# Smt. Mamta Devi v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 4 ILRA 276
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-19
- **Case number:** Writ - C No. 27107 of 2020
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-mamta-devi-v-state-of-u-p-anr-47003
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Civil Law - Essential Commodities Act
(10 of 1955) - Section 3 - U.P. Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Sale and
Distribution Control) Order (2016) ,
Cl.2(j),
Section
8(7)
-
G.O.
dated
05.08.2019 para 2 (I) - Fair price shop
licence - Cancellation - Held - District
Supply Officer is competent authority to
suspend
or
cancel
fair
price
shop
owner's license, in entire district, which
include both urban and rural area -
District Supply Officer is not required to
take any prior approval of the District
Magistrate - Cancellation of fair price
shop licence by the District Supply
Officer, without prior approval of D.M.
proper (Para 9, 10)

Dismissed. (E-4)

## Text

276 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

25. The aforementioned statement of
objects and reasons clearly takes note of the fact
situation that though the Panchayat Raj
Institutions have been in existence for a long
time, they have not been able to acquire the
status and dignity of viable and responsive
peoples' bodies due to a number of reasons
including insufficient representation of weaker
sections like scheduled castes, scheduled tribes
and women. It was accordingly proposed to
provide reservations of seats for scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes in proportion to their
population for membership of Panchayats and
office of Chairpersons in Panchayats at each
level and reservation of not less than one-third
of the seats for women.

26. The intended beneficiaries to whom
reservation is to be provided i.e. scheduled
castes, scheduled tribes and other backward
class of citizens - are clearly identified under
Article 243D which is in consonance with the
statement of objects and reasons of the Seventythird Amendment Act, for furtherance of the
contemplated
aim
of
democratic
decentralization and in order to pursue the
objective of ensuring that the traditionally
marginalized groups should progressively gain
a foothold in the institutions of local self
government. The idea of providing reservation
under Article 243D is to ensure that a minimum
number of seats are provided for and are filled
in by the vulnerable sections of the society so as
to safeguard their interests by giving them an
effective voice in local self government at each
of the three levels of the panchayat institutions.
This is more so for the reasons that for
democratic decentralization to percolate to the
grass root level, it would be necessary to
empower the vulnerable sections of the society.

27. Claim of the petitioner with regard
to providing reservation for dependents of
freedom fighters in panchayat institutions is
to be tested in the context of the overall
scheme as envisaged under Part IX of the
Constitution and the corresponding state
legislation brought to implement it. The aim
and object of the reservation policy contained
in Part IX is to enable the marginalized
sections of society namely the scheduled
castes,
scheduled
tribes,
women
and
backward classes of citizens, to participate in
the process of democratic decentralization by
having a share in governance which was
hitherto denied to them. No such rationale or
nexus to support the claim for providing
reservation to dependents of freedom fighters
in Panchayat institutions has been pointed out
before us.

28. The reservation of seats and offices
in the panchayat institutions being governed
in terms of the provisions under Article 243D
under Part IX of the Constitution and there
being no provision thereunder for providing
reservation
to
dependents
of
freedom
fighters, the claim sought to be raised in the
present writ petition does not have any legal
foundation.

29.

Having
regard
to
the
aforementioned facts, we are of the view that
the writ petition is devoid of merits and is
accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2021)04ILR A276
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

Writ - C No. 27107 of 2020

Smt. Mamta Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
4 All. Smt. Mamta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
277
Sri Yadavendra Mani Mishra, Sri Prashant
Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Essential Commodities Act
(10 of 1955) - Section 3 - U.P. Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Sale and
Distribution Control) Order (2016) ,
Cl.2(j),
Section
8(7)
-
G.O.
dated
05.08.2019 para 2 (I) - Fair price shop
licence - Cancellation - Held - District
Supply Officer is competent authority to
suspend
or
cancel
fair
price
shop
owner's license, in entire district, which
include both urban and rural area -
District Supply Officer is not required to
take any prior approval of the District
Magistrate - Cancellation of fair price
shop licence by the District Supply
Officer, without prior approval of D.M.
proper (Para 9, 10)

Dismissed. (E-4)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner as well as learned Standing
Counsel appearing for the State respondents
and perused the record.

2. Present petition has been filed
challenging the impugned order dated
28.2.2020 passed by the respondent no. 2District Supply Officer, Etawah whereby fair
price shop of the petitioner has been
cancelled.

3. The Stamp Reporter has reported
laches of 208 days in challenging the
impugned order.

4. It was submitted by learned counsel
for the petitioner is that the petitioner had
earlier approached this Court by filing a writ
petition being Writ-C No. 17151 of 2020
(Mamta Devi vs. State of UP and another),
which was dismissed with liberty to file fresh
petition vide order dated 7.12.2020. By
drawing attention to the Government Orders
dated 13.4.2017 and 6.9.2018, it was
submitted that the District Supply Officer is
required to obtain approval from the District
Magistrate before passing the impugned
order. It was submitted that the order of
suspension and cancellation can be passed by
him only after obtaining permission from the
District Magistrate. By drawing attention to
Government Order dated 6.9.2018, it was
submitted that in paragraph 3 (i) it has been
provided that the Sub Divisional Officer can
inspect
the
shop
but
for
suspension/cancellation of the fair price shop
he is required to submit his report to the
District
Magistrate
and
the
District
Magistrate may obtain opinion from the
District
Supply
Officer.
Submission,
therefore, is that the order passed by the
District Supply Officer without taking
permission from the District Magistrate is
without jurisdiction. Attention was also
drawn to paragraphs 7 and 17 of the
judgement of this Court passed in Writ-C No.
56555 of 2017 (Surendra Yadav vs. State of
UP and 2 others) decided on 1.10.2018
wherein in paragraph 7, the Government
Order dated 13.4.2017 has been considered
and it was noticed that it could not be pointed
out by the learned Standing Counsel that
before passing the order of suspension the
District Supply Officer had obtained written
permission from the District Magistrate and
therefore, it was held that suspension order
cannot be sustained.

5. Per contra, placing reliance on
paragraph 2(1) of Government Order dated
5.8.2019 it was submitted by the learned
Standing Counsel that the District Supply
278 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Officer has overall jurisdiction both urban
and rural and can pass orders including
suspension and cancellation. He submits
that powers of Sub Divisional Officer were
separately defined and therefore, the
District Supply Officer has the jurisdiction
over the entire district and for passing such
orders he is not required to take any
permission from the District Magistrate and
it is only the Sub Divisional Officer, who
has jurisdiction in rural area that too in his
Tehsil, is required to take written approval
from the District Magistrate.

6. I have considered the rival
submissions and perused the record.

7. For ready reference, paragraph 2(i)
of the Government Order dated 5.8.2019 is
quoted as under:

"2. mfpr nj nqdkuksa ds fo:)
dk;Zokgh&

1⁄411⁄2 ftyk iwfrZ vf/kdkjh dks lEiw.kZ ftys
ds 1⁄4ftles uxjh; ,oa xzkeh.k nksuksa {ks= lfEefyr
gksaxs1⁄2 yf{kr tu forj.k iz.kkyh ds lHkh nqdkuksa ds
fujh{k.k rFkk muds fo:) n.MkRed dk;Zokgh
1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k vkfn1⁄2 djus dk vf/kdkj
gksxkA xzkeh.k {ks= esa miftykf/kdkjh vius rglhy
vUrxZr lHkh nqdkuksa dk fujh{k.k rks dj ldsaxs]
fdUrq
fodzsrkvksa
ds
fo:)
n.MkRed
1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k ,oa cgkyh1⁄2 dk;Zokgh gsrq
viuh vk[;k ftykf/kdkjh dks izsf"kr djsaxsA
ftykf/kdkjh }kjk vko';drkuqlkj lEcfU/kr izdj.k
esa ftyk iwfRkZ vf/kdkjh ls foHkkxh; vfHker izkIr
fd;k tk;sxkA ftykf/kdkjh dk fyf[kr vkns'k izkIr
gksus ds mijkUr mi ftykf/kdkjh }kjk fodzsrkvksa ds
fo:) n.MkRed 1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k ,oa cgkyh1⁄2
dh dk;Zokgh djrs gq,] izJxr nqdku dh fLFkfr ds
lEcU/k esa vkWuykbu izfof"V vafdr dh tk;sxhA mi
ftykf/kdkjh }kjk izdj.k esa d`r dk;Zokgh dh ,d
izfr ftyk iwfrZ dk;kZy; dks vfuok;Z rkSj ij
miyC/k djk;h tk;sxh] rkfd mfpr nj fodszrkvksa
ds dk;Zjr gksus dh fLFkfr dks v|ru fd;k tk
ldsA" (Emphasis supplied)

