# Smt. Geeta Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 600
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-25
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 44649 of 2024
- **Bench:** Anish Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-geeta-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53939
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

Cr.P.C. if approached after approaching the
Revisional Court under Sections 397 or 399
Cr.P.C.

Headnotes
Maintainability-sec.
482
Cr.P.C.-
Preliminary objection for maintainability -
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not
dependent on any other provisions of the
Cr.P.C.- despite there being an express
provision under Sections 397(3) and 399(3)
Cr.P.C.- there cannot be a total ban on
power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.- merely because the
applicant has approached this Court after
having approached the Revisional Court
under Sections 397 or 399 Cr.P.C.- Section
482 Cr.P.C. application cannot be rejected on
this ground alone- facts of the caseabetment of suicide must be express and
cannot be implied- no express abetment to
suicide-impugned order- facts has been duly
appreciated
by
the
trial
court
before
rejecting the complaint case filed by the
applicant. Application dismissed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited

## Text

_Characters 0–39,955 of 47,388. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39955 for what follows._

600 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
but till date even the number has not been
allotted to the misc. case to the file of
application
u/s
340
Cr.P.C.,
present
application is disposed of with a direction
to the opposite party no.3-Consolidation
Officer, Phoolpur, District-Azamgarh to
decide the application of the applicant u/s
340 Cr.P.C., expeditiously.
---------
(2025) 9 ILRA 600
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANISH KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 44649 of 2024

Smt. Geeta Devi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Gaurav Singh Tomar, Subhash Gosain

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Issue for consideration
Regarding maintainability of Application u/s 482
Cr.P.C. if approached after approaching the
Revisional Court under Sections 397 or 399
Cr.P.C.

Headnotes
Maintainability-sec.
482
Cr.P.C.-
Preliminary objection for maintainability -
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are not
dependent on any other provisions of the
Cr.P.C.- despite there being an express
provision under Sections 397(3) and 399(3)
Cr.P.C.- there cannot be a total ban on
power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.- merely because the
applicant has approached this Court after
having approached the Revisional Court
under Sections 397 or 399 Cr.P.C.- Section
482 Cr.P.C. application cannot be rejected on
this ground alone- facts of the caseabetment of suicide must be express and
cannot be implied- no express abetment to
suicide-impugned order- facts has been duly
appreciated
by
the
trial
court
before
rejecting the complaint case filed by the
applicant. Application dismissed. (E-9)

Case Law Cited
1. Dharampal & Ors. vs. Ramshri : 1993 (1) SCC
435
2. Deepti alias Arati Rai vs. Akhil Rai & Ors. :
1995 (5) SCC 751
3. Rajathi vs C. Ganesan : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118
4. Krishnan and Another vs. Krihnaveni and
Another: AIR 1997 Supreme Court 987
5. Lakshmi Bai Patel vs. Shyam Kumar Patel :
2002 3 JT 409
6. Mohit vs. State of U.P. : 2013 (7) SCC 789
7. Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 718 of 2006
(Jagveer vs. State of U.P. and Another)
8. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra
[(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
9. Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1 SCC 43
10. Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 SCC (Cri)
10]
11. Prabhu Chawla v. State of Rajasthan, (2016)
16 SCC 30
12. Vijay v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 13
SCC 317
13. Kaisar Jaha v. S.P., Distt. Sultanpur, 2024
SCC OnLine All 6758
14. Vijay Singh vs. State of U.P. and 7 Others
(Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.No. 14485
of 2024)
15. Nandu Alias Nandlal vs. State of U.P. and 7
Others (Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
No. 2241 of 2025) dated 09.05.2025

List of Acts
1. Code of Criminal Procedure

List of Keywords
Sections 397 or 399 Cr.P.C.; Section 482
Cr.P.C.; preventing the abuse of the process of
court or securing the ends of justice;exercise
such power with self-restraint

Appearances of parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Gaurav Singh Tomar,
Subhash Gosain
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : G.A.
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
601
(Delivered by Hon'ble Anish Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. Heard Sri Subhash Gosain, learned
counsel for the applicant and and Sri
Rakesh Kumar Mishra, learned A.G.A. for
the State.

2. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed seeking
quashing of the order dated 09.10.2024
passed in Criminal Revision No. 02 of
2024 (Smt. Geeta Devi vs. State of U.P.
and Others) as well as the order dated
20.12.2023 passed in Complaint Case No.
173 of 2022 (Smt. Geeta Devi vs. Sunil
Kumar and Others) under Sections 306,
504, 506, 388 I.P.C. and under Section 203
Cr.P.C., P.S.- Kotwali Orai, District-
Jalaun.

3. Learned A.G.A. has raised a
preliminary objection with regard to the
maintainability of the instant application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as the applicant
had already availed the remedy of revision
under Section 397 Cr.P.C. and the said
criminal revision was rejected. Relying
upon the provisions of Section 397(3) as
well as 399(3) Cr.P.C., learned A.G.A.
submits that the second revision is barred
under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Thus, the Application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is nothing else but a second
revision, which is specifically barred in the
Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore,
where there is a specific statutory bar the
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., cannot
be exercised.

4. In support of his submissions,
learned A.G.A. has relied upon the
judgments
of
the
Apex
Court
in
Dharampal & Ors. vs. Ramshri : 1993
(1) SCC 435, Deepti alias Arati Rai vs.
Akhil Rai & Ors. : 1995 (5) SCC 751 and
also Rajathi vs C. Ganesan : 1999 SCC
(Cri) 1118.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the
applicant relying upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Krishnan and Another vs.
Krihnaveni and Another: AIR 1997
Supreme Court 987, which is a threejudge Bench, submits that there can be no
fetters in the powers of the High Court
under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. Once, the
second revision is barred under the
provision of
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure, this Court has ample power to
entertain the application under Section 482
Cr.P.C., if there is a miscarriage of justice.
He has further relied upon the judgments in
Lakshmi Bai Patel vs. Shyam Kumar
Patel : 2002 3 JT 409.

6. Learned counsel for the applicant
has further relied upon the judgment of the
Apex Court in Mohit vs. State of U.P. :
2013 (7) SCC 789. He further places
reliance upon the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Criminal
Misc. Writ Petition No. 718 of 2006
(Jagveer vs. State of U.P. and Another),
wherein it is held that while exercising the
powers
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution
of
India,
the
evidence
available
on
record
cannot
be
reappreciated by this Court. Relying upon the
aforesaid observation, learned counsel for
the applicant submits that once the
Application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
was rejected and the criminal revision filed
against the same was also rejected, the
matter requires re-appreciation of evidence,
therefore, the remedy under Article 227 is
not available to the applicant herein.
Further, he submits that the remedy of
second revision is also barred under the
provisions of Section 397(3) and 399(3)
602 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Cr.P.C. In view thereof, learned counsel for
the applicant submits that where there is no
remedy available to the applicant in a
criminal case, the powers under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is unfettered and that can be
exercised by this Court, if there is a
miscarriage of justice.

7. In view thereof, learned counsel for
the applicant submits that the application
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the
applicant is maintainable.

8. Having heard the rival submissions
so made by learned counsel for the parties,
this Court has carefully gone through the
record of the instant case.

9. The brief facts of the instant case
are that the applicant herein filed an
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
against the opposite parties no. 2, 3 and 4,
alleging therein that the son of the applicant
herein was married to opposite party no.4.
Since after the marriage, the opposite party
no.4 used to quarrel with her son and used
to pressurize him to transfer his property in
her name and also bear the expenses of her
maternal
family
members.
In
her
application, she has also narrated various
incidents and finally, it has been alleged
that due to such torture and humiliation on
the part of the opposite party no.4 and her
family members, on 20.07.2021, at around
6:00 P.M., the son of the applicant herein
went to his room, however, in the morning,
when his room was not opened, then she
informed the police and the police opened
the door, and found that the son of the
applicant herein had committed suicide. It
is alleged that the opposite parties have
abetted the son of the applicant to commit
suicide and they are still threatening her for
false implication in false cases. The said
application was treated as a complaint case
and thereupon the statements of witnesses
under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. were
recorded. However, vide order dated
20.12.2023, the complaint case of the
applicant herein was rejected under Section
203 Cr.P.C. Aggrieved by the same, the
applicant herein had filed the Criminal
Revision No.2 (Smt. Geeta Devi vs. State
of U.P. and Others) before the District and
Sessions Judge, which has also been
rejected
vide
impugned
order
dated
09.10.2024.

