# Smt. Madhavi Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 126
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-03-16
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 1811 of 2023
- **Bench:** Alok Mathur
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-madhavi-mishra-v-state-of-u-p-ors-49926
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-
Compassionate
Appointment - Uttar Pradesh Cooperative
Society Employees' Service Regulation,
1975 - Regulation 104(V); Uttar Pradesh
Dying in Harness Rules 1974 - Exclusion of
married daughter from the ambit of family
in the Note appended in sub clause (V) in
Regulation 104 of the Regulations of 1975
is illegal, unconstitutional and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. Accordingly, the word 'unmarried'
in the said Note is struck down. (Para 14)

The definition of family occurring in the Dying in
Harness Rules, 1974 is pari materia with Note
appended to Regulation 104 of the Regulations
of 1975 and the definition of family included the
daughter but excluded married daughter. The
assumption that after marriage, a daughter
cannot be said to be a member of the family of
her father or that she ceases to be dependent
on
her
father
irrespective
of
social
circumstances cannot be countenanced.

B. The test in matters of compassionate
appointment is a test of dependency
within defined relationships. There are
situations where a son of the deceased
government servant may not be in need of
compassionate
appointment
because
the
economic and financial position of the family of
the deceased are not such as to require the
grant of compassionate appointment on a
preferential basis. But the dependency or a
lack of dependency is a matter which is
not determined a priori on the basis of
whether or not the son is married.
Similarly, whether or not a daughter of a
deceased
should
be
granted
compassionate appointment has to be
defined with reference to whether, on a
consideration of all relevant facts and
circumstances, she was dependent on the
deceased government servant. Excluding
daughters purely on the ground of marriage
would constitute an impermissible discrimination
and be violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution. (Para 12, 13)

A direction is issued to the respondents to
consider the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate appointment again in light of the
decision of the Full Bench in the case of Vimla
Srivastava (infra) as well as the directions
issued hereinabove and the case of the
petitioner would not be rejected merely on the
ground that she is a married daughter. (Para 16)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

Smt. Vimla Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2016
(2) ESC 660 (AIL (DB) (Para 11)

Present petition assails the orders dated
29.06.2021 and 01.07.2022, passed by
opposite party No. 2 i.e. Secretary, Uttar
Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Services
Board, Lucknow, rejecting the claim of the
petitioner for appointment under Dying in
Harness Rules.

## Text

126 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
order shall be communicated by learned
State Counsel to the authority concerned
forthwith.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 126
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Writ A No. 1811 of 2023

Smt. Madhavi Mishra ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
O.P. Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary

A.
Service
Law
-
Compassionate
Appointment - Uttar Pradesh Cooperative
Society Employees' Service Regulation,
1975 - Regulation 104(V); Uttar Pradesh
Dying in Harness Rules 1974 - Exclusion of
married daughter from the ambit of family
in the Note appended in sub clause (V) in
Regulation 104 of the Regulations of 1975
is illegal, unconstitutional and violative of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. Accordingly, the word 'unmarried'
in the said Note is struck down. (Para 14)

The definition of family occurring in the Dying in
Harness Rules, 1974 is pari materia with Note
appended to Regulation 104 of the Regulations
of 1975 and the definition of family included the
daughter but excluded married daughter. The
assumption that after marriage, a daughter
cannot be said to be a member of the family of
her father or that she ceases to be dependent
on
her
father
irrespective
of
social
circumstances cannot be countenanced.

B. The test in matters of compassionate
appointment is a test of dependency
within defined relationships. There are
situations where a son of the deceased
government servant may not be in need of
compassionate
appointment
because
the
economic and financial position of the family of
the deceased are not such as to require the
grant of compassionate appointment on a
preferential basis. But the dependency or a
lack of dependency is a matter which is
not determined a priori on the basis of
whether or not the son is married.
Similarly, whether or not a daughter of a
deceased
should
be
granted
compassionate appointment has to be
defined with reference to whether, on a
consideration of all relevant facts and
circumstances, she was dependent on the
deceased government servant. Excluding
daughters purely on the ground of marriage
would constitute an impermissible discrimination
and be violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution. (Para 12, 13)

A direction is issued to the respondents to
consider the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate appointment again in light of the
decision of the Full Bench in the case of Vimla
Srivastava (infra) as well as the directions
issued hereinabove and the case of the
petitioner would not be rejected merely on the
ground that she is a married daughter. (Para 16)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

Smt. Vimla Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2016
(2) ESC 660 (AIL (DB) (Para 11)

Present petition assails the orders dated
29.06.2021 and 01.07.2022, passed by
opposite party No. 2 i.e. Secretary, Uttar
Pradesh Cooperative Institutional Services
Board, Lucknow, rejecting the claim of the
petitioner for appointment under Dying in
Harness Rules.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Alok Mathur, J.)
3 All. Smt. Madhavi Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
127

1. Heard Sri O. P. Tiwari, learned
counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing
counsel for respondent No.s 1 and Sri
Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary for respondent
No.s 2 to 5.

2. The short counter affidavit filed on
behalf of respondent No.2 and its rejoinder
affidavit filed today in the Court are taken
on record.

3. With the consent of the parties the
petition is being decided at the admission
stage itself.

4. By means of the present writ
petition the petitioner has assailed the order
dated 29.6.2021 as well as the order dated
1.7.2022 passed by opposite party No.2 i.e.
Secretary,
Uttar
Pradesh
Cooperative
Institutional Services Board, Lucknow
thereby rejecting the claim of the petitioner
for appointment under Dying in Harness
Rules.

5. It is submitted on behalf of the
petitioner that her father Sri Sunil Kumar
Mishra, who was working on Class IV Post
in District Cooperative Bank, died during
service on 7.1.2021 leaving behind the
petitioner and his widow. It is stated that
the mother of the petitioner is also a cancer
patient and the petitioner, who is a married
lady is living with her mother and looking
after after her. It is stated that due to sudden
demise of father of the petitioner the family
has fallen into financial destitution and,
hence, according to Regulation 104 (V) of
Uttar
Pradesh
Cooperative
Society
Employees'
Service
Regulation
1975
(hereinafter referred to as the Regulations
of 1975) which provides for compassionate
appointment,
the
petitioner
made
an
application on 1st March, 2021 for
compassionate appointment. It has further
been submitted that the petitioner had
annexed all the relevant documents for due
consideration for such appointment. The
case of the petitioner was considered and
forwarded
to
the
Bank
Managing
Committee and subsequently has been
rejected by means of the impugned order
solely on the ground that the petitioner is a
married daughter of the deceased employee
and is not included in the definition of the
family as per note appended to Rule 104 of
the Regulations of 1975.

6. It is stated that the petitioner being
aggrieved of the aforesaid order has
approached this Court challenging the
impugned order whereby her candidature
has been rejected and has further assailed
the validity of Rule 104 (v) of the the
Regulations of 1975 in as much as married
daughter
would be
included
in
the
definition
of
daughter
and
such
a
discrimination on the face of it is illegal
and arbitrary.

7. It has been submitted that according
to the note appended to Regulation 104 of
the Regulations of 1975 ''the family, for the
purposes of this Regulation, shall include
wife/husband, sons and unmarried or
widowed
daughters
of
the
deceased
employee.' It is stated that just because of
the fact that unmarried and widow
daughters only are included in the said
definition and the petitioner being married
daughter has been held to be excluded from
the definiton of family.

8. Sri Rakesh Kumar Chaudhary
appearing
for
the
respondents
i.e.
Cooperative Institutional Services Board
has supported the impugned order and
submitted that there is no infirmity in the
same in as much as the service Regulations
of 1975 do not included a married daughter
128 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the definition of the family and, hence,
there is no infirmity in the impugned order
by which the claim of the petitioner for
compassionate
appointment
has
been
rejected. He has further submitted that in
the counter affidavit filed by respondent
No.2
it
has
been
stated
that
U.P.
Cooperative Institutional Services Board
had already proposed an amendment to the
definition of the family in the Regulation
1975 to the effect that married daughter be
also included in the definition of the family.
He has annexed a copy of the letter dated
22.9.2022
along
with
the
proposed
amendment. He has further submitted that
had the amendment been allowed and
incorporated in the Service Regulations
then the claim of the petitioner could have
been accepted but prior to its approval and
incorporation in the said Regulations there
is no infirmity in the rejection of the claim
of the petitioner.

9. I have heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

10. The only question which falls for
determination before this Court is as to
whether married daughter would fall into
the definition of family. The note appended
to Rule 104 of the Regulations of 1975 is
quoted as under:-

" Note. The family, for the
purposes of this Regulation, shall include
the wife / husband, sons and unmarried or
widowed
daughters
of
the
deceased
employee."

11. This question has been elaborately
considered by a Division Bench of this
Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava
Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2016 (2) ESC
660 (All. (DB) where a similar provision
which had occurred in the Uttar Pradesh
Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 came under
the scrutiny of the Division Bench of this
Court where also the married daughter was
not included in the definition of the family.
This Court held the said provision to be iin
violation
of
the
provisions
of
the
Constitution as well as arbitrary and and
held that married daughter would fall
within the ambit of explanation ''family'.
For the sake of convenience the relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are quoted
as under:-

"9. While assessing the rival
submissions, it must be noted at the outset
that the definition of the expression
"family" in Rule 2 (c) incorporates the
categories
of
heirs
of
a
deceased
government servant. Among them are the
wife or husband, sons and adopted sons,
unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted
daughters,
widowed
daughters
and
widowed daughters-in-law. Clause (ii) of
Rule 2 (c) brings a son as well as an
adopted son within the purview of the
expression "family" irrespective of marital
status. A son who is married continues to
be within the ambit of the expression
"family" for the purpose of Rule 2 (c). But
by the stroke of a legislative definition, a
daughter who is married is excluded from
the scope and purview of the family of a
deceased government servant unless she
falls within the category of a widowed
daughter. The invidious discrimination that
is inherent in Rule 2 (c) lies in the fact that
a daughter by reason of her marriage is
excluded from the ambit of the expression
"family". Her exclusion operates by reason
of marriage and, whether or not she was at
the time of the death of the deceased
government servant dependent on him.
Marriage does not exclude a son from the
ambit of the expression "family". But
marriage excludes a daughter. This is
3 All. Smt. Madhavi Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
129
invidious. A married daughter who has
separated after marriage and may have
been dependent on the deceased would as a
result of this discrimination stand excluded.
A divorced daughter would similarly stand
excluded. Even if she is dependent on her
father, she would not be eligible for
compassionate appointment only because
of the fact that she is not "unmarried". The
only basis of the exclusion is marriage and
but for her marriage, a daughter would not
be excluded from the definition of the
expression "family".

10. The issue before the Court is
whether marriage is a social circumstance
which is relevant in defining the ambit of
the expression "family" and whether the
fact that a daughter is married can
constitutionally be a permissible ground to
deny her the benefit of compassionate
appointment. The matter can be looked at
from a variety of perspectives. Implicit in
the definition which has been adopted by
the state in Rule 2 (c) is an assumption that
while a son continues to be a member of the
family and that upon marriage, he does not
cease to be a part of the family of his father,
a daughter upon marriage ceases to be a
part of the family of her father. It is
discriminatory
and
constitutionally
impermissible for the State to make that
assumption and to use marriage as a
rationale for practicing an act of hostile
discrimination by denying benefits to a
daughter when equivalent benefits are
granted to a son in terms of compassionate
appointment. Marriage does not determine
the continuance of the relationship of a
child, whether a son or a daughter, with the
parents. A son continues to be a son both
before and after marriage. A daughter
continues
to
be
a
daughter.
This
relationship is not effaced either in fact or
in law upon marriage. Marriage does not
bring about a severance of the relationship
between a father and mother and their son
or between parents and their daughter.
These relationships are not governed or
defined by marital status. The State has
based its defence in its reply and the
foundation
of
the
exclusion
on
a
paternalistic notion of the role and status of
a woman. These patriarchal notions must
answer the test of the guarantee of equality
under Article 14 and must be held
answerable to the recognition of gender
identity under Article 15.

11. The stand which has been
taken by the state in the counter affidavit
proceeds on a paternalistic notion of the
position of a woman in our society and
particularly of the position of a daughter
after marriage. The affidavit postulates that
after marriage, a daughter becomes a
member of the family of her husband and
the responsibility for her maintenance
solely lies upon her husband. The second
basis which has been indicated in the
affidavit is that in Hindu Law, a married
daughter
cannot
be
considered
as
dependent of her father or a dependent of a
joint Hindu family. The assumption that
after marriage, a daughter cannot be said
to be a member of the family of her father
or that she ceases to be dependent on her
father irrespective of social circumstances
cannot be countenanced. Our society is
governed
by
constitutional
principles.
Marriage cannot be regarded as a
justifiable ground to define and exclude
from who constitutes a member of the
family when the state has adopted a social
welfare policy which is grounded on
dependency.
The
test
in
matters
of
compassionate appointment is a test of
dependency within defined relationships.
There are situations where a son of the
deceased government servant may not be in
need
of
compassionate
appointment
because
the
economic
and
financial
130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
position of the family of the deceased are
not such as to require the grant of
compassionate
appointment
on
a
preferential basis. But the dependency or a
lack of dependency is a matter which is not
determined a priori on the basis of whether
or not the son is married. Similarly,
whether or not a daughter of a deceased
should
be
granted
compassionate
appointment has to be defined with
reference to whether, on a consideration of
all relevant facts and circumstances, she
was dependent on the deceased government
servant. Excluding daughters purely on the
ground of marriage would constitute an
impermissible
discrimination
and
be
violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution.

12. A variety of situations can
be envisaged where the application of the
rule
would
be
invidious
and
discriminatory. The deceased government
servant may have only surviving married
daughters to look after the widowed
parent - father or mother. The daughters
may be the only persons to look after a
family in distress after the death of the
bread earner. Yet, under the rule, no
daughter
can
seek
compassionate
appointment only because she is married.
The family of the deceased employee will
not be able to tide over the financial
crisis from the untimely death of its wage
earner who has died in harness. The
purpose and spirit underlying the grant of
compassionate
appointment
stands
defeated. In a given situation, even
though
the
deceased
government
employee leaves behind a surviving son,
he may not in fact be looking after the
welfare of the surviving parents. Only a
daughter may be the source of solace -
emotional and financial, in certain cases.
These are not isolated situations but
social realities in India. A surviving son
may have left the village, town or state in
search of employment in a metropolitan
city. The daughter may be the one to care
for a surviving parent. Yet the rule
deprives the daughter of compassionate
appointment only because she is married.
Our law must evolve in a robust manner
to accommodate social contexts. The
grant of compassionate appointment is
not just a social welfare benefit which is
allowed to the person who is granted
employment. The purpose of the benefit is
to enable the family of a deceased
government servant, who dies in harness,
to
be
supported
by
the
grant
of
compassionate appointment to a member
of the family. Excluding a married
daughter from the ambit of the family
may well defeat the object of the social
welfare benefit.

13.
The
living
tree
-
the
Constitution - on which the law derives
legitimacy is a liberal instrument for
realising fundamental human freedoms.
The law and the Constitution must account
for multiple identities. Individuals - men
and women - have multiple identities : as a
worker in the work place; as a child, parent
and spouse; identities based on preferences
and orientation; those based on language,
religion
and
culture.
But
from
a
constitutional
perspective,
they
are
protected and subsumed in the overarching
privileges of citizenship and in the
guarantee of individual freedoms.

14. In the judgment of this Court
in Isha Tyagi vs. State of U.P.2, a Division
Bench
considered
the
legality
of
a
condition which was imposed by the State
Government while providing horizontal
reservation to descendants of freedom
fighters. The condition which was imposed
by the State excluded the children of the
daughter of a freedom fighter from seeking
admission to medical colleges in the State
3 All. Smt. Madhavi Mishra Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
131
under an affirmative action programme.
Holding this to be unconstitutional, the
Division Bench held as follows:

"It would be anachronistic to
discriminate against married daughters by
confining the benefit of the horizontal
reservation in this case only to sons (and
their sons) and to unmarried daughters. If
the marital status of a son does not make
any difference in law to his entitlement or
to his eligibility as a descendant, equally in
our view, the marital status of a daughter
should in terms of constitutional values
make no difference. The notion that a
married daughter ceases to be a part of the
family of her parents upon her marriage
must undergo a rethink in contemporary
times. The law cannot make an assumption
that married sons alone continue to be
members of the family of their parents, and
that a married daughter ceases to be a
member of the family of her parents. Such
an
assumption
is
constitutionally
impermissible because it is an invidious
basis to discriminate against married
daughters and their children. A benefit
which this social welfare measure grants to
a son of a freedom fighter, irrespective of
marital status, cannot be denied to a
married daughter of a freedom fighter."

15. Dealing with the aspect of
marriage, the Division Bench held as
follows:

"Marriage does not have and
should not have a proximate nexus with
identity. The identity of a woman as a
woman continues to subsist even after and
notwithstanding her marital relationship.
The time has, therefore, come for the Court
to affirmatively emphasise that it is not
open to the State, if it has to act in
conformity with the fundamental principle
of equality which is embodied in Articles 14
and 15 of the Constitution, to discriminate
against married daughters by depriving
them of the benefit of a horizontal
reservation, which is made available to a
son irrespective of his marital status."

16. The principles underlying
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution have
an important bearing on gender identity. In
C.B. Muthamma vs. Union of India3, the
Supreme Court considered the legality of a
rule in the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct
and Discipline) Rules under which a
woman member of the service was required
to obtain the permission of the Government
before her marriage was solemnized and
could be required to resign from service
after her marriage, if the Government was
satisfied that her family and domestic
commitments are likely to come in the way
of the due and efficient discharge of her
duties as a member of the service. The
Supreme Court held that "If a married man
has a right, a married woman, other things
being equal, stands on no worse footing".
In the meantime the Central Government
had indicated that the rule was being
reconsidered and its deletion was being
gazetted.

17. In Vijaya Manohar Arbat vs.
Kashirao Rajaram Sawai4, the Supreme
Court held in the context of the provisions
of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 1973 that "a daughter after her
marriage does not cease to be a daughter
of the father or mother".

18. The same principle was
applied in Githa Hariharan vs. Reserve
Bank of India5 while defining the ambit of
the expression "the father, and after him,
the mother" in Section 6(a) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956. The Supreme Court
observed that if the word 'after' was read to
mean that a mother would be disqualified
from acting as a guardian of a minor
during the lifetime of the father, this would
run counter to the constitutional mandate
of gender equality and will lead to an
132 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
impermissible
differentiation
between
males and females. Interpreting the word
'after', the Supreme Court held that it does
not necessarily mean after the death of the
father but would mean in the absence of,
whether temporary or otherwise or in a
situation of the apathy of the father or his
inability to maintain the child.

19. In Savita Samvedi vs. Union
of India6, the Supreme Court considered
the validity of a circular of the Railway
Board by which a railway servant who is
an allottee of service accommodation was
entitled to nominate, while retiring from
service, a son or unmarried daughter
among other persons for allotment of the
accommodation
on
out-of-turn
basis.
Holding that the circular (insofar as it
precluded the nomination of a married
daughter for allotment of accommodation)
violated Article 14, the Supreme Court
observed as follows:

"... If he has only one married
daughter, who is a railway employee, and
none of his other children are, then his
choice is and has to be limited to that
railway employee married daughter. He
should be in an unfettered position to
nominate that daughter for regularization
of railway accommodation. It is only in the
case of more than one children in Railway
service that he may have to exercise a
choice and we see no reason why the
choice be not left with the retiring official's
judgment on the point and be not respected
by the railway authorities irrespective of
the gender of the child. There is no
occasion for the railways to be regulating
or bludgeoning the choice in favour of the
son when existing and able to maintain his
parents. The Railway Ministry's Circular in
that regard appears thus to us to be wholly
unfair, gender biased and unreasonable,
liable to be struck down under Article 14 of
the Constitution. The eligibility of a
married daughter must be placed on a par
with an unmarried daughter (for she must
have been once in that state), so as to claim
the benefit of the earlier part of the
Circular, referred to in its first paragraph,
above-quoted."

