami Rubkari Khas
to Honourable Shoeb Qureshi.

Besides that pension you are
entitled to receive under the Pension Rules
of the State Treasury, you are also entitled
to receive a sum of Rs 400 as monthly
pension from Treasury of Deorhi in lieu of
valuable services of Deodhi Khas and you
are (further) granted your residential house
situated at Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad, as
gift."

10. The original of the crucial
sentence, which has been underlined (in
bold type) reads:

"Aur aapka sakoonti makan
waqya Bara Mahal Shahjahanabad apko
inayat ataa kiya jata hai."

11. The firman was by order
published in the Bhopal Government
Gazette, dated October 31, 1934, under the
heading: "Pension to Aali Mortabat Sir
Syed Liaqat Ali Saheb". Rendered into
English, its material part runs thus:

"Now the said Hon'ble again
requests
for
grant
of
his
previous
application on account of rendering service
for more than thirty years. Hence His
Highness the Ruler of Bhopal Khuld-AllahMulkahum
considering
his
valuable
services and his faithful sacrifices that he
had served without remuneration for the
last two years, taking into consideration the
economic
condition
of
the
State.
Considering (all his valuable services) with
gratitude (His Highness the Ruler of State)
grants him permission to retire from 1st
November, 1934 and also grants him his
residential house situated at Bara Mahal
Shahjahanabad as gift."

His Highness the Ruler of Bhopal
State further orders that Hon'ble Syed Sir
Liaqat Ali Saheb be paid Rs 400 monthly
pension from the Treasury of Deorhi Khas
in respect of services of Deorhi Khas
besides his regular pension under the Rules
of the State Treasury for which he is
entitled to receive from the Treasury of
State."

12. The original of the underlined
sentence (in bold type), in the Gazette
Notification reads:

"Aur unko sakoonti makan waqya
Bara
Mahal
Shahjahanabad
inayat
marhmat pharmate hain."

13. It is to be noted that the
disposition evidenced by the firman, Ext. P1, is a tripartite grant made by an
autocratic
ruler
to
his
subject
in
recognition of long, meritorious services
rendered by the latter. This grant belongs to
the category of dispositions, which under
the English Common Law are known as
"Crown grants"

14. The tenor and language of the
Firman, particularly the words "aapko
inayat ataa kiya jata hai" unmistakably
mark it out as a sovereign grant. According
to Steingass' Persian-English Dictionary
"inayat" (Noun) signifies "a favour, a gift,
a present, a bounty"; and "ataa" (Verb)
means "to give, to confer a benefit or
present with". "Ataa" (Noun) implies
"giving, a present, gift, donation, favour, a
grant,
endowment,
concession;
consideration".

15. In the widest sense, "grant"
may comprehend everything that is granted
or passed from one to another by deed. But
1788 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
commonly, the term is applied to rights
created or transferred by the Crown, e.g.,
grants of pensions, patents, charters,
franchise (See Earl Jowtt's Dictionary of
English Law).

16. In England, contrary to the
ordinary rule applicable to grants by a
subject, grants by the Crown are usually
construed most favourably for the Crown.
The Rule in case of Royal Grants is that
general words will not pass prerogative
rights by implication.

17. This general rule is, however,
capable of important relaxations in favour
of the subject. If the intention of the
Sovereign is obvious from the document
which in precise, unequivocal terms defines
the extent and nature of the benefit
conferred, it must take effect. No question
of seeking extrinsic aid to its construction
arises. If the grant is for valuable
consideration it must be construed strictly
in favour of the grantee, for the honour of
the Sovereign and where two constructions
are possible, one valid and the other void,
that which is valid ought to be preferred,
for the honour of the Sovereign ought to be
more regarded than the Sovereign's profit.
Where, however, two interpretations may be
given to the grant, both of which are good,
that which is most favourable to the Crown
is in many cases preferred. (See Halsbury's
Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 7, paras
669 and 670, pp. 314-316).

18. These rules of interpretation
have been applied to sovereign grants in
India, also. (See Raja Rajinder Chand v.
Sukhi [AIR 1957 SC 286 : 1956 SCR 889 as
per S.K. Das, J. at p. 902] ; Gulabdas
Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat [6 IA 54 :
ILR 3 Bom 186 (PC)] ; Shekh Sultan Sani v.
Shekh Ajmodin [20 IA 50 : ILR 17 Bom 431
(PC)] ; Aziz-un-nissa v. Tassadduk Husain
Khan [28 IA 65 : ILR 23 All 324 (PC)] ;
Ram Narayan Singh v. Ram Saran Lal [AIR
1918 PC 203 : ILR 46 Cal 683 (PC) : 46 IA
88] )

19. It is in the light of the above
principles that we have to determine
whether by the firman, Ext. P-1, the Ruler
intended to grant a life-estate or an
absolute estate in the suit house."