10. On the aforementioned backdrop,
it has been submitted by learned A.G.A.
that since the applicant has already availed
the remedy of criminal revision, therefore,
an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is
not maintainable as the second revision is
impermissible in view of the provisions of
Sections 397(3) and 399(3) Cr.P.C.

11. Before proceeding further it would
be relevant to take note of the provisions of
Section 482 Cr.P.C. as well as Sections 397
and 399 Cr.P.C., which reads as under:

S. 397 Calling for records to
exercise powers of revision

(1) The High Court or any
Sessions Judge may call for and examine
the record of any proceeding before any
inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the
correctness, legality or propriety of any
finding. Sentence or order, recorded or
passed, and as to the regularity of any
proceedings of such inferior Court, and
may, when calling for such record, direct
that the execution of any sentence or order
be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on bail or
on his own bond pending the examination
of the record.
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
603

(2) The powers of revision
conferred by Sub-Section (1) shall not be
exercised in relation to any interlocutory
order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding.

(3) If an application under this
section has been made by any person
either to the High Court or to the Sessions
Judge, no further application by the same
person shall be entertained by the other of
them.

S. 399 Sessions Judge's powers
of revision

(1) In the case of any proceeding
the record of which has been called for by
himself the Sessions Judge may exercise all
or any of the powers which may be
exercised by the High Court under SubSection (1) of section 401.

(2) Where any proceeding by way
of revision is commenced before a Sessions
Judge under Sub-Section (1), the provisions
of Sub-Sections (2), (3), (4) and (5) of
section 401 shall, so far as may be, apply to
such proceeding and references in the said
subsections to the High Court shall be
construed as references to the Sessions
Judge.

(3) Where any application for
revision is made by or on behalf of any
person before the Sessions Judge, the
decision of the Sessions Judge thereon in
relation to such person shall be final and
no further proceeding by way of revision
at the instance of such person shall be
entertained by the High Court or any
other Court.

S. 482 Saving of inherent power
of High Court

Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect
to any order this Code, or to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice.

12.
From
the
perusal
of
the
aforementioned provisions, it is apparent
that Section 397(1) Cr.P.C. confers power
upon the High Court as well as the Sessions
Judge to call for records in exercise of
power of revision. However, sub-section
(2) of Section 397 Cr.P.C. limits the power
under this Section and restrained that the
said power cannot be exercised in relation
to an interlocutory order passed in any
appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings.
Sub-section (3) of Section 397 Cr.P.C.
further restrains and limits the power of
revision that once the application under
Section 397(1) has been made by any
person either before the High Court or the
Sessions Judge, no further application by
the same person can be entertained by the
either of them. Meaning thereby, the
second revision by the same person is
impermissible.

13. Similarly, sub-section (3) of
Section 399 Cr.P.C, also states that order
passed in a revision by the Sessions Judge
shall be final and no further proceedings by
way of revision at the instance of such
person shall be entertained by the High
Court or any other court. Thus, according
to the provisions of Section 399(3) Cr.P.C,
further proceedings against the revisional
order passed by the Sessions Judge are not
permissible to be entertained even by the
High Court or any other court.

14. Section 482 Cr.P.C. states the
inherent power of the High Court and
provides that nothing in this Code shall
limit or affect the inherent power of the
High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary:
604 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) to give effect to any order
under this Code;

(ii) to prevent abuse of the
process of any court; and

(iii) to secure the ends of justice.

15. Before proceeding further it would
be relevant to take note of some of the
judgements of the Apex Court in this
regard.

