# Smt. Jasvinder Kaur v. N.H.A.I. & Ors. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1267
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-29
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-jasvinder-kaur-v-n-h-a-i-ors-opp-parties-52030
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

1268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil Law - the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 - Sections 31, 34 & 37 -
Appellant-
Commercial
Court's
order
dismissing the application under Section
34 of the Act as time barred challenged-
Appellant
preferred
arbitration
under
Section 3G (5) of the NHAI Act- Award
passed by competent authority- back
dated- Section 31(5) of the Act- Delivery of
signed copy of the arbitral award is a
mandatory requirement- plays pivotal role-
Appeal allowed. (Paras 8, 9, 10, and 14)

HELD:
Delivery of an arbitral award under Section 31(5)
of the Act plays a pivotal role by initiating various
stages of the arbitration process, setting
limitation periods, and conferring rights upon the
parties. In the realm of sports, where victory and
defeat hang in balance, arbitration serves as the
referee adjudicating disputes on the field of play.
Section 31(5) of the Act acts as the final whistle,
signalling the end of the match and the
declaration of the winner. For the prevailing party,
the delivery of the award marks the culmination
of their efforts and provides them with a means
of enforcing their rights against the losing party.
Conversely, for the losing party, the delivery of
the award represents the beginning of the period
within which they may challenge the award on
specified grounds under Section 34 of the Act.
(Para 8)

In such circumstances, placing the onus on the
parties to request a copy of the award could
potentially disadvantage parties who may 8 be
unaware of their rights or unable to navigate the
intricacies of the arbitration process effectively. This
could lead to situations where one party, typically
the more legally sophisticated or resourceful party,
obtains a copy of the award promptly, while the
other party, due to lack of awareness or means, is
left uninformed and disadvantaged. Such an
outcome would not only be contrary to the
principles of equality and fairness that underpin
arbitration but could also undermine public
confidence in the arbitration process as a whole.
(Para 9)

The only exception to Section 31(5) of the Act arises
in situations where a party has consciously accepted
the award or acted upon it. This exception is
grounded in the principles of fairness, finality, and
efficiency in arbitration. When a party has
consciously accepted the award, it indicates a clear
and unequivocal acknowledgment of the tribunal's
decision. This acceptance can manifest in various
forms, such as a written St.ment agreeing to the
award, compliance with the terms of the award, or
any conduct that demonstrates acknowledgment of
the award's finality. By consciously accepting the
award, the party essentially waives any procedural
rights related to the formal receipt of the signed
award copy. (Para 10)

The argument of the Respondents that the
Appellant never requested for a certified copy of the
award is of no consequence since Section 31(5) of
the Act casts a duty upon the Arbitrator to deliver
the award. Section 31(5) of the Act unequivocally
imposes an obligation upon the Arbitrator to deliver
a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party
involved in the arbitration. This statutory duty is not
contingent upon a party's request for the award;
rather, it is an imperative that must be fulfilled by
the Arbitrator irrespective of any such request. The
failure to comply with this statutory obligation can
lead
to
significant
procedural
irregularities,
potentially undermining the arbitral process and the
enforceability of the award. (Para 14)

Appeal allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

5 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1267
borrower and in this respect symbolic
possession of the property was taken on
30.07.2012 in terms of Section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act. Once the possession is
taken, bank thereafter applied under Section
14 of the SARFAESI Act for execution of
the possession proceedings for taking actual
physical possession. Once an application
under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act is
filed the same would relate to the provisions
of Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and
actual possession would in no manner effect
the taking of possession in terms of Section
13(4) by way of symbolic possession. The
symbolic possession itself is the possession
under law and as such once the bank has
taken possession of the property in question
in the year 2012 itself and the auction notice
was issued on 18.03.2016 in respect of the
auction to be held on 30.04.2016, the
borrower was well aware of the fact that the
bank has taken possession in terms of
Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act as the
auction notice itself stated the aforesaid fact
in para-2, which is quoted herein below:

"And WHEREAS the borrower
having failed to repay the amount, and
hence, the undersigned, in exercise of
powers conferred U/S 13(4) of the said Act
read with Rule 8 of the Rules taken over
possession
of
the
property/properties,
(hereinafter referred as the said properties)
more fully described herein below on
30/07/2012."

