# Smt. Lata Rani v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 1 ILRA 497
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-04-18
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16117 of 2004
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-lata-rani-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-42908
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

U.P. Police(Extra ordinary Pension)Rules
1961 read with first Amendment Rule
1975-Rule
3-claim
of
extra-ordinary
Pension-denied
on
ground-while
returning from
duty place on way
suffered
pain
in
chest-admitted
in
hospital and dead-can not be treated
death during course of discharge of dutycan not be interfered by Writ Court.

Held:Para-28
There may be some occasions to engulf such
a situation, but it is not in the present case.
In fact, Rule 3 of Rules, 1961 is more
restricted than what the provision has been
in
Act,
1923,
which
came
up
for
consideration in so many cases above. I have
no hesitation in saying that some of the
judgments of High Court though help
petitioner but in the light of binding decision
of Supreme Court, I am left with no option
but to hold that in the case in hand,
petitioner cannot be held entitled for extra
ordinary pension under Rules 1961.

Case Law Discussed:
W.P. No. 47802 of 2010; W.P. No. 55471 of
2009; 1981 TAC 359; 1987 Lab.I.C. 1795;
1984 (2) TAC 56; 1991(1) T.A.C. 140; AIR
1964 SC 193; AIR 1970 SC 1906; 1991 (2)
T.A.C. 62; 2003(1) T.A.C. 561; 1996(6) SCC 1;
(1977) 2 All ER 420; AIR 1958 SC 881.

## Text

1 All] Smt. Lata Rani Vs. The State of U.P. and Ors.

497
validity of registered adoption deed and that
the petitioner is not legally adopted son.

12. In the case of Shiv Prasad Vs. State
of U.P. and others (Supra) the petitioner
therein was adopted when he was two years
old and started living with his adoptive parents
and adoption deed was also got registered. On
consideration
of
provisions
of
U.P.
Recruitment of Dependants of Government
Servant (Dying-in-Harness) Rules, 1974, it
has been held that the petitioner therein was
entitled for the claim of compassionate
appointment.

13. In view of the above, the
impugned order is not sustainable and is
liable to be set aside and is accordingly,
set aside. The petitioner is entitled to be
appointed on compassionate ground being
adopted son. The respondents are directed
to consider compassionate appointment
treating the petitioner as adopted son of
Sushila Kumari within a period of two
months from the date of presentation of
the certified copy of this order.

14. The writ petition is, accordingly,
allowed.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.04.2014

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16117 of 2004

Smt. Lata Rani....... ...........Petitioner
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. .....Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Atul Tej Kulshreshtha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

U.P. Police(Extra ordinary Pension)Rules
1961 read with first Amendment Rule
1975-Rule
3-claim
of
extra-ordinary
Pension-denied
on
ground-while
returning from
duty place on way
suffered
pain
in
chest-admitted
in
hospital and dead-can not be treated
death during course of discharge of dutycan not be interfered by Writ Court.

Held:Para-28
There may be some occasions to engulf such
a situation, but it is not in the present case.
In fact, Rule 3 of Rules, 1961 is more
restricted than what the provision has been
in
Act,
1923,
which
came
up
for
consideration in so many cases above. I have
no hesitation in saying that some of the
judgments of High Court though help
petitioner but in the light of binding decision
of Supreme Court, I am left with no option
but to hold that in the case in hand,
petitioner cannot be held entitled for extra
ordinary pension under Rules 1961.

Case Law Discussed:
W.P. No. 47802 of 2010; W.P. No. 55471 of
2009; 1981 TAC 359; 1987 Lab.I.C. 1795;
1984 (2) TAC 56; 1991(1) T.A.C. 140; AIR
1964 SC 193; AIR 1970 SC 1906; 1991 (2)
T.A.C. 62; 2003(1) T.A.C. 561; 1996(6) SCC 1;
(1977) 2 All ER 420; AIR 1958 SC 881.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri Atul Tej Kulshreshtha,
learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Standing Counsel for the respondents.