16 In Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551 : 1978
SCC (Cri) 10] the Three-Judge Bench was
to consider the scope of the power of the
High Court under Section 482 and Section
397(2) of the Code.

"6. The point which falls for
determination in this appeal is squarely
covered by a decision of this Court, to
which one of us (Untwalia, J.) was a
party in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana
[(1977) 4 SCC 137 : 1977 SCC (Cri)
585] . But on a careful consideration of
the matter and on hearing learned
Counsel for the parties in this appeal we
thought it advisable to enunciate and
reiterate the view taken by two learned
Judges of this Court in Amar Nath case
but
in
a
somewhat
modified
and
modulated form. In Amar Nath case as in
this, the order of the trial court issuing
process
against
the
accused
was
challenged and the High Court was asked
to quash the criminal proceeding either
in exercise of its inherent power under
Section
482
of
the
1973
Code
corresponding to Section 561-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 -
hereinafter called the 1898 Code or the
old Code, or under Section 397(1) of the
new Code corresponding to Section 435
of the old Code. Two points were decided
in Amar Nath case in the following terms:

(1) While we fully agree with the
view taken by the learned Judge that where
a revision to the High Court against the
order of the Subordinate Judge is expressly
barred under sub-section (2) of Section 397
of the 1973 Code the inherent powers
contained in Section 482 would not be
available to defeat the bar contained in
Section 397(2).

(2) The impugned order of the
Magistrate,
however,
was
not
an
interlocutory order.

7.
For
the
reasons
stated
hereinafter we think that the statement of
the law apropos Point No. 1 is not quite
accurate and needs some modulation. But
we are going to reaffirm the decision of the
Court on the second point.

8. Under Section 435 of the 1898
Code the High Court had the power to
"call for and examine the record of any
proceeding before any inferior criminal
court situate within the local limits of its ...
jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself ... as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order
recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such
inferior Court", and then to pass the
necessary orders in accordance with the
law engrafted in any of the sections
following Section 435. Apart from the
revisional power, the High Court possessed
and possesses the inherent powers to be
exercised ex debito justitiae to do the real
and
the
substantial
justice
for
the
administration of which alone Courts exist.
In express language this power was
recognized and saved in Section 561-A of
the old Code. Under Section 397(1) of the
1973 Code, revisional power has been
conferred on the High Court in terms which
are identical to those found in Section 435
of the 1898 Code. Similar is the position
apropos the inherent powers of the High
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
605
Court. We may read the language of
Section 482 (corresponding to Section 561A of the old Code) of the 1973 Code. It
says:

Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

At the outset the following
principles may be noticed in relation to the
exercise of the inherent power of the High
Court
which
have
been
followed
ordinarily
and
generally,
almost
invariably, barring a few exceptions:

(1) That the power is not to be
resorted to if there is a specific provision
in the Code for the redress of the
grievance of the aggrieved party;

(2) That it should be exercised
very sparingly to prevent abuse of process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the
ends of justice;

(3) That it should not be
exercised as against the express bar of law
engrafted in any other provision of the
Code."

9. In most of the cases decided
during several decades the inherent power
of the High Court has been invoked for the
quashing of a criminal proceeding on one
ground or the other. Sometimes the
revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
has also been resorted to for the same kind
of relief by challenging the order taking
cognizance or issuing processes or framing
charge on the grounds that the Court had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance and
proceed with the trial, that the issuance of
process was wholly illegal or void, or that
no charge could be framed as no offence
was made out on the allegations made or
the evidence adduced in Court. In the
background aforesaid, we proceed to
examine as to what is the correct position
of law after the introduction of a provision
like sub-section (2) of Section 397 in the
1973 Code.

10. As pointed out in Amar Nath
case the purpose of putting a bar on the
power of revision in relation to any
interlocutory order passed in an appeal,
inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to
bring about expeditious disposal of the
cases finally. More often than not, the
revisional power of the High Court was
resorted to in relation to interlocutory
orders delaying the final disposal of the
proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom
decided to check this delay by introducing
sub-section (2) in Section 397. On the one
hand, a bar has been put in the way of the
High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge)
for exercise of the revisional power in
relation to any interlocutory order, on the
other, the power has been conferred in
almost the same terms as it was in the
1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section
482, however, it would follow that nothing
in the Code, which would include subsection (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court", But, if we
were to say that the said bar is not to
operate in the exercise of the inherent
power at all, it will be setting at naught
one of the limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the revisional powers. In such
a situation, what is the harmonious way
out? In our opinion, a happy solution of
this problem would be to say that the bar
provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397
operates only in exercise of the revisional
power of the High Court, meaning thereby
that the High Court will have no power of
revision in relation to any interlocutory
order. Then in accordance with one of the
other principles enunciated above, the
606 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
inherent power will come into play, there
being no other provision in the Code for
the redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party. But then, if the order
assailed is purely of an interlocutory
character which could be corrected in
exercise of the revisional power of the
High Court under the 1898 Code, the
High Court will refuse to exercise its
inherent power. But in case the impugned
order clearly brings about a situation
which is an abuse of the process of the
Court or for the purpose of securing the
ends of justice interference by the High
Court
is
absolutely
necessary,
then
nothing contained in Section 397(2) can
limit or affect the exercise of the inherent
power by the High Court. But such cases
would be few and far between. The High
Court must exercise the inherent power
very sparingly. One such case would be the
desirability of the quashing of a criminal
proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously
or as being without jurisdiction. Take for
example a case where a prosecution is
launched
under
the
Prevention
of
Corruption Act without a sanction, then the
trial of the accused will be without
jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a
second trial, after proper sanction will not
be barred on the doctrine of autrefois
acquit. Even assuming, although we shall
presently show that it is not so, that in such
a case an order of the Court taking
cognizance or issuing processes is an
interlocutory order, does it stand to reason
to say that inherent power of the High
Court cannot be exercised for stopping the
criminal proceeding as early as possible,
instead of harassing the accused up to the
end? The answer is obvious that the bar
will not operate to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court and/or to secure the
ends of justice. The label of the petition
filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial.
The High Court can examine the matter in
an appropriate case under its inherent
powers. The present case undoubtedly falls
for exercise of the power of the High Court
in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973
Code,
even
assuming,
although
not
accepting, that invoking the revisional
power of the High Court is impermissible."

17. Following the aforesaid judgement
of Madhu Limaye (supra), the Apex
Court in Raj Kapoor v. State, (1980) 1
SCC 43, the Apex Court has observed as
under:

"10. The first question is as to
whether the inherent power of the High
Court under Section 482 stands repelled
when the revisional power under Section
397 overlaps. The opening words of Section
482 contradict this contention because
nothing of the Code, not even Section 397,
can affect the amplitude of the inherent
power preserved in so many terms by the
language of Section 482. Even so, a
general principle pervades this branch of
law when a specific provision is made: easy
resort to inherent power is not right except
under compelling circumstances. Not that
there is absence of jurisdiction but that
inherent power should not invade areas set
apart for specific power under the same
Code. In Madhu Limaye case [Madhu
Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4
SCC 551 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 : AIR 1978
SC 47] this Court has exhaustively and, if
I may say so with great respect, correctly
discussed and delineated the law beyond
mistake. While it is true that Section 482 is
pervasive it should not subvert legal
interdicts written into the same Code,
such, for instance, in Section 397(2).
Apparent conflict may arise in some
situations between the two provisions and
a happy solution would be to say that the
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
607
bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section
397 operates only in exercise of the
revisional power of the High Court,
meaning thereby that the High Court will
have no power of revision in relation to
any
interlocutory
order.
Then
in
accordance
with
one
or
the
other
principles enunciated above, the inherent
power will come into play, there being no
other provision in the Code for the redress
of the grievance of the aggrieved party.
But then, if the order assailed is purely of
an interlocutory character which could be
corrected in exercise of the revisional
power of the High Court under the 1898
Code, the High Court will refuse to
exercise its inherent power. But in case
the impugned order clearly brings about a
situation which is an abuse of the process
of the Court or for the purpose of securing
the ends of justice interference by the
High Court is absolutely necessary, then
nothing contained in Section 397(2) can
limit or affect the exercise of the inherent
power by the High Court. But such cases
would be few and far between. The High
Court must exercise the inherent power
very sparingly. One such case would be
the desirability of the quashing of a
criminal proceeding initiated illegally,
vexatiously
or
as
being
without
jurisdiction" [(1977) 4 SCC 551, 556, para
10 : AIR 1978 SC 47, 51]

In short, there is no total ban on
the exercise of inherent power where
abuse of the process of the court or other
extraordinary situation excites the court's
jurisdiction.
The
limitation
is
selfrestraint, nothing more. The policy of the
law is clear that interlocutory orders, pure
and simple, should not be taken up to the
High Court resulting in unnecessary
litigation and delay. At the other extreme,
final orders are clearly capable of being
considered in exercise of inherent power,
if glaring injustice stares the court in the
face. In between is a tertium quid, as
Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for
example, where it is more than a purely
interlocutory order and less than a final
disposal. The present case falls under that
category where the accused complain of
harassment through the court's process.
Can we state that in this third category the
inherent power can be exercised? In the
words of Untwalia, J.: (SCC p. 556, para
10)

"The answer is obvious that the
bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of
the process of the Court and/or to secure
the ends of justice. The label of the petition
filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial.
The High Court can examine the matter in
an appropriate case under its inherent
powers. The present case undoubtedly falls
for exercise of the power of the High Court
in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973
Code,
even
assuming,
although
not
accepting, that invoking the revisional
power of the High Court is impermissible."

I am, therefore clear in my mind
that the inherent power is not rebuffed in
the case situation before us. Counsel on
both sides, sensitively responding to our
allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that
the fanatical insistence on the formal filing
of a copy of the order under cessation need
not take up this court's time. Our
conclusion concurs with the concession of
counsel on both sides that merely because a
copy of the order has not been produced,
despite its presence in the records in the
court, it is not possible for me to hold that
the entire revisory power stands frustrated
and the inherent power stultified."

18. In Dharampal (supra), the
Division Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as under:
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"6. .............The Sessions Judge
had dismissed the said application on May
14, 1979. Section 397(3) bars a second
revision application by the same party. It is
now well settled that the inherent powers
under Section 482 of the Code cannot be
utilised for exercising powers which are
expressly barred by the Code. Hence the
High Court had clearly erred in entertaining
the second revision at the instance of
respondent 1. On this short ground itself,
the impugned order of the High Court can
be set aside."

19. In Deepti alias Arati Rai (supra),
the Division Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as under:

"4. ..................It should have also
applied its mind to the aspect that second
revision application, after dismissal of the
first one by Sessions Court is not
maintainable and that inherent power
under Section 482 of the Code cannot be
utilised for exercising powers which are
expressly barred by the Code. As we find
that the order passed by the High Court is
not legal and just it will have to be set
aside.................."

20. In Krishnan (supra), the Three
Judges' Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as under:

"10. Ordinarily, when revision
has been barred by Section 397(3) of the
Code, a person - accused/complainant -
cannot be allowed to take recourse to the
revision to the High Court under Section
397(1) or under inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482 of the Code
since it may amount to circumvention of the
provisions of Section 397(3) or Section
397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High
Court has suo motu power under Section
401
and
continuous
supervisory
jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code.
So, when the High Court on examination
of the record finds that there is grave
miscarriage of justice or abuse of the
process of the courts or the required
statutory procedure has not been complied
with or there is failure of justice or order
passed or sentence imposed by the
Magistrate requires correction, it is but
the duty of the High Court to have it
corrected at the inception lest grave
miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is,
therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to
prevent abuse of the process that the High
Court is preserved with inherent power
and would be justified, under such
circumstances, to exercise the inherent
power and in an appropriate case even
revisional power under Section 397(1) read
with Section 401 of the Code. As stated
earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as
to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure,
unnecessary delay in trial and protraction
of proceedings. The object of criminal trial
is to render public justice, to punish the
criminal and to see that the trial is
concluded expeditiously before the memory
of the witness fades out. The recent trend is
to delay the trial and threaten the witness
or to win over the witness by promise or
inducement. These malpractices need to be
curbed and public justice can be ensured
only when trial is conducted expeditiously.

21. In Rajatjhi (supra), the Division
Bench of the Apex Court has followed the
judgement
in
Krishnan
(Supra)
and
observed as under:

11. In the present case, the High
Court minutely examined the evidence and
came to the conclusion that the wife was
living separately without any reasonable
cause and that she was able to maintain
herself. All this the High Court did in
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
609
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of
the Code which powers are not a
substitute for a second revision under subsection (3) of Section 397 of the Code. The
very fact that the inherent powers
conferred on the High Court are vast
would mean that these are circumscribed
and could be invoked only on certain set
principles."

22. In Laxshmi Bai Patel (supra), the
Division Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as under:

"(3) BEFORE taking up the
merits of the case, it would be proper to
consider the exercise of jurisdiction under
section 482 Cr. P.C. by the High Court in
the facts and circumstances of the case. In
a case where the sessions court exercising
revisional power under section 397(3)
Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition
by the aggrieved party, a second revision
petition about acceptance of the same party
is barred. The position is well-settled that
in such a case power under section 482
Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High
Court in rare cases and in exceptional
circumstances where the court finds that
permitting the impugned order to remain
undisturbed will amount to abuse of
process of the court and will result in
failure of justice."

23. In Dhariwal Tobacco Products
Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 2
SCC 370, the Division Bench of the Apex
Court has observed as under:

"6.
Indisputably
issuance
of
summons is not an interlocutory order
within the meaning of Section 397 of the
Code. This Court in a large number of
decisions beginning from R.P. Kapur v.
State of Punjab [AIR 1960 SC 866] to Som
Mittal v. Govt. of Karnataka [(2008) 3 SCC
574 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2008) 1 SCC
(L&S) 910] has laid down the criterion for
entertaining an application under Section
482. Only because a revision petition is
maintainable, the same by itself, in our
considered opinion, would not constitute a
bar for entertaining an application under
Section 482 of the Code. Even where a
revision application is barred, as for
example the remedy by way of Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this
Court has held that the remedies under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India would be available. (See Surya Dev
Rai v. Ram Chander Rai [(2003) 6 SCC
675] .) Even in cases where a second
revision before the High Court after
dismissal of the first one by the Court of
Session is barred under Section 397(2)
[Ed.: The intended provision seems to be
Section 397(3). In this regard See (1)
Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241
: 1997 SCC (Cri) 544; (2) Puran v.
Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC
(Cri) 1124; (3) Kailash Verma v. Punjab
State Civil Supplies Corpn., (2005) 2 SCC
571 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 538.] of the Code,
the inherent power of the Court has been
held to be available."

24. In Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013)
7 SCC 789, the Division Bench of the
Apex Court has observed as under:

"28. So far as the inherent power
of the High Court as contained in Section
482 CrPC is concerned, the law in this
regard is set at rest by this Court in a
catena of decisions. However, we would
like to reiterate that when an order, not
interlocutory in nature, can be assailed in
the High Court in revisional jurisdiction,
then there should be a bar in invoking the
inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. In
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
other words, inherent power of the Court
can be exercised when there is no remedy
provided
in
the
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure for redressal of the grievance.
It is well settled that the inherent power of
the Court can ordinarily be exercised
when there is no express provision in the
Code under which order impugned can be
challenged."

25. In Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30, the Three
Judges' Bench of the Apex Court has
observed as under:

6. In our considered view any
attempt to explain the law further as
regards the issue relating to inherent
power of the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is unwarranted. We would simply
reiterate that Section 482 begins with a non
obstante clause to state:

"482. Saving of inherent powers
of High Court.

.-Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

A fortiori, there can be no total
ban on the exercise of such wholesome
jurisdiction where, in the words of Krishna
Iyer, J.

