# Smt. Madresh & Ors v. U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 7 ILRA 72
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-04-17
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 243 of 1995
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-madresh-ors-v-u-p-s-r-t-c-ors-50607
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act,1988-
Sections 166, 168 & 173- Death in accidentGrant of Compensation-Future ProspectsDeceased was aged about 36 years-Rule 220A(3) of the Rules of 1998, deceased falls in the
category of 40 years and below, entitling his
dependents to add future prospect to his
income to extent 50% of his salaryClaimant's
award
is
modified
and
the
compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.
5,82,980/-. The sum of money shall carry
simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum
from the date of institution of the claim
petition, until realization. The entire sum of
enhanced compensation shall be payable to
the claimants in the manner that 60% of the
compensation shall go to the widow, and out
of the balance 40%, the other four claimants
shall equally share. (Para 1 to 25)

The appeal is partly allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2023) 7 ILRA 72
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.04.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 243 of 1995

Smt. Madresh & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
U.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Devendra Singh, Sri Pravindra Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Samir Sharma, Sri Sunil Kumar Mishra,
Sri Vikas Sahai

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act,1988-
Sections 166, 168 & 173- Death in accidentGrant of Compensation-Future ProspectsDeceased was aged about 36 years-Rule 220A(3) of the Rules of 1998, deceased falls in the
category of 40 years and below, entitling his
dependents to add future prospect to his
income to extent 50% of his salaryClaimant's
award
is
modified
and
the
compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.
5,82,980/-. The sum of money shall carry
simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum
from the date of institution of the claim
petition, until realization. The entire sum of
enhanced compensation shall be payable to
the claimants in the manner that 60% of the
compensation shall go to the widow, and out
of the balance 40%, the other four claimants
shall equally share. (Para 1 to 25)

The appeal is partly allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. Sarla Verma (Smt.) & ors. Vs DTC (2009) 6
SCC 121

2. Vimal Kanwar & ors. Vs Kishore Dan & ors.
(2013) 7 SCC 476
3. Helen C. Rebello Vs M SRTC [(1999) 1 SCC 90
: 1999 SCC (Cri) 197]

4. National Ins. Co. Vs Pranay Sethi & ors.
(2017) 16 SCC 680

5. New India Assur. Co. Ltd Vs Urmila Shukla &
ors.. (2021) SCC OnLine SC 822

6. Sushil Kumar & ors. Vs M/s. Sampark Lojastic
Pvt. Ltd & ors. (2017) 35 LCD 1311

7. Ram Sarup Vs Munshi (1963) AIR SC 553

8. Dayawati Vs Inderjit (1966) AIR SC 1423
9. Mula Vs Godhu (1971) AIR SC 89

10. Amarjit Kaur Vs Pritam Singh (1974) AIR SC
2068

11. Puttamma Vs K.L. Narayana Reddy (2013)
15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3
SCC (Cri) 574

12. UP SRTC Vs Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC
362

13. Magma General Ins. Co. Ltd. Vs Nanu Ram
@ Chuhru Ram & ors. (2018) 18 SCC 130
(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is an appeal by the claimants
of Motor Accident Claim Petition No.48 of
1992,
seeking
enhancement
of
compensation awarded by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal.

2. According to the claimantappellants, who are dependents of the late
Rajvir Singh, the deceased, on the 2nd of
December, 1991 was proceeding from
Roorkee to Meerut on board Maruti Car,
bearing registration No. DNC-2281. He
was travelling on the car along with Raj
Kumar and some others. The car was
moving according to the rule of the road
and at a controlled speed. At forty minutes
7 All. Amar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
73
past seven in the evening, as the car
reached the Village Siwaya, a bus, owned
by the Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport
Corporation (for short, 'UPSRTC'), bearing
registration No. UHN-2268, approached
from the opposite direction. It was driven at
the high speed of about 70 kilometers per
hour and negligently. It hit the Maruti Car,
leading to injury being sustained by several
persons. One Raj Kumar died on the spot.
Rajvir Singh, who sustained grievous
injuries, was admitted to the Medical
College Hospital. He breathed his last on
03/04.12.1991. A First Information Report
about the accident was lodged with the
Police, leading to the registration of a case.
Rajvir Singh's body was sent to autopsy,
that was carried out at the P.L. Sharma
Hospital, Meerut.

3. According to the claimantappellants (for short, 'the claimants'), the
deceased was a Constable in the Uttar
Pradesh Police and aged thirty-six and a
half years at the time of his demise. He was
a healthy man and in the usual course of
life would have gone on to celebrate his
85th birthday. The deceased was in receipt
of a total salary of Rs.1961/- per mensem.
Due to Rajvir Singh's untimely demise, the
claimants have been destituted and left
without a source of income. The claimants
have also been denied their love and
affection. A compensation in the sum of
Rs.8,10,000/- was, accordingly, claimed.

4. A written statement was filed on
behalf of the UPSRTC, who are opposite
party No.1 to the claim petition and
respondent No.1 to this appeal. The UPSRTC
have generally denied the allegations in the
claim petition. The particulars of the accident
have been denied, leading to Rajvir Singh's
death. It has been averred that burden lay
upon the claimants to establish the factum of
the accident. It is the further case of the
UPSRTC that the accident did not happen on
account of negligence of the bus driver, but it
is a case of contributory negligence, where
the bus driver and the driver of the Maruti
Car ought to share the liability in equal
proportion. It was also pleaded that the
compensation sought is excessive and
without basis. The case further pleaded is that
compensation cannot come to the claimants
as a lottery or windfall.

5. A written statement was filed on behalf
of the National Insurance Company Limited,
Branch Office Haridwar through the Divisional
Manager, Begum Bridge, Meerut, opposite
party No.4 to the claim petition and respondent
No.4 here, who are Insurers of the Maruti Car.
The Insurance Company aforesaid took a
stand that it is the claimants' burden to
establish the factum of the accident and all
other things necessary to entitle them to
compensation. It was the Insurance Company's
case that the car was not being driven
negligently and not responsible for the
accident. It was the offending bus alone, that
has to be held liable. The Insurance Company
too said that the compensation demanded was
excessive.

6. Upon pleadings of parties, the
following issues were framed (translated into
English from Hindi):

"1. Whether the accident in
question happened on 02.12.1991 at 7.40
p.m. in the jungle of Shivaya, Police
Station Daurala, Meerut on account of
negligent driving at a high speed by the
drivers of bus No. UHN-2268 and Martu
car No. DNC-2282? If yes, its effect.

2. Whether the claimants are
entitled to receive any compensation? If
yes, how much and from which party?
74 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. On behalf of the clamants, Smt.
Madresh, the widow, was examined as PW1, whereas Constable Ajay Pal Singh, an
eye-witness of the accident, was examined
as PW-2. In the claimants' documentary
evidence, a copy of the FIR, the charge
sheet, the site plan, the postmortem report
and the deceased's salary certificate,
besides his High School Certificate were
filed. On behalf of the UPSRTC, the bus
driver, Raj Kumar was produced in the
witness-box and examined as DW-1.

8. It must be noticed that the claim
petition has, of course, been pursued by the
claimants before the Tribunal and defended
by the UPSRTC. The other three opposite
parties do not appear to have much
contested the claim before the Tribunal.
Before this Court, the appeal has been
supported by the claimants and resisted on
behalf of the UPSTRC. None of the other
parties have appeared at the hearing before
this Court.

9. Heard Mr. Pravindra Singh, learned
Counsel for the claimants and Mr. Vikas
Sahai, learned Counsel appearing for the
UPSRTC. No one appears on behalf of
respondent Nos.2 to 4.

10. The lower court records have been
carefully perused.

11. Since this appeal is limited to a
claim for enhancement of compensation,
this Court proposes to scrutinize the
findings of the Tribunal on Issue No.2
alone. There is no cavil about the findings
on the first issue.

12. It is argued by the learned
Counsel for the claimants that the Tribunal
has erred in law in applying a multiplier of
'12', instead of '15', on account of the fact
that the widow was in receipt of a family
pension of Rs.500-600/- per month. He
submits that the pension payable to the
widow is not legally deductible, or in any
manner relevant to a quantification of the
dependency. It is also argued that the
Tribunal has not awarded anything towards
future prospects of the deceased. Also,
nothing has been awarded towards loss of
consortium to each of the claimants,
besides award towards loss of estate and
adequate funeral expenses.

13. Mr. Vikas Sahai, learned Counsel
appearing on behalf of the UPSRTC, on the
other hand, has supported the impugned
judgment and says that it makes for a just
award, which ought not to be disturbed.

14. In order to work out the
compensation and pass a just and fair
award, the most fundamental figure to be
determined is the deceased's monthly
income. Happily in this case, the deceased
was a government servant, whose income,
whether high or low, is accepted in law and
by the society with a kind of trust, faith and
reverence, which the income of the richest
of men may not command. The deceased's
income in this case has the infallible
certification of the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Haridwar, who has issued a
certificate dated 20.12.1991, paper No. 38Ga. We have perused the said certificate. It
shows the deceased's income to be
Rs.1961. The monthly income of the
deceased is, therefore, to be regarded as
Rs.1961/-, the annual income working out
to a figure of Rs.23,532/-.

15. The deceased left behind five
dependents, to wit, his widow Smt.
Madresh, two minor daughters, Km.
Kalpna and Km. Alpna, aged 13 and 11
years, respectively, and two sons, Master
7 All. Amar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
75
Atul and Master Pintu, aged 8 years and 4
years, respectively. Going by the principle
for determining the number of surviving
family members, in turn to quantify the
deduction towards personal and living
expenses for the deceased, Rule 220-A
(2)(iii) of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1998 (for short, 'the Rules of 1998') serves
as the guide. The Rule postulates that for
the purpose of calculation of the number of
family members in Clause (ii), a minor
dependent will be counted as half a unit.
Therefore, the four children of the deceased
would make for two dependents, whereas
the widow would constitute one. Thus, it
has to be held that the deceased was
survived
by
three
dependent
family
members. According to Rule 220-A(2)(ii)
of the Rules of 1998, deduction towards
personal and living expenses for a married
person in order to work out the survivors'
dependency, where he is survived by
dependents in the bracket of 2 to 3 shall be
one-third. The same deduction for living
expenses of the deceased is envisaged in
Paragraph No.30 of the decision in Sarla
Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi
Transport Corporation and another,
(2009) 6 SCC 121, where the dependent
family members are 2-3. Thus, in this case,
out of the annual income of the deceased, a
one-third has to be deducted towards
personal and living expenses.

16. The next issue to be considered,
in order to work out the dependency, is
the appropriate multiplier to apply.
According
to
the guidance
of
the
Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (supra)
in Paragraph No.42 of the report, for the
dependents of a deceased in the age
bracket of 36-40 years, the applicable
multiplier is '15'. Here, the deceased was
aged thirty-six and a half years. There is
no cavil about his age as the High School
Certificate is on record as paper No.40Kha. The High School Certificate shows
the deceased's date of birth as 1st July,
1955. At the time of his demise, on
03/04.12.1991,
the
deceased
would,
therefore, be aged as 36 years or as the
Tribunal says, thirty-six and a half years.
Therefore,
the
applicable
multiplier
would clearly be '15' and not '12', as
adopted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has
adopted a lower multiplier, apparently
referring to the fact that the widow is in
receipt of a family pension of Rs.500600/-. The fact that the widow is in
receipt of family pension is absolutely
irrelevant for the purpose of working out
the dependency for the claimants. In this
regard, the law on the issue has been
authoritatively laid down by the Supreme
Court in Vimal Kanwar and others v.
Kishore Dan and others, (2013) 7 SCC
476, where it has been held:

18. The first issue is "whether
provident fund, pension and insurance
receivable by the claimants come within
the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act
to be termed as 'pecuniary advantage'
liable for deduction".