2. A short question up for
consideration in this case, "whether
petitioner is entitled for extra ordinary
pension
under
U.P.
Police
(Extra
Ordinary
Pension)
Rules,
1961
(hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1961")
as amended by U.P. Police (Extra
Ordinary Pension) (First Amendment)
Rules, 1975".
498 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. The facts, which are not in
dispute, are that petitioner's husband, a
Constable in U.P. Police Force, was
posted at Aligarh. While returning from
performing his duty in office, on the way,
suffered pain in chest and thereafter he
was admitted in hospital where he was
declared dead. The petitioner applied for
extra ordinary pension under Rules 1961
as amended in 1975. The application was
forwarded
with
favourable
recommendation of Senior Superintendent
of Police, Aligarh vide letter dated
13/14.6.2002 (Annexure 1 to the writ
petition) but has been turned down by
Finance
Controller,
U.P.
Police
Headquarter, Allahabad vide letter dated
22.4.2003
holding
that
petitioner's
husband has not died in the course of
employment and therefore, petitioner is
not entitled for extra ordinary pension
under Rules, 1961.

4. A short question, up for
consideration in the case in hand is,
whether, at the time when petitioner's
husband
suffered
heart
attack
and
ultimately died, can he be held to be in
mids of performing official duty or not.

5. Rule 3, as amended in 1975 of
Rules, 1971 read as under:

^^3- ;g fu;ekoyh jkT;iky ds cuk, fu;e ls
fu;af=r gksus okys LFkk;h ;k vLFkk;h :i ls
lsok;ksftr lHkh iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa vkSj deZpkfj;ksa
1⁄4jktif=r vkSj vjktif=r nksuksa1⁄2 ij ykxw gksxh tks
Mkdqvksa ;k l'kL= vijkf/k;ksa ;k fons'kh izfrjksf/k;ksa
ls yM+us esa ;k fdlh vU; drZO;ksa dk ikyu djus
ds nkSjku ekjs tk,a ;k ftudh e`R;q gks tk;sA*

izfrcU/k ;g gS fd ,sls iqfyl deZpkjh ds
ifjokj dks ftls bl fu;ekoyh ds v/khu vfHkfu.kZ;
fn;k x;k gks] mRrj izns'k flfoy lfoZlst 1⁄4,DLVk~
vkfMZujh isa'ku1⁄2 :Yl ds v/khu dksbZ vfHkfu.kZ; ugha
fn;k tk;sxk vkSj u ;w0ih0 fycjykbTM isa'ku :Yl]
1961 vFkok ;w0ih0 fjVk;jesaV osuhfQV :Yl] 1961
ds v/khu dksbZ ikfjokfjd isa'ku @ vkuqrksf"kd vkSj
u ;w0ih0 dUVhaC;wVjh isa'ku Q.M :Yl ds v/khu
ljdkjh va'knku fn;k tk;sxkA^^

6. Before such amendment, extra
ordinary pension was admissible only if
Police Officer, governed by Rules, 1961,
has died in encounter with docoits, armed
criminals and foreign insurgencies.

7. In 1975, scope of Rule 3 was
enlarged and now rule also apply to
gazetted police officer, if they die or
killed, performing some other duties.
Learned Single Judge (Hon'ble Dilip
Gupta,
J.)
in
the
judgment
dated
11.8.2010 in Writ Petition No.47802 of
2010 (Smt. Munni Devi Vs. State of U.P.
& Ors.) has taken a view that "Rules
should be liberally interpreted in such
manner that it gives benefit to Police
Officers/employees who killed or die,
while performing official duties and it
should not be restricted to extra risk."

8. His Lordship has also referred to
communication dated 23.01.1980, issued
by General Secretary, Government of
U.P.
to
the
Accountant
General
expressing opinion of State Government
in the matter relating to payment of extra
ordinary pension to one Vijay Bahadur
Singh and it says:

"The constable in this case will be
said to have died in the course of
performance of his duty within the
meaning of rule 3 and as such he is
entitled to benefit therein. The operation
of the rule is not confined to case where a
member of police force is killed. It also
extends to a case where such a person dies
in the course of performance of duty even
without an encounter with decoits or
armed criminals etc."
1 All] Smt. Lata Rani Vs. The State of U.P. and Ors.

499

9. Similar view has been taken by this
Court also in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No.55471 of 2009 (Smt. Suneeta Sharma Vs.
State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 19.4.2011,
wherein while returning from duty, Police
Official fell from train and died. This Court
held that death occurred while discharging
"any other duties" and extra ordinary pension
under Rule 1961 would be admissible in such
a case. The Court, in para 5 of the judgment,
further said:

"...It also says that it is not confined only
when a police official in the aforesaid
circumstances is killed but it also applicable if
he die while discharging his duties. The
provision is a welfare legislation made for the
benefit of police officials who sustain fatal
injuries or otherwise lost their life while
discharging official duties. There is no reason
for restricting the aforesaid provision which has
been made much wider by 1975 amendment."

10. Therein, this Court also deprecated
approach of Finance Controller in finding
ways to deny extra ordinary pension to the
survivors of deceased Police Officers by
giving a restricted interpretation to Rules 1961
taking an approach of exclusion instead of
liberal and beneficial interpretation. In para 7,
the Court expressed its view as under:

"7. It is really unfortunate that widow
of a member of a disciplined service has
to engage in a long drawn litigation for
the last almost five years for her
sustenance,
i.e.,
for
claiming
extra
ordinary pension under statutory rules
which is admissible to her but on account
of misconceived notions and traditional
mindset of respondents for denying
everything to a petty employee or his
family that this benefit has not reacher her
so far. The denial is without any
substantial reason. Instead of helping the
petitioner, a widow of a police official
who sustained fatal injuries while on duty,
respondents have tried to find out ways
and means to deny benefit of a welfare
legislation, compelling her to live life in
penury and starvation. This attitude of
respondents deserves to be condemned
with strongest words. The laxity and an
attitude of defiance on the part of respondents is
also writ large from the fact that in the
impugned order dated 02.07.2006 (Annexure-6
to the writ petition) the Finance Controller has
denied benefit observing that petitioner's
husband has died in suspicious circumstances
and this has been reiterated by Superintendent
of Police, Firozabad in its letter dated
11.08.2006 without showing as to what alleged
suspicious circumstances were/are. When the
petitioner challenges this attitude, in the counter
affidavit filed in this writ petition no such
defence has been taken and there is not even a
whisper that the death took place in suspicious
circumstance and on the contrary it is admitted
that husband of petitioner died while
discharging his duties. In para 9 it has only
reiterated the language of impugned letter but
nothing has been said about the alleged
circumstances which according to respondents
were suspicious. This also fortify the
recklessness and harassing attitude on the part
of respondents to make the bereaved family
members of deceased employee to suffer or to
surrender for their contentious desires or
demand. Learned Standing Counsel despite his
best efforts could not give even a single reason
to justify denial of extra ordinary pension under
1961 Rules as amended in 1975. In my view
the conduct and manner in which the
respondents have acted makes them liable to
pay not only interest on the dues payable to
petitioner but also exemplary costs."

11. In the present case, thus the only
question, which has to be seen, whether it can be
said that petitioner's husband died while he was
discharging his "other official duties" or not.
500 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. The petitioner's husband was posted
in Mounted Police and due to non availability
of official accommodation, was residing in a
private accommodation. On 27.1.2002, he
attended Mounted Police officials counting
and thereafter while returning to his private
residential accommodation, suffered stroke in
his chest and by the time reached his house,
his condition became serious. His wife
immediately took him to Pandit Dindayal
Upadhyay Hospital for treatment but when
reached there, doctors thereat declared him
dead. The Senior Superintendent of Police,
Aligarh has treated this entire process of
deceased constables attendance in Mounted
Police Constable counting and the period
when he was returning to his private residence
as a part of official duty and recommended for
extra ordinary pension vide letter dated
13/14.6.2002. However, it has not been
accepted by higher authorities. The official
duty, as per the version of the respondents,
came to an end as soon as counting was over
and petitioner left official campus proceeding
towards his private residence.

13. The petitioner's counsel, however,
contended that the employee, when comes to
join his work and till he reaches his house
back, entire period should be counted in the
midst
of
discharging
duties.
Certain
authorities are also relied on for this purpose.

14. In Indian Rare Earths Ltd. Vs. A.
Subaida Beevi and others, 1981 TAC 359,
the Court considered the matter arising from
Workmen's
Compensation
Act,
1923
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1923"). The
workman was residing at about 7 or 8
kilometres away from his work place and for
coming to the factory, he used to walk about
3 kilometres from his place of residence to
take a bus, and leave him at about 2
kilometres away from the plant where again
he used to go by using bicycle. On 1.4.1977,
he started from his residence to his work
place and when on the National Highway, on
his way to work place, met an accident and
sustained injuries,
ultimately died on
2.4.1977. The question was whether this
accident can be treated to be one which has
arisen "out of and in the course of his
employment". The Court said that residence
of workman was not on any bus route
wherefore he cannot travel major portion of
his way to his work-place by bus. Thus, it is
a case where exigencies of his employment
and circumstances obliged him and the
company allowed him to ride a bicycle to
reach the work-place. Otherwise, it was an
implied condition on his employment that he
may travel to his work-pace from his
residence and back home by a bicycle. The
Court thus said that when car dashed him on
public road, he was there by virtue of his
status as a workman working under the
industrial employer and therefore, it was in
the course of his employment. The Court
further said:

"It is by now well settled that the
expression "in the course of employment"
connotes not only actual work but also any
other engagement natural and incidental
thereto, including "the course of employment"
reasonably extended both as regards workhours and work-place applying the doctrine of
national extension as regards time and place,
as laid down by the several decisions."

15. Another decision is Director (T.
&
M.),
D.N.K.
Project
Vs.
Smt.
D.Buchitalli, 1987 Lab.I.C. 1795. The
deceased employee while coming out of
factory premises, attending to his duty in
morning hours, fell down at the main gate
and on being removed was declared dead.
The question was, whether it is arising out
of and in course of employment or not.
The Workman Commissioner took a
1 All] Smt. Lata Rani Vs. The State of U.P. and Ors.

501
decision against employer that death has
taken place out of and in the course of
employment. The Court agreeing with the
above view, said as under:

"In the present case, no doubt, the
evidence is that the deceased had a heart
disease earlier, but on the fateful day, as
the evidence disclose, the deceased
worked for four hours inside the factory
premises and while he was coming out of
the factory, he profusely sweated and by
the time he was taken to the hospital, he
was found dead. The stress and strain of
the four hours of work the deceased had
must be taken to be an accelerating factor
in giving the final blow on account of
which the deceased died."

16. In Administrator, Municipal
Council, Udaipur Vs. Uma Devi, 1984 (2)
TAC 56, the workman died as a result of
accident when he was going to join his
duties in the mid-night. The Court held
that since workman was going to join his
duties at the octroi out post of Municipal
Council, it has to be held that it is an
accident in the course of employment i.e.
during course of his employment.

17.

Surajbai
Vs.
Cement
Corporation of India Ltd. and another,
1991(1) T.A.C. 140, was also a case
where workman was going to join duties
and met a fatal accident. The accident
took place between the sump-pit and the
office of the employer i.e. within the
premises of the undertaking of industrial
unit. The road had been built by Cement
Corporation of India Limited for use of its
employees. Thus, as a matter of fact, the
Court found that accident took place
within the premises of undertaking but
before the workman could reach his place
of duty. Construing the provisions of Act,
1923,
liberally,
being
a
welfare
legislation, the Court said:

"It was at one time thought that an
accident arose out of and in the course of
employment only if the workman was injured
at the place of his employment. There is of
course, no difficulty in accepting such an
accident as an accident arising out of and in
the course of employment. But this narrow
interpretation has not been able to satisfy new
challenges created by modern methods of
working
of
industrial
undertakings
to
determine the exact place of employment of a
workman in the context t of modern industrial
development, is in itself a difficult task. A
pilot who is responsible for flying the air-craft
is supposed to be working at the cock-pit of
the plane and his place of work would be the
place wherever the plane flies. A light house
workman, particularly in cases where lighthouse is situated in the middle of sea on some
tiny island, is required to be taken to that
island by some method before he can actually
start working. An underground mine worker
reports at the opening of the mine and travels
underground to reach his actual place of work.
These are the instances of modern industries
and such instances can be multiplied. The
Mines Act, 1952, provides that a workman
joins his duty before he has reached the place
of his actual work. Industrial Jurisprudence
treats the air-craft pilot and a light-house
worker as on duty even before he has actually
started working. The modern management
methods do not even require a work-man to
work. Some of them are kept waiting to be
available whenever there is work. These
developments
had
made
it
wholly
unnecessary to consider a workman on duty
only when he reaches his place of work or
starts working. For purposes of workmen's
compensation the law has adopted what is
known as "the principle of notional extension
of employer's premises". If the place of
502 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

accident by application of this doctrine can be
said to be the place of duty of the workman
concerned, the workman is held entitled to
compensation even if he had not reached his
actual place of work."

18. Thereafter, relying on a decision
of Apex Court in General Manager,
B.E.S.T. Undertaking, Bombay Vs. Mrs.
Agnes, AIR 1964 SC 193, the Court held
that accident in question was in the course
of employment entitling the heirs of
workman for compensation under the said
Act. The passage from the Apex Court
decision in General Manager, B.E.S.T.
Undertaking, Bombay Vs. Mrs. Agnes
(supra), relied on by Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Surajbai Vs. Cement
Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), reads as
under:

"The
question,
when
does
an
employment begin and when does it cease,
depends upon the facts of each case. But the
Courts have agreed that the employment
does not necessarily end when the 'down
tool' signal is given or when the workman
leaves the actual workshop where he is
working. There is a notional extension at
both the entry and exit by time and space.
The scope of such extension must necessarily
depend on the circumstances of a given case.
As employment may end or may begin not
only when the employee begins to work or
leaves his tools but also when he used the
means of access and egress to and from the
place of employment. A contractual duty or
obligation on the part of an employee to use
only a particular means of transport extends
the area of the field of employment to the
course of the said transport. Though at the
beginning the word 'duty' has strictly
construed, the later decision have liberalized
this concept. A theoretical option to take an
alternative route may not detract from such a
duty if the accepted one is of proved
necessity or of practical compulsion. But
none of the decisions cited at the Bar deals
with a transport service operating over a
large area like Bombay. They are, therefore,
of little assistance, except in so far as they
laid down the principles of general
application. Indeed, some of the laws words
expressly excluded from the scope of their
discussion cases where the exigencies of
work compel an employee to travel public
streets and other public places. The problem
that now arises before us is a novel one and
is not covered by authority."

19. There is another decision of
Apex Court in M. Mackenzie Vs. I.M.
Issak, AIR 1970 SC 1906, where the
Court said:

"The
words
"arising
out
of
employment" are understood to mean that
"during the course of the employment,
injury has resulted from some risk
incidental to the duties of the service,
which, unless engaged in the duty owing
to the master, it is reasonable to believe
the workman would not otherwise have
suffered". In other words, there must be a
casual relationship between the accident
and the employment. The expression
"arising out of employment" is again not
confined to the mere nature of the
employment. The expression applies to
employment as such to its nature, its
conditions,
its
obligations
and
its
incidents. If by reason of any of those
factors the workman is brought within the
one of special danger, the injury would be
one which arises 'out of employment'. To
put it differently, if the accident had
occurred on account of a risk which is an
incident of the employment, the claim for
compensation must succeed, unless of
course the workman has exposed himself
1 All] Smt. Lata Rani Vs. The State of U.P. and Ors.

503
to an added peril by his own imprudent
act."