"abuse of the process of the
court or other extraordinary situation
excites the Court's jurisdiction. The
limitation is self-restraint, nothing more".
(Raj Kapoor case [Raj Kapoor v. State,
(1980) 1 SCC 43 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 72] ,
SCC p. 48, para 10)

We venture to add a further
reason in support. Since Section 397
CrPC is attracted against all orders other
than interlocutory, a contrary view would
limit the availability of inherent powers
under Section 482 CrPC only to petty
interlocutory orders! A situation wholly
unwarranted and undesirable.

7.
As
a
sequel,
we
are
constrained to hold that the Division
Bench, particularly in para 28, in Mohit
[Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC 789
: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 727] in respect of
inherent power of the High Court in
Section 482 CrPC does not state the law
correctly.
We
record
our
respectful
disagreement."

26. In Vijay v. State of Maharashtra,
(2017) 13 SCC 317, the Division Bench of
the Apex Court has observed as under:

"7. After hearing the counsel and
also after perusing the impugned order, we
are of the considered opinion that the order
of the High Court has no legs to stand in
view of the law laid down by this Court in
Prabhu Chawla [Prabhu Chawla v. State of
Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 30] . In the
above referred case, in view of the
divergent opinions of this Court in
Dhariwal
Tobacco
Products
Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 : (2009)
1 SCC (Cri) 806] and Mohit v. State of
U.P. [Mohit v. State of U.P., (2013) 7 SCC
789 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 727] , the matter
was placed before the three-Judge Bench of
this Court. The three-Judge Bench took the
view that Section 482 CrPC begins with a
non obstante clause to state:

"482. Saving of inherent powers
of High Court.

-Nothing in this Code shall be
deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to
any order under this Code, or to prevent
9 All. Smt. Geeta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
611
abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

As Section 397 CrPC is attracted
against all orders other than interlocutory,
a contrary view would limit the availability
of inherent powers under Section 482
CrPC only to petty interlocutory orders! A
situation which is wholly unwarranted and
undesirable. The three-Judge Bench has
confirmed the law laid down by this Court
in Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd.
[Dhariwal Tobacco Products Ltd. v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 2 SCC 370 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 806]

8. In view of the above settled
law, mere availability of alternative
remedy cannot be a ground to disentitle
the relief under Section 482 CrPC and,
apart from this, we feel that the learned
Judge without appreciating any of the
factual and legal position, in a mechanical
way, passed the impugned order, which
warrants interference by this Court.
Accordingly, the order of the High Court is
set aside and the matter is remanded to the
High Court for reconsideration in the light
of the settled legal position."

27. In Kaisar Jaha v. S.P., Distt.
Sultanpur, 2024 SCC OnLine All 6758,
the Coordinate Bench has observed as
under:

"10. The two Judge Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court which decided
Vipin Sahni (Supra) after relying upon the
earlier two Judge Bench decision in the
case of Mohit (Supra), did not take note of
the three Judge Bench decision in the case
of Prabhu Chawla (Supra), which will
prevail over the two Judge Bench
decision. Thus the law as it exists now is
that there are no absolute restrictions on
the inherent powers of this Court and
availability of a remedy of filing a revision
would not create an absolute bar against
the inherent powers of this Court being
invoked. However, the inherent power can
be invoked only to make such orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Sanhita, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice."

28. In a recent judgement passed by
this Court in Vijay Singh vs. State of U.P.
and 7 Others (Application under Section
482 Cr.P.C.No. 14485 of 2024) dated
21.10.2024, the Coordinate Bench of this
Court has observed as under:

"10. Thus, it is clear that availing of
remedy of revision before Sessions Judge
under section 399 Cr.P.C. does not bar a
person from invoking power of High Court
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but High Court
should not act as a second Revisional
Court under garb of exercising inherent
powers. While exercising inherent powers
in such a matter, the High Court can
interfere only where it is satisfied that if
complaint is allowed to be proceeded with,
it would amount to abuse of the process of
Court or that interest of justice otherwise
call for quashing of the charges.