# Smt. Janki Bai v. District Judge, Jhansi and another

- **Citation:** (2005) 2 ILRA 624
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2005-07-04
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2036 of 1983
- **Bench:** S.U. Khan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-janki-bai-v-district-judge-jhansi-and-another-40498
- **Pages:** 3

## Headnote

S.C.

U.P.
Urban
Building
(Regulation
of
letting on Rent and Eviction Act 1972Section-21
(1-A)-Release
Applicationland already in possession of small
portion of tenanted accommodation-her
husband
in
governement
service
occupying
the
house
provided
by
employer-on the date of filing the
release application-was to retire after
four months-approch of Lower Appellate
Court
not
only
astonishment
and
shocking
but
against
well
settled
principle
of
law-accommodation
provided by employer-the status of
employee-become
as
tenant
such
possession can not be considered as
alternative accommodation.

Held: Para 3 and 4

The appellate court did not give any
weight to the fact that after about four
months of the filing of the release
application landlady's husband was to
retire and in fact retired. Even if need is
considered on the date of filing of the
release
application
there
was
no
occasion to deny the release on the
2 All] Smt. Janki Bai V. District Judge, Jhansi and another 625
ground of availability of the house
provided by the employer then his
position in only that of tenant and
possession of the house as tenant is not
to be considered as an alternative
accommodation available to the landlord
as held by the Supreme Court in G.K.
Devi Versus Ghanshyam Das, AIR 2000
SC 656

The judgment and order passed by the
lower
appellate
court
is
utterly
erroneous in law, based upon wholly
irrelevant consideration and arrived at
by
ignoring
relevant
material
and
circumstances.
AIR 2000 SC-656-relied on

## Text

INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
624
two shops. Even if both the shops had
been in occupation of one and the same
tenant, the court would have been obliged
to consider as to whether release of one
shop would satisfy the need of the
landlord or not (vide R.C. Kesarvani Vs.
Dwarika Prasad, 2002 (2) ARC 298
(S.C.)). In the instant case two shops were
in tenancy occupation of two different
tenants. One tenant has already vacated.
In my opinion therefore the need stands
satisfied
to
a
great
extent.
Under
somewhat
similar
circumstances,
Supreme Court in Deena Nath Versus
Pooran Lal, AIR 2001 SC 2655 held that
if landlord had one room already in
possession and another room became
available to him during pendency of the
proceedings then need stood satisfied.

3. Accordingly I am of the opinion
that due to availability of the shop vacated
by Sahdeo during pendency of writ
petition the need of the landlord stands
satisfied to a great extent.

Accordingly
writ
petition
is
dismissed.

4. I have held in Khursheda versus
A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 64 and H.M.
Kichlu versus A.D.J. 2004 (2) ARC 652
that while granting relief against eviction
to the tenant in respect of building
covered
by
Rent
Control
Act
or
maintaining the said relief already granted
by the court below, Writ Court is
empowered to enhance the rent to a
reasonable extent. The rent of Rs.20/- per
month for a shop in Varanasi is highly
inadequate, virtually it is no rent.

5. Accordingly it is directed that
with effect from July 2005 onwards
respondent No.3 Gopal shall pay rent to
the landlord petitioner at the rate of
Rs.500/- per month. Petition Dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.07.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.U. KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2036 of 1983

Smt. Janki Bai

...Petitioner
Versus
District Judge, Jhansi and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Prakash Gupta

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

U.P.
Urban
Building
(Regulation
of
letting on Rent and Eviction Act 1972Section-21
(1-A)-Release
Applicationland already in possession of small
portion of tenanted accommodation-her
husband
in
governement
service
occupying
the
house
provided
by
employer-on the date of filing the
release application-was to retire after
four months-approch of Lower Appellate
Court
not
only
astonishment
and
shocking
but
against
well
settled
principle
of
law-accommodation
provided by employer-the status of
employee-become
as
tenant
such
possession can not be considered as
alternative accommodation.

Held: Para 3 and 4

The appellate court did not give any
weight to the fact that after about four
months of the filing of the release
application landlady's husband was to
retire and in fact retired. Even if need is
considered on the date of filing of the
release
application
there
was
no
occasion to deny the release on the
2 All] Smt. Janki Bai V. District Judge, Jhansi and another 625
ground of availability of the house
provided by the employer then his
position in only that of tenant and
possession of the house as tenant is not
to be considered as an alternative
accommodation available to the landlord
as held by the Supreme Court in G.K.
Devi Versus Ghanshyam Das, AIR 2000
SC 656

The judgment and order passed by the
lower
appellate
court
is
utterly
erroneous in law, based upon wholly
irrelevant consideration and arrived at
by
ignoring
relevant
material
and
circumstances.
AIR 2000 SC-656-relied on

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.U. Khan, J.)

1. This is landlady's writ petition
arising out of eviction/release proceedings
initiated by her against tenant respondent
No. 2 Nand Lal Narula on the ground of
bonafide need under section 21 of U.P.
Act No. 13 of 1972 (U.P. Rent Regulation
Act).

2. Property in dispute is a house
adjoining
portion
of
which
is
in
possession of the landlady. Landlady's
husband was employed in Municipal
Board, Jhansi and was going to retire on
31.8.1981.
Landlady
filed
release
application in April 1981 stating therein
that by virtue of his employment husband
of the landlady was provided a house by
the Municipal Board and after retirement
he would have to vacate the said house
hence accommodation in dispute should
be released. It was further stated that the
adjoining portion of the accommodation
in dispute already in possession of the
landlady was too small to satisfy her need.
It was stated by the landlady and
categorically admitted by the tenant that
the tenant had also acquired another
house. Prescribed authority, Jhansi before
whom
the
release
application
was
registered as P.A. Case No. 29 of 1981,
allowed
the
release
application
on
12.2.1982. Against the said judgment and
order tenant respondent No. 2 filed R.C.
Appeal No. 12 of 1982. District Judge,
Jhansi on 8.11.1982, allowed the appeal
hence this writ petition by landlady.

3. The application was filed under
section 21 (1)(a) as well as section 21 (1A) of the Act. Under the latter provision,
it is provided that if landlord of a building
is in service and has been provided
residential house by his employer then at
the time of his retirement tenanted house
may be released. In respect of the said
provision, the learned District Judge held
that as a small portion adjacent to the
accommodation in dispute was already in
possession of the landlady hence no relief
under the said provision could be granted.

In respect of the ground of bonafide
need under section 21 (1)(a), the appellate
court held that even though during
pendency of release application landlord
had retired but subsequent events could be
considered only when they helped the
tenant and not when they helped the
landlord. The court can only express its
astonishment and shock at this approach.
Such type of approach is not only fatal to
scheme of the Act but borders on cruelty
to landlord. The appellate court did not
disagree with the prescribed authority,
that the accommodation adjacent to the
house in dispute was insufficient for need
of the landlady. However appellate court
took the view that need will have to be
determined on the date of filing of the
release application and as on that date
landlady's husband was in service and
occupying the house provided by the
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
626
employer hence on the date of filing of
the release application there was no
bonafide need. The appellate court did not
give any weight to the fact that after about
four months of the filing of the release
application landlady's husband was to
retire and in fact retired. Even if need is
considered on the date of filing of the
release application there was no occasion
to deny the release on the ground of
availability of the house provided by the
employer then his position in only that of
tenant and possession of the house as
tenant is not to be considered as an
alternative accommodation available to
the landlord as held by the Supreme Court
in G.K. Devi Versus Ghanshyam Das,
AIR 2000 SC 656. It is only such
occupation of the landlord which is as of
right,
which
can
be
taken
into
consideration
as
an
alternative
accommodation available to the landlord.
If
a
landlord
is
occupying
an
accommodation either as licencee or as a
tenant or as an employee, the same is
irrelevant and cannot be taken into
consideration
while
considering
his
bonafide
need
for
release
of
the
accommodation in the occupation of the
tenant.

4. The judgment and order passed by
the lower appellate court is utterly
erroneous in law, based upon wholly
irrelevant consideration and arrived at by
ignoring
relevant
material
and
circumstances.

Writ petition is accordingly allowed.

5. Judgment and order passed by the
lower appellate court is set-aside and that
of prescribed authority is restored.

 Petition Allowed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.07.2005

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.U. KHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 33779 of 2002

Ranvir Singh and another
...Petitioner
Versus
The Board of Revenue U.P., Allahabad
and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Vivek Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Anupam Kulshrestha
Sri K.R. Sirohi
Sri Anuj Kumar
S.C.

U.P.
Zamindari
Abolution
and
Land
Reforms
Act,
1956-Section
161Exchange of Land-reserved for public
utility-can
not
be
exchanged
with
Bhumidari Land of private personspermissible only when the land is not
covered by Section 132 of the Act.

Held: Para 10

Under Section 132 (VI) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R.
Act
it
has
been
provided
that
Bhoomidhari rights shall not accrue in
any land set apart for public purpose
under U.P. Consolidations of Holdings
Act. It is correct that under Section 161
of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act exchange of Gaon
Sabha land is permissible. However,
reading
the
said
section
alongwith
Section 132 U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act makes it
quite
clear
that
such
exchange
is
permissible only when Gaon Sabha land
sought to be exchanged is not covered
by Section 132 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act.
Case law discussed:
1971 R.D. 466
1990 ALJ 366