20. In General Manager, Western
Railway Vs. Chandrabai alias Narainibai,
1991 (2) T.A.C. 62, Madhya Pradesh High
Court again following the decision in
General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking,
Bombay Vs. Mrs. Agnes (supra) held that
notional extension of employer's premises
must be applied and therefore, if an
employee has died while he was going to
join his duty from his house due to an
accident, it must be deemed that it was "in
the course of his employment".

21. The last decision cited is Senior
Divisional
Controller,
North
West
Karnataka Road Transport Corporation
Vs. Shoba & Ors., 2003(1) T.A.C. 561 of
Karnataka High Court. There also the
employee was on his way to report his
duty when suddenly collapsed and taken
to hospital where he died. The Court held
that since death has taken on the road and
not within the place of employment, it
cannot be held that it was during the
course of employment.

22. All the decisions are in the context
of Act, 1923. However, I find that there is a
three Judges judgment of Apex Court in
Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and
another Vs. Francis De Costa and another,
1996 (6) SCC 1. Therein the matter has been
dealt with in detail on a reference made by a
two Judges Bench to larger Bench. The
Court relied on two decisions, one is the
decision of Court of Appeal in England in
Regina
Vs.
National
Insurance
Commissioner, Ex Parte, Michael, (1977) 2
All ER 420 and another, an earlier decision
of itself in Saurashtra Salt Manufacturing Co.
Vs. Bai Valu Raja, AIR 1958 SC 881. The
following passage from observation of Lord
Denning in Regina (supra) was quoted with
approval:

"Take a case where a man is going to
or from his place of work on his own
bicycle, or in his own car. He might be
said to be doing something "reasonably
incidental" to his employment. But if he
has an accident on the way, it is well
settled that it does not "arise out of and in
the course of his employment". Even if
his employer provides the transport, so
that he is going to work as a passenger in
his employer's vehicle (which is surely
"reasonably
incidental"
to
his
employment), nevertheless, if he is
injured in an accident, it does not arise out
of and in the course of his employment. It
needed a special "deeming" provision in a
statute to make it "deemed" to arise out of
and in the course of his employment."

23. Similarly, following observation
of Hon'ble S.Jafer Imam in Saurashtra
Salt Manufacturing Co. (supra) was also
quoted with approval:

"It is well settled that when a workman is
on a public road or a public place or on a public
transport he is there as any other member of the
public and is not there in the course of his
employment makes it necessary for him to be
there. A workman is not in the course of his
employment from the moment he leaves his
home and is on his way to his work. He
certainly is in the course of his employment if
he reaches the place of work or a point or an
area which comes within the theory of notional
extension, outside of which the employer is not
liable to pay compensation for any accident
happening to him. In the present case, even if it
be assumed that the theory of notional
extension extends upto point D, the theory
cannot be extended beyond it. The moment a
workman left point B in a boat or left point A
504 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

but had not yet reached point B, he could not be
said to be in the course of his employment and
any accident happening to him on the journey
between these two points could not be said to
have arisen out of and in the course of his
employment."

24. Following the above, the Court in
Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation (supra)
held that following factors have to be proved:

i. There was an accident;

ii. The accident had a casual
connection with the employment; and

iii. The accident must have been
suffered in course of employment.

25. The Court distinguished the
decision in General Manager, B.E.S.T.
Undertaking, Bombay Vs. Mrs. Agnes
(supra) by observing:

"It was held by Subba Rao and
Mudholkar,
JJ.
(Raghubar
Dayal,
J.
dissenting) that the bus driver was given
facility by the management to travel in any
bus belonging to the undertaking. It was
given because efficiency of the service
demanded it. Therefore, the right of the bus
driver to travel in the bus was to discharge
his duty punctually and efficiently. This was
a condition of service and there was an
obligation to travel in the said buses as a part
of his duty. It was held that in the case of a
factory, the premises of an employer was a
limited one but in the case of a City Transport
Service, the entire fleet of buses forming the
service would be "premises". This decision in
our view, does not come to the assistance of
the employee's case. An employee of a
Transport Undertaking was travelling in a
vehicle provided by the employer. Having
regard to the purpose for which he was
travelling and also having regard to the
obligation on the part of the employee to
travel in the said buses as a part of his duty,
the Court came to the conclusion that this
journey was in the course of his employment
because the entire fleet of buses formed the
premises within which he worked."

