# Smt. Manju & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2021) 3 ILRA 422
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-02-08
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 2695 of 2021
- **Bench:** Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-manju-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-46892
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973-Section 482 & Indian
Penal Code, 1860-Sections 498-A, 304-B &
3⁄4 D.P. Act,1961-discharge applicationrejection-deceased
committed
suicidethough the applicants are sister-in-law
and brother-in-law of the deceased but
evidence regarding the presence of the
accused at the time of incident cannot be
evaluated at the stage of framing charge-
accused can be discharged only when the
charge is groundless. (Para 1 to 22)

B. It is well settled that at the stage of
charge the court is not required to
consider pros and cons of the case.
Marshalling and appreciation of evidence
is not in the domain of the court at that
point of time. What is required from the
court is to sift and weigh the materials for
the limited purpose whether or not a
prima facie case for framing a charge
against the accused has been made out.
(Para 5 to 21)

The Application is rejected. (E-5)
List of Cases cited: -

## Text

422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13.

The
application
stands
accordingly dismissed.
----------
(2021)03ILR A422
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 2695 of 2021

Smt. Manju & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Amit Daga

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973-Section 482 & Indian
Penal Code, 1860-Sections 498-A, 304-B &
3⁄4 D.P. Act,1961-discharge applicationrejection-deceased
committed
suicidethough the applicants are sister-in-law
and brother-in-law of the deceased but
evidence regarding the presence of the
accused at the time of incident cannot be
evaluated at the stage of framing charge-
accused can be discharged only when the
charge is groundless. (Para 1 to 22)

B. It is well settled that at the stage of
charge the court is not required to
consider pros and cons of the case.
Marshalling and appreciation of evidence
is not in the domain of the court at that
point of time. What is required from the
court is to sift and weigh the materials for
the limited purpose whether or not a
prima facie case for framing a charge
against the accused has been made out.
(Para 5 to 21)

The Application is rejected. (E-5)
List of Cases cited: -

1. K. Subba Rao & ors. Vs St. of Telangana,
(2018) 14 SC 452

2. Kans Raj Vs St. of Punj., (2000) 5 SCC 207

3. St. of Bih. Vs Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39

4. W.B. Vs Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1980) AIR SC 52

5. St. of Bih. Vs Ramesh Singh, (1977) AIR SC
2018

6. Palwinder Singh Vs Balvinder Singh, (2009)
AIR SC 887

7. St. Of Ori. Vs Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1
SCC 568

8. Sanghi Bros. (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. Vs Sanjay
Chaudhary (2009) AIR SC 9

9. R.P. Kapur Vs St. of Punj. (1960) AIR SC 866

10. St. of Har. Vs Bhajan Lal, (1992) SCC (Cr.)
426

11. Vijayan Vs St. of Ker. & anr. (2010) 2 SCC
398

12. M.E. Shivalingamurthy Vs C.B.I., Bengaluru,
(2020) 1 Supreme 169

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Manju Rani
Chauhan, J.)

1. Heard Sri Amit Daga, learned
counsel for the applicants and learned
A.G.A. for the State.

2. This application u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
has been filed against the orders dated
20.01.2020 and 06.02.2020 passed by
learned Additional District & Sessions
Judge (F.T.C.), constituted under the 14th
Financial Commission, Jhansi in Sessions
Trial No. 281 of 2019, (State of U.P. Vs.
Arvind Kushwaha and others), under
Sections 498A, 304B I.P.C. and Section 3/4
3 All. Smt. Manju & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
423
D.P. Act, Police Station Kotwali, District
Jhansi, (arising out of Case Crime No. 281
of 2019).

3. Brief facts of the case are that the
marriage of daughter of informant was
solemnized with Arvind (brother of applicant
no. 1) on 27.06.2018 according to Hindu Rites
and Rituals. The informant had given dowry as
per his capacity, but the applicants along with
other family members were harassing the
deceased Poonam for non-fulfillment of
additional dowry demand. On 17.05.2019, at
about 06:00 p.m., informant's daughter Neha
received a phone call from Arvind (husband of
the deceased) on which information was given
that her sister Poonam had committed suicide
by hanging herself and she was admitted in the
hospital. On receiving such an information,
when the family members of the deceased
reached the hospital, they found that Poonam
had already expired. Therefore, an F.I.R. was
lodged on 17.05.2019 against 8 persons who
are husband as well as other family members
alleging therein that the accused persons
namely, Arvind, Ramesh Chandra, Savitri
Devi, Smt. Manju, Smt. Vinita, Kumari Arti,
Govind and Ravi has done to death informant's
daughter. After lodging of the F.I.R., inquest
proceedings were conducted and post-mortem
was also conducted.

