# Smt. Manju v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2012) 2 ILRA 812
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-07-04
- **Case number:** Misc. Bench No. 397 of 2012
- **Bench:** Devi Prasad Singh, Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-manju-v-state-of-u-p-42163
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Constitution of India. Article 243-E (243-4)
tenure of chairperson of Nagar panchayatfirst date of meeting-administrating oath
of Chairperson-can not be treated starting
point
for
the
period
of
tenure-but
subsequent adjourned date for want of
Quorum-shall be taken into considerationas such the period of 5 years-expire on
15.01.2012-any suggestion apart from
that-held misconceived.

Held: Para 19

In the instant case, admittedly a meeting
was held on 17.11.2006 and in the said
meeting only the oath was administered to
the members and the Chairperson of the
Nagar Panchayat. As has been held by the
2 All] Smt. Manju V. State of U.P.
813
Division
Bench
of
this
Court
in
its
judgment dated 05.12.2011 in the case of
Writ Petition No. 11226(M/B) of 2011
Sandeep Alias Sandeep Mehrotra and
another Versus State of U.P. and others
alongwith other connected matters, taking
oath of office is the condition precedent
and entitles a member to participate in the
meeting of the Municipal Board or the
Municipal Corporation. Thus, so far as the
arguments being raised by Shri Sharad
Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner
to the effect that the meeting in which
only oath is administered to the members
and Chairperson of the Nagar Panchayat
should not be treated to be the first
meeting for the purpose of determining
the term as provided in Article 243-U of
the Constitution of India and Section 10-A
of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act,
1916 is concerned, the Court is in complete
agreement with the said argument in view
of the law laid down by this Court in its
judgment dated 05.12.2011 in the case of
Writ Petition No. 11226 (M/B) of 2011
Sandeep Alias Sandeep Mehrotra (Supra).
Thus, the meeting of Nagar Panchayat held
on 17.11.2006 cannot be said to be the
first meeting of the Nagar Panchayat so as
to reckon its term of five years. To this
extent the argument advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sharad
Pathak is accepted.
Case law discussed:
1988 (Supp) SCC 562; (1976) 3 SCC 344; (1988)
4 SCC 577; (1989) 2 SCC 484; Writ Petition No.
11226(M/B) of 2011 Sandeep Alias Sandeep
Mehrotra and another Versus State of U.P. and
others alongwith other connected matters

## Text

812 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
(Supra)
and
also
in
the
case
of
N.Balakrishnan Versus M.Krishnamurthy
(Supra), this Court is of the definite view
that the order passed by the Assistant
Settlement Officer Consolidation, Gonda
could not have been interferred with by the
learned Deputy Director of Consolidation,
Gonda.

19.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondents has also placed reliance on the
judgments reported in (2003)SCC 257,
Jamal Uddin Ahmad Versus Abu Saleh
Najmuddin and another and (2002) 1 SCC
633,
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
Mumbai Versus Anjum M.H.Ghaswala and
others. The said judgments do not come to
the rescue of the respondents as the case of
Jamal Uddin Ahmad (Supra) pertains to
Representation of People Act, 1951 and
discusses the principles of Exercise of
Statutory Power in a manner prescribed by
the Statute. As regards the case of Anjum
M.H.Ghaswala (Supra) it may be noted that
the said case also only lays emphasis on the
well accepted legal principle that where a
statute vests certain power in an authority to
be exercised in a particular manner, that
power has to be exercised only in that
manner. In view of the Court, these
judgments, thus have no application to the
present case.

20. In view of above, the writ petition
is allowed and the judgment and order dated
17.02.2006 passed by the Deputy Director
of Consolidation, Gonda in Revision
No.911
(Madhao
and
others
Versus
Luxman and others), under Section 48 of
the U.P.Consolidation of Holdings Act,
pertaining to Village Tulsipur Manjha,
Pargana
Nawabganj,
Tehsil-Tarabganj,
District Gonda is hereby, quashed. The
Consolidation Officer, Gonda shall decide
the matter afresh as per terms of remand
order dated 23.11.2005 passed by the
Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation,
Gonda. The matter by the Consolidation
Officer,
Gonda
shall
be
decided
expeditiously, say within a period of six
months from the date of production of a
certified copy of this order before him.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.07.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DEVI PRASAD SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DEVENDRA KUMAR
UPADHYAYA, J.