19. The aforesaid issue fell for
consideration before this Court in Helen C.
Rebello v. Maharashtra SRTC [(1999) 1
SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 197] . In the said
case, this Court held that provident fund,
pension, insurance and similarly any cash,
bank balance, shares, fixed deposits, etc.
are all a "pecuniary advantage" receivable
by the heirs on account of one's death but
all these have no correlation with the
amount
receivable
under
a
statute
occasioned only on account of accidental
death. Such an amount will not come
within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles
Act to be termed as "pecuniary advantage"
76 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
liable for deduction. The following was the
observation and finding of this Court: (SCC
pp. 111-12, para 35)

"35. Broadly, we may examine
the receipt of the provident fund which is a
deferred payment out of the contribution
made by an employee during the tenure of
his service. Such employee or his heirs are
entitled to receive this amount irrespective
of the accidental death. This amount is
secured, is certain to be received, while the
amount under the Motor Vehicles Act is
uncertain and is receivable only on the
happening of the event viz. accident, which
may not take place at all. Similarly, family
pension is also earned by an employee for
the benefit of his family in the form of his
contribution in the service in terms of the
service conditions receivable by the heirs
after his death. The heirs receive family
pension even otherwise than the accidental
death. No co-relation between the two.
Similarly, life insurance policy is received
either by the insured or the heirs of the
insured on account of the contract with the
insurer, for which the insured contributes in
the form of premium. It is receivable even
by the insured if he lives till maturity after
paying all the premiums. In the case of
death, the insurer indemnifies to pay the
sum to the heirs, again in terms of the
contract for the premium paid. Again, this
amount is receivable by the claimant not on
account of any accidental death but
otherwise on the insured's death. Death is
only a step or contingency in terms of the
contract, to receive the amount. Similarly
any cash, bank balance, shares, fixed
deposits, etc. though are all a pecuniary
advantage receivable by the heirs on
account of one's death but all these have no
co-relation with the amount receivable
under a statute occasioned only on account
of accidental death. How could such an
amount come within the periphery of the
Motor Vehicles Act to be termed as
'pecuniary advantage' liable for deduction.
When we seek the principle of loss and
gain, it has to be on a similar and same
plane having nexus, inter se, between them
and not to which there is no semblance of
any co-relation. The insured (the deceased)
contributes his own money for which he
receives the amount which has no corelation to the compensation computed as
against the tortfeasor for his negligence on
account of the accident. As aforesaid, the
amount receivable as compensation under
the Act is on account of the injury or death
without making any contribution towards it,
then how can the fruits of an amount
received through contributions of the
insured be deducted out of the amount
receivable under the Motor Vehicles Act.
The amount under this Act he receives
without any contribution. As we have said,
the compensation payable under the Motor
Vehicles Act is statutory while the amount
receivable under the life insurance policy is
contractual.""

17. Therefore, in our opinion, the
Tribunal went wrong in scaling down the
multiplier to '12', instead of adopting the
appropriate multiplier of '15'.

18. So far as the future prospects of
the deceased are concerned, he was aged 36
years or thereabouts. According to Rule
220-A(3) of the Rules of 1998, the
deceased falls in the category of 40 years
and below, entitling his dependents to add
future prospect to his income to the extent
50% of his salary.

19. The issue if the award of future
prospects would be governed by the
decision in National Insurance Company
v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16
SCC 680 or Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules of
7 All. Amar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
77
1998, fell for consideration of the Supreme
Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd v.
Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 822. In Urmila Shukla
(supra), it was held:

"9. It is to be noted that the
validity of the Rules was not, in any way,
questioned in the instant matter and thus
the only question that we are called upon to
consider is whether in its application, subRule 3(iii) of Rule 220A of the Rules must
be given restricted scope or it must be
allowed to operate fully.

10. The discussion on the point in
Pranay Sethi was from the standpoint of
arriving at "just compensation" in terms of
Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988.