7. Once the bank has declared in the
auction
notice
that
they
are
taken
possession of the property in question
under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, it
is not open for the purchaser to raise
objection in respect of the application of
bank under Section 14 of the SARFAESI
Act being pending before the District
Magistrate which are only execution
proceedings in respect of the order of
possession passed under Section 13(4) of
the SARFAESI Act.

8. It is further to be seen that the
applicant was the Branch Manager and was
exercising
statutory
powers
under
SARFAESI Act and as such he is protected
by Section 32 of the SARFAESI Act and no
criminal proceedings or prosecution can be
lodged against the applicant, who is an
Officer of the Bank.

9. In view thereof, the present
criminal proceedings against applicant are
bad in law, therefore, the summoning order
dated 09.08.2018 passed by Additional
Chief Judicial Magistrate, IXth, Varanasi in
Complaint Case No. 1865 of 2018 (Mohd.
Akhlaq Khan vs. Vinod Kumar) under
Sections 417, 504, 506 IPC, is hereby set
aside.

10. The present application under
Section 482
Cr.P.C.
is,
accordingly,
allowed.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1267
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Appeal U/s 37 of Arbitration & Conciliation Act
1996 NO. 264 of 2023

Smt. Jasvinder Kaur ...Appellant
Versus
N.H.A.I. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Appellant:
Ms. Gunjan Jadwani, Ms. Chandrika Patel

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Mr. Pranjal Mehrotra
1268 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Civil Law - the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 - Sections 31, 34 & 37 -
Appellant-
Commercial
Court's
order
dismissing the application under Section
34 of the Act as time barred challenged-
Appellant
preferred
arbitration
under
Section 3G (5) of the NHAI Act- Award
passed by competent authority- back
dated- Section 31(5) of the Act- Delivery of
signed copy of the arbitral award is a
mandatory requirement- plays pivotal role-
Appeal allowed. (Paras 8, 9, 10, and 14)

HELD:
Delivery of an arbitral award under Section 31(5)
of the Act plays a pivotal role by initiating various
stages of the arbitration process, setting
limitation periods, and conferring rights upon the
parties. In the realm of sports, where victory and
defeat hang in balance, arbitration serves as the
referee adjudicating disputes on the field of play.
Section 31(5) of the Act acts as the final whistle,
signalling the end of the match and the
declaration of the winner. For the prevailing party,
the delivery of the award marks the culmination
of their efforts and provides them with a means
of enforcing their rights against the losing party.
Conversely, for the losing party, the delivery of
the award represents the beginning of the period
within which they may challenge the award on
specified grounds under Section 34 of the Act.
(Para 8)

In such circumstances, placing the onus on the
parties to request a copy of the award could
potentially disadvantage parties who may 8 be
unaware of their rights or unable to navigate the
intricacies of the arbitration process effectively. This
could lead to situations where one party, typically
the more legally sophisticated or resourceful party,
obtains a copy of the award promptly, while the
other party, due to lack of awareness or means, is
left uninformed and disadvantaged. Such an
outcome would not only be contrary to the
principles of equality and fairness that underpin
arbitration but could also undermine public
confidence in the arbitration process as a whole.
(Para 9)

The only exception to Section 31(5) of the Act arises
in situations where a party has consciously accepted
the award or acted upon it. This exception is
grounded in the principles of fairness, finality, and
efficiency in arbitration. When a party has
consciously accepted the award, it indicates a clear
and unequivocal acknowledgment of the tribunal's
decision. This acceptance can manifest in various
forms, such as a written St.ment agreeing to the
award, compliance with the terms of the award, or
any conduct that demonstrates acknowledgment of
the award's finality. By consciously accepting the
award, the party essentially waives any procedural
rights related to the formal receipt of the signed
award copy. (Para 10)

The argument of the Respondents that the
Appellant never requested for a certified copy of the
award is of no consequence since Section 31(5) of
the Act casts a duty upon the Arbitrator to deliver
the award. Section 31(5) of the Act unequivocally
imposes an obligation upon the Arbitrator to deliver
a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party
involved in the arbitration. This statutory duty is not
contingent upon a party's request for the award;
rather, it is an imperative that must be fulfilled by
the Arbitrator irrespective of any such request. The
failure to comply with this statutory obligation can
lead
to
significant
procedural
irregularities,
potentially undermining the arbitral process and the
enforceability of the award. (Para 14)

Appeal allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Smt. Sudha Vs U.O.I.& ors. (Appeal under
Section 37 of the Arbitration & Conciliation
Act, 1996 No. 271 of 2022) (Allahabad High
Court)

2. U.O.I.Vs Bhola Prasad Agarwal & anr. 2022
SCC OnLine Chh 1644

3. Resurgent Power Projects Ltd. Vs ABB India
Ltd. reported in MANU/TN/1154/2020

4. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare & anr. Vs
M/s. Hosmac Projects Division of Hosmac India
Pvt. Ltd. 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8296.

5. U.O.I.-Vs- Tecco Trichy Engineers reported in
(2005) 4 SCC 239

6. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs
Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd. reported in
(2021) 7 SCC 657
5 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1269
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

1. The instant application has been
filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration &
Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred
to as the 'Act') by Smt. Jasvinder Kaur
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Appellant')
challenging the order dated February 7,
2023 passed by District Judge, Rampur by
which the application under Section 34 of
the Act filed by the Appellant was dismissed
as time barred.

FACTS

2. I have laid down the factual matrix
of the instant lis below:

a. A notification under Section 3A
of the National Highways Act, 1956
(hereinafter referred to as the 'NHAI Act')
was issued by National Highways Authority
of India (hereinafter referred to as the
'Respondent No. 1'). Subsequently, a
notification under Section 3D of the NHAI
Act was published by the Respondent on
June 17, 2013.

b. Appellant filed an objection
before the Competent Authority, claiming
higher rate of compensation. Objection of
the Appellant was rejected by the Competent
Authority. Against the award passed by the
Competent
Authority,
the
Appellant
preferred arbitration under Section 3G(5) of
the NHAI Act.

c. The Arbitrator passed an award
on January 31, 2023 (back dated to October
11,
2022).
Thereafter,
the Appellant
proceeded to challenge the said arbitral
award under Section 34 of the Act before the
District
Judge,
Rampur
which
was
dismissed vide order dated February 7, 2023
as time barred.

d. Aggrieved by the order dated
February 7, 2023, the Appellant has
preferred the instant appeal under Section 37
of the Act before this Court.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
APPELLANT

3. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellant
has
made
the
following
submissions before this Court:

a. District Judge, Rampur in its
order dated February 7, 2023 has failed to
return any finding as to when the signed
copy of the award was served upon the
Appellant. In the absence of any finding as
to when the signed copy of the award was
served upon the Appellant, it was erroneous
on part of the District Judge, Rampur to
return a finding that there was a delay in
filing the application under Section 34 of the
Act, in as much as Section 34(3) of the Act
provides that the limitation for filing an
application under Section 34 of the Act shall
begin from the date when the arbitral award
has been received by the aggrieved party.

b. In the application filed by the
Appellant under Section 34 of the Act before
the
District
Judge,
Rampur,
it
was
specifically pleaded by the Appellant that
the award was not pronounced on October
11, 2022 which was the date fixed for
pronouncement of award. The Appellant
was making continuous efforts to enquire
about the status of the award from court
officer of the Arbitrator. Subsequently the
award was pronounced only on January 31,
2023 and the certified copy of the same was
made available to the Appellant only on
February 1, 2023 pursuant to which the
application under Section 34 of the Act was
filed on February 7, 2023 and as such there
is no delay in filing the application under
Section 34 of the Act.

c. Appellant also sent a letter to the
Respondents on February 6, 2023 duly
1270 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
intimating them that the award was
pronounced only on January 31, 2023 and as
such the Appellant will be assailing the same
by filing a case under Section 34 of the Act.

d. District Judge, Rampur, without
considering the averments of the Appellant,
proceeded to dismiss the application under
Section 34 of the Act vide its order dated
February 7, 2023 without arriving at any
finding as to when the Appellant became
aware of the award.

e. Reliance is placed upon the
judgment of this Court in Smt. Sudha v.
Union of India & 3 Others (Appeal under
Section
37
of
the
Arbitration
&
Conciliation Act, 1996 No. 271 of 2022).

f. A bare perusal of the Counter
Affidavit filed by the Respondents clearly
goes to show that the Respondent No. 1 has
not controverted the fact that the award was
not pronounced by the Arbitrator on October
11, 2022 and instead the award was
published only on January 31, 2023. No
document, much less, any averment has
been made by the Respondents to show that
the award was published on October 11,
2022 and not January 31, 2023. Moreover,
even the details of the order sheet of the
arbitration case, filed by the Respondent No.
1, clearly shows that there is no recording of
judgment delivery/pronouncement of order
on October 11, 2022.

g. Respondents have sought to
rely upon the judgment passed by the High
Court of Chhattisgarh in Union of India v.
Bhola Prasad Agarwal & Anr. reported in
2022 SCC OnLine Chh 1644 but the said
judgment is distinguishable with the instant
case, in as much as in the case before the
High Court of Chhattisgarh, the Appellant
therein was already aware of the award,
which is not the circumstance in the instant
case.

h. Respondents have sought to
rely upon the judgment passed by the
Madras High Court in Resurgent Power
Projects Limited v. ABB India Limited
reported in MANU/TN/1154/2020 which is
distinguishable from the facts of the instant
case. There is a categorical finding about
awareness of the award by the appellant
therein, which is absent in the instant case.

i. Importance of delivering a
signed copy of the award by the arbitrator to
the party as per Section 31(5) of the Act has
been considered by the High Court of Delhi
in Ministry of Health & Family Welfare &
Anr. v. M/s. Hosmac Projects Division of
Hosmac India Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2023
SCC OnLine Del 8296.

j. In view of the aforesaid facts and
circumstances, it is submitted that the
present appeal filed by the Appellant under
Section 37 of the Act be allowed and order
dated February 7, 2023 passed by District
Judge, Rampur be set aside.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
RESPONDENTS

4. Learned counsel appearing for the
Respondents has made the following
submissions:

a. Appellant was well aware that
the matter was fixed for orders on October
11, 2022. Even, then the Appellant applied
for the certified copy well after the expiry of
three months limitation period under
Section 34(3) of the Act. This clearly shows
that the Appellant was not interested in the
matter. It must be borne in mind that this
Court ought not to adopt an approach which
helps a dishonest evader, and defeats the
very intent of the legislation that is the Act.
Had the Appellant been prudent, the
Appellant would have applied for the
certified copy of the award well within the
three months period from October 11, 2022.
The Appellant at this belated stage cannot
5 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1271
contend
that
the Appellant
had
no
knowledge of the award being passed on
October 11, 2022. Not even a shred of
evidence is on record to established the bona
fides of the Appellant.

b. The District Judge, Rampur in
its order categorically records that there is a
delay of 37 days in filing the application
under Section 34 of the Act. As there is 37
days delay, the instant Appeal deserves to be
dismissed with costs.

CONCLUSION & ANALYSIS

5. The primary issue raised in the
instant case is that whether the District
Judge, Rampur was justified in dismissing
the application filed by the Appellant under
Section 34 of the Act since the Appellant
was never served with a signed copy of the
arbitral award, which is a mandatory
requirement under Section 31(5) of the
Arbitration Act. Relevant parts of Section
31(5) of the Arbitration Act have been
extracted herein below for ease of reference:

"31. Form and contents of
arbitral award. -

(1) ...

(2) ...

(3) ...

(4) ...

(5) After the arbitral award is
made, a signed copy shall be delivered to
each party."

6. Section 31(5) of the Arbitration Act
while seemingly procedural in nature,
embodies broader objectives. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Union of India -v- Tecco
Trichy Engineers reported in (2005) 4 SCC
239 propounded the importance of the
requirement to deliver a signed copy of the
arbitral
award
on
parties.
Relevant
paragraph of the said judgment reads as
under:

"8. The delivery of an arbitral
award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is
not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter
of substance. It is only after the stage under
Section 31 has passed that the stage of
termination of arbitral proceedings within
the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises.
The delivery of arbitral award to the party,
to be effective, has to be "received" by the
party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal
and receipt by the party of the award sets in
motion several periods of limitation such as
an
application
for
correction
and
interpretation of an award within 30 days
under Section 33(1), an application for
making an additional award under Section
33(4) and an application for setting aside an
award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this
delivery of the copy of award has the effect
of conferring certain rights on the party as
also bringing to an end the right to exercise
those rights on expiry of the prescribed
period of limitation which would be
calculated from that date, the delivery of the
copy of award by the Tribunal and the
receipt thereof by each party constitutes an
important
stage
in
the
arbitral
proceedings."

7. In Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran
Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies
Private Limited reported in (2021) 7 SCC
657, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
that the limitation for filing objections to an
arbitral award will only commence from the
date of receipt of a signed copy under
Section 31(5) of the Act. Relevant paragraph
is extracted below:

"29.The judgment inTecco Trichy
Engineers[Union of Indiav.Tecco Trichy
Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4 SCC
1272 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
239]
was
followed
inState
of
Maharashtrav.ARK Builders (P) Ltd.[State
of Maharashtrav.ARK Builders (P) Ltd.,
(2011) 4 SCC 616 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ)
413] , wherein this Court held that Section
31(1) obliges the members of the Arbitral
Tribunal to make the award in writing and
sign it. The legal requirement under subsection (5) of Section 31 is the delivery of a
copy of the award signed by the members of
the Arbitral Tribunal/arbitrator, and not any
copy of the award. On a harmonious
construction of Section 31(5) read with
Section 34(3), the period of limitation
prescribed for filing objections would
commence only from the date when the
signed copy of the award is delivered to the
party making the application for setting
aside the award. If the law prescribes that a
copy of the award is to be communicated,
delivered, despatched, forwarded, rendered,
or sent to the parties concerned in a
particular way, and since the law sets a
period of limitation for challenging the
award in question by the aggrieved party,
then the period of limitation can only
commence from the date on which the award
was received by the party concerned in the
manner prescribed by law. The judgment
inTecco
Trichy[Union
of
Indiav.Tecco
Trichy Engineers & Contractors, (2005) 4
SCC 239] has been recently followed
inAnilkumar
Jinabhai
Patelv.Pravinchandra
Jinabhai
Patel
[Anilkumar Jinabhai Patelv.Pravinchandra
Jinabhai Patel, (2018) 15 SCC 178 : (2019)
1 SCC (Civ) 141] ."

8. Delivery of an arbitral award under
Section 31(5) of the Act plays a pivotal role
by initiating various stages of the arbitration
process, setting limitation periods, and
conferring rights upon the parties. In the
realm of sports, where victory and defeat
hang in balance, arbitration serves as the
referee adjudicating disputes on the field of
play. Section 31(5) of the Act acts as the
final whistle, signalling the end of the match
and the declaration of the winner. For the
prevailing party, the delivery of the award
marks the culmination of their efforts and
provides them with a means of enforcing
their rights against the losing party.
Conversely, for the losing party, the delivery
of the award represents the beginning of the
period within which they may challenge the
award on specified grounds under Section
34 of the Act.

9. The duty to deliver an arbitral
award, a cornerstone of the arbitration
process, is unequivocally cast upon the
arbitral tribunal. Rooted in the foundational
principles of arbitration, procedural fairness,
and judicial integrity, this obligation
embodies the essence of justice delivery and
the sanctity of due process. Arbitration, as an
alternative dispute resolution mechanism,
operates on the premise of party autonomy,
where disputing parties voluntarily submit
their grievances to a neutral arbitrator or
tribunal, with the expectation of a fair and
impartial adjudication process. Within this
framework, the arbitral tribunal assumes a
quasi-judicial role, vested with the authority
to render decisions that are binding on the
parties, akin to the solemn pronouncements
of
traditional
courts.
Arbitration
proceedings often involve parties with
disparate
levels
of
legal
knowledge,
resources, and bargaining power. In such
circumstances, placing the onus on the
parties to request a copy of the award could
potentially disadvantage parties who may be
unaware of their rights or unable to navigate
the intricacies of the arbitration process
effectively. This could lead to situations
where one party, typically the more legally
sophisticated or resourceful party, obtains a
copy of the award promptly, while the other
5 All. Vinod Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1273
party, due to lack of awareness or means, is
left uninformed and disadvantaged. Such an
outcome would not only be contrary to the
principles of equality and fairness that
underpin
arbitration
but
could
also
undermine
public
confidence
in
the
arbitration process as a whole.

10. The only exception to Section
31(5) of the Act arises in situations where a
party has consciously accepted the award or
acted upon it. This exception is grounded in
the principles of fairness, finality, and
efficiency in arbitration. When a party has
consciously accepted the award, it indicates
a clear and unequivocal acknowledgment of
the tribunal's decision. This acceptance can
manifest in various forms, such as a written
statement agreeing to the award, compliance
with the terms of the award, or any conduct
that demonstrates acknowledgment of the
award's finality. By consciously accepting
the award, the party essentially waives any
procedural rights related to the formal
receipt of the signed award copy. This
waiver is based on the principle that actions
speak louder than words; if a party behaves
in a manner that indicates acceptance,
insisting on formal delivery becomes
redundant. Similarly, if a party acts upon the
award, such as by making payments or
performing obligations stipulated by the
award,
this
conduct
also
signifies
acceptance. Acting upon the award reflects
the party's intention to comply with the
tribunal's decision, further reinforcing the
notion that the formal delivery of the signed
award is unnecessary. The rationale behind
this exception aligns with the core
objectives of arbitration, which include
resolving
disputes
efficiently
and
minimizing procedural formalities that
could hinder the swift execution of arbitral
awards.
This
exception
prevents
unnecessary delays that could arise if parties
who have already accepted or acted upon the
award were still required to wait for the
formal delivery of a signed copy. Moreover,
this exception upholds the principle of
estoppel, where a party is prevented from
denying the validity of the award after
having accepted it or acted upon it. This is
particularly important in maintaining the
integrity and finality of arbitral decisions, as
it prevents parties from engaging in conduct
that would contradict their prior acceptance
of the award.

11. It appears from the factual matrix
of the instant case that a signed copy of the
arbitral award was never delivered upon the
Appellant by the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator
had announced that the award was reserved
on October 11, 2022 and also will be
pronounced on October 11, 2022 but the
Arbitrator did not deliver his award on that
day. Instead, the award was actually
pronounced on January 31, 2023 with a back
date, which should not have been done.
Appellant cannot be blamed for this lapse on
part of the Arbitrator. Furthermore, what
emerges from the Counter Affidavit filed by
the Respondents is that there is no specific
denial of the fact that although the award
was scheduled to be pronounced on October
11, 2022 it was in reality pronounced on
January 31, 2023. Relevant paragraph from
the Counter Affidavit is extracted herein:

"That the contents of paragraph
nos. 8,9,10,11,12,13 and 14 of the affidavits,
as stated, are not admitted. In reply, it is
respectfully submitted that from a perusal of
the impugned judgment and order dated
7.2.2023 passed by the District Judge,
Rampur, it is apparent that the appellant had
not given any sufficient cause for the 37 days
delay, nor any documents were filed in
support
of
the
Delay
Condonation
Application, and therefore, it is apparent
1274 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the application under Section 34(3) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
filed by the Appellant was liable to be
rejected, and the same was rightly rejected
by the Learned Court Below by the judgment
and order dated 7.2.2023."

12. The judgments in Bhola Prasad
(supra) and Resurgent Power (supra) relied
upon by the Respondents do not align with
the factual circumstances in the instant case.
In Bhola Prasad (supra) and Resurgent
Power (supra), the Appellant was aware of
the award and had knowledge of its content.
However, nothing has been brought on
record by the Respondents to establish that
the Appellant in the instant case was aware
of or had knowledge of the contents of the
arbitral award. The lack of evidence
supporting the Appellant's awareness of the
arbitral
awards
creates
a
substantial
disparity between the circumstances of the
present case and those in Bhola Prasad
(supra) and Resurgent Power (supra)
therefore making the law laid down in the
aforesaid judgments inapplicable to the
instant case. The Appellant cannot be placed
at a disadvantage as a result of statutory
lapse on part of the Arbitrator to not deliver
a signed copy of the award under Section
31(5) of the Act.

13. The Appellant in the instant case
received a certified copy of the arbitral
award which was passed on January 31,
2023 (although dated October 11, 2022) on
February 1, 2023. Thereafter, the Appellant
preferred the application under Section 34 of
the Act before the District Judge, Rampur on
February 7, 2023 that is within the
prescribed limitation period of three months
as provided under Section 34(3) of the Act.
Since, a certified copy of the arbitral award
was received by the Appellant only on
February 1, 2023, it is from that date only
that the clock of limitation will start ticking.

14. The argument of the Respondents
that the Appellant never requested for a
certified copy of the award is of no
consequence since Section 31(5) of the Act
casts a duty upon the Arbitrator to deliver
the award. Section 31(5) of the Act
unequivocally imposes an obligation upon
the Arbitrator to deliver a signed copy of the
arbitral award to each party involved in the
arbitration. This statutory duty is not
contingent upon a party's request for the
award; rather, it is an imperative that must
be fulfilled by the Arbitrator irrespective of
any such request. The failure to comply with
this statutory obligation can lead to
significant
procedural
irregularities,
potentially undermining the arbitral process
and the enforceability of the award. The
eventual pronouncement of the award on
January 31, 2023, with a backdate,
introduces a further layer of procedural
irregularity. The practice of backdating an
arbitral award is inherently problematic as it
can obscure the actual timeline of the
arbitral proceedings, potentially affecting
the parties' rights and obligations. In this
case, the backdated pronouncement of the
award could mislead the parties regarding
the timeline for challenging or enforcing the
award, thereby affecting their legal recourse.

15. In light of the aforesaid, the instant
Appeal under Section 37 of the Act is
allowed and the order dated February 7,
2023 passed by the District Judge, Rampur is
set aside. This Court directs the District Judge,
Rampur to adjudicate the application filed by
the Appellant under Section 34 of the Act on
merits expeditiously and preferably, within a
period of 6 months from the date of receipt of
a certified copy of this order.
5 All. Beeru Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
1275

16. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
allowed. There shall be no order as to the
costs.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1275
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 418 of 2023

Beeru Kumar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Yashwant Pratap Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Modification application in
a Bail application- Applicant- Granted bail
a year ago- Bail order prescribed one of the
sureties to be a family member- No family
member of the applicant in the St. of Uttar
Pradesh- Father, sole surviving member,
resides abroad- Unable to come back to
give surety- Trial court - Fixing surety- to
apply mind to socioeconomic conditions of
the prisoner- It shall not impose any
onerous or arbitrary surety conditions-
Order
granting
bail
should
not
get
defeated- Onerous surety condition put by
the court recalled - Dictum in Arvind Singh
Vs
St.
of
Uttar
Pradesh
reiterated-
Application allowed.

HELD: Courts should examine the socioeconomic
conditions of a prisoner while fixing surety
conditions. Further, the Courts should not impose
conditions which cannot be satisfied by the
prisoner
on
account
of
his
destitute
circumstances
or
conditions
of
want
or
deprivation faced by him.

While fixing sureties the trial court has to apply
its mind to the socioeconomic conditions of the
prisoner. Further the trial court while fixing
sureties shall not impose any onerous or arbitrary
conditions which defeat the order granting bail to
the concerned prisoner or prevent the applicant
from being set forth at liberty.

All trial courts as well as DLSAs are under an
obligation to comply with the directions of this
Court in Arvind Singh (supra) as well as those
made above in this order. Learned District Judge,
Deoria shall make necessary enquiries and
appropriately counsel the trial judge and the
DLSA, Deoria in the matter.

Application allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

Arvind Singh Vs St. of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Home
Deptt. (Application U/S 482 No.2613 of 2023)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. The applicant was granted bail by
this Court by order dated 18.05.2023. While
granting the bail following terms and
conditions of sureties were provided by this
Court in the order dated 18.05.2023:

"7. Let the applicant, Beeru
Kumar, who is involved in the aforesaid
case crime, be released on bail on his
furnishing a personal bond and two sureties
(one should be of a family member) each in
the like amount to the satisfaction of the
court concerned subject to following
conditions. Further, before issuing the
release order, the sureties be verified.

i. The applicant shall not tamper
with
the
prosecution
evidence
by
intimidating/ pressurizing the witnesses,
during the investigation or trial.

ii. The applicant shall cooperate in
the trial sincerely without seeking any
adjournment.