# Smt. Kalawati Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 197
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-18
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 41628 of 2011
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar, Rajendra Kumar-Iv
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-kalawati-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49639
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) Land Law - The Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Section 6 -
Persons holding vacant land in excess of
ceiling limit to file statement, Section 8 -
Preparation of draft statement as regards
vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit ,
Section 10 - Acquisition of vacant land in
excess
of
ceiling
limit
-
Section
10(1)/10(3) - notification i.e. land vesting
in the State - rationale behind Sections
10(5) and 10(6) of the Act - Section 10(5)
prescribes an ordinary and logical course
of action that ought to be followed before
the authorities decided to use force to
dispossess the occupant under Section
10(6) - a grievance cannot be raised long
after an alleged violation of Section 10(5),
as the erstwhile owner can still be evicted
by the State if they fail to deliver
possession - Urban Land Ceiling and
Regulation (Repeal Act, 1999). (Para -
15,11,18 )

Possession of surplus land - taken by State -
question - whether petitioner have right to
retain possession of the surplus land -
transferred to him by the erstwhile owner - after
vesting of the land in the State under Section
10(3) of the Act.(Para - 20)

HELD:-Petitioner lacks locus. The surplus land
vested with the State upon notification under
Section 10(3) followed by dispossession of the
erstwhile owner of the land (Khelai) under
Section 10(5) way back in 1981. Owner never
protested or agitated his dispossession before
any authority or Court. The subsequent buyer
(Petitioner) cannot raise challenge to the
procedure of dispossession at belated stage on
the strength of a sale deed being void ab-initio.
(Para -23)
198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Writ Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
197
However, we find no force in the
contention. So far as the disputed lands are
concerned, it is an admitted fact that
Government offices are already being run
therefrom. It is also not disputed that the
respondents had taken possession of the
lands in pursuance of impugned notices of
resumption and that they continue to run
their offices.

Conclusion

17. GGO No.179 was a statutory
exercise and an existing law. The rights
conferred thereunder to a grantee was a
species of land tenure where the grantee
was only conferred with possessory rights
over the land. He was entitled to build
permanent structure, which he could also
transfer subject to certain restrictions, but
title in the land continued to vest in the
Union of India, with unfettered right to
resume any time for public purpose by
serving a month's notice. The payment of
compensation
was
not
a
condition
precedent for valid resumption of land. It
was a ministerial act and payment, a
resultant consequence.

18. As a result of the aforesaid
discussion, there is no merit in the
petitions.
The
same
are
accordingly
dismissed, but without any order as to
costs.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 197
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ C No. 41628 of 2011
Smt. Kalawati Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.B. Khare, Sri A.K. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava

(A) Land Law - The Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Section 6 -
Persons holding vacant land in excess of
ceiling limit to file statement, Section 8 -
Preparation of draft statement as regards
vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit ,
Section 10 - Acquisition of vacant land in
excess
of
ceiling
limit
-
Section
10(1)/10(3) - notification i.e. land vesting
in the State - rationale behind Sections
10(5) and 10(6) of the Act - Section 10(5)
prescribes an ordinary and logical course
of action that ought to be followed before
the authorities decided to use force to
dispossess the occupant under Section
10(6) - a grievance cannot be raised long
after an alleged violation of Section 10(5),
as the erstwhile owner can still be evicted
by the State if they fail to deliver
possession - Urban Land Ceiling and
Regulation (Repeal Act, 1999). (Para -
15,11,18 )

Possession of surplus land - taken by State -
question - whether petitioner have right to
retain possession of the surplus land -
transferred to him by the erstwhile owner - after
vesting of the land in the State under Section
10(3) of the Act.(Para - 20)

HELD:-Petitioner lacks locus. The surplus land
vested with the State upon notification under
Section 10(3) followed by dispossession of the
erstwhile owner of the land (Khelai) under
Section 10(5) way back in 1981. Owner never
protested or agitated his dispossession before
any authority or Court. The subsequent buyer
(Petitioner) cannot raise challenge to the
procedure of dispossession at belated stage on
the strength of a sale deed being void ab-initio.
(Para -23)
198 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Writ Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Shiv Ram Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors. , Writ C
No. 37964 of 2009

2. St. of U.P. Vs Hari Ram , (2013) 4 SCC 280

3. St. of Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma , (2015)
5 SCC 321

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

2. The petitioner claims to be the
subsequent purchaser of a portion of the
surplus land declared under the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for
Short "the Act") from the land holder, vide
sale deed dated 25.01.1994.

3. By the instant writ petition,
petitioner
seeks
a
direction
to
the
respondents not to dispossess the petitioner
from Plot No. 12633 situated in Village
Basaratpur Tappa, Qasba, Pargana Haveli,
Tehsil Sadar, District Gorakhpur, i.e. the
land which came to be declared surplus on
23.09.1978. Further, direction has also been
sought to quash the order dated 27.04.2011,
passed by the second respondent District
Magistrate,
Gorakhpur,
rejecting
the
representation of the petitioner.

4. The facts, inter se, the parties are
not in dispute that the land holder Khelai,
son of, late Ganpat, submitted a return no.
254 under Section 6(1) of the Act, in
respect of Plots No. 1263, 1538 and a
residential house. The competent authority
upon survey prepared a draft statement and
the returnee was subjected to notice to file
objection under Section 8(3) of the Act.
Khelai filed objections on 15.07.1978, the
competent authority declared 1475.67 sq.
meter land as excess land, vide order dated
23.09.1978, under Section 8(4) of the Act,
from the afore-noted plots. No objection
was filed against the order, consequently,
notification under Section 10(1) of the Act
was duly published in the official gazette
on 26.12.1978, followed by, notification
under Section 10(3) of the Act, duly
notified
on
29.08.1980.
Thereafter,
followed by notice under Section 10(5) of
the Act on 17.10.1981. Pursuant, thereof,
Circle
Lekhpal
took
possession
on
14.12.1983. The name of the State came to
be recorded in the revenue record in 1399 -
1404 Fasali, in respect of the excess land,
after expunging the name of tenure holder
Khelai.

5. In the afore-noted factual backdrop,
it is submitted by the petitioner that the
original land owner i.e. Khelai vide sale
deed dated 25.01.1994, transferred 275 sq.
meter of the excess declared land of plot
no. 1263, in favour of the petitioner.
Thereafter, the name of the petitioner came
to be mutated by the Tehsildar in the
revenue record on 15.04.1994 (1401
Fasali). It is submitted that since State had
not taken possession, from the erstwhile
owner, petitioner is entitled to retain
possession in view of Urban Land Ceiling
and Regulation (Repeal Act, 1999) (for
short "Repeal Act"), which came into force
on 18.03.1999.

6. It is submitted that the Repeal Act
mandated that all proceedings relating to
any order made under the principal Act
pending
immediately,
before
the
commencement of the Repeal Act, before
any Court, Tribunal or Authority shall abate
provided that the section shall not apply to
such proceedings relatable to the land,
2 All. Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
199
possession of which has been taken over by
the State Government or by any Authority
duly authorized by the State in this behalf.

7. Learned Standing Counsel in
rebuttal
submits
that
against
the
proceedings under the Act, the original land
holder did not file any objection or appeal.
The proceedings came to be concluded on
19.08.1981, with the surplus land vesting in
the State, and thereafter, possession was
taken under Section 10(5) of the Act on
14.12.1983, thereafter, the name of the
State was duly entered in the revenue
record. Further, it is submitted that the
petitioner would have no locus being a
subsequent purchaser after the notification
i.e. land vesting in the State (Section 10(1)
/ 10(3)), and therefore, it is urged that the
transfer is a nullity i.e. void ab-initio .

8.

Rival
submissions
fall
for
consideration.