11. If an indicia is made available
in the form of a statutory instrument which
affords a favourable treatment, the decision
in Pranay Sethi cannot be taken to have
limited the operation of such statutory
provision specially when the validity of the
Rules was not put under any challenge. The
prescription of 15% in cases where the
deceased was in the age bracket of 50-60
years as stated in Pranay Sethi cannot be
taken as maxima. In the absence of any
governing principle
available
in
the
statutory regime, it was only in the form of
an indication. If a statutory instrument has
devised a formula which affords better or
greater benefit, such statutory instrument
must be allowed to operate unless the
statutory instrument is otherwise found to
be invalid.

12. We, therefore, reject the
submission advanced on behalf of the
appellant and affirm the view taken by the
Tribunal as well as the High Court and
dismiss this appeal without any order as to
costs."

20. In the opinion of this Court,
therefore, the right to determination of
future prospects would be governed by
Rule 220-A(3) and not the principles laid
down in Pranay Sethi (supra).

21. It was urged on behalf of the
UPSRTC that Rule 220-A(3) of the Rules
of 1998 would not be applicable to the
present case, because they were introduced
w.e.f. 26th September, 2011, whereas the
accident in this case had happened in the
year
1991.
This
question
fell
for
consideration of a Division Bench of this
Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s.
Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and
others, 2017 (35) LCD 1311. In Sushil
Kumar (supra), it was held:

"31. Rule 220-A was inserted in
the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules,
1998 in view of the various decisions of the
law courts for providing benefit on account
of future prospects of the injured/deceased.
It
provides
for
addition
of
certain
percentage
of
the
income
of
the
injured/deceased in his actual income
depending
upon
the
age
of
the
injured/deceased for the purposes of
determination of the compensation. The
aforesaid Rule came into effect on
26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim
petition but before filing of the appeal
though
the
accident
took
place
on
08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of
the above Rule.

32. It is in view of the above that
an argument is being raised that Rule 220A of the Rules which came into effect on
26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident
which had taken place on 08.05.2010.

33. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi
AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a
change in law during the pendency of an
78 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appeal has to be taken into account and will
cover the rights of the parties.

34. The view expressed above
was followed by the Supreme Court in
Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89.

35. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR
1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as
under:-If the new law speaks in language,
which expressly or by clear intendment,
takes in even pending matters, the court of
trial as well as the court of appeal must
have regard to an intention so expressed,
and the court of appeal may give effect to
such a law even after the judgment of the
court of first instance.

36. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam
Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given
to the change in law during the pendency of
an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under
the procedural law of this country is in the
nature of rehearing of the suit by superior
court.

37. It was in the light of the
above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan
Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR
1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in
law during the pendency of an appeal has
to be taken into account and will cover the
right of the parties.

38. The aforesaid decision was
followed by a Division Bench of this court
in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation
Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003
(4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation
to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act
and it was observed that it is apparent that
the change in law during the pendency of
the original proceedings has to be taken
into account so as to cover the rights of the
parties.

39. In view of above decision the
view expressed by the Division Bench of
this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not
of good law as it does not takes into
account the decisions referred to above in
holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules
which came into effect on 26.09.2011
would not apply to the accident that took
place prior to the said date only for the
reason that the Rule was not specifically
stated to be retrospective in nature."

22. No decision by a Larger Bench or
the Supreme Court has been brought to the
notice of this Court overruling the law as
aforesaid laid down in Sushil Kumar.
There is, thus, no difficulty in applying the
provisions of the Rules of 1998, here and
elsewhere,
for
the
determination
of
compensation payable to the deceased in
this case.

23. The claimants are entitled to
receive
compensation
under
the
conventional heads. This issue was again
the subject matter of consideration by their
Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pranay
Sethi, where it has been held:

"48. This aspect needs to be
clarified
and
appositely
stated.
The
conventional sum has been provided in the
Second Schedule to the Act. The said
Schedule has been found to be defective as
stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP
SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC
362] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L.
Narayana
Reddy
[Puttamma
v.K.L.
Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 :
(2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC
(Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating :
(SCC p. 80, para 54)

"54. ... we hold that the Second
Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now
become
redundant,
irrational
and
unworkable due to changed scenario
including the present cost of living and
current rate of inflation and increased life
expectancy."
7 All. Amar Bahadur Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
79

49. As far as multiplier or
multiplicand is concerned, the same has
been put to rest by the judgments of this
Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also
provides for general damages in case of
death. It is as follows:

"3. General damages (in case of
death):

The following general damages
shall
be
payable
in
addition
to
compensation outlined above:

(i)
Funeral expenses
Rs 2000
(ii)
Loss
of
consortium,
if
beneficiary is the spouse
Rs 5000
(iii)
Loss of estate
Rs 2500
(iv)
Medical expenses - actual
expenses
incurred
before
death
supported
by
bills/vouchers
but
not
exceeding
Rs 15,000"

50. On a perusal of various
decisions of this Court, it is manifest that
the Second Schedule has not been followed
starting from the decision in Trilok
Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra,
(1996) 4 SCC 362] and there has been no
amendment to the same. The conventional
damage amount needs to be appositely
determined. As we notice, in different cases
different amounts have been granted. A
sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards
consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir
Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC
(Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for
grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is
founded on the observation as we have
reproduced hereinbefore.

51. On the aforesaid basis, the
Court has revisited the practice of awarding
compensation under conventional heads.

52. As far as the conventional
heads are concerned, we find it difficult to
agree
with
the
view
expressed
in
Rajesh[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9
SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013)
3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S)
149] . It has granted Rs 25,000 towards
funeral expenses, Rs 1,00,000 towards loss
of consortium and Rs 1,00,000 towards loss
of care and guidance for minor children.
The head relating to loss of care and minor
children does not exist. ThoughRajesh
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] refers
to Santosh Devi [Santosh Devi v. National
Insurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 421 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 726 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 167] , it
does not seem to follow the same. The
conventional
and
traditional
heads,
needless to say, cannot be determined on
percentage basis because that would not be
an
acceptable
criterion.
Unlike
determination of income, the said heads
have to be quantified. Any quantification
must have a reasonable foundation. There
can be no dispute over the fact that price
index, fall in bank interest, escalation of
rates in many a field have to be noticed.
The court cannot remain oblivious to the
same. There has been a thumb rule in this
aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme
difficulty in determination of the same and
unless the thumb rule is applied, there will
be immense variation lacking any kind of
consistency as a consequence of which, the
orders passed by the tribunals and courts
are likely to be unguided. Therefore, we
think it seemly to fix reasonable sums. It
seems to us that reasonable figures on
conventional heads, namely, loss of estate,
loss of consortium and funeral expenses
should be Rs 15,000, Rs 40,000 and Rs
15,000 respectively. The principle of
80 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
revisiting the said heads is an acceptable
principle. But the revisit should not be factcentric or quantum-centric. We think that it
would be condign that the amount that we
have quantified should be enhanced on
percentage basis in every three years and
the enhancement should be at the rate of
10% in a span of three years. We are
disposed to hold so because that will bring
in consistency in respect of those heads."

(emphasis by Court)

24. The question of award of
compensation for loss of consortium was
considered by the Supreme Court in
Magma General Insurance Company
Ltd. v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram
and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130. In
Magma General Insurance Company
Ltd. (supra), it was held:

"21. A Constitution Bench of this
Court in Pranay Sethi[National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC
680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2
SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads
under which compensation is to be awarded
in a death case. One of these heads is loss
of
consortium.
In
legal
parlance,
"consortium" is a compendious term which
encompasses
"spousal
consortium",
"parental
consortium",
and
"filial
consortium". The right to consortium
would include the company, care, help,
comfort, guidance, solace and affection of
the deceased, which is a loss to his family.
With respect to a spouse, it would include
sexual relations with the deceased spouse :
[Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 :
(2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC
(Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149]

21.1.
Spousal
consortium
is
generally defined as rights pertaining to the
relationship of a husband-wife which
allows compensation to the surviving
spouse for loss of "company, society,
cooperation, affection, and aid of the other
in every conjugal relation". [Black's Law
Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).]