11. The appellant in the said case
were heirs of Sir Liaqat Ali who claimed
the said document to be gift under Muslim
Law and, thus, an absolute transfer. The
same was strongly disputed by the other
side and it was claimed, amongst other, that
the last sentence of the Firman read along
with the preamble shows that the same
created a right of residence for life and not
an absolute and heritable ownership.
Considering the submissions, the Court
held:-

"23. We are not persuaded to
accept the appellant's contention that the
firman conveys, in precise and unequivocal
terms, full and absolute ownership of the
suit house to the grantee. In our opinion,
the language of the last sentence of the
firman, which is the sheet-anchor of this
contention, even by itself, does not
indubitably and unequivocally indicate that
the intention of the Ruler was to grant an
absolute estate. The firman is conspicuous
by the non-employment of any words
declaring that thenceforth the grantee
would have a heritable estate in the house
or that the grantor had transferred all his
rights in the property, absolutely in favour
of the grantee. There is no use of such
words that the grant would take effect as
"nasalan-dar-nasalan", "from generation
to generation" "to warsan, kaiam u
qaman" "to grantee and his heirs" etc.
pointing towards the creation of a heritable
estate. Even the use of such terms by itself,
has been held to be an inconclusive
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1789
indication of the grantor's intention to
confer absolute, heritable rights. Thus in
Gulabdas Jugjivandas case [6 IA 54 : ILR
3 Bom 186 (PC)] , despite a reference in
the sanad to the children or descendants' of
the grantee, the Judicial Committee held
that the grant had not been made "on terms
which would make them hereditary".

24. Again, in Shekh Sultan v.
Shekh Ajmodin, delivering the judgment of
the Board, Lord Hannen quoted with
approval, a minute dated March 15, 1922,
recorded by Sir Thomas Munro

"in which he states that the terms
in such document (sunnuds) 'for ever' from
generation to generation or in Hindu
grants, 'while the sun and moon endure',
'are mere forms of expression', and were
never supposed either by the donor or
receiver to convey the durability which they
imply or any beyond the will of the
Sovereign".

On the authority of another
minute recorded by Sir Thomas Munro, it
was further observed

"that while the seizure of private
property by the native princes would have
been considered unjust by the country,
Jagir grants were not regarded by the
people in the light of private property".

25. It is not necessary to multiply
authorities with regard to the construction
of such customary terms which could
possibly be indicative of the grantor's
intention to make a heritable grant,
because the firman Ext. P-1, is bereft of all
such terms. It will be sufficient to say that
the language of the firman does not in clear
and
unambiguous
terms
express
an
intention to create an absolute estate in
favour of the grantee and his heirs. The
firman has therefore to be construed in
accordance with the well established rule
of construction applicable to sovereign
grants.

26. Another cardinal canon of
interpretation to be borne in mind is, that
in order to ascertain the real intention of
the grantor, the firman has to be read as a
whole. It will not be correct - as the
appellants want us to do - to dissect the
firman into three water-tight compartments
or to read the last sentence of the firman
out of the context. It is also permissible to
consider the surrounding circumstances
and the occasion on which this grant was
made, as legitimate aids to construction of
the firman [see Gulabdas Jugjivandas v.
Collector of Surat [6 IA 54 : ILR 3 Bom
186 (PC)] ].

27. The occasion for the grant as
apparent from the preamble of the firman,
Ext. P-1, (reproduced in the Notification
Ext. P-2) was that the grantee Sir Liaqat
Ali,
having
attained
the
age
of
superannuation, was retiring with the
permission of the grantor, after putting in
"valuable" and "faithful" service for more
than thirty years including two years for
which he served without remuneration, in
view of the poor economic condition of the
State. An analysis of the firman will show
that it confers three-fold benefits on the
grantee. Firstly, it grants him such pension
as would be admissible under the Service
Rules. This he would draw from the State
Treasury. Secondly, in addition to the first,
it grants him pension at the rate of Rs 400
per month which the pensioner would be
entitled to draw from the Deodhi Treasury
i.e. the Privy Purse of the Ruler. Thirdly, it
grants him a beneficial interest in the
residential house, in these terms: "Aur
aapka sakoonti makan waqya Bara Mahal
Shahjahanabad apko inayat ataa kiya jata
hai".