9. The question posed before the
Division Bench of this Court in Shiv Ram
Singh Versus State of U.P. and others1 is
extracted:

"The issue which has been raised
before the Court is whether, as a result of
the repeal of the principal Act with effect
from 18 March 1999, the petitioner would
be entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act.
That, in turn, would depend on whether
possession of the land was taken over by
the State or by any person duly authorised
prior to 18 March 1999."

10. The Court speaking through D.Y.
Chandrachud, C.J. (as My Lord then was)
noted the submission made on behalf of the
petitioner:

"On behalf of the petitioner, it has
been submitted that the issuance of a notice
under Section 10(5) as well as a notice
under Section 10(6) is mandatory having
regard to the judgment of the Supreme
Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Hari
Ram2. In the present case, it has been
sought to be urged that the State has not
been able to establish that a notice either
under Section 10(5) or under Section 10(6)
was duly served upon the petitioner.
Secondly, it has been submitted that under
the Uttar Pradesh Urban Land Ceiling
(Taking of Possession, Payment of Amount
and Allied Matters) Directions, 19833
issued under Section 35 of the principal
Act, a detailed procedure has been
prescribed for taking possession of vacant
land in excess of the ceiling limit and
unless that procedure has been duly
followed, it cannot be held that possession
was validly taken in the eyes of law."

11. The stand of the State before the
Court was noted as follows:

"On behalf of the State, the
learned Chief Standing Counsel has
submitted, firstly, that the decision of the
Supreme Court in Hari Ram's case (supra)
has since been considered by the Supreme
Court in a subsequent judgment in State of
Assam Vs Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma4 in which
it has been clarified that the earlier
decision did not deal with the question
whether a breach of Section 10(5) of the
principal Act and possible dispossession
without notice would vitiate the act of
dispossession itself or render it non est in
the eyes of law."

12. The Court considered the rival
contentions on the following question :
200 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"The basic issue which falls for
consideration in these proceedings is
whether possession of land declared
surplus had been taken over from the
petitioner prior to 18 March 1999. Section
3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act provides that
repeal of the principal Act shall not affect
the vesting of any vacant land under subsection (3) of Section 10, possession of
which has been taken over by the State
Government or by any person duly
authorised by the State Government in this
behalf or by the competent authority."

13. The relevant provisions for taking
over possession are to be found in subsections (5) and (6) of Section 10 of the
principal Act. Sub-sections (5) and (6) reads
as follows:

"(5) Where any vacant land is
vested in the State Government under subsection (3), the competent authority may, by
notice in writing, order any person who may
be in possession of it to surrender or deliver
possession thereof to the State Government or
to any person duly authorised by the State
Government in this behalf within thirty days
of the service of the notice.

(6) If any person refuses or fails to
comply with an order made under sub-section
(5), the competent authority may take
possession of the vacant land or cause it to be
given to the concerned State Government or
to any person duly authorised by such State
Government in this behalf and may for that
purpose use such force as may be necessary.

Explanation.-In this section, in subsection (1) of section 11 and in Sections 14
and 23, "State Government", in relation to -

(a) any vacant land owned by the
Central Government, means the Central
Government;

(b) any vacant land owned by any
State Government and situated in the
Union territory or within the local limits of
a cantonment declared as such under
Section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2
of 1924), means that State Government."

14. The Court in Shiv Ram Singh
(supra) considered the earlier decision of
the Supreme Court in Hari Ram (supra)
followed by the subsequent decision
rendered in Bhaskar Jyoti Sharma (supra)
with
regard
to
the
failure
of
the
Government
/
Authorized
person
/
Competent Authority, to issue notice to the
land owners under Section 10(5) of the Act.
The Division Bench in Shiv Ram Singh
(supra) discussed the impact of lack of
notice
under
Section
10(5)
and
its
consequence in view of the Repeal Act in
the following terms.

"Under sub-section (5) of Section
10 of the principal Act, where any vacant
land is vested in the State Government
under sub-section (3), the competent
authority is empowered, by notice in
writing, to order any person who may be in
possession,
to
surrender
or
deliver
possession of the land to the government or
to the duly authorised person within thirty
days of the service of notice. Under subsection (6), if any person refuses or fails to
comply with an order made under subsection (5), the competent authority may
take possession of the vacant land and may
for that purpose use such force as may be
necessary. These provisions came up for
consideration before the Supreme Court in
Hari Ram (supra). The Supreme Court
observed that sub-section (5) of Section 10
visualizes a situation of a peaceful
surrender and delivery of possession, while
sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates
a situation of forceful dispossession.
Forceful dispossession, it was held, would
result where a person had failed to
2 All. Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
201
peacefully surrender or give delivery of
possession under Section 10(5). Though
Section 10(5) uses the expression 'may' in
regard to the issuance of a notice, the
Supreme Court held that the provision must
be understood as 'shall'. In other words, the
issuance of a notice under sub-section (5)
of Section 10 would be mandatory. This
decision has since been considered in
Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra). In the
subsequent decision, the Supreme Court
observed that the issue which needed
examination was whether the failure of
the Government or the authorised officer
or the competent authority to issue notice
to the land owners under Section 10 (5)
would result in an inference or conclusion
that
such
a
dispossession
is
no
dispossession in the eyes of law and would
hence attract the provisions of Section 3 of
the Repeal Act. The answer to that
question was held to be in the negative."

15. In Shiv Ram Singh (supra) the
Court after noticing the provision of
Section 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6), was of the
firm view that the grievance cannot be
raised long after an alleged violation of
Section 10(5). Assuming that the alleged
dispossession was not proceeded by any
notice under Section 10(5) of the Act, the
erstwhile owner could have made a
grievance based on Section 10(5), and even
sought restoration. In that event upon such
restoration of the land, the erstwhile owner
can still be evicted by the State resorting to
Section 10(5) / 10(6) of the Act upon
failure to deliver possession. A person,
therefore, who had his land upon being
declared surplus under Section 10(3) may
not consider it worthwhile to agitate the
violation of Section 10(5) for want of due
procedure, in that event the owner can be
dispossessed by the State authorities the
very next day by following the procedure
and taking possession under Section 10(5).
In that view of the matter, it would be an
academic exercise for the owner in
possession
to
find
fault
with
his
dispossession on that ground that no notice
under Section 10(5) was served upon him.
It is in this view of the matter the owner
after notification under Section 10(3) has
not protested or agitated with regard to his
dispossession.

16. Further, any grievance based on
Section 10(5) of the Act ought to have been
made by the owner within a reasonable
time of such dispossession. In any such
situation, the owner or a person in
possession must be deemed to have waived
his right under Section 10(5) of the Act.
Any other view would give a license to a
litigant to make a grievance not because he
has suffered any real prejudice that needs to
be redressed but only to reap the fortiutions
circumstance of a Repeal Act.

17. Shiv Ram Singh (supra),
thereafter explained and spelled out the law
pertaining to dispossession of the land
owner without notice under Section 10(5)
of the Act.

"Hence, the law which has been
laid down is that dispossession of the land
owner without a notice under Section 10(5)
would entitle the land owner to complain of
the act of dispossession without notice, in
which event the State can issue a fresh
notice before dispossessing the land owner
but unless there is something inherently
wrong so as to affect the very process of
taking over possession, such as the identity
of the land or the boundaries thereof, a
person who had lost his land by reason of
the land being declared surplus under
Section 10 (3) may not make a grievance
since he would be conscious of the fact that
202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the State can take over possession by a
simple act of giving a notice. In the view of
the Supreme Court, such a grievance
cannot be raised long after an alleged
violation of Section 10(5). We extract,
herein below, the observations of the
Supreme Court in the judgment:

"...what needs examination is
whether the failure of the Government or
the authorised officer or the competent
authority to issue a notice to the land
owners in terms of Section 10(5) would by
itself mean that such dispossession is no
dispossession in the eye of law and hence
insufficient to attract Section 3 of the
Repeal Act. Our answer to that question is
in the negative. We say so because in the
ordinary course actual physical possession
can be taken from the person in occupation
only after notice under Section 10(5) is
issued to him to surrender such possession
to the State Government, or the authorised
officer or the competent authority. There is
enough good sense in that procedure
inasmuch as the need for using force to
dispossess a person in possession should
ordinarily
arise
only
if
the
person
concerned
refuses
to
cooperate
and
surrender or deliver possession of the lands
in question. That is the rationale behind
Sections 10(5) and 10(6) of the Act. But
what would be the position if for any
reason the competent authority or the
Government or the authorised officer
resorts to forcible dispossession of the
erstwhile owner even without exploring the
possibility of a voluntary surrender or
delivery of such possession on demand.
Could such use of force vitiate the
dispossession itself or would it only amount
to an irregularity that would give rise to a
cause of action for the aggrieved owner or
the person in possession to seek restoration
only to be dispossessed again after issuing
a notice to him. It is this aspect that has to
an extent bothered us. The High Court has
held that the alleged dispossession was not
preceded by any notice under Section 10(5)
of the Act. Assuming that to be the case all
that it would mean is that on 7th December,
1991 when the erstwhile owner was
dispossessed from the land in question, he
could have made a grievance based on
Section 10(5) and even sought restoration
of possession to him no matter he would
upon such restoration once again be liable
to be evicted under Sections 10(5) and
10(6) of the Act upon his failure to deliver
or surrender such possession. In reality
therefore unless there was something that
was inherently wrong so as to affect the
very process of taking over such as the
identity of the land or the boundaries
thereof or any other circumstance of a
similar nature going to the root of the
matter hence requiring an adjudication, a
person who had lost his land by reason of
the same being declared surplus under
Section 10(3) would not consider it
worthwhile to agitate the violation of
Section 10(5) for he can well understand
that even when the Court may uphold his
contention that the procedure ought to be
followed as prescribed, it may still be not
enough for him to retain the land for the
authorities could the very next day
dispossess him from the same by simply
serving a notice under Section 10(5). It
would, in that view, be an academic
exercise for any owner or person in
possession
to
find
fault
with
his
dispossession on the ground that no notice
under Section 10(5) had been served upon
him."

Again, the Supreme Court has
observed:

"The issue can be viewed from
another angle also. Assuming that a person
in possession could make a grievance, no
matter without much gain in the ultimate
2 All. Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
203
analysis, the question is whether such
grievance could be made long after the
alleged violation of Section 10(5). If actual
physical possession was taken over from
the erstwhile land owner on 7th December,
1991 as is alleged in the present case any
grievance based on Section 10(5) ought to
have been made within a reasonable time of
such dispossession. If the owner did not do
so, forcible taking over of possession
would acquire legitimacy by sheer lapse of
time. In any such situation the owner or
the person in possession must be deemed
to have waived his right under Section
10(5) of the Act. Any other view would, in
our opinion, give a licence to a litigant to
make a grievance not because he has
suffered any real prejudice that needs to
be redressed but only because the
fortuitous circumstance of a Repeal Act
tempted him to raise the issue regarding
his dispossession being in violation of the
prescribed procedure."

18. The earlier decision in Hari Ram
(supra) has been distinguished in the
following observations:

"....This Court was in Hari Ram's
case (supra) considering whether the word
'may' appearing in Section 10(5) gave to
the competent authority the discretion to
issue or not to issue a notice before taking
physical possession of the land in question
under Section 10(6). The question whether
breach of Section 10(5) and possible
dispossession without notice would vitiate
the act of dispossession itself or render it
non est in the eye of law did not fall for
consideration in that case. In our opinion,
what Section 10(5) prescribes is an
ordinary and logical course of action that
ought to be followed before the authorities
decided to use force to dispossess the
occupant under Section 10(6). In the case
at
hand
if
the
appellant's
version
regarding dispossession of the erstwhile
owner in December 1991 is correct, the
fact that such dispossession was without a
notice under Section 10(5) will be of no
consequence and would not vitiate or
obliterate the act of taking possession for
the purposes of Section 3 of the Repeal
Act."