20. In Air India Cabin Crew Assn.
vs. Yeshaswinee Merchant7, the Supreme
Court dealt with the prohibition under
Article 15(2) on discrimination on the
ground only of sex. Interpreting the
provisions of Articles 15 and 16, the
Supreme Court held that the constitutional
mandate would be infringed where a
woman would have received the same
treatment as a man but for her sex.

.....

26. In conclusion, we hold that
the exclusion of married daughters from the
ambit of the expression "family" in Rule 2
(c) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules is illegal
and unconstitutional, being violative of
Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.

27. We, accordingly, strike down
the word 'unmarried' in Rule 2 (c) (iii) of
the Dying-in-Harness Rules.

28. In consequence, we direct that
the
claim
of
the
petitioners
for
compassionate
appointment
shall
be
reconsidered. We clarify that the competent
authority would be at liberty to consider
the claim for compassionate appointment
on the basis of all the relevant facts and
circumstances and the petitioners shall not
be excluded from consideration only on the
ground of their marital status."

12.
Considering
the
aforesaid
judgment this Court is of the considered
opinion that the said judgment passed in the
case of Vimla Srivastava (Supra) squarely
applies to the facts of the present case. The
definition of family occurring in the Dying
in Harness Rules, 1974 is pari materia with
Note appended to Regulation 104 of the
3 All. Aditya Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
133
Regulations of 1975 and the definition of
family included the daughter but excluded
married daughter.

13. This Court in the aforesaid Full
Bench has not accepted the stand of the
State which proceeds on a paternalistic
notion of the position of a woman in our
society and particularly of the position of
a
daughter
after
marriage.
The
assumption
that
after
marriage,
a
daughter cannot be said to be a member
of the family of her father or that she
ceases to be dependent on her father
irrespective
of
social
circumstances
cannot be countenanced. The test in
matters of compassionate appointment is
a test of dependency within defined
relationships. There are situations where
a son of the deceased government servant
may not be in need of compassionate
appointment because the economic and
financial position of the family of the
deceased are not such as to require the
grant of compassionate appointment on a
preferential basis. But the dependency or
a lack of dependency is a matter which is
not determined a priori on the basis of
whether or not the son is married.
Similarly, whether or not a daughter of a
deceased
should
be
granted
compassionate appointment has to be
defined with reference to whether, on a
consideration of all relevant facts and
circumstances, she was dependent on the
deceased government servant. Excluding
daughters purely on the ground of
marriage
would
constitute
an
impermissible
discrimination
and
be
violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution.

14. Accordingly, it is held that
exclusion of married daughter from the
ambit of family in the Note appended in
sub clause (V) in Regulation 104 of the
Regulations
of
1975
is
illegal,
unconstitutional and violative of Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, the word 'unmarried' in the
said Note is struck down.

15. The
impugned
orders
dated
29.6.2021 and 1.7.2022 passed by opposite
party No.2 are quashed.

16. A direction is issued to the
respondents to consider the claim of the
petitioner for compassionate appointment
again in light of the decision of the Full
Bench in the case of Vimla Srivastava
(supra) as well as the directions issued
hereinabove and the case of the petitioner
would not be rejected merely on the ground
that she is a married daughter.

17. In light of the above, the writ
petition stands allowed.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 133
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.02.2023
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ A No. 1834 of 2001

Aditya Kumar Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
H.G.S. Parihar, Meenakshi Singh Parihar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Ghaus Beg, R.K. Katiyar, Rajiv Singh
Chauhan

A.
Service
Law
-
Extension
of
Appointment/Regularization - Payment of