26. In view of above binding
decision of Apex Court, I find that unless
death of deceased constable, in the case in
hand, can be said to have caused while he
was "in discharge of his other official
duties" only then extra ordinary pension
would be admissible and not otherwise.

27. As already discussed above, the
deceased employee attended his mounted
police counting at official premises and
left for his residence. It is on way to
residence, he suffered chest pain, which
ultimately resulted in his death. It is
difficult to extend the term "in discharge
of official duties" to the extent that
employee, when commences his journey
from his house to official place and while
returning from office to house, both these
period should necessarily be deemed to be
in discharge of his official duties.

28. There may be some occasions to
engulf such a situation, but it is not in the
present case. In fact, Rule 3 of Rules, 1961
is more restricted than what the provision
has been in Act, 1923, which came up for
consideration in so many cases above. I
have no hesitation in saying that some of the
judgments of High Court though help
petitioner but in the light of binding
decision of Supreme Court, I am left with
no option but to hold that in the case in
hand, petitioner cannot be held entitled for
extra ordinary pension under Rules 1961.

29. The writ petition, therefore,
lacks merit. Dismissed.
--------
1 All] Niresh Kumar Srivastava & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors.

505
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.04.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE AMITAVA LALA, J.
THE HON'BLE P.K.S. BAGHEL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 16299 of 2012

Niresh Kumar Srivastava & Anr. Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ............Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri S.P. Pandey, Sri R.N. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Akhileshwar Singh, S.C.

Constitution of India, Art.-21-Protection
of person and property-inter-religion
marriage-even live in relationship-in 21st
century-considering honour killing-local
police be more alert in protection of
three
person
or
property-necessary
direction issued.

Held:Para-4
From
the
aforesaid
three
judgments,
precisely we get three relevant points.
Firstly, if one is sui juris, no fetter can be
placed upon choice of the person with whom
she is to stay nor any one can restrict her.
Secondly, any person cannot give threats
or commit or instigate the acts of
violence and cannot harass the adult
person who undergoes inter-caste or
inter-religion marriage. Administration/
policy authorities can be directed to see
to it so that the couple, upon being
major, should not be harassed by any
one. Thirdly, live-in relationship between
two consenting adults of heterogenic sex
does not amount to any offence. It will
not be unnecessary to say that there are
many States in our country where
castism or religionism is so deep-rooted
even in the 21st Century that one can go
to the extent of honour killing upon
being forgetful that their interference
might cause unhappiness in the life of
their children. Such type of activities are
totally in violation of the preamble of the
Constitution of India in connection with
human dignity of an individual. The
country is one and it is pluralistic in
nature. No secular idea can be ignored.
No person shall be deprived of his life and
personal liberty except according to the
procedure established by law as per Article
21 of the Constitution of India. Liberty and
reasonable restriction are inbuilt in such
Article.

Case Law Discussed:
(1976) 3 SCC 234; (2006) 5 SCC 475; (2010)5
SCC 600.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amitava Lala, J.)

Amitava Lala, J.--The present writ
petition has been filed by the father-inlaw and daughter-in-law for protection of
their life and property, since there is
serious threat for their inter religion
marriage. Presently, the boy is in
Germany and he will be able to come to
India only in the month of May, 2012 for
identification, if necessary, before the Court.

1.

The
Supreme
Court
has
considered such type of issue repeatedly
in the case of Gian Devi v. Supdt., Nari
Niketan, Delhi, (1976) 3 SCC 234, at
page 235 :

"Whatever may be the date of birth
of the petitioner, the fact remains that she
is at present more than 18 years of age. As
the petitioner is sui juris no fetters can be
placed upon her choice of the person with
whom she is to stay, nor can any
restriction be imposed regarding the place
where she should stay. The court or the
relatives of the petitioner can also not
substitute their opinion or preference for
that of the petitioner in such a matter".