4. When the matter was investigated,
statements of the informant and his son Rahul
were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The
statements of other persons like Smt. Geeta
Devi, Kumari Neha, Jitendra Kumar Dwivedi,
Neeraj Kushwaha and Ravi Kushwaha was also
recorded. After recording the statements of
other witnesses of Panchayatnama, charge sheet
had been submitted against accused persons on
01.07.2019.

5. It has been submitted by learned
counsel for applicants that applicant no. 1
and applicant no. 3 who are sister-in-law of
the deceased was married way back in the
year 1998 and 2011 respectively and are
living separately. Therefore, there was no
occasion of roping them with vague and
general allegations in the F.I.R. which has
been lodged by the informant. Since, the
investigating agency without collecting any
credible and convincing material had
submitted a charge sheet against the
applicants,
therefore,
a
discharge
application dated 02.01.2020 was moved
and the same has been rejected vide order
dated 20.01.2020, without marshelling and
evaluating the material collected by the
investigating agency. Learned counsel for
the applicants submits that discharge
application has been rejected in a casual
manner without seeing that the material
collected by the Investigating Officer does
not show the involvement of the applicants
in the incident which led to death of the
deceased.

6. Learned counsel for the applicants
has placed reliance upon the judgments of
the Apex Court passed in the case of K.
Subba Rao and others Vs. State of
Telangana reported in (2018) 14 SCC 452,
wherein, it has been stated that court should
be careful in proceeding against the distant
relatives
in
crimes
pertaining
to
matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths.
The relatives of the husband should not be
roped in on the basis of omnibus
allegations unless specific instances of their
involvement in the crime are made out.

7. He has also placed reliance on the
judgement of the Apex Court passed in the
case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab
reported in (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein, it
has been stated that for the fault of the
husband, the in-laws or the other relations
cannot, in all cases, be held to be involved
424 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in the demand of dowry. In cases where
such accusations are made, the overt acts
are attributed to persons other than the
husband are required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.

8. All the contentions raised by the
learned counsel for the applicants relate to
disputed questions of fact. The court has also
been called upon to adjudge the testimonial
worth of prosecution evidence and evaluate
the same on the basis of various intricacies of
factual details which have been touched upon
by the learned counsel. The veracity and
credibility of material furnished on behalf of
the prosecution has been questioned and false
implication has been pleaded.

9. Per contra, learned A.G.A. for the
State has opposed the contention raised by
the learned counsel for the applicants and
states that there is no illegality or infirmity in
the orders dated 20.01.2020 and 06.02.2020.
It has been next submitted that the orders
dated 20.01.2020 and 06.02.2020 has been
rightly rejected by the concerned court below.

10. Before proceeding to adjudge the
validity of the impugned orders it may be
useful to cast a fleeting glance to some of the
representative cases decided by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court which have expatiated upon
the legal approach to be adopted at the time
of framing of the charge or at the time of
deciding whether the accused ought to be
discharged. It shall be advantageous to refer
to the observations made by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar vs.
Ramesh Singh 1977 (4) SCC 39 which are
as follows :-

"4. Under S. 226 of the Code
while opening the case for the prosecution
the prosecutor has got to describe the
charge against the accused and State by
what evidence he proposes to prove the
guilt of the accused. Thereafter, comes at
the initial stage, the duty of the Court to
consider the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith and to hear
the submissions of the accused and the
prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to
pass thereafter an order either u/s. 227 or
u/s. 228 of the Code. If "the Judge
considers that there is not sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his
reasons for so doing", so enjoined by s.
227. If, on the other hand, "the Judge is of
opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence
which .....................

(b) in exclusively triable by the
court, he shall frame in writing a charge
against the accused," as provided in S. 228.

Reading
the
two
provisions
together in juxtaposition, as they have got
to be, it would be clear that at the
beginning and the initial stage of the trial
the truth, veracity and effect of the
evidence which the prosecutor proposes to
adduce are not to be meticulously judged.
Nor is any weight to be attached to the
probable defence of the accused. It is not
obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the
trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a
sensitive balance whether the facts, if
proved, would be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or not. The
standard of test and judgment which is to
be finally applied before recording a
finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of
the accused is not exactly to be applied at
this stage of deciding the matter under s.
227 and 228 of the Code. At that stage the
court is not to see whether there is
sufficient ground for conviction of the
accused or whether the trial is sure to end
in his conviction. Strong suspicion against
the accused, if the matter remains in the
3 All. Smt. Manju & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
425
region of suspicion, cannot take the place
of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the
trial. But at the initial stage if there is a
strong suspicion which leads the court to
think that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence
then it is not open to the court to say that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. The presumption of the
guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at
the initial stage is not in the sense of the
law governing the trial of criminal cases in
France where the accused is presumed to be
guilty unless the contrary is proved. But it
is only for the purpose of deciding prima
facie whether the court should proceed with
the trial or not. If the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the accused even if fully accepted
before it is challenged in cross-examination
or rebutted by the defence, if any, cannot
show that the accused committed the
offence, there will be no sufficient ground
for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive
list of the circumstances to indicate as to
what will lead to one conclusion or the
other is neither possible nor advisable. We
may just illustrate the difference of the law
by one more example. If the scales of pan
as to the guilt or innocence of the accused
are something like even at the conclusion
of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of
doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But
if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial
stage of making an order under S. 227 or S.
228, then in such a situation ordinarily and
generally the order which will have to be
made will be one under S. 228 and not
under S. 227."

11. Aforesaid case was again referred
to in another Apex Court's decision
Superintendent
and
Remembrancer
of
Legal Affairs, West Bengal Versus Anil
Kumar Bhunja AIR 1980 (SC) 52 and the
Apex Court proceeded to observe as
follows:

"18. It may be remembered that
the case was at the stage of framing
charges; the prosecution evidence had not
yet commenced. The Magistrate had,
therefore, to consider the above question on
a general consideration of the materials
placed before him by the investigating
police officer. At this stage, as was pointed
out by this Court in State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018, the
truth, veracity and effect of the evidence
which the prosecutor proposes to adduce
are not to be meticulously judged. The
standard of test, proof and judgment which
is to be applied finally before finding the
accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly
to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or
228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973. At this stage, even a very strong
suspicion founded upon materials before
the Magistrate, which leads him to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of
the factual ingredients constituting the
offence alleged; may justify the framing of
charge against the accused in respect of the
commission of that offence."

12. In yet another case of Palwinder
Singh Vs. Balvinder Singh AIR 2009 SC
887 the Apex Court had the occasion to
reflect upon the scope of adjudication and
its ambit at the time of framing of the
charge and also about the scope to consider
the material produced by the accused at that
stage. Following extract may be profitably
quoted to clarify the situation :

"12.
Having
heard
learned
counsel for the parties, we are of the
opinion that the High Court committed a
serious error in passing the impugned
judgment insofar as it entered into the
426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
realm of appreciation of evidence at the
stage of the framing of the charges itself.
The jurisdiction of the learned Sessions
Judge while exercising power under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is limited. Charges can be
framed also on the basis of strong
suspicion. Marshalling and appreciation of
evidence is not in the domain of the Court
at that point of time. This aspect of the
matter has been considered by this Court in
State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi,
(2005) 1 SCC 568 wherein it was held as
under :"

"23. As a result of the aforesaid
discussion, in our view, clearly the law is
that at the time of framing charge or taking
cognizance the accused has no right to
produce any material. Satish Mehra's Case
holding that the trial Court has powers to
consider even materials which the accused
may produce at the stage of Section 227 of
the Code has not been correctly decided."

13. The following observations made
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Sanghi Brothers (Indore) Pvt. Ltd. v.
Sanjay Choudhary AIR 2009 SC 9 also
reiterated the same position of law :-

"10.
After
analyzing
the
terminology used in the three pairs of
sections it was held that despite the
differences there is no scope for doubt that
at the stage at which the Court is required
to consider the question of framing of
charge, the test of a prima facie case to be
applied.

11. The present case is not one
where the High Court ought to have
interfered with the order of framing the
charge. As rightly submitted by the learned
counsel for the appellants, even if there is a
strong suspicion about the commission of
offence and the involvement of the
accused, it is sufficient for the Court to
frame a charge. At that stage, there is no
necessity of formulating the opinion about
the prospect of conviction. That being so,
the impugned order of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is set aside. The
appeal is allowed.

14. In fact while exercising the
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. or while wielding the powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India the
quashing of the complaint can be done only
if it does not disclose any offence or if
there is any legal bar which prohibits the
proceedings on its basis. The Apex Court
decisions in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of
Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and State of
Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 SCC(Cr.)
426 make the position of law in this regard
clear recognizing certain categories by way
of illustration which may justify the
quashing of a complaint or charge sheet.

15. In fact the scope to discharge the
accused u/s 245(2) Cr.P.C. is extremely
limited.
There
are
only
exceptional
circumstances which may justify such
discharge after passing of the summoning
order without any further evidence of such
a nature being produced which may
completely absolve or exonerate the
accused and the charge against them may
appear to be groundless. There may also be
such circumstances which may be brought
to the notice of the court like the absence of
legally required sanction or any such legal
embargo which prohibits the continuation
of proceedings against accused. Ordinarily
it is indeed very hard to succeed in
obtaining a discharge successfully on the
basis of same set of evidence which was
found sufficient by the court for the
purpose of summoning the accused to face
the trial but because the possibility,
3 All. Smt. Manju & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
427
however limited it be, does exist to get a
discharge even without recording any
evidence
after
summoning
that
the
applications u/s 245(2) Cr.P.C. are moved
and are, as they should be, entertained by
the courts.

16. The legal principles applicable in
regard to an application seeking discharge
has been referred in the decision of P.
Vijayan Vs. State of Kerala and another,
(2010) 2 SCC 398 and are as follows:

i. If two views are possible and one
of them gives rise to suspicion only as
distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial
Judge would be empowered to discharge the
accused.

ii. The Trial Judge is not a mere
Post Office to frame the charge at the
instance of the prosecution.

iii. The Judge has merely to sift the
evidence in order to find out whether or not
there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Evidence would consist of the statements
recorded by the Police or the documents
produced before the Court.

iv. If the evidence, which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted
before it is challenged in cross-examination
or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any,
"cannot show that the accused committed
offence, then, there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial".

v. It is open to the accused to
explain away the materials giving rise to the
grave suspicion.

vi. The court has to consider the
broad probabilities, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before
the court, any basic infirmities appearing in
the case and so on. This, however, would not
entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into
the pros and cons.

vii. At the time of framing of the
charges, the probative value of the material
on record cannot be gone into, and the
material
brought
on
record
by
the
prosecution, has to be accepted as true.

viii.
There
must
exist
some
materials for entertaining the strong suspicion
which can form the basis for drawing up a
charge and refusing to discharge the accused.

17. The defence of the accused is not to
be looked into at the stage when the accused
seeks to be discharged under Section 227 of
the Cr.P.C. The expression, "the record of the
case", used in Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., is to
be understood as the documents and the
articles, if any, produced by the prosecution.
The Code does not give any right to the
accused to produce any document at the stage
of framing of the charge. At the stage of
framing of the charge, the submission of the
accused is to be confined to the material
produced by the Police.

18. In the latest judgment of M.E.
Shivalingamurthy Vs. Central Bureau of
Investigation, Bengaluru reported in 2020 1
Supreme 169, it has been held that defence of
accused is not to be looked into at the stage
when the accused seeks to be discharged
under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.

19. In the present case, though the
applicants are sister-in-law and brother-inlaw of the deceased but evidence regarding
the presence of the accused at the time of
incident cannot be evaluated at the stage.

20. Illumined by the case law referred
to herein above, this Court has adverted to
the entire record of the case.

21. The submissions made by the
learned counsel for the applicants call for
adjudication on pure questions of fact
428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
which may be adequately adjudicated upon
only by the trial court and while doing so
even the submissions made on points of
law can also be more appropriately gone
into by the trial court in this case. This
Court does not deem it proper, and
therefore cannot be persuaded to have a
pre-trial before the actual trial begins. A
threadbare discussion of various facts and
circumstances, as they emerge from the
allegations made against the accused, is
being purposely avoided by the Court for
the reason, lest the same might cause any
prejudice to either side during trial. But it
shall suffice to observe that the perusal of
the complaint, the summoning order and
also all other the material available on
record makes out a prima facie case against
the accused at this stage and this Court
does not find any justifiable ground to set
aside the impugned order refusing the
discharge of the accused. This court has not
been able to persuade itself to hold that no
case against the accused has been made out
or to hold that the charge is groundless.

22. The prayer for quashing or setting
aside the impugned orders is refused as I do
not see any illegality, impropriety and
incorrectness in the impugned orders or the
proceedings under challenge. There is
absolutely no abuse of court's process
perceptible in the same. The present matter
also does not fall in any of the categories
recognized by the Supreme Court which
might justify interference by this Court in
order to upset or quash them.

23. The present application lacks
merit and is accordingly rejected.
----------

(2021)03ILR A428
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.02.2021
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. MANJU RANI
CHAUHAN, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 12174 of 2020

Pramod & Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
The State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Raj Kumar Kesari

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A., Sri Ashutosh Mishra

Matrimonial
dispute
-
Compromise
-
Criminal Procedure Code (2 of 1974) ,
S.482 - Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) ,
S.498A, S.323, S.504 - Dowry Prohibition
Act (28 of 1961) , S.3, S.4 - Cruelty by
husband & dowry demand - compromise
during
pendency
of
appeal
against
conviction - Offence non-compoundable in
nature
-Matrimonial
dispute
between
parties - Held - High Court has inherent
powers under section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash
criminal proceedings arising out of a
matrimonial disputes at any stage even
after conviction and during the pendency
of the criminal appeal (Para 44)

During the pendency of criminal appeal, after
settling their all the disputes, accused (husband)
and complainant (wife) arrived at a compromise
- Both living happily as husband & wife under
the same roof, with their son - If Court, in
exercise of its inherent power u/s 482 Cr.P.C.,
does not quash the criminal proceedings as well
as the order of conviction, then the happy life of
husband and wife (opposite party no.2) will be
ruined, especially the happy future life of their
son, whose golden future remains yet to
commence and who will suffer a lot -
Proceedings as well as conviction, liable to be
quashed. (Para 43)

Allowed

List of cases cited :