28. As is indicated in the firman
(Ex. P-1), Notification (P-2) in making this
tripartite grant the Ruler was actuated by
considerations of gratitude for the valuable
1790 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
services rendered by the grantee. The
object
of
conferring
these
three-fold
benefits was the same, namely, to secure to
the
retiring
servant
a
handsome
maintenance and comfortable residence for
the rest of his life. In other words, all the
three benefits granted under this firman
were cognate benefits, arising out of the
same occasion, and made with the same
object in view viz. to enable the grantee to
live comfortably in retirement. These
related benefits could be compendiously
described as "retirement benefits". The
first
two
benefits
were
indisputably
pensionary benefits enuring only for the
lifetime of the grantee. All the three kindred
benefits, including the one in question,
were expressly meant for the person of the
grantee. This is clear from the word
"aapko" which means "to you" in the
phrase "aapko inayat ataa kiya jata hai".
The conjunction "aur" (and) at the
commencement of the last sentence of the
firman inextricably links the grant of
interest in the residential house, with the
pensionary
benefits
conferred
in
the
foregoing parts of the firman. In short, all
the three-fold benefits granted under this
firman are off-spring of the same genus.
The language of the firman relating directly
to the grant in question, therefore, takes its
colour from the preceding parts of the
firman relating to the pensionary benefits
conferred on the grantee for life. Thus, if
the crucial words quoted above, are
construed in the context of the akin grants,
and according to the general tenor of the
firman as a whole, it becomes clear that the
intention of the Ruler was to grant only a
right of residence limited to the lifetime of
the grantee, and not an absolute estate in
the house.

29.
The
surrounding
circumstances
also
confirm
the
interpretation adopted by us. The first such
circumstance was that at the time of the
grant, the grantee had no issue, nor any
near relation. Indeed, he died widowless
and issueless. In this context, coupled with
the omission of any words such as to
"grantee and his heirs" or "nasalan-darnasalan" indicating the grant to be
heritable, it would be reasonable to hold
that the grant was intended to be for life
only.

30.
There
is
yet
another
circumstance which points towards the
same conclusion. It is that at the time of the
grant the grantee was already residing in
the suit house. In this context, the word
"sakoonti" (residential) in the last part of
the firman used in association with
"makan" (house) assumes significance. It
suggests that the intention of the grantor
was to convey to the grantee no more than
a right of residence in the house which the
latter was already enjoying.

...................

33. The argument advanced on
behalf of the appellants: that the grant in
question was a "hiba" made in accordance
with Mohammedan law by one Muslim to
another, has been stated only to be rejected.
To all intents and purposes, it was a grant
made by an absolute Ruler to his subject
who
had
rendered
long,
meritorious
services, on the eve of his retirement.
Reference to Muslim law is therefore
misconceived. We may, however, say in
passing that even according to the
observations of the Privy Council relied
upon by the counsel, creation of an interest
limited in point of time, in the usufruct of
the property is not necessarily repugnant to
Muslim law."

12. As in the aforesaid case of Mohsin
Ali (supra), the Bagh in the present case
was also granted by the State of Rampur to
Farooqi Begum. There is no term used in
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1791
the entire grant which may show that the
State had withdrawn all its rights over the
Bagh or any such word which can be
construed as grant with heritable interest.
The grant notes that it is made to Farooqi
Begum as similar grant is also made to
another begum. The grant at best is for the
user and benefits of Begum Sahiba and
nothing more. There is nothing in the
document which can be read as withdrawal
by the Rampur State of all its right from the
said Bagh and/or surrender of all its rights
in favour of Farooqi Begum or creation of
any heritable interest in favour of Farooqi
Begum and her children. Therefore, as
already settled by Supreme Court in case of
Mohsin Ali (supra)1 that such a grant can
always be resumed by the State, as all
rights and powers of State, including the
power to resume the same, continued.
Farooqi Begum had right to enjoy the Bagh
for her life only, or till the will of the
sovereign.

13. Next submission of learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant is that the grant
was never resumed by the State of Rampur
or State of U.P. and there is no such
document on record. Learned counsel for
the appellant claims that the secondary
evidence, register and list submitted before
the Court to prove resumption, were not
properly proved and were not reliable
evidences. The said fact is strongly
disputed by the counsel for the State of U.P.
Learned counsel for the State of U.P. claims
that both the courts have given a finding
that the fact of resumption is proved from
the secondary evidence filed and the same,
being a concurrent finding of fact, can not
be disputed at the stage of second appeal.

14.
Before
considering
the
said
submission of parties, suffice is to say that,
as already held above, the grant was made
only for the user and benefit of Farooqi
Begum. The same was only for the life time
of Farooqi Begum and was not heritable.
Admittedly, Farooqi Begum expired during
pendency of the present second appeal and
thereafter, her daughter was substituted as
her legal heir who also expired and, now,
appellants before this Court are sons of the
said daughter. Neither the daughter nor the
present substituted heirs of late Farooqi
Begum have any right in the Bagh in
dispute. Therefore, no relief in their favour
can be granted. This fact was put during
course of argument to the senior counsel
for the appellant and disputing the same she
raised her third submission and claimed
that after extension of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act
on Rampur State, late Farooqi Begum
became a bhumidhar and her rights became
absolute. Thus, now heirs of late Farooqi
Begum are having absolute rights as
bhumidhars and they cannot be evicted
from the Bagh in dispute. This submission
will be considered later and first this Court
considers the submissions of appellant with
regard to secondary evidence filed by the
State of U.P. to prove resumption of bagh
by the next Nawab of Rampur.