8. It is not in dispute that the order
has been passed by the District Supply
Officer, Etawah. In Surendra Yadav
(supra),
Government
Order
dated
13.4.2017 only has been considered.
However, in the case of Arjun vs. State
of UP and others, 2018 (10) ADJ 450
after
considering
joint
reading
of
Government orders dated 17.8.2002,
30.9.2004 and 13.4.2017 this Court held
that the District Supply Officer is
competent
to
pass
such
orders,
paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 7 whereof
are quoted as under:

"1. The instant writ petition
challenges the order of cancellation
dated 14.8.2017. Initially the writ petition
was entertained as there was a confusion
as to whether the District Supply Officer
could have passed the impugned order.
Today the learned Standing Counsel has
produced the Government Order dated
17.8.2002 and has relied on Clause -12
which is being been reproduced herein
under :

"ftykiwfrZ vf/kdkjh dks ;g vf/kdkj
gksxk fd xzkeh.k {ks= dh nqdkuksa dk fujh{k.k rFkk
vfu;ferrk ik;s tkus ij nqdkunkjksa ds fo:)
n.MkRed dk;Zokgh dj ldrs gSAß

2. It shows that District Supply
Officer had the authority to inspect and
take disciplinary action against all fair
price shops in the vllages.

3.
The
learned
Standing
Counsel further placed reliance on a
Government
Order
dated
30.9.2004
which is also being reproduced herein
under:

"[kk| rFkk jln vuqHkkx&5 y[kuÅ%
fnukad 30 flrEcj] 2004
4 All. Smt. Mamta Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
279

fo"k; %& *xzkeh.k rFkk 'kgjh {ks=ksa dh
mfpr
nj
dh
nqdkuksa
ds
p;u]
fuyEcu@fujL=hdj.k ,oa

lEc)hdj.k ds lEcU/k esa izfdz;k dk
fu/kkZj.kA*

egksn;]

mi;qZDr
fo"k;d
'kklukns'k
la[;k&2714@29&6&2002&162 lk0@2001] fnukad
17
vxLr]
2002]
la[;k&2715@29&6&2002&162lk0@2001] fnukad 17
vxLr] 2002] la[;k

3577@29&6&03&8 1⁄41131⁄2@03] fnukad
22&10&2003 ,oa l[;k&2260@29&6&2004&300
lk0@2003] fnukad] 29 tqykbZ] 2004 rFkk le;≤ ij
tkjh vU; 'kklukns'kksa dh d`i;k lanHkZ xzg.k djasA

2& fofHkUu ftyksa }kjk 'kklu ls xzkeh.k
{ks= ,oa 'kgjh {ks= esa mfpr nj nqdkuksa ds
n.MkRed dk;Zokgh 1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k vkfn1⁄2
ds vf/kdkj dh fLFkfr Li"V djus ds lEcU/k esa
ekxZn'kZu dh vis{kk dh x;h gSA mDr ds izfjizs{; esa
eq>ls ;g dgus dh vis{kk dh x;h gS fd
ftykf/kdkjh rFkk ftykiwfrZ vf/kdkjh dks lEiw.kZ
ftys ds 1⁄4ftlesa uxjh; ,oa xzkeh.k nksuksa {ks=
lfEefyr gksaxs1⁄2 yf{kr tu forj.k iz.kkyh ds lHkh
nqdkuksa ds fujh{k.k rFkk muds fo:) n.MkRed
dk;Zokgh 1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k vkfn1⁄2 djus dk
vf/kdkj gksxkA mi ftykf/kdkjh dks vius rglhy
esa fLFkr lHkh nqdkuksa ds fujh{k.k rFkk muds fo:)
n.MkRed dk;Zokgh 1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k vkfn1⁄2
djus dk vf/kdkj ;Fkkor~ jgsxkA

3& mijksDr 'kklukns'k mDr lhek rd
la'kksf/kr le>s tk;sA

4. It shows a further authority
had been vested in the Sub-divisional
Officer to take action against the fair price
shop dealers. Thereafter, the learned
Standing Counsel drew the attention of the
Court to the Government Order dated
13.4.2017 which is being reproduced
herein under:

"fo"k; %& xzkeh.k ,oa 'kgjh {ks=ksa dh
mfpr nj dh nqdkuksa ds p;u] fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k
,oa

lEc)hdj.k ds lEcU/k esa izfdz;k dk
fu/kkZj.kA

egksn;]

mi;qZDr
fo"k;d
'kklukns'k
la[;k&3126@29&6&2004&300lk0@03Vhlh] fnukad
30-09-2004 dk d`i;k lUnHkZ xzg.k djus dk d"V djsa]
ftlesa lkoZtfud forj.k iz.kkyh dh lHkh nqdkuksa ds
fujh{k.k
vkSj
muds
fo:)
n.MkRed
1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k1⁄2
dk;Zokgh
dk
vf/kdkj
ftykf/kdkjh@ftyk iwfrZ vf/kdkjh dks Hkh iznku fd;k
x;k gSA fofHkUu lzksrksa ls 'kklu ds laKku esa ;g ckr
yk;h tk jgh gS fd ,d gh fcUnq ij dk;Zokgh ftyk
iwfrZ vf/kdkjh@mi ftykf/kdkjh vFkok ftykf/kdkjh
dks dk;Zokgh dk vf/kdkj iznku dj fn;k x;k gS]
tcfd lkoZtfud forj.k iz.kkyh ds lqpk: lapkyu
dk nkf;Ro lEcfU/kr ftykf/kdkfj;ksa dks lkSaik x;k gSA

2& vr% mDr 'kklukns'k esa vkaf'kd
la'kks/ku djrs gq, bl lEcU/k esa eq>s ;g dgus dk
funs'k gqvk gS fd mi ftykf/kdkjh vius rglhy esa
fLFkfr lHkh nqdkuksa dk fujh{k.k rks dj ldrs gSa] fdUrq
muds fo:) n.MkRed 1⁄4fuyEcu@fujLrhdj.k1⁄2 ,oa
cgky dh dk;Zokgh ftyk iwfrZ vf/kdkjh ds ek/;e ls
i=koyh ij ftykf/kdkjh dh fyf[kr vuqefr izkIr
djus ds mijkUr gh djsaxsA

3 mDr 'kklukns'k fnukad 30&09&2004
dks bl lhek rd la'kksf/kr le>k tk;A

6. It has been provided in this
Government Order that the records of the
case would go to the District Magistrate
through the District Supply Officer. A joint
reading of the three Government Orders
dated 17.8.2002, 30.9.2004 and 13.4.2017
makes it clear that the District Supply
Officer has, in a given district, powers to
take action against the fair price shop
dealers. Additionally, the Sub-divisional
Officer has also been given powers under
the Government Order dated 30.9.2004 but
280 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the same has been curtailed by the
Government Order dated 13.4.2017 and the
Sub-divisional Officer, though can take
action, can do so only after the approval of
the District Magistrate.

7. Under such circumstances, the
impugned order which has been passed by
the District Supply Officer could have very
well been passed by him. It was well within
the jurisdiction of the District Supply
Officer to pass the orders."
 (Emphasis supplied)

9. A reference may also be made to the
definition
of
competent
authority
as
provided in clause 2 (j) and clause 8 (7) of
the Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities
(Regulation of Sale and Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 (hereinafter referred
to the 'Control Order, 2016'), which are
quoted as under:

"2. Definitions.-

(a) .....

(j) "Competent Authority" means
Collector and includes Additional District
Magistrate (Civil supplies), District Supply
Officer and Sub Divisional Magistrate or
Area Rationing Officer;

8. Operation of fair price shops.

(1) ....

(7) The Competent Authority
shall take prompt action in respect of
violation of any condition of license
including any irregularity committed by the
fair price shop owner, which may include
suspension or cancellation of the fair price
shop owner's license." (Emphasis supplied)

10. Clearly, the District Supply Officer
is also the Competent Authority as
provided in the Control Order, 2016.
Clause 8 (7) of the Control Order, 2016
clearly provides that Competent Authority
shall take prompt action in respect of
violation of any condition of license
including any irregularity committed by the
fair price shop owner, which may include
suspension or cancellation of the fair price
shop licence. It is, therefore, clear that the
District Supply Officer is the competent
officer to take prompt action under Clause
8 (7) of the Control Order, 2016. Now this
position has been clarified in categorical
terms by paragraph 2 (I) of the Government
Order dated 5.8.2019 quoted above, which
clearly provides that the District Supply
Officer has overall jurisdiction over the
entire district, which include both, the
urban and the rural area. It is only in
respect of the powers to be exercised by the
Sub Divisional Officer in respect of shops
situated in the rural area falling in his
Tehsil, before passing
the order of
suspension or cancellation he is required to
submit his report to the District Magistrate,
who, in turn, if so desire, may seek opinion
of the District Supply Officer and it is after
obtaining the written approval from the
District Magistrate, the Sub Divisional
Officer can pass the orders. Thus, it is clear
that the powers of District Supply Officer
to pass suspension and cancellation order in
the given entire district are unfettered and
he is not required to take prior approval of
the District Magistrate as is in the case of
Sub Divisional Officer, whose jurisdiction
is limited to the shops situated in the rural
area in his Tehsil only.

11. In Surendra Yadav (supra)
decided on 1.10.2018 judgement of Arjun
(supra) decided on 1.12.2017 has not been
considered.

12. In any case, in the Government
Order
dated
5.8.2019
the
authority,
4 All. Ali Mohammad & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
281
jurisdiction and competence of the District
Supply Officer has been clarified in
absolute terms to the effect that he has
jurisdiction to pass order of suspension or
cancellation in respect of the entire given
district.

13. In such view of the matter, I do
not find any force in the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
order passed by the District Supply Officer
is without jurisdiction.

14. On this count, this petition is
devoid of merit and is accordingly
dismissed. No other grounds are pressed
before this Court.

15. The petitioner is, however, at
liberty to challenge the order by filing
statutory appeal, if he so desires.

16. No order as to costs.
----------
(2021)04ILR A281
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 18.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIKAS KUNVAR SRIVASTAV, J.

U/S 482/378/407 No. 1367 of 2021

Ali Mohammad & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Devendra Pratap

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973- Section 482 - Quashing
of criminal proceedings under Sections
323, 504, 308, 325 I.P.C on basis of
Compromise
-
Non-
Compoundable
offence- The offence under Section 308
I.P.C. is with regard to the attempt to
commit
culpable
homicide.
The
said
Section of 308 I.P.C. is not compoundable
offence either with or without leave of the
court- None of the offences are heinous
offence affecting public at large, the
parties being members of the family- They
have no other criminal case between
them, therefore, they are entitled to live
peacefully as family members in the
society- The inherent power may be
exercised in different ways to achieve its
ultimate objective. Formation of opinion
by the High Court before it exercises
inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
on either of the twin objectives (i) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court
or (ii) to secure the ends of justice, is a
sine qua non.

It is settled law that the power u/s 482 Cr.Pc
can be exercised to quash the criminal
proceedings
even
in
non-compoundable
offences where the offence arises out of a
family dispute, is not heinous and is private and
personal in nature, not effecting public life, and
the parties have amicably arrived
at a
compromise
rendering
the
possibility
of
conviction remote.( Para 11, 12, 13)

Criminal Application accordingly allowed.
(E-2)

Judgements/ Case law relied upon: -

1. Gyan Singh Vs St. of Punj. & anr. (2012) 10
SCC 303

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vikas Kunvar
Srivastav, J.)

 1. The case is called out.