19. The Division Bench in Shiv Ram
Singh
(supra)
made
the
following
observation on raising the grievance by the
land owner or any person belatedly and not
at the relevant time:

"We must also advert to another
aspect of the matter particularly having
regard to the recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma
(supra). The issue is whether such a
grievance could be made long after, before
the Court. The petitioner had waited for
nearly three years after the Repeal Act
came into force to file the first writ petition
and thereafter for a period of over two
years
after
the
disposal
of
the
representation despite the finding of the
District Magistrate that possession was
taken over on 25 June 1993. In our view,
such a belated challenge should not, in any
event, be entertained."

20.

In
the
afore-noted
legal
proposition with regard to possession of the
surplus land which finally came to be taken
by the State, the question that arises, in the
given facts, is as to whether the petitioner
would have right to retain possession of the
surplus land transferred to him by the
erstwhile owner after vesting of the land in
the State under Section 10(3) of the Act.

21. The relevant provision of Section
10(4) is extracted :
204 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"10(4)
During
the
period
commencing on the date of publication of
the notification under sub-section (1) and
ending with the date specified in the
declaration made under sub-section (3)-

(i) no person shall transfer by
way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or
otherwise
any
excess
vacant
land
(including any part thereof) specified in the
notification
aforesaid
and
any
such
transfer made in contravention of this
provision shall be deemed to be null and
void; and

(ii) no person shall alter or cause
to be altered the use of such excess vacant
land."

22. The question of issuing notice
under Section 10(5) to the petitioner after
16 years from the date of notice under
Section 10(1) of the Act does not arise. The
State had taken possession from the land
owner way back in 1981. The subsequent
transfer of the land in 1994, followed by
mutation of the name of the petitioner,
would have no bearing on the right of the
petitioner. The transfer of the surplus land
by the erstwhile owner, in the eye of law
being nullity i.e. void ab-initio would not
confer any right or title upon the petitioner.
The possession of the petitioner after the
proceedings concluding under the Act,
upon the State taking possession, would
merely be a case of encroachment of State
land. The Repeal Act would not come to
the assistance of the petitioner, rather, the
case of the petitioner would not fall within
the ambit and scope of the Repeal Act
being subsequent purchaser of the surplus
land after notification under Section 10(1) /
10(3) of the Act.

23. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, petitioner lacks
locus, and any case, the proceedings came
to be set up belatedly by the petitioner in
2006 by approaching this Court and filing a
petition, being Writ Petition No. 14698 of
2006, which came to be disposed of
directing the Collector to take a decision.
Pursuant thereof, the impugned order came
to be passed on 27.04.2011, whereby, the
second respondent after recording the facts
arrived at a conclusion that the transfer of
the land by the erstwhile owner, declared
surplus, vesting in the State, is a void
document and does not confer any right and
title upon the petitioner. The erstwhile
tenure holder (Khelai), had no title or
ownership to transfer the
land, the
petitioner on the strength of alleged
possession on State land cannot agitate his
dispossession in view of Repeal Act. The
surplus land vested with the State upon
notification under Section 10(3) followed
by dispossession of the erstwhile owner of
the land (Khelai) under Section 10(5) way
back in 1981. The owner never protested or
agitated his dispossession before any
authority or Court. In the circumstances,
the subsequent buyer (Petitioner) cannot
raise challenge to the procedure of
dispossession at belated stage on the
strength of a sale deed being void ab-initio.

24. The writ petition being devoid of
merit, is accordingly, dismissed.

25. No order as to costs.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 204
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 1 of 2021
In