Misc. Bench No. 397 of 2012

Smt. Manju

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. Through Prin. Secy. Urban
Development Deptt. L ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Sharad Pathak

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Hemant Kumar Mishra
Sri Ram Kumar Singh

Constitution of India. Article 243-E (243-4)
tenure of chairperson of Nagar panchayatfirst date of meeting-administrating oath
of Chairperson-can not be treated starting
point
for
the
period
of
tenure-but
subsequent adjourned date for want of
Quorum-shall be taken into considerationas such the period of 5 years-expire on
15.01.2012-any suggestion apart from
that-held misconceived.

Held: Para 19

In the instant case, admittedly a meeting
was held on 17.11.2006 and in the said
meeting only the oath was administered to
the members and the Chairperson of the
Nagar Panchayat. As has been held by the
2 All] Smt. Manju V. State of U.P.
813
Division
Bench
of
this
Court
in
its
judgment dated 05.12.2011 in the case of
Writ Petition No. 11226(M/B) of 2011
Sandeep Alias Sandeep Mehrotra and
another Versus State of U.P. and others
alongwith other connected matters, taking
oath of office is the condition precedent
and entitles a member to participate in the
meeting of the Municipal Board or the
Municipal Corporation. Thus, so far as the
arguments being raised by Shri Sharad
Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner
to the effect that the meeting in which
only oath is administered to the members
and Chairperson of the Nagar Panchayat
should not be treated to be the first
meeting for the purpose of determining
the term as provided in Article 243-U of
the Constitution of India and Section 10-A
of the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act,
1916 is concerned, the Court is in complete
agreement with the said argument in view
of the law laid down by this Court in its
judgment dated 05.12.2011 in the case of
Writ Petition No. 11226 (M/B) of 2011
Sandeep Alias Sandeep Mehrotra (Supra).
Thus, the meeting of Nagar Panchayat held
on 17.11.2006 cannot be said to be the
first meeting of the Nagar Panchayat so as
to reckon its term of five years. To this
extent the argument advanced by learned
counsel for the petitioner, Shri Sharad
Pathak is accepted.
Case law discussed:
1988 (Supp) SCC 562; (1976) 3 SCC 344; (1988)
4 SCC 577; (1989) 2 SCC 484; Writ Petition No.
11226(M/B) of 2011 Sandeep Alias Sandeep
Mehrotra and another Versus State of U.P. and
others alongwith other connected matters

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devendra Kumar
Upadhyaya, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and have perused the record.

2. By means of present writ petition,
the
petitioner
who
was
elected
as
Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat, Fatehpur
Chaurasi,
District
Unnao
(hereinafter
referred to as "Nagar Panchayat") in the
election held in the month of October, 2006,
has prayed that the order passed by the
District Magistrate, Unnao appointing the
Executive Officer of the Nagar Panchayat
as Administrator be quashed and she be
allowed to function and discharge her duties
as Chairperson till 24.06.2012.

3. The facts of the case as narrated by
the learned counsel for the petitioner are
that the last election of Chairperson of
Nagar Panchayat was held in the month of
October, 2006 in which the petitioner,
Smt.Manjoo emerged as winner and
accordingly,
in
a
meeting
held
on
17.11.2006 she was administered oath of
the office of the Chairperson of Nagar
Panchayat . Learned counsel for the
petitioner further stated that the first
meeting of the Nagar Panchayat was held
on 25.06.2007, as such in terms of the
provisions contained in Article 243-E (243U) of the Constitution of India, her term as
Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat would
come to an end only on 24.06.2012. In this
view, the learned counsel for the petitioner
argued further that any order appointing
Administrator in place of the petitioner
would amount to illegal curtailment of term
of the petitioner to which she is legally and
constitutionally entitled to avail.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner,
Shri Sharad Pathak in his valiant attempt to
establish the case in favour of the petitioner
has argued that since the term of
Chairperson of Nagar Panchayat as per
provisions of Article 243-E (243-U) of the
Constitution of India is five years as such
any order passed by any authority which
has the effect of curtailing the said term of
five years will be unconstitutional. He has
further stated that for the purpose of
computing five years in reference to the
provisions of Article 243-E (243-U) of
814 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Constitution of India, in the instant case, the
first meeting of Nagar Panchayat will be
deemed to have taken place only on
25.6.2007 and not the earlier alleged
meetings for the reason that in the meetings
allegedly held prior to the meeting dated
25.06.2007, no business was transacted for
want of quorum.

