# Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 1599
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-02-11
- **Case number:** Special Appeal No. 48 of 2020
- **Bench:** Biswanath Somadder, Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-krishna-shri-gupta-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45545
- **Pages:** 14

## Headnote

under the Intermediate Education Act,
1921 - prescribes alternative eligibility
criteria for appointment as Principal or
Headmaster of an institution - dismissal
of claim of the appellant for the post of
Principal based on the case of Amal
1600 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kishore
Singh
is
unfounded
-
the
appellant's claim rests on the alternate
eligibility
criterion
prescribed
under
clause (2)
The qualifications prescribed in terms of clause
(2) being one of the alternative sets of
eligibility criteria specifically omits to mention
any
training
qualification,
a
candidate
possessing the qualifications thereunder would
not require to possess a training qualification
which is required under the alternative criteria
as per clause (1) and clause (3) of the Entry 1
under Appendix A of Chapter II of the
Regulations. Therefore, no requirement of any
training qualification and a second class post
graduate
degree
along
with
teaching
experience of ten years in intermediate classes
in any recognized institution alone is sufficient
for the purpose of being eligible for the post of
Principal. (para 38 & 39)
B. Doctrine of Precedent - a judgment is
only an authority for what it actually
decided and not what logically follows
from the various observations made in
the judgment - it is necessary to see what
were the facts of the case in which the
decision was given and what was the
point decided
C. Interpretation of Statute - "or" -
generally construed as being disjunctive
i.e., a connective that marks alternatives
The use of the word "or" as a connective
between the three sets of eligibility criteria is
indicative of the disjunctive sense marking the
three alternatives. The three sets of eligibility
criteria under Entry 1 of Appendix A have thus
been prescribed, alternatively, as minimum
qualifications for being appointed as head of
the institution. (para 30)
Special Appeal Allowed. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

_Characters 0–39,904 of 45,996. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39904 for what follows._

2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1599
Khan AIR 1989 SC 1 it was held that in
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. High Court would not embark
upon an enquiry whether the allegations in
the complaint are like to be established by
evidence or not.

7. The scope and ambit of power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been
examined by Hon'ble Apex Court in
Union of India Vs. Prakash P. Hinduja
and another, AIR 2003 SC 2616 and
observed as follows:-

"The grounds on which power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised
to
quash
the
criminal
proceedings
basically are (1) where the allegations
made in the FIR or complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted
in their entirety do not prima facie
constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused (2) where the
uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not
disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused, (3)
where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of Code
of Criminal Procedure or the concerned
Act to the institution and continuance of
the proceedings. But this power has to be
exercised in a rare case and with great
circumspection".

8. In case in hand, from the perusal
of the material on record and looking into
the facts of the case, at this stage it cannot
be said that no offence is made out against
the applicant. All the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the applicant
relates to the disputed question of fact
which cannot be adjudicated upon by this
Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At this
stage only prima facie case is to be seen in
the light of law laid down in the above
mentioned cases and in the cases of R.P.
Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960
S.C. 866 and State of Haryana Vs.
Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426.

9. In view of the above, the prayer
for quashing the entire proceedings and
charge sheet dated 16.10.2019 of the
aforesaid case pending before the court
concerned is refused.

10. Accordingly, this application u/s
482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1599

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BISWANATH SOMADDER, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Special Appeal No. 48 of 2020

Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Amit Saxena, Sri Amit Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashok Khare, Sri Siddharth
Khare

A. Eligibility/Qualification - Regulation 1
of Chapter II of the Regulation framed
under the Intermediate Education Act,
1921 - prescribes alternative eligibility
criteria for appointment as Principal or
Headmaster of an institution - dismissal
of claim of the appellant for the post of
Principal based on the case of Amal
1600 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Kishore
Singh
is
unfounded
-
the
appellant's claim rests on the alternate
eligibility
criterion
prescribed
under
clause (2)
The qualifications prescribed in terms of clause
(2) being one of the alternative sets of
eligibility criteria specifically omits to mention
any
training
qualification,
a
candidate
possessing the qualifications thereunder would
not require to possess a training qualification
which is required under the alternative criteria
as per clause (1) and clause (3) of the Entry 1
under Appendix A of Chapter II of the
Regulations. Therefore, no requirement of any
training qualification and a second class post
graduate
degree
along
with
teaching
experience of ten years in intermediate classes
in any recognized institution alone is sufficient
for the purpose of being eligible for the post of
Principal. (para 38 & 39)
B. Doctrine of Precedent - a judgment is
only an authority for what it actually
decided and not what logically follows
from the various observations made in
the judgment - it is necessary to see what
were the facts of the case in which the
decision was given and what was the
point decided
C. Interpretation of Statute - "or" -
generally construed as being disjunctive
i.e., a connective that marks alternatives
The use of the word "or" as a connective
between the three sets of eligibility criteria is
indicative of the disjunctive sense marking the
three alternatives. The three sets of eligibility
criteria under Entry 1 of Appendix A have thus
been prescribed, alternatively, as minimum
qualifications for being appointed as head of
the institution. (para 30)
Special Appeal Allowed. (E-10)

List of cases cited:-

1. Amal Kishore Singh V. State of U.P. ad ors 2018
(10) ADJ 529 (distinguished)

2. Cable Corporation of India Limited V. Additional
Commissioner of Labour and ors (2008) 7 SCC 680
3. Guru Nanak Dev University V. Sanjay Kumar
Katwal and anr (2009) 1 SCC 60

4. G.P. Ceramics (P) Ltd. V. Commissioner, Trade Tax,
U.P. (2009) 2 SCC 90

5. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board V. Henderson
(1888) 13 AC 595 (HL)

6. The State of Orissa V. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and
ors AIR 1968 SC 647

7. Quinn V. Leathem 1901 AC 495

8. UOI V. Amrit Lal Manchandra and ors (2004) 3
SCC 75

9. London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton 1951 AC
737

10. Home Office V. Dorcet Yacht Co. 1970 (2) ALL
ER 294

11. Herrington V. British Railways Board 1972 (2)
WLR 537
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amit Saxena, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Amit
Shukla, for the appellant and Sri Ashok
Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Sri Siddharth Khare, for the respondentpetitioner.

2. This intra-court appeal has been
preferred against the judgment and order
dated
19.12.2019
passed
in
Writ-A
No.48219 of 2013 (Anita Singh Vs. State
of U.P. and others) whereby the order
dated 16.05.2013, which was impugned in
the writ petition, has been set aside and the
District Inspector of Schools, Jalaun, has
been directed to pass a fresh order in light
of the observations made in the judgment
for the senior most eligible person to be
allowed to officiate as Principal of the
Institution so long as regularly selected
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1601
Principal is not made available. Further,
the respondent-petitioner has been held to
be entitled to salary as officiating Principal
in accordance with the provisions of
Section 18(2) of the U.P. Secondary
Education Services Selection Board Act,
19821.

3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case
are that the post of Principal at Jalaun
Balika Inter College2, Jalaun fell vacant
on
30.6.2009.
The
aforementioned
Institution is a recognized Institution under
the
provisions
of
the
Intermediate
Education Act, 19213 and the payment of
salaries to teachers and other employees of
the said Institution is regulated in terms of
the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh High
School and Intermediate Colleges Payment
of Salaries of Teachers
and Other
Employees Act, 19714.

4. A question arose as to who is
entitled to officiate as Principal of the
Institution and by an order dated 16.5.2013
the District Inspector of Schools5, Jalaun
accepted the candidature of the appellant
herein to officiate as Principal as against
the claim of the respondent-petitioner
primarily on the ground that on the date of
occurrence of the vacancy on 30.06.2009
the petitioner did not fulfil the prescribed
eligibility criteria.

5. The learned Single Judge while
adverting to the rival claims of the two
teachers has taken notice of a judgment
rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in
Amal Kishore Singh Vs. State of U.P.
and others6, on the point as to whether a
person possessing Bachelor's degree in
physical education is qualified to be
appointed as Principal in a recognised
intermediate college. Following the view
expressed by the Full Bench that a teacher
having B.P.Ed. degree is not eligible to be
appointed as Principal of an intermediate
college, the learned Single Judge drew an
inference that the training qualification
possessed by the appellant being a diploma
in physical education she could not be
treated to possess the requisite training
qualification
for
the
purposes
of
appointment to the post of Principal in a
recognised intermediate college.

6. As regards the petitioner not
possessing the requisite qualification for
the post of Principal on the date of
occurrence of the vacancy on 30.06.2009,
since
she
obtained
the
necessary
qualification only later on 15.12.2010, the
learned Single Judge applying the doctrine
of necessity held that though the initial
appointment of the appellant as officiating
Principal in such circumstances may be
justified but such necessity would continue
only so long as a qualified and eligible
teacher was not available to be appointed
as officiating Principal. It has been further
held that the petitioner having acquired the
necessary eligibility on 15.12.2010, the
appellant had no right to continue as
Principal any further and accordingly the
order dated 16.5.2013 has been set aside
and the District Inspector of Schools has
been directed to pass a fresh order in light
of the observations made in the judgment
for the senior most eligible person to be
allowed to officiate as Principal of the
Institution so long as regularly selected
Principal
is
not
made
available.
Simultaneously, the petitioner has also
been held entitled to salary for the post of
officiating Principal in accordance with
the relevant statutory provision.

7. The principal contention raised by
the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant is that the Hon'ble Single Judge
1602 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
had erred in failing to consider that on the
date of occurrence of vacancy on 30th
June, 2009, the appellant was having a
postgraduate degree with second division
in the subject Sanskrit and also more than
ten
years'
teaching
experience
in
intermediate classes and as such she was
fully eligible to be appointed as Principal
as per eligibility criteria specified under
Entry 1, clause (2) of Appendix A under
Chapter
II,
Regulation
1
of
the
Regulations framed under the Act, 1921.

8. It is submitted that even though
the appellant may not possess the requisite
training qualification as per the law laid
down in the Full Bench Judgment in the
case of Amal Kishore Singh, she still
fulfills the requisite qualification as per
terms of clause (2) under Entry 1 of
Appendix A of the Regulations referred to
above.

9. The finding recorded by the
learned Single Judge that "there has never
been any disciplinary action" against the
petitioner have also been assailed by
submitting that the material facts with
regard
to
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner have
been concealed including the fact that she
had also been placed under suspension.

10. Per contra, the learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the respondent writ
petitioner has supported the order passed
by the learned Single Judge by submitting
that in view of the pronouncement made
by the Full Bench in the case of Amal
Kishore Singh, the appellant did not
possess the requisite training qualification
for being appointed as Principal as per the
Regulations and her initial appointment as
officiating Principal could only be justified
on the touchstone of doctrine of necessity
and that such necessity came to an end
when the writ petitioner obtained the
necessary training qualification for being
appointed as Principal in December, 2010,
and accordingly the continuance of the
appellant as officiating Principal thereafter
was not permissible in law.

11. In order to appreciate the rival
contentions,
the
necessary
statutory
framework with regard to the subject
matter of the controversy may be adverted
to.

12. The Intermediate Education Act,
Amal
Kishore
SinghAmal
Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
Singh
1921
was
enacted
for
the
establishment of a Board of High School
and Intermediate Examination for the
purposes of regulating and supervising the
system of High School and Intermediate
Education in Uttar Pradesh and to
prescribe courses therefor. Amal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore Singh

13. The institution in question is a
recognised institution as per terms of the
aforementioned Act, 1921. Section 16E of
the Act, deals with the procedure for
selection of teachers and heads of
institutions. Section 16-F pertains to the
selection committees for making the
aforesaid appointments and Section 16-FF
is in respect of minority institutions.

14. The power to make regulations
for the purposes of carrying into the effect
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1603
the provisions of the Act, 1921 is as per
terms of sub-section (1) of Section 15 of
the Act. It is in exercise of the aforesaid
powers that regulations have been framed
and the subject matter of "appointment of
heads of institutions and teachers" has
been dealt with under Chapter II thereof,
which is referable to the provisions
contained under Sections 16-E, 16-F and
16-FF of the Act, 1921.

15. Regulation 1 under Chapter II of
the
Regulations
stipulates
that
the
minimum qualifications for appointment
as heads of institution and teachers in any
recognised institution, whether by direct
recruitment or otherwise, shall be as given
in
Appendix
A.
The
educational
qualifications and training experience for
appointment as head of the institution is
provided under Entry 1 of Appendix A,
and the same are being extracted below:-

Sl.
No.
Name of the Post &
Educational
Training Experience
Age
Desirable
Qualifications
1
2
3
4
1
Head of institution
(1) trained M.A. or
M.Sc. or M.Com or
M.Sc. (Agri) or any
equivalent
Postgraduate
or
any
other degree which
is
awarded
by
corporate
body
specified in abovementioned para one
and should have at
least
teaching
experience of four
years in classes 912 in any training
institute or in any
institution
or
university specified
in above-mentioned
para one or in any
degree
college
affiliated to such
University
or
Minimu
m
30 years

institution,
recognized
by
Board
or
any
institution affiliated
from
Boards
of
other States or such
other
institutions
whose examinations
recognised by the
Board, or should the
condition is also
that he/she should
not be below 30
years' of age.
or
(2) First or second
class post-graduate
degree along with
teaching experience
of
ten
years
in
Intermediate classes
of any recognized
institutions or third
class post-graduate
degree
with
teaching experience
of fifteen years,
or
(3) Trained postgraduate
diplomaholder in science.
The
condition
is
that he has passed
this diploma course
in first or second
class
and
have
efficiently
worked
for 15 or 20 years
respectively
after
passing
such
diploma course.

Notes: (1) Assistant teachers
having at least second class postgraduate
degree and specified teaching experience
of ten years in Intermediate classes of a
recognised institution may be exempted
from training qualifications, (as per the
provisions contained in the Act.)

(2) Teaching experience includes
teaching prior to or after teaching or both.

(3)
Higher
classes
means
classes from 9 to 12 and experience of
teaching these classes is admissible for
the
post
of
Head
Master
of
Intermediate college.
1604 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

16. The provisions of the Uttar
Pradesh Secondary Education Service
Selection Boards Act, 19827, which was
enacted to establish Selection Boards for
the selection of teachers in institutions
recognised under the Act, 1921, may also
be taken note of.

17. The powers and duties of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Secondary
Education
Services Selection Board8 are prescribed
under Section 9 of the said Act and it inter
alia includes the power to prepare
guidelines in respect of matters relating to
the method of recruitment and promotion
of teachers; to conduct examinations,
where necessary, and hold interviews and
make selection, of candidates for being
appointed as teachers and to make
recommendations regarding appointment
of selected candidates.

18. Section 16 of the Act, 1982,
which begins with a non-obstante clause,
provides that notwithstanding anything to
the
contrary
contained
under
the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 or the
Regulations made thereunder but subject
to certain specified provisions of the Act,
every appointment of a teacher shall on or
after the date of commencement of the
U.P.
Secondary
Education
Service
Selection Board (Amendment) Act, 20019
be made by the management only on
recommendation of the Board, and any
appointment made in contravention thereof
shall be void.

19. Section 18 of the Act, as substituted
by the U.P. Act No.5 of 2001 w.e.f. 30.12.2000
provides for appointment of ad hoc Principals
or Headmasters, and it runs as follows:-

"18.
Ad
hoc
Principals
or
Headmasters.--(1) Where the management
has notified a vacancy to the Board in
accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 10
and the post of the Principal or the Headmaster
actually remained vacant for more than two
months, the Management shall fill such
vacancy on purely ad hoc basis by promoting
the senior most teacher, -

(a) in the lecturer's grade in respect
of a vacancy in the post of the Principal;

(b) in the trained graduate's grade in
respect of a vacancy in the post of the
Headmaster.

(2) Where the Management fails to
promote the senior most teacher under subsection (1), the Inspector shall himself issue the
order of promotion of such teacher and the
teacher concerned shall be entitled to get his
salary as the Principal or the Headmaster, as
the case may be, from the date he joins such
post in pursuance of such order of promotion.

(3) Where the teacher to whom the
order of promotion is issued under sub-section
(2) is unable to join the post of Principal or the
Headmaster, as the case may be, due to any act
or omission on the part of the Management,
such teacher may submit his joining report to
the Inspector, and shall thereupon be entitled to
get his salary as the Principal or the
Headmaster, as the case may be, from the date
he submits the said report.

(4) Every appointment of an ad
hoc
Principal
or
Headmaster
under
subsection (1) shall cease to have effect
from
the
date
when
the
candidate
recommended by the Board joins the
post."

20. In terms of Section 32 of the Act,
1982 the provisions of the Act, 1921 and
the Regulations made thereunder in so far
as they are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Act, 1982 or the Rules or
Regulations made thereunder are to
continue
to
be
in
Amal
Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1605
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore SinghAmal Kishore
SinghAmal Kishore Singh force for the
purposes
of
selection,
appointment,
promotion, dismissal, removal, termination
or reduction in rank of a teacher.

21. In exercise of rule making power
conferred under Section 35 of the Act,
1982, the U.P. Secondary Education
Service Selection Board Rules, 1998, were
made and Rule 5 thereof provides the
academic qualifications for appointment to
the post of teachers, and the same reads as
under:-

"5. Academic qualifications.--A
candidate for appointment to a post of
teacher
must
possess
qualifications
specified in Regulation 1 of Chapter II of
the
Regulations
made
under
the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921."

22. As per terms of the aforesaid
rule, in order to be appointed as a teacher,
which term includes a Principal or a
Headmaster, the qualifications would be as
specified under Regulation 1 of Chapter II
of the Regulations framed under the
Intermediate Education Act, 1921. Thus, in
order to be considered for appointment as
an ad hoc Principal or Headmaster under
Section 18 of the Act, 1982, the teacher
concerned has to possess the qualifications
which are prescribed for appointment as
Principal
or
Headmaster
under
the
Regulations, as provided under Entry 1 of
Appendix A of Chapter II thereof.

23. The minimum educational
qualifications/training experience for the
purposes of appointment as head of an
institution, as set out under Entry 1 of
Appendix A of Chapter II, Regulation 1 of
the Regulations under the Act, 1921,
envisages three alternatives, which are as
follows:-

(1) trained M.A. or M.Sc. or
M.Com or M.Sc. (Agri) or any equivalent
Post-graduate or any other degree which is
awarded by corporate body specified in
above-mentioned para one and should
have at least teaching experience of four
years in classes 9-12 in any training
institute or in any institution or university
specified in above-mentioned para one or
in any degree college affiliated to such
University or institution, recognized by
Board or any institution affiliated from
Boards of other States or such other
institutions
whose
examinations
recognised by the Board, or should the
condition is also that he/she should not be
below 30 years' of age; or

(2) first or second class postgraduate degree along with teaching
experience of ten years in Intermediate
classes of any recognized institutions or
third class post-graduate degree with
teaching experience of fifteen years, or

(3)
trained
post-graduate
diploma-holder in science. The condition
is that he has passed this diploma course in
first or second class and have efficiently
worked for 15 or 20 years respectively
after passing such diploma course.

24. Notice may be had of the fact
that the three sets of alternative eligibility
criteria mentioned aforesaid under Entry 1
of Appendix A are connected by the word
"or".

25. In logic, mathematics and in the
context of statutory interpretation, the
word "or" has generally been construed as
being disjunctive i.e. a connective that
marks alternatives. It has been used to
1606 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
connect
words,
phrases
or
classes
representing alternatives.

26. The meaning of the word "or" as a
tool of statutory construction fell for
consideration in the context of interpretation of
Section 25-N (6) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, in Cable Corporation of India
Limited Vs. Additional Commissioner of
Labour and others10, and it was held that the
word "or" is normally disjunctive and its use in
a statute manifests the legislative intent of the
alternatives prescribed under law. The relevant
observations made in the judgment are as
follows :-

"11. The word "or" is normally
disjunctive and "and" is normally conjunctive.
But at times they are read as vice versa to give
effect to the manifest intention of the
legislature as disclosed from the context. As
stated by Scrutton, L.J.:

"You do sometimes read ''or' as ''and'
in a statute. But you do not do it unless you are
obliged because ''or' does not generally mean
''and' and ''and' does not generally mean ''or'.
And as pointed out by Lord Halsbury the
reading of ''or' as ''and' is not to be resorted to,
''unless some other part of the same statute or
the clear intention of it required that to be
done'. But if the literal reading of the words
produces an unintelligible or absurd result ''and'
may be read for ''or' and ''or' for ''and' even
though the result of so modifying the words is
less favourable to the subject provided that the
intention of the legislature is otherwise quite
clear. Conversely if reading of ''and' as ''or'
produces grammatical distortion and makes no
sense of the portion following ''and', ''or' cannot
be read in place of ''and'..."

12. In Fakir Mohd. v. Sita Ram
[(2002) 1 SCC 741] it was held that the word
"or" is normally disjunctive. The use of the
word "or" in a statute manifests the legislative
intent of the alternatives prescribed under law.

xxx

14. A plain reading of the
provision makes the position clear that two
courses are open. Power is conferred on
the appropriate Government to either on its
own motion or on an application made,
review its order or refer the matter to the
Tribunal. Whether one or the other of the
courses could be adopted depends on the
fact of each case, the surrounding
circumstances and several other relevant
factors.

15. Under sub-section (6) of
Section 25-N it is open to the appropriate
Government or the specified authority to
review its order granting or refusing to
grant permission under sub-section (3).

16. "24. When the words of a
statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i.e.
they are reasonably susceptible to only one
meaning, courts are bound to give effect to
that meaning irrespective of consequences.
(See State of Jharkhand v.Govind Singh
[(2005) 10 SCC 437 and Nathi Devi v.
Radha Devi Gupta [(2005) 2 SCC 271] .)

25. In Sussex Peerage case
[(1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] , Cl
& Fin at p. 143 Tindal, C.J. observed as
follows: (ER p. 1057)

''If the words of the statute are in
themselves precise and unambiguous, then
no more can be necessary than to expound
those words in their natural and ordinary
sense. The words themselves alone do, in
such case, best declare the intention of the
lawgiver.'

26. When the language is plain
and unambiguous and admits of only one
meaning no question of construction of a
statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself.

27. As observed in Nathi Devi
case [(2005) 2 SCC 271] if the words used
are capable of one construction only, then
it would not be open to the courts to adopt
any other hypothetical construction on the
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1607
ground that such construction is more
consistent with the alleged object and
policy of the Act. The spirit of the law may
well be an elusive and unsafe guide and
the supposed spirit can certainly be not
given effect to in opposition to the plain
language of the sections of the Act.[Ed.:
As observed in Orient Paper & Industries
Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2006) 12 SCC 468.]"

27. In a similar set of facts, as in the
present case, where two sets of eligibility
criteria were prescribed for admission to a
University course and they were connected
by the word "or", the Supreme Court in the
case of Guru Nanak Dev University vs.
Sanjay Kumar Katwal and another11,
held that the use of "or" between two
qualifications conveyed a disjunctive sense
indicating alternatives and possession of
either of the qualifications would make a
candidate eligible. It was reiterated that the
word "or" is normally used in the
disjunctive sense unless the context
warrants otherwise. The relevant extract
from the judgment is as follows :-

"9. The prescription of eligibility
criteria is very clear. It requires a
Bachelor's degree with not less than 45%
marks
or
a
Master's
degree.
The
University's contention that the candidate
must have a Bachelor's degree and only if
his marks are less than 45% in the
Bachelor's degree course, was the Master's
degree to be considered, would mean that
the word "or" should be substituted by the
words "in the event of the candidate not
having 45% marks in the Bachelor's
degree". Reading such words into the
provision is impermissible. The word "or"
is
disjunctive.
No
doubt,
in
some
exceptional circumstances, the word "or"
has been read as conjunctive as meaning
"and", where the context warranted it. But
the word "or" cannot obviously be read as
referring to a conditional alternative, when
such condition is not specified. In view of
the provision relating to eligibility being
unambiguous and using the word "or", it is
clear that a Master's degree without a
Bachelor's
degree
will
satisfy
the
eligibility requirement."

28. The interpretation of the word
"or" in the context of an exemption
notification issued under the U.P. Trade
Tax Act, 1948 came up for consideration
in the case of G.P. Ceramics (P) Ltd. Vs.
Commissioner,
Trade
Tax,
Uttar
Pradesh12, and it was held that the three
contingencies provided for under the
notification which were connected by the
word "or", were disjunctive in nature. It
was stated thus :-

"24. The eligibility criteria is
contained in the notification. Sub-clause
(ii) of Clause 2-B of the notification
envisages three contingencies i.e. (i) the
unit is established on land or building or
both owned by the dealer; or (ii) the unit is
established on land or building or both
taken on lease for a period of not less than
15 years; or (iii) the unit is established on
land or building or both allotted to such
unit
by
the
State
or
the
Central
Government or any government company
or any corporation owned or controlled by
the Central or the State Government.

xxx

27. The eligibility criteria are
laid down in the notification, which, as
noticed hereinbefore, provide for three
contingencies. They are disjunctive in
nature and not conjunctive..."

29. In this regard, we may also refer
to the observations made by Lord
Halsbury in Mersey Docks and Harbour
1608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Board vs. Henderson13, which are as
follows :-

"......I know no authority for such
a proceeding unless the context makes the
necessary meaning of "or" "and" as in
some instances it does; but I believe it is
wholly unexampled so to read it when
doing so will upon one construction
entirely alter the meaning of the sentence
unless some other part of the same statute
or the clear intention of it requires that to
be done...."

30. In the instant case, the use of the
word "or" as a connective between the
three sets of eligibility criteria is indicative
of the disjunctive sense marking the three
alternatives. The three sets of eligibility
criteria under Entry 1 of Appendix A have
thus been prescribed, alternatively, as
minimum
qualifications
for
being
appointed as head of the institution.
Accordingly, in terms of clause (2) thereof
a person having a first or second class
postgraduate degree alongwith teaching
experience of ten years in Intermediate
classes of any recognised institution or
having a third class postgraduate degree
with teaching experience of fifteen years,
would be held to be eligible.

31. The facts of the present case, as
reflected from the order dated 16.05.2013
passed by the DIOS, which was under
challenge in the writ petition, indicate that
the appellant herein possessed a second
class post gratuate degree (M.A. in
Sanskrit), and had been granted the
Lecturer's pay scale with effect from
17.02.2001. She also had a teaching
experience of ten years in intermediate
classes as on the date of occurrence of
vacancy against the post of Principal on
30.06.2009. In addition, the appellant also
possessed the training qualifications of
C.P.Ed and D.P.Ed.

32. In respect of the petitioner the
order dated 16.5.2013 records that at the
time of occurrence of vacancy against the
post of Principal in the Institution the
petitioner in addition to possessing the
educational
qualification
of
M.A.
(Economics) in third class, had a teaching
experience
of
only
six
years
in
intermediate classes.

33. In view of the aforementioned
position, the DIOS, in terms of the
order 16.5.2013, held that the appellant
having posssessed a second class post
graduate degree along with teaching
experience of ten years in intermediate
classes at the institution in question, as
on the date of occurrence of vacancy on
the post of Principal on 30.6.2009, was
qualified for the post of Principal. The
order also records that since the
petitioner had a post graduate degree in
third class with teaching experience of
only six years as on the aforesaid date
of occurrence of vacancy, she did not
possess
the
necessary
eligibility
qualification for the post of Principal.

34. The principal ground on which
the learned Single Judge has non-suited
the claim of the appellant to be
appointed as officiating Principal is by
placing reliance upon the judgment of
the Full Bench in the case of Amal
Kishore Singh referred to above. The
learned
Single
Judge
by
placing
reliance upon the judgment has held
that since the appellant only possessed a
diploma in physical education she was
not
having
the
requisite
training
qualification in order to make her
eligible for the post of Principal.
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1609

35. In order to appreciate the import
of the judgment rendered in the case of
Amal Kishore Singh (supra), it may be
apt to take note of the questions referred
for consideration by the Full Bench, which
are as follows:-

"(i) Whether training qualification
B.P.Ed. is equivalent qualification to that of
B.Ed., L.T., B.T./C.T. Etc. so as to be covered
by the phrase "equivalent qualification" of
training degree/diploma as contained by
Clause-2 of Appendix-A of Chapter-II of the
Regulations framed under the Intermediate
Education Act, 1921?

(ii) Whether a teacher possessed of
a degree of Post Graduate and training
qualification of B.P.Ed. from an institute duly
recognized by National Council for Teachers
Education is qualified for being considered for
appointment as Principal/Headmaster of a
recognized
High
School/Intermediate
institution?

(iii) Whether the law laid down by
the Division Bench in the case of Vindhyachal
Yadav (Supra) is the correct law or not."

36. The Full Bench in the case of Amal
Kishore Singh thus principally considered the
question as to whether a B.P.Ed. degree which
is a post graduate training qualification, would
entitle a person to hold the post of Principal of
an Intermediate college. The aforementioned
question was answered by Full Bench by
stating that a B.P.Ed. degree holder is eligible
to be appointed as Headmaster of a High
School, but not as Principal of an Intermediate
college. The relevant extract from the
judgment in the case of Amal Kishore Singh,
answering the questions referred, is as follows
:-