15. For disputing the findings of the
original and appellate Courts with regard to
the secondary evidence submitted to prove
resumption of grant in 1930, Senior
Counsel
for
the
defendant-appellants
submits that the Muafiat register filed by
the State of U.P. was having loose papers
with entries made in different inks. For the
said purposes she has relied upon the oral
statement of Roop Kishore, arranger,
revenue records, who has stated that
normally on the first and last pages of such
register, a stamp is put and signature of
officer is made which is not found in the
register deposited before this Court. He
further states that register does not contain
1792 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
page numbers. Thus, the same cannot be
taken into account as it is not a reliable
document.

16. Admittedly, a fire had taken place
in which revenue records of former
Rampur State were destroyed. Therefore,
original orders of resumption of grant are
lost. A perusal of the register shows that all
the Muafiat grants of Rampur State and
their resumptions are noted in the said
register. It is not that the entry of
resumption with regard to disputed Bagh
Huzoor Pasand alone is made at the end of
the
register.
There
are
number
of
resumption entries, before and after the
entry of Bagh Huzoor Pasand, of same
period (1930), with regard to other Baghs
given to different begums also noted in the
said register. A mere fact that the entries are
made with different inks or some of its
pages are loose itself cannot be a reason to
disbelieve the register. The statement of
witness Roop Kishore that normally a
stamp is placed at the beginning and end of
the register or absence of page numbers in
itself is not a sufficient ground to disbelieve
the register as no other register containing
such stamps and signatures was filed before
the Court to prove any such prevalent
procedure. No rule was referred to under
which any such stamp or signatures was
required to be put. Even otherwise, witness
Roop Kishore only brought the register as
he was a clerk in the revenue department.
He also proved list of Munshi Gopinath. He
claimed that he was engaged in 1926 in
Muhafizkhana Mal of Rampur State. He
was removed in July, 1930 and re-engaged
in October, 1931 and is thus unaware of
developments of said period (July, 1930October, 1931). Till 1930 he was working
as extra weeder and did not perform any
other work. His re-engagement was with
garden department. Therefore, he was
never in charge of maintaining the disputed
register, rather of any revenue record. His
engagement in revenue department was
only as a weeder and he performed work of
making
bundles
of
weeding
files.
Therefore, his statement with regard to
manner of preparation and maintenance of
Muafi register being outside his domain of
work is not reliable. He was not even aware
as to which office maintained the said
register as he states that Muafi register
might be kept in early times in darulnisha
or Muhafizkhana. Therefore, he is only a
witness who brought record/register from
revenue department of State of U.P. and his
evidence can only be read to that extent. He
never maintained records of State of
Rampur and can not give evidence on
manner in which they were maintained.
Therefore, this Court does not find any
reason to disbelieve the finding of facts
given by both the original as well as
appellate Courts. An old register containing
details of all Muafiats of the State of
Rampur, including that of defendant,
cannot be disputed only on such flimsy
grounds, when contents of resumption of
other grants in favour of all such persons,
including other begums, is duly and
correctly noted.

17. Now for considering merit of the
submission of appellant-defendant with regard
to her bhumidhari rights, it is necessary to go
into the applicability of U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act
to the Rampur State. U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act
itself came into force w.e.f. 24.01.1951. At that
time, it was not applied on State of Rampur.
The same was made applicable to the
territories of the former Rampur State by
notification no. 3168/IA-599-1951, dated
30.06.1954 and estates were vested in State by
notification no. 3169/IA-599-1951, dated
01.07.1954 respectively. Relevant portions of
the said notifications read as follow:-
5 All. Smt. Farooqi Begum Vs. State of U.P.
1793
"Gazette Notification No.3168/I-A-5591951
Dated Lucknow, June 30, 1954

IN
exercise
of
the
powers
conferred by sub-clause (ii) of clause (e) of
sub-section (1) of section 2 of the Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P. Act No.I of 1951),
hereinafter referred to as the said Act, the
Governor, Uttar Pradesh is pleased to
direct that the said Act shall apply, subject
to the modifications and amendments
specified in the Schedule hereto annexed, to
the territories of the former Rampur State
as defined in the Rampur (Administration)
Order, 1949.

The Governor is further pleased to
order under sub-section (3) of section I of
the said Act, that this Act shall come into
force in the aforesaid territories with effect
from the date of this notification."
"Gazette Notification No.3169/I-A-5591951,
Dated Lucknow, July 1, 1954.

IN exercise of powers conferred
by sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 (U.P.