5. Placing heavy reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of State of Andhra Pradesh and
another Versus Dr.Mohan Jeet Singh and
another reported in 1988 (Supp) SCC 562,
The Punjab University Chandigarh Versus
Vijay Singh Lamba and others reported in
(1976) 3 SCC, 344, Chandra Kant Khaire
Versus Dr.Shanta Ram Kale and others
reported in (1988) 4 SCC 577 and Jayant
Bhai Manu Bhai Patel and others Versus
Arun Subodh Bhai Mehta and others
reported in (1989) 2 SCC 484 , Shri Sharad
Pathak, learned counsel for the petitioner
has painstakingly tried to bring-home a case
in favour of the petitioner and argued that in
absence of quorum, no meeting can be said
to have taken place at all and hence for the
purpose of calculating the term of the
petitioner, the meetings held prior to
25.06.2007 are meaningless. He has
referred to certain documents annexed with
the writ petition in the shape of certain
certificates and reports submitted by the
authorities and has tried to impress upon the
Court that even the authorities admit that
the first meeting was held only on
25.06.2007 and not before that.

6. Shri Pathak has further placed
reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of
this Court in a Bunch of writ petitions,
leading Writ Petition being Writ Petition
No.11226(M/B) of 2011 decided on
05.12.2011 wherein it has been held that
after taking oath of the office, the first
meeting convened and held, shall be treated
as the first meeting for the purpose of
Article 243-U of the Constitution of India.

7. Shri Pathak, learned counsel for the
petitioner has also brought to the notice of
the court that against the judgment of the
Division Bench dated 05.12.2011 in the
aforesaid Bunch of the writ petitions, no
interference was made, so far as the
aforesaid finding regarding the first meeting
of the Nagar Panchayat is concerned, by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in its order dated
13.12.2011.

8. Shri Pathak, further argued for the
petitioner and heavily relied on the
Government Order dated 17.12.2011 issued
in regard to taking appropriate steps for
managing the affairs of the local bodies on
account of the fact that the elections of the
local bodies could not be held before expiry
of their term. Shri Pathak says that even the
aforesaid
Government
Order
dated
17.12.2011 provides that the term of the
local body concerned shall commence from
the first meeting of the local body after the
date on which the oath is administered to
the Chairperson and other members.

9. On the other hand, learned counsels
appearing for the opposite parties have
submitted that the first meeting of the Nagar
Panchayat, after the oath was administered
to its Chairperson and members, was
convened on 16.01.2007 and the first
meeting for the purpose of Article 243-U of
the Constitution of India or for the purpose
of determination of term of the Nagar
Panchayat should be taken to be 16.01.2007
and not 25.06.2007, as is being asserted on
behalf of the petitioner.

10. A counter affidavit on behalf of
the opposite party no.3 has been filed
2 All] Smt. Manju V. State of U.P.
815
wherein, it has been stated that after oath
was administered to the Chairperson and
members of the Nagar Panchayat on
17.11.2006, an agenda was circulated to
convene the meeting of Nagar Panchayat on
16.01.2007. In the counter affidavit the
agenda of the meeting and minutes of the
meeting dated 16.01.2007 have been
annexed as Annexure No.CA-2. It has
further been argued that thereafter another
meeting was convened to be held on
15.06.2007 and then the meeting was held
on 25.06.2007. The submission of behalf of
the opposite parties is that though the
quorum in the meetings held on 16.01.2007
and 15.06.2007 was not complete, however,
the meetings were convened though no
business could be transacted in these two
meetings, namely; in the meetings dated
16.01.2007 and 15.06.2007.

11. It has been argued by the learned
counsel for the opposite parties that since
the first meeting, after the oath was
administered, was convened on 16.01.2007
for which agenda was also circulated
amongst the members of the Nagar
Panchayat, as such 16.01.2006 is the date of
the first meeting for the purpose of
computing and determining the term of
Nagar Panchayat.

12. We have carefully considered the
contentions made and arguments advanced
by learned counsels appearing for respective
parties and have also gone through the
material available on record of the case.

13. The sole question which falls for
consideration in the instant writ petition is
as to whether the term of Nagar Panchayat
and of its Chairperson would come to an
end on 24.06.2007 treating the meeting
dated 25.06.2007 as the first meeting of
Nagar Panchayat or prior to that, i.e.
treating
the
meeting
convened
on
16.01.2007 as the first meeting of Nagar
Panchayat.

14.

After
74th
Constitutional
amendment, Part IