# Smt. Mamta Srivastava v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2016) 1 ILRA 192
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-02-15
- **Case number:** Service Bench No. 1185 of 2014
- **Bench:** Shri Narayan Shukla, Rakesh Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-mamta-srivastava-v-state-of-u-p-anr-43404
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Act 2009-Section 2(b)-U.P. Act no. 4 of 1993by amending original Act for first time on
20.08.99-married
grand
daughter
also
include-petitioner
being
married
grand
daughter of freedom fighter-participated in
competitive examination in U.P. Subordinate
Services-in
pursuance
of
advertisement
15.12.94-seeking benefits of amended Actpetition challenging enactment 1993 being
discriminatory between daughter and grand
daughter-whether such amended provisionapplicable prospectively or retrospectively ?-
held-being purely new legislation without
1 All. Smt. Mamta Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
193
explanatory
effect-can
not
be
said
retrospective unless otherwise providedpetition dismissed.
Held: Para-19 & 20

## Text

192
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
7.
There has been a clear failure on
the part of the authorities to enforce their
statutory powers including the power which
has been conferred upon the Director under
Section 17(3) of the Act. Under Section
17(2), the Director is empowered to direct
the management to appoint the selected
candidate and to pay him salary from the
date specified in the order. The salary is
recoverable as arrears of land revenue from
the property belonging to or vested in the
institution under sub-section (3) of Section
17. These statutory powers have been
conferred for a salutary public purpose.
Failure to comply with a direction under
Section 17 is a criminal offence under
Section 22 of the Act. The Director was
obligated, upon being informed by the
appellant, to have taken recourse to the
provisions of Section 17(3) of the Act by
issuing a direction to the Management of
the College to pay arrears of salary and then
proceeding to recover them as arrears of
land revenue through the Collector. The
appellant cannot be blamed for the failure of
the statutory authorities to comply with their
provisions. The conduct of the Management
in obtaining an injunction in a proceeding to
which
the
appellant
was
not
even
impleaded, speaks volumes of the manner
in which the rights of a duly selected
candidate have been defeated for no fault of
his.
8. In these circumstances, we are of
the view that the judgment of the learned
Single Judge granting to the appellant
relief only of the arrears of salary from 30
June 2006 would not sub-serve the ends
of justice. We clarify that this part of the
direction is not set aside as such.
However, on the wider claim of the
appellant, we direct that the Director of
Education shall, within a period of three
months from the receipt of a certified
copy of this order, carry out an enquiry
under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section
17 and issue appropriate directions for the
disbursal of salary to the appellant. The
Director shall scrutinize all facts after due
notice both to the appellant and to the
Management. The retiral dues of the
appellant shall thereupon be computed on
the basis of the directions so issued.
9. The special appeal is allowed in
these terms. There shall be no order as to
costs.
-------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 15.02.2016
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SHRI NARAYAN SHUKLA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAKESH SRIVASTAVA, J.
Service Bench No. 1185 of 2014
Smt. Mamta Srivastava
...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Dr. Lalta Prasad Mishra, Prafulla Tiwari
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Rajnish Kumar
Uttar Pradesh Public Services (Reservation
for physically handicapped, dependents of
freedom fighters & Ex-Serviceman)(Amendment)
Act 2009-Section 2(b)-U.P. Act no. 4 of 1993by amending original Act for first time on
20.08.99-married
grand
daughter
also
include-petitioner
being
married
grand
daughter of freedom fighter-participated in
competitive examination in U.P. Subordinate
Services-in
pursuance
of
advertisement
15.12.94-seeking benefits of amended Actpetition challenging enactment 1993 being
discriminatory between daughter and grand
daughter-whether such amended provisionapplicable prospectively or retrospectively ?-
held-being purely new legislation without
1 All. Smt. Mamta Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
193
explanatory
effect-can
not
be
said
retrospective unless otherwise providedpetition dismissed.
Held: Para-19 & 20
19. The purpose of statement of objects
and reasons as has been discussed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Utkal Contractions and Joinery (P) Ltd.
(Supra) is very limited to understand the
background and the antecedent state of
affairs leading up to the legislation. It
shows the intention of the legislation to
amend the Act. The object is very clear
as the statement of objects and reasons
states that the impugned amendment
was made to remove the discrimination
between daughter and grand daughter.
It is purely a substantive amendment,
which
cannot
be
said
to
be
a
retrospective unless the Act provide so,
whereas in this case no such provision is
provided
under
the
Act
that
the
amendment
in
question
shall
have
retrospective force.
20. In view of the aforesaid submissions,
we are of the view that the impugned
amendment of 2009 is prospective in
nature and it does not apply from the date
of substantive enactment of the Act 1993.
In the result the writ petition stands
dismissed.
Case Law discussed:
(2004) 8 SCC; (2001) 8 SCC 24; (2015) 1 SCC;
(1985) 1 SCC 591; 1987 (Supp) SCC 751; AIR
1963 SC 1241.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Shri Narayan
Shukla, J.)
1. Heard Dr.L.P.Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioner as well as
Mr.Vivek
Kumar
Shukla,
learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel.
2.
The petitioner had claimed her
candidature for selection in U.P. Upper
Subordinate Services notified through the
advertisement dated 15.12.1994 under the
quota reserved for the dependents of freedom
fighters. The petitioner's grand father Shri Brij
Nath Prasad Srivastava was a freedom fighter.
Earlier her name was not enlisted amongst the
successful candidates, but later on, on the
basis of recommendation done by the
Commission, her name was recommended for
appointment on the post of Assistant
Accounts Officer. Since she could not submit
the requisite certificate of dependent of
freedom fighter in the prescribed proforma, a
letter was issued by the U.P.State Public
Service Commission (in short Commission)
on 26.4.1999, whereby the petitioner was
required to submit a requisite certificate, she
submitted
the
said
certificate
to
the
Commission. However, vide letter dated
2.7.1999 issued by the Secretary of the
Commission the petitioner's candidature was
rejected on the ground that in her application
the petitioner had mentioned that she was
married, whereas the benefit provided under
the U.P. Public Services (Reservation for
Physically
handicapped,
dependents
of
freedom fighters and ex-servicemen) Act,
1993 (in short Act 1993) was not available to
the married men/women.
3.
Aggrieved petitioner submitted a
representation to the Secretary of the
Commission stating therein that at the time
of submission of application pursuant to the
advertisement
dated
15.12.1994
the
petitioner was not married, therefore, in her
application against the Coloumn of marital
status she marked as 'unmarried'. Later on
she got married on 20.1.1995. The Secretary
of the Commission rejected the petitioner's
representation vide order dated 16.11.1999.
The petitioner had instituted a writ petition
being writ petition No.2024 (SB) of 1999, in
which the petitioner had challenged the order
dated 2.7.1999 as well as 16.11.1999, passed
by
the
Commissioner
rejecting
the
petitioner's representation.
194
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. Section 2(b) of the Act 1993
defines
the
word
'dependents'
with
reference to a freedom fighter as follows:-
(i) Son and daughter (married or
unmarried) of freedom fighter.
(ii)Grand-son (son of a son) and
unmarried grant-daughter (daughter of a
son) of freedom fighter.
5. The relationship between the
petitioner and her grand-father is not
disputed. Thus she is a grand-daughter of
Shri Brij Nath Prasad Srivastava, who had
been declared as a freedom fighter. The
provisions of Section 2(b) of the Act 1993
being discriminatory were amended and a
married-grand daughter was included
within the definition of 'dependents' of
freedom fighters, therefore, the writ
petition was dismissed as having become
infructuous.
6. Since the married grand-daughter
of the freedom fighter was included
within the definition of dependents of
freedom fighters, the State Government
took a decision vide letter dated 12 April
2010 to appoint her on the post of
Assistant Accounts Officer, however, no
appointment order was issued, therefore,
she submitted a representation dated
30.5.2014 before the State Government to
appoint her on the post of Assistant
Accounts Officer, but has failed to get an
appointment.
7.
Dr.L.P.Mishra, learned counsel for
the petitioner drew attention of this Court
towards the statement of objects and reasons
of amendment introduced in the Uttar
Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for
Physically Handicapped, Dependents of
Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen)
(Amendment) Act, 2009 notified on 20
August 2009 and submitted that since the
purpose of amendment was to remove the
discrimination between the daughter and
grand-daughter
the
State
Government
decided to amend the said Act to include the
married grand-daughter of a freedom fighter
in the said definition of word 'dependents'.
He vehemently submitted that in case of
daughter of the freedom fighter married or
unmarried both had been included to be
dependents of the freedom fighter, but in
case of grand daughter only the unmarried
grand daughter was defined to be dependent
of the freedom fighter. The statement of
objects and reasons of the amendment Act
2009 is extracted below:-
"Statement of Objects and Reason.-
The
Uttar
Pradesh
Public
Services
(Reservation for Physically Handicapped,
Dependents of Freedom Fighters and ExServiceman) Act, 1993 (U.P. Act No.4 of
1993) has been enacted to provide for the
reservation
of
posts
in
favour
of
physically handicapped, dependents of
freedom fighters and ex-servicemen.
Clause (b) of Section 2 of the said Act
defines
the
word
"dependent".
In
accordance with the said definition son
and daughter (married or unmarried) and
grand son and unmarried grand daughter
were the dependents of a freedom fighter.
In order to remove the discrimination
between daughter and grand daughter it
was decided to amend the said Act to
include the married grand daughter of a
freedom fighter in the said definition of
the word "dependent".
8. The amended provision of Section
2 of the Act 1993 is reproduced
hereunder:-
"2. Amendment of Section 2 of U.P.Act
No.4 of 1993.- In Section 2 of the Uttar
1 All. Smt. Mamta Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
195
Pradesh Public Services (Reservation for
Physically Handicapped, Dependents of
Freedom Fighters and Ex-Servicemen) Act,
1993, hereinafter referred to as the principal
Act, in clause (b) in sub-clause (ii) for the
words "unmarried grand daughter (daughter
of a son)" the words "grand daughter
(daughter of a son) (married or unmarried)"
shall be substituted."
9. In the present case the main facet of
problem is the date of application of the said
amendment published in the Gazette on 20
August 2009. Dr.Mishra has contended that
since the purpose of amendment was to
remove the discrimination between the
daughter and grand daughter and once the
grand daughter has been put at par with the
daughter
(married
or
unmarried)
this
amendment has to be given effect to from the
date of incorporation of the Act 1993. He
further tried to fortify his argument with the
contentions that the amendment is purely
clarificatory in nature, therefore, it becomes
applicable from the previous date of
enforcement of the Act 1993. In support of
his submission he cited the following
decisions:-
(1) Zile Singh versus State of
Haryana and others reported in (2004) 8
SCC, relevant paragraphs 16 and 19 of the
same are reproduced hereunder:-
"16. Where a statute is passed for the
purpose of supplying an obvious omission in
a former statute or to "explain" a former
statute, the subsequent statute has relation
back to the time when the prior Act was
passed. The rule against retrospectivity is
inapplicable to such legislations as are
explanatory and declaratory in nature. A
classic illustration is the case of Attorney
General v. Pougett (1816) 2 Price 381:146
ER 130 (Price at p.392). By a Customs Act
of 1873 (53 Geo.3), c.33) a duty was
imposed upon hides of 9s 4d, but the Act
omitted to state that it was to be 9s 4d per
ewt., and to remedy this omission another
Customs Act (53 Geo.3, c.105) was passed
later in the same year. Between the passing
of these two Acts some hides were exported,
and it was contended that they were not
liable to pay the duty of 9s 4d per ewt., but
Thomson, C.B., in giving judgment for the
Attorney General, said: (DR p.134).
"The duty in this instance was, in
fact, imposed by the first Act; but the
gross mistake of the omission of the
weight, for which the sum expressed was
to have been payable, occasioned the
amendment made by the subsequent Act;
but that had reference to the former
statute as soon as it passed, and they must
be taken together as if they were one and
the same Act;" (Price at p.392).
(2) Shyam Sunder and others versus
Ram Kumar and another, reported in
(2001) 8 SCC 24, relevant paragraphs 39
and 40 of the same are reproduced
hereunder:-
"39. Lastly, it was contended on behalf
of the appellants that the amending Act
whereby new Section 15 of the Act has been
substituted is declaratory and, therefore, has
retroactive operation. Ordinarily when an
enactment declares the previous law, it
requires to be given retroactive effect. The
function of a declaratory statute is to supply
an omission or to explain a previous statute
and when such an Act is passed, it comes
into effect when the previous enactment was
passed. The legislative power to enact law
includes the power to declare what was the
previous law and when such a declaratory
Act is passed, invariably it has been held to
be retrospective. Mere absence of use of the
word "declration" in an Act explaining what
was the law before may not appear to be a
declaratory Act but if the court finds an Act
as declaratory or explanatory, it has to be
196
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
construed as retrospective. Conversely where
a statute uses the word "declaratory", the
words so used may not be sufficient to hold
that the statute is a declaratory Act as words
may be used in order to bring into effect new
law.
40. Cries on Statute Law, 7th Edn.
stated the statement of law thus: "If a
doubt is felt as to what the common law is
on some particular subject, and an Act is
passed to explain and declare the common
law, such an Act is called a declaratory
Act."
(3) Commissioner of Income Tax
(Central)-I, New Delhi versus Vatika
Township Private Limited, reported in
(2015) 1 SCC, relevant paragraph 32 of
which is reproduced hereunder:-
"32.Let us sharpen the discussion a
little more. We may note that under
certain
circumstances,
a
particular
amendment can be treated as clarificatory
or declaratory in nature. Such statutory
provisions are labelled as "declaratory
statutes". The circumstances under which
provisions can be termed as "declaratory
statutes"
are
explained
by
Justice
G.P.Singh
Principles
of
Statutory
Interpretation, (13th Edn., Lexis Nexis
Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2012) in
the following manner:
"Declaratory statutes
The
presumption
against
retrospective operation is not applicable
to declaratory statutes. As stated in
CRAIES and approved by the Supreme
Court: 'For modern purposes a declaratory
Act may be defined as an Act to remove
doubts existing as to the common law, or
the meaning or effect of any statute. Such
Acts are usually held to be retrospective.
The usual reason for passing a declaratory
Act is to set aside what Parliament deems
to have been a judicial error, whether in
the statement of the common law or in the
interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not
invariably, such an Act contains a
Preamble, and also the word "declared" as
well as the word "enacted". But the use of
the words 'it is declared' is not conclusive
that the Act is declaratory for these words
may, at times, be used to introduce new
rules of law and the Act in the latter case
will only be amending the law and will
not necessarily be retrospective. In
determining, therefore, the nature of the
Act, regard must be had to be substance
rather than to the form. If a new Act is 'to
explain' an earlier Act, it would be
without
object
unless
construed
retrospective. An explanatory Act is
generally passed to supply an obvious
omission or to clear up doubts as to the
meaning of the previous Act. It is well
settled that if a statute is curative or
merely declaratory of the previous law
retrospective
operation
is
generally
intended. The language 'shall be deemed
always to have meant' is declaratory, and
is in plain terms retrospective. In the
absence of clear words indicating that the
amending Act is declaratory it would not
be so construed when the pre-amended
provision was clear and unambiguous. An
amending Act may be purely clarificatory
to clear a meaning of a provision of the
principal Act which was already implicit.
A clarificatory amendment of this nature
will
have
retrospective
effect
and,
therefore, if the principal Act was existing
law which the Constitution came into
force, the amending Act also will be part
of the existing law."
The above summing up is factually
based on the judgments of this Court as
well as English decisions."
10. In view of the
principles
propounded above, the learned counsel
1 All. Smt. Mamta Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
197
for the petitioner has submitted that the
amendment made in the Act 1993 is
purely declaratory as it declares that
through the amendment 2009 the married
grand-daughter shall also be included in
the
definition
of
'dependent',
this
amendment shall came into force from the
date of enactment of the Act itself.
Therefore, the petitioner's candidature,
which was considered for appointment on
the post of Assistant Accounts Officer
being 'dependent' of her grand-father a
freedom fighter cannot be rejected.
11.
Per contra Mr.Vivek Kumar
Shukla, learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel contended that the statement of
objects and reasons of the amendment Act
2009 itself speaks that in order to remove the
discrimination between daughter and granddaughter Section 2 of the Act 1993 was
amended to include the married grand
daughter of a freedom fighter in the
definition of word 'dependent'. Since in the
case of daughter, the Act has covered both
married and unmarried daughter, whereas in
the case of grand-daughter only unmarried
grand daughter was included in the definition
of 'dependent' of freedom fighter, the
legislatures felt that non inclusion of married
grand daughter of a freedom fighter appears
to be discriminatory, therefore, it legislated a
law to include the married grand daughter
also in the definition of 'dependents' of
freedom fighters. There was no ambiguity in
the provisions of the Act, which had required
clarification of the Act by way of legislation
nor have the provisions of the Act stated
clearly that the amendment in question is in a
declaratory form, rather the provisions of the
Act are very clear. Earlier only unmarried
grand daughter was included in the definition
of 'dependents' of freedom fighter and now
married grand daughter of the freedom
fighter has also been included in the
definition of 'dependents'. The reasons
assigned in the statement of objects and
reasons of amendment that Section 2 of the
Act 1993 has been amended in order to
remove the discrimination between the
daughter and grand daughter does not mean
that there was ambiguity in the legislation,
which has been clarified by way of
amendment. The intention of the legislation
to include married grand daughter is very
much
obvious
i.e.
to
remove
the
discrimination between two, therefore, it
cannot be said that the amendment in the Act
being declaratory in nature shall become
effective from the date of original enactment
of the Act 1993.
12. Without disputing the proposition
of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, he submitted that definitely the
clarification being explanatory/clarificatory
will have the retrospective effect. He has
urged that in this case the nature of
amendment in question is not an explanatory
or clarificatory, but by way of legislation the
married grand daughter has been included in
the definition of 'dependents' it is completely
a substantive amendment in the Act, 1993.
13. He cited a case of S.Sundaram
Pillai and others versus V.R.Pattabiraman
and others, reported in (1985) 1 SCC 591.
The Bench consisting of three Hon'ble
Judges had considered the impact of
explanation and had held that it is now
well settled that an Explanation added to a
statutory provision is not a substantive
provision in any sense of the term. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court considering the
various aspects of the explanation and
observed as under:-
" (a) The object of an Explanation is
to understand the Act in the light of the
explanation.
198
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(b) It does not ordinarily enlarge the
scope of the original section which it
explains, but only makes the meaning
clear beyond dispute."
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
summed up its consideration in the
following manner:-
"53. Thus, from a conspectus of the
authorities referred to above, it is manifest
that the object of an Explanation to a
statutory provision is-
(a) to explain the meaning and
intendment of the Act itself,
(b) where there is any obscurity or
vagueness in the main enactment, to
clarify the same so as to make it
consistent with the dominant object which
it seems to subserve,
(c) to provide an additional support
to the dominant object of the Act in order
to make it meaningful and purposeful,
(d) an Explanation cannot in any way
interfere with or change the enactment or
any part thereof but where some gap is
left which is relevant for the purpose of
the Explanation, in order to suppress the
mischief and advance the object of the
Act it can help or assist the Court in
interpreting
the
true
purport
and
intendment of the enactment, and
(e) it cannot, however, take away a
statutory right with which any person
under a statute has been clothed or set at
naught the working or an Act by
becoming
an
hindrance
in
the
interpretation of the same."
15. He further cited a decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case
of M/s. Utkal Contractors and Joinery (P)
Ltd. and others versus State of Orissa,
reported in 1987 (Supp) SCC 751, in which
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the
scope of statement of objects and reasons of
the Act. The Supreme Court held that the
authority of a statutory notification cannot be
judged merely on the basis of statement of
objects and reasons accompanying the bill.
The Supreme Court further referred its
another decision rendered in the case of State
of West Bengal v. Union of India, reported in
AIR 1963 SC 1241, in which it had held
that:-
"It is however well settled that the
Statement
of
Objects
and
Reasons
accompanying a Bill, when introduced in
Parliament, cannot be used to determine the
true meaning and effect of substantive
provisions of the statute. They cannot be
used except for the limited purpose of
understanding the background and the
antecedent state of affairs leading up to the
legislation. But we cannot use this statement
as an aid to the construction of the enactment
or to show that the legislature did not intend
to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the
State or in any way to affect the State
Governments' rights as owner of minerals. A
statute, as passed by Parliament, is the
expression of the collective intention of the
legislature as a whole, and any statement
made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of
the intention and objects of the Act cannot be
used to cut down the generality of the words
used in the statute."
16. Regard being had to the
aforesaid submissions, we proceed to
decide the core issue involved in the
matter, whether the amended Act 2009
including the married grand-daughter in
the definition of 'dependent' shall have a
retrospective
effect?
1 All. Smt. Ram Sawari Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
199
17.
The statement of objects and
reasons accompanying with the amendment
Act 2009 speaks that the said amendment has
been brought into the Act to remove the
discrimination between the daughter and
grand-daughter. The purpose of amendment
is obvious as earlier the married daughter
was included in the definition of 'dependents'
of freedom fighter. Whereas in case of grand
daughter only unmarried grand daughter was
included in the definition of 'dependents' of
freedom fighter. It appears that legislatures
thought it discriminatory between the two
and by amending the Act 1993, they had
included the married grand-daughter also in
the definition of 'dependents' of freedom
fighters. It is purely new legislation without
having any explanatory effect of any
provision available under the Act.
18. The scope of explanation has
been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in paragraph 53 of its judgment
rendered in the case of S.Sundaram Pillai
and others (Supra), in which the Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
has
held
that
the
explanation cannot in any way interfere
with or change the enactment, rather it
assists the Court in interpreting the true
purport and intendment of the enactment.
19.
The purpose of statement of
objects and reasons as has been discussed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Utkal Contractions and Joinery (P) Ltd.
(Supra) is very limited to understand the
background and the antecedent state of
affairs leading up to the legislation. It
shows the intention of the legislation to
amend the Act. The object is very clear as
the statement of objects and reasons states
that the impugned amendment was made
to remove the discrimination between
daughter and grand daughter. It is purely a
substantive amendment, which cannot be
said to be a retrospective unless the Act
provide so, whereas in this case no such
provision is provided under the Act that
the amendment in question shall have
retrospective force.
20. In view of the aforesaid
submissions, we are of the view that the
impugned
amendment
of
2009
is
prospective in nature and it does not apply
from the date of substantive enactment of
the Act 1993. In the result the writ
petition stands dismissed.
-------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.01.2016
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.
Writ-C No. 1191 of 2016
Smt. Ram Sawari Devi & Ors. Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Aditya Kumar Singh
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Constitution
of
India,
Art.-226Opportunity of hearing-when requiredorder
entailing
Civil
consequenceopportunity of hearing must-petitioner
being Pradhan of village in question and
beneficiary
of
BPL
Card
holder-by
impugned order recovery sought to be
made-without opportunity of hearingheld-illegal-quashed.
Held: Para-12
Learned standing counsel has not been
able to demonstrate from the perusal of
recovery certificate that anywhere the
version of the petitioners has been
considered. It is settled law that any