21.2.
Parental
consortium
is
granted to the child upon the premature
death of a parent, for loss of "parental aid,
protection, affection, society, discipline,
guidance and training".

21.3. Filial consortium is the right
of the parents to compensation in the case
of an accidental death of a child. An
accident leading to the death of a child
causes great shock and agony to the parents
and family of the deceased. The greatest
agony for a parent is to lose their child
during their lifetime. Children are valued
for their love, affection, companionship and
their role in the family unit.
(emphasis by Court)

25. In the circumstances, this appeal
deserves to succeed and in order to make a
just award, the impugned award shall stand
modified and revised as follows:

(I) Monthly Income (of the deceased)
= 1961

(ii) Annual Income (of the deceased) =

1961x12

 = 23532

(iii) Annual Income+Future Prospects

 (monthly income x 50%)

= 23532+11766

 = 35298

(iv) Annual Dependency = Annual
Income - one-third deduction towards
personal expenses of the deceased =
35298-11766 = 23532

(v) Total Dependency = Annual
Dependency x Applied Multiplier =

23532 x 15

 = 352980

(vi) Claimant's entitlement towards
conventional heads = Loss of Estate +
Funeral
Expenses
+
dependents'
Consortium
=15000+15000+40000x5
=
230000
7 All. Sanjay Kumar Sharma & Anr. Vs. Sri Murari Lal & Ors.
81

The
total
compensation
would
therefore, work out to a figure of Rs.
352980+ Rs. 230000 = 582980

26. In the result, this appeal is
allowed in part. The impugned award
passed by the Tribunal is modified and the
compensation awarded enhanced to Rs.
5,82,980/-. The aforesaid sum of money
shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7%
per annum from the date of institution of
the claim petition, until realization. The
entire sum of enhanced compensation shall
be payable to the claimants in the manner
that 60% of the compensation shall go to
the widow, and out of the balance 40%, the
other four claimants shall equally share.
Any sum of money already deposited with
the Tribunal by the UPSRTC, pursuant to
the impugned award or the interim orders
passed by this Court, shall be adjusted
against the award. Costs easy.
----------
(2023) 7 ILRA 81
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.04.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. KAUSHAL JAYENDRA
THAKER, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 316 of 1997

Sanjay Kumar Sharma & Anr. ...Appellants
Versus
Sri Murari Lal & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Madhav Jain

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.K. Shukl

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 -
Section 173- Death in accident-Grant of
Compensation-deceased
was
aged
30
years was a compounder working with a
doctor who has left behind him his
mother, father, widow, one son and two
daughters-The tribunal has considered his
income to be Rs. 1200/-p.m, deducted
1/3rd, granted multiplier of 16, added Rs.
10,000/- towards non pecuniary damages
and granted interest at the rate of 12%.-
income of Rs. 1200/- p.m cannot be said
to be on the lower side, the same is
maintained, 40% future prospects to be
added-Multiplier
of
17
as
per
the
judgment
of
Sarla
Verma
would
be
admissible.
Rs.

50,000/-
for
non
pecuniary damages- Total compensation :
2,78,480/-The interest on the enhanced
amount would be 7% from the date of
filing of the claim petition as that would
have been rate in the year 1997.(Para 1 to
18)
The appeal is partly allowed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

1. Lakkamma Vs United India Ins. Co. Ltd.
(2021) AIR SC 3301

2. Sarla Verma Vs DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121

3. A.V. Padma Vs Venugopal (2012) 1 GLH SC 442

4. Smt. Hansaguri P. Ladhani Vs The Oriental
Ins. Co. Ltd. (2007) 2 GLH 291

5. Smt. Sudesna & ors. Vs Hari Singh & anr.,
FAFO No. 23 of 2001

6. Bajaj Allianz General Ins. Co. Pvt. Ltd. Vs
U.O.I. & ors.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Kaushal
Jayendra Thaker, J.)

1. Heard Sri Madhav Jain, learned
counsel
for
the
appellants
and
Sri
A.K.Shukl learned counsel for respondents.

2. This appeal, at the behest of the
claimants, challenges the judgement and