"47. We, thus, answer question (i) in
affirmative and question (iii) by holding that
Vindhyachal Yadav does not lay down the
correct law. However, question (ii) has to be
answered, subject to certain riders. A B.P.Ed.
degree being a post graduate training
qualification, would entitle a person to hold
post of Headmaster of a recognised High
School but not that of Principal of an
Intermediate college. The reason is that under
Regulations, 2001 as well as under Minimum
Qualification Regulations, 2014 framed by
NCTE, B.P.Ed. is recognised as eligibility
qualification for teaching Classes IX - X
(Secondary/ High School) but not for Classes
XI - XII (Senior Secondary/Intermediate). For
teaching Intermediate classes, the person
should possess M.P.Ed. degree of at least two
years duration from any National Council for
Teacher Education recognised institution.
These regulations do not prescribe any
separate qualification for Head of institution
and thus the qualification prescribed for a
teacher of Intermediate classes (SeniorSecondary) would also apply to Head of such
an institution. We have already held above that
the qualifications prescribed by NCTE would
be binding on the State, therefore, the
qualifications
prescribed
by
Minimum
Qualification Regulations, 2014 have to be
read alongwith Appendix-A and thus, a teacher
possessing B.P.Ed. degree, would not be
eligible to hold post of Principal of an
Intermediate College.

48. We, thus, reply to question
(ii) by holding that a teacher in physical
education having B.P.Ed. degree is eligible
to be appointed as Headmaster of a High
School, but not as Principal of an
Intermediate college."

37. The principal question which fell
for consideration before the Full Bench in
the case of Amal Kishore Singh was thus
as to whether a person holding a B.P.Ed.
Degree would be held to possess the
necessary training qualification for being
appointed to the post of Principal in a
1610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recognised intermediate college, and the
said question was answered by holding
that a teacher having B.P.Ed. degree is
eligible to be appointed as Headmaster of
a High School, but not as Principal of an
Intermediate college.

38. As we have already taken note of,
Entry 1 under Appendix A of Chapter II of
the
Regulations,
prescribes
three
alternative sets of qualifications for being
eligible for appointment as Head of the
institution. The requirement of possessing
a training qualification is prescribed under
clause (1) and clause (3) under Entry 1,
whereas there is no such prescription of a
training qualification under clause (2)
thereof. In terms of clause (2), a person
having a first or second class post-graduate
degree along with teaching experience of
ten years in Intermediate classes of any
recognized institution or a third class postgraduate degree with teaching experience
of fifteen years, has been held to be
eligible. The qualifications prescribed in
terms of clause (2) being one of the
alternative sets of eligibility criteria which
specifically omits to mention any training
qualification, a candidate possessing the
qualifications
thereunder
would
not
require to possess a training qualification
which is required under the alternative sets
of criteria as per clause (1) and clause (3)
of the aforesaid Entry.

39. The question under consideration
in the case of Amal Kishore Singh being
with regard to the training qualifications as
prescribed under clause (1) and the
interpretation thereof, the law laid down in
the aforesaid judgment, would not be
applicable to the facts of the present case,
inasmuch as the claim of the appellant
herein rests on the other alternative
eligibility criterion as prescribed under
clause
(2)
whereunder
there
is
no
requirement of any training qualification
and a second class post graduate degree
along with teaching experience of ten
years in intermediate classes in any
recognised institution, alone is sufficient
for the purpose of being eligible for the
post of Principal in terms thereof.

40. The law with regard to
applicability of the doctrine of precedents
is well settled. It has been consistently
held that a judgment is only an authority
for what it actually decides and not what
logically
follows
from
the
various
observations made in the judgment. In
order to fully understand and appreciate
the binding force of a decision, it is always
necessary to see what were the facts of the
case in which the decision was given and
what was the point decided.

41. In the case of The State of Orissa Vs.
Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors.14
referring to the observations made by Earl
of
Halsbury
LC
in
Quinn
Vs.
Leathem15, it was stated thus :-

"12...A decision is only an
authority for what it actually decides.
What is of the essence in a decision is its
ratio and not every observation found
therein nor what logically follows from the
various observations made in it. On this
topic this is what Earl of Halsbury L.C.
said in Quinn v. Leathem, 1901 AC 495.

"Now before discussing the case
of Allen v. Flood, (1898) AC 1 and what
was decided therein, there are two
observations of a general character which I
wish to make, and one is to repeat what I
have very often said before, that every
judgment must be read as applicable to the
particular facts proved, or assumed to be
proved, since the generality of the
2 All. Smt. Krishna Shri Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1611
expressions which may be found there are
not intended to be expositions of the whole
law, but governed and qualified by the
particular facts of the case in which such
expressions are to be found. The other is
that a case is only an authority for what it
actually decides.