# Smt. Jyoti & Anr v. M.A.C.T. Fatehpur & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 4 ILRA 638
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-03-24
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 8262 of 2023
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-jyoti-anr-v-m-a-c-t-fatehpur-anr-49992
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law- The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Sections 159, 166(3) & 166(4)- (Rule 150
of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989Rule 204 A of Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle
Rules 1998- Claim petition filed by the
petitioner
u/s
166
of
the
M.V
Act
dismissed being beyond the limitation
prescribed u/s 166 (3)- Two modes of
claiming compensation are prescribed,
one under sub section 3 of Section 166
and other under sub-section 4 of section
166-The duty to file the claim is cast upon
the Police Authorities under Section 166(4)
read with Rule 150 of Central M.V Rules
coupled with an obligation cast upon the
tribunal to treat the same as claim
application under Section 166(4) read with
Rule 204A of the UP M.V Rules-Mandate of
Section 159 & Section 166(4) of the Act has
to be considered before rejecting any claim
application under section 166 (3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act on grounds of limitation.
(Para 9-15, 20-24)

Writ petition allowed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
took place during the course of disciplinary
proceedings wherein the petitioner was
warranted to appear but he failed to do so.
Moreover, it has been argued by learned
counsel for the petitioner that only on the
basis of inquiry report which has never
been supplied to the petitioner is brazen in
law and the same is contrary to the
procedure as settled by catena of judgments
by the Apex Court wherein few of the
leading cases have been referred and taken
shelter of the same.

12. The judgment in the case of
Union of India Vs. Mohd Ramzam Khan
[1990 0 Supreme (SC) 606] is one of
them. The same has been followed by a
Division Bench of this Court in the case of
State of U.P. and others Vs. Mam Chand
Tyagi and another [2017 (6) ALJ 460]
and Mohammad Shoeb Vs. State of U.P.
and 6 others (Special Appeal No.447 of
2016, decided on 30.08.2017).

13.

Sofar
as
the
ground
of
maintainability of this petition as raised by
learned counsel for the respondents, it has
been held by a coordinate Bench of this
Court in Alauddin Vs. State of U.P. and 3
others (2013 ILR 2 All 851) that the
grievance arising out of service matters
connecting to Madrasa is maintainable
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India by way of filing writ petition before
the Hon'ble Court.

14. After considering the rival
contentions as raised by learned counsel for
both the parties as well as after going
through the different judgments as supplied
by learned counsel for the petitioner along
with the proceedings initiated by the
respondents while conducting the inquiry
and the disciplinary proceedings, the writ
petition is hereby allowed. The impugned
order dated 25.10.2009 is hereby set aside
on the following grounds:-

I. The entire matter against the
petitioner
has
been
initiated
while
constituting the three Members Committee
and no evidence or records have ever been
called from the petitioner while conducting
the inquiry.

II. The inquiry report was never ever
served upon the petitioner and he has never
been given any opportunity for explaining
his defense in respect of the findings
arrived at by the Inquiry Committee.

III. The Disciplinary Authority without
following
the
proper
procedure
for
conduction of the disciplinary proceedings
directly arrived over the conclusion only
after
giving
credence
to
the
report
submitted by the Inquiry Committee.

IV. For imposing the major penalty, it
was mandatory on the part of the
respondents to conduct proper disciplinary
proceedings as mentioned in the Uttar
Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline
and Appeal) Rule, 1999.

15. The respondent no. 4 is directed to
reinstate the petitioner and extend the
benefit of backwages as admissible to him
immediately after receiving a certified copy
of this order.
----------
(2023) 4 ILRA 638
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ-C No. 8262 of 2023

Smt. Jyoti & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
M.A.C.T. Fatehpur & Anr. ...Respondents
4 All. Smt. Jyoti & Anr. Vs. M.A.C.T. Fatehpur & Anr.
639
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Ram Singh, Sri Amit Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:

Civil Law- The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988Sections 159, 166(3) & 166(4)- (Rule 150
of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989Rule 204 A of Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle
Rules 1998- Claim petition filed by the
petitioner
u/s
166
of
the
M.V
Act
dismissed being beyond the limitation
prescribed u/s 166 (3)- Two modes of
claiming compensation are prescribed,
one under sub section 3 of Section 166
and other under sub-section 4 of section
166-The duty to file the claim is cast upon
the Police Authorities under Section 166(4)
read with Rule 150 of Central M.V Rules
coupled with an obligation cast upon the
tribunal to treat the same as claim
application under Section 166(4) read with
Rule 204A of the UP M.V Rules-Mandate of
Section 159 & Section 166(4) of the Act has
to be considered before rejecting any claim
application under section 166 (3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act on grounds of limitation.
(Para 9-15, 20-24)

Writ petition allowed. (E-15)

List of Cases cited:

1. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs Swaran Singh;
(2004) 3 SCC 297

2. CIT Vs Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003)3 SCC 57

3.
P.
Raghava
Kurup
&
anr.
Vs
V.
Ananthakumari & ors. (2007) 9 SCC 179

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ram Singh the counsel
for the petitioner.

2. The present petition has been filed
by the petitioner challenging the order
dated 27.01.2023 whereby the claim
petition filed by the petitioner under section
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has
been dismissed as being beyond the
limitation prescribed under section 166 (3)
of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as
amended with effect from 01.04.2022.

3. The facts, in brief, are that the legal
heirs of Late Chetan Kumar filed a petition
under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act claiming compensation on account of
the death of Late Chetan Kumar in a motor
accident on 01.05.2022. The said claim
petition was filed on 27.01.2023. As the
same was beyond the limitation of six
months prescribed under section 166 (3) of
the Act, the same was dismissed by means
of the impugned order.

4. The submission of the counsel for
the petitioner is that there was a delay of
about fifty seven days' and the Act being a
beneficial piece of legislation should be
interpreted liberally and the delay should
be condoned. He relies upon a judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Swaran
Singh; (2004) 3 SCC 297.

5. To analyze the submission made at
the
bar,
the
scheme
of
claiming
compensation as prescribed under the
Motor Vehicles Act ( herein after referred
to as MV Act) is to be read as a whole. The
relevant chapters for the case in hand are
chapter XI and Chapter XII of the Act and
Sections 159 and Section 166 and the Rules
framed by the Central Government and the
State Government.

6. It is relevant to note the provisions
as contained in Section 166 of the Act,
which is as under :

"166. Application for compensation.
(1) An application for compensation
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
arising out of an accident of the nature
specified in sub-section (1) of section 165
may be made

(a) by the person who has sustained
the injury; or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the
accident, by all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorized by
the person injured or all or any of the legal
representatives of the deceased, as the case
may be :

Provided that where all the legal
representatives of the deceased have not
joined in any such application for
compensation, the application shall be
made on behalf of or for the benefit of all
the legal representatives of the deceased
and the legal representatives who have
not so joined, shall be impleaded as
respondents to the application.

[Provided further that where a
person
accepts
compensation
under
section 164 in accordance with the
procedure provided under section 149,
his claims petition before the Claims
Tribunal shall lapse.]

(2) Every application under subsection (1) shall be made, at the option of
the claimant, either to the Claims
Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area
in which the accident occurred or to the
Claims Tribunal within the local limits of
whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or
carries on business or within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant
resides, and shall be in such form and
contain such particulars as may be
prescribed:)

(3) No application for compensation
shall be entertained unless it is made
within six months of the occurrence of
the accident.

(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat
any report of accidents forwarded to it
under section 159 as an application for
compensation under this Act.
(5) Notwithstanding anything in this Act
or any other law for the time being in
force, the right of a person to claim
compensation for injury in an accident
shall, upon the death of the person
injured,
survive
to
his
legal
representatives, irrespective of whether
the cause of death is relatable to or had
any nexus with the injury or not."

7. In terms of the provision of Section
166 (3) of the Act, it is clear that the
legislature in its wisdom prescribed that the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal shall not
entertain any application for grant of
compensation, if the same is not filed
within six months of the occurrence of the
incident, thus, starting point of limitation is
the date of occurrence of the incident.
Relying upon the said provision, the order
impugned has been passed by the Tribunal
rejecting the claim petition.

8. The said view of the Tribunal, in
the opinion of this court, is not justified as
the court has interpreted the provisions of
section 166 in a narrow and pedantic
manner, whereas, the Act being a socio
beneficial piece of legislation, needs to be
interpreted purposively and the various
sections
have
to
be
interpreted
harmoniously.

9. Section 166(3) of the Act cannot
be read in isolation disjunct with
Section
166
(4)
which
makes
it
mandatory for the Claims Tribunal to
treat
any
report
of
the
accident
forwarded to it under section 159 as an
application for compensation.
4 All. Smt. Jyoti & Anr. Vs. M.A.C.T. Fatehpur & Anr.
641

10. Section 159 of the Act which is
quoted herein below, mandates the Police
Officer, investigating the accident to
necessarily
prepare
an
accidental
information
report
to
facilitate
the
settlement of claim within a period of three
months and containing such particulars to
the Claims Tribunal or any other agency
that may be prescribed. Section 159 of the
Act is quoted as under:

"159.
Information
to
be
given
regarding accident - The police officer
shall, during the investigation, prepare an
accident information report to facilitate the
settlement of claim in such form and
manner,
within
three
months
and
containing such particulars and submit the
same to the Claims Tribunal and such other
agency as may be prescribed."

11. Section 164C of the Motor
Vehicle Act confers power on the Central
Government to frame rules for the purpose
of carrying into effect the provision of
Chapter XI of Motor Vehicle Act which
includes Section 159.

12. In terms of the powers under
Section 164C, the Central Government has
framed rules known as Central Motor
Vehicles Rules, 1989. Rule 150 of the said
rules provides as under:

"150. Furnishing of copies of reports
to Claims Tribunal.--(1) The police report
referred to in section 159 shall be in Form
54 and the accident information report
shall be submitted to the Claims Tribunal,
insurer and such other agency as may be
notified by the Central Government.

(2) A registering authority or a police
officer who is required to furnish the
required information to the person eligible
to claim compensation under section 160
or insurer against whom a claim has been
made and such other person as may be
notified by the Central Government, shall
furnish the information in Form 54, within
seven days from the date of receipt of the
request and on payment of a fee of rupees
ten."

13. On a conjoint reading of section
166 (4) read with section 159 of the Act
read with Rule 150 of Central Motor
Vehicle Rules, it is clear that on the
occurrence of any accident, a duty has been
cast upon the Police Officer, investigating
the accident, to send an information
containing the particulars to the Claims
Tribunal in Form No.54 and the Claims
Tribunal is bound to accept the said report
as an application for settlement of the
Claim.

14. Section 176 of Motor Vehicle Act
empowers State Government to frame rules
for the Tribunals and in excrecise of the
said powers State Government has framed
rules Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules
1998. Rules 204 A of the said rules is
quoted as under :

204-A. Police report submitted under
Section 158(6)-(1) On receipt of report of
Investigating Police Officer
submitted
under sub- rule (4) of Rule 202- A, the
Claims Tribunal shall go through the same
and may call for such further information
or material as considered necessary for
proper and effective action in accordance
with sub-section (4) of Section 166.

(2)
The
Claims
Tribunal
after
examining
the
report
and
further
information material, if called for, shall
register the claim case thereon and, then,
issue notice for appearance to all the
parties concerned which would include the
victims
the
accident,
of
the
legal
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
representatives of persons deceased, as the
case may be driver, owner and insurer of
the Vehicle involved in the accident.

(3) On receipt of notice, the parties
mentioned in sub-rule (2) would be
required to appear and declare through
affidavit, if any claim case had been
preferred, or was being preferred in
respect of the same cause of action, and if
so, the report of Investigating Police
Officer, treated as Claim case, would be
tagged to such claim case preferred
independently by the parties.

(4) If the persons injured, or legal
representative of the persons deceased do
not appear in response to the notice issued
under sub-rule (2) in the manner indicated
in sub-rule (3) the Claims Tribunal may
presume that the said parties were not
interested in pursuing the same for, any
compensation in such proceedings, and on
such presumption the case shall be closed.

(5) Unless the Police report treated as
claim case stands tagged to independent
claim case preferred by the parties
themselves, the Claims Tribunal shall call
upon
the
person,
injured
or
legal
representatives of the person deceased as
the case, may be, and the persons who have
appeared in response to the notice, to
submit statements of facts regarding
compensation, if claimed by them.

(6) If statements of facts about
compensation claimed and basis thereof
are furnished by the parties. The case shall
be further proceeded in the same manner as
required to deal with applications moved by
the parties for compensation directly before
the Claims Tribunal.

(7) If statements of facts about the
compensation claimed, has been furnished
by the parties and subsequently commits
default in appearance, the provisions of
Order-IX of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 would apply"

15. On a conjoint reading of Section
166(3) read with Section 166(4) read with
the rules as referred to above ,the
inescapable conclusion is that two modes
of claiming compensation are prescribed,
one under sub section 3 of Section 166 and
other under sub-section 4 of section
166.The duty to file the claim is cast upon
the Police Authorities under Section 166(4)
read with Rule 150 of Central M.V Rules
coupled with an obligation cast upon the
tribunal to treat the same as claim
application under Section 166(4) read with
Rule 204A of the UP M.V Rules.

16. In fact, in terms of the Rule
204A(3) any claim filed by the claimant in
addition to the report of Police Authorities
is to be tagged with the first report and is to
be heard and decided simultaneously.

17. In view of there being two modes
prescribed for making claim under subsections 3 and 4 of section 166 and both
have a same purpose and both are aimed at
the same objective i.e. to expeditiously
register a claim for damages sustained in
the accident, both have to be harmoniously
reconciled so as to promote the object of
the Statute and not to frustrate it.

18. The Supreme Court has laid down
principles that govern the doctrine of
harmonious constructions in (2003)3 SCC
57; CIT vs. Hindustan Bulk Carriers
wherein it was observed and laid down in
paras 14 to 21 as under:

"14. A construction which reduces the
statute to a futility has to be avoided. A
statute or any enacting provision therein
must be so construed as to make it effective
and operative on the principle expressed in
the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat
i.e. a liberal construction should be put
4 All. Smt. Jyoti & Anr. Vs. M.A.C.T. Fatehpur & Anr.
643
upon written instruments, so as to uphold
them, if possible, and carry into effect the
intention of the parties. [See Broom's Legal
Maxims (10th Edn.), p. 361, Craies on
Statutes (7th Edn.), p. 95 and Maxwell on
Statutes (11th Edn.), p. 221.]

15. A statute is designed to be
workable and the interpretation thereof by
a court should be to secure that object
unless crucial omission or clear direction
makes that end unattainable. (See Whitney
v. IRC [1926 AC 37 : 10 Tax Cas 88 : 95
LJKB 165 : 134 LT 98 (HL)] , AC at p. 52
referred to in CIT v. S. Teja Singh [AIR
1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR 408] and
Gursahai Saigal v. CIT [AIR 1963 SC 1062
: (1963) 48 ITR 1] .)

16. The courts will have to reject that
construction which will defeat the plain
intention of the legislature even though
there may be some inexactitude in the
language used. (See Salmon v. Duncombe
[(1886) 11 AC 627 : 55 LJPC 69 : 55 LT
446 (PC)] AC at p. 634, Curtis v. Stovin
[(1889) 22 QBD 513 : 58 LJQB 174 : 60
LT 772 (CA)] referred to in S. Teja Singh
case [AIR 1959 SC 352 : (1959) 35 ITR
408] .)

17. If the choice is between two
interpretations, the narrower of which
would fail to achieve the manifest purpose
of the legislation, we should avoid a
construction which would reduce the
legislation to futility, and should rather
accept the bolder construction, based on
the view that Parliament would legislate
only for the purpose of bringing about an
effective result. (See Nokes v. Doncaster
Amalgamated Collieries [(1940) 3 All ER
549 : 1940 AC 1014 : 109 LJKB 865 : 163
LT 343 (HL)] referred to in Pye v. Minister
for Lands for NSW [(1954) 3 All ER 514 :
(1954) 1 WLR 1410 (PC)] .) The principles
indicated in the said cases were reiterated
by this Court in Mohan Kumar Singhania v.
Union of India [1992 Supp (1) SCC 594 :
1992 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1992) 19 ATC 881
: AIR 1992 SC 1] .

18. The statute must be read as a
whole and one provision of the Act should
be construed with reference to other
provisions in the same Act so as to make a
consistent enactment of the whole statute.

19. The court must ascertain the
intention of the legislature by directing its
attention not merely to the clauses to be
construed but to the entire statute; it must
compare the clause with other parts of the
law and the setting in which the clause to
be interpreted occurs. (See R.S. Raghunath
v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335 :
1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507
: AIR 1992 SC 81] .) Such a construction
has the merit of avoiding any inconsistency
or repugnancy either within a section or
between two different sections or provisions
of the same statute. It is the duty of the
court to avoid a head-on clash between two
sections of the same Act. (See Sultana
Begum v. Prem Chand Jain [(1997) 1 SCC
373 : AIR 1997 SC 1006] .)

20. Whenever it is possible to do so, it
must be done to construe the provisions
which appear to conflict so that they
harmonise. It should not be lightly assumed
that Parliament had given with one hand
what it took away with the other.

21.The provisions of one section of the
statute cannot be used to defeat those of
another unless it is impossible to effect
reconciliation between them. Thus a
construction that reduces one of the
provisions to a "useless lumber" or "dead
letter" is not a harmonised construction. To
harmonise is not to destroy."

19. The rule of interpreting two provisions
of a statute was considered by the Supreme
Court in (2007) 9 SCC 179; P. Raghava
Kurup and another vs. V. Ananthakumari
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and others and the Supreme Court in paras
7, 9 and 10 has recorded as under :

7. Therefore, the intention of the ruleframing authority can be brought forth by
reading these two provisions harmoniously.
The settled principle of interpretation of
statute is that if two rules can be read
harmoniously and the object sought to be
achieved can be achieved without violation
of any rule then it should be so read.
Secondly, it may also be relevant to
mention that Note (1) to Rule 1 was
inserted in 1982 subsequently knowing fully
well that Rule 43-B starts with non obstante
clause. Therefore, the note which is
subsequent to the Rules of 1959 can be
read harmoniously without doing any
violence to Rule 43-B.

9. Mr Rao placed reliance on a
decision of this Court in Nalinakhya
Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [AIR 1953
SC 148 : 1953 SCR 533] their Lordships
observed as follows: (SCR p. 534)

"In construing a statute it is not
competent to any court to proceed upon the
assumption that the legislature has made a
mistake and even if there is some defect in
the phraseology used by the legislature, the
court cannot aid the defective phrasing of
an Act or add and amend, or by
construction, make up deficiencies which
are left in the Act."

10. No attempt is made in this case to
add or subtract any word. It is only after
reading the two provisions of the Rules
harmoniously the result can be achieved
without any violence to any of the
provisions of the Act or the Rules. The
object as already indicated above, was to
provide promotional avenues to the nonteaching staff for the post of teacher
provided they fulfil requisite qualifications.
Therefore, this case is of no help to the
appellants."

20. Scope of Section 166(3) which
empowers the claimant to apply under
Section 166(3) within 6 months on conjoint
reading with Section 166(4) of the Act and
on the basis of analysis referred above, has
to be referable to cases of motor accidents
in which no FIR could be registered for any
reason or where he chooses to file a claim
before the Police Authorities send the
report to the Claims Tribunal.

21. In the present case, the Tribunal
has not considered this aspect and has
failed to record any material fact in respect
of the accident report being on record
and/or steps taken thereon by the Tribunal
in terms of Rule 204 A and has proceeded
to reject the claim petition ignoring the said
aspect, as such, the impugned order dated
27.01.2023 is not sustainable and is liable
to be set aside.

22. The Claims Tribunal is directed to
process and decide the claim in accordance
with law as it was the duty of the Police
Officer investigating the accident to sent
the information and it was also mandatory
on the Claims Tribunal to accept the said
report as a claim application which appears
to have not been done, for no fault of the
petitioner.

23. In case the police officer has
failed to fill/send his report, the Tribunal
will be well within its powers to call for the
same and register it as a Claim Petition and
then take steps as prescribed under Rule
204A of the Rules.

24. Thus, the order dated 27.01.2023
is set aside. It is further directed for
guidance of Tribunals functioning under the
Act, that the mandate of Section 159 and
Section 166(4) of the Act has to be
considered before rejecting any claim
4 All. Laxman Singh Bhadauriya Vs. Controlling Auth. Under the payment of Gratuity Act &
 Anr.
645
application under section 166 (3) of the
Motor Vehicles Act
on
grounds
of
limitation.

25. The writ petition stands allowed.

26. The Registrar General is directed
to forward a copy of this judgment to all
the Claims Tribunal functioning in the State
of U.P.
----------
(2023) 4 ILRA 645
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.04.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Writ-C No. 18684 of 2010

Laxman Singh Bhadauriya ...Petitioner
Versus
Controlling Auth. Under the payment of
Gratuity Act & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.N. Dubey, Sri Amit Kumar Srivastava, Sri
S.K. Singh Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 -
Section 7(3-A) - Notification dated
01.10.1987
-
Gratuity
-
Delayed
payment
-
10%
interest
rate
is
provided - However, award of 4%
interest
was
passed
-
Legality
challenged - Held, the respondent no. 1
has not given any basis or source for
payment of only 4% annual interest
instead of 10% annual interest as per
existing notification dated 01.10.1987
issued by the Central Government in
respect of Sec 7 (3-A) of the Payment
of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Payment of 4 %
interest is contrary and against the law.
(Para 8)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Umesh Chandra
Sharma, J.)

1. Heard Sri S.N.Dubey, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Sri Jitendra
Narain Rai, learned Additional Chief
Standing Counsel.

2. This writ petition has been filed for
the issuance of writ, order or direction in
the nature of Certiorari for quashing the
Award
dated
18.12.2009
passed
by
Respondent no. 1 so far it relates to 4%
interest and also for issuance of mandamus
directing the Respondent no. 2 to pay 10%
interest on the delayed payment of gratuity.

3. In brief, facts of the case are that
the
petitioner
was
clerk
in
District
Cooperative Bank, Ltd. Fatehpur, and
retired from the service on 31.01.2000. He
completed 29 years service but the
respondent no. 2 paid him less gratuity of 4
years and 10 months. He moved an
application on 16.08.2007 before the
Respondent no. 01 with the prayer that the
respondent no. 2 has paid less gratuity
therefore, he may be directed to pay Rs.
85,983/-. The case was registered as case
no. P.G. 13/2007 marked as annexure - 1 to
the petition. Respondent no. 2 filed written
statement and its photocopy is annexure - 2
to this petition. The petitioner filed the
rejoinder annexure - 3 to the petition.

4. The petitioner filed documentary
evidence and adduced oral evidence before
respondent no.1. The respondent no. 1 by
the judgment and order dated 18.12.2009
allowed
the
petition
directing
the
respondent no. 2 to pay Rs 34,632/-which
is annexure - 4 to the petition. The
respondent no. 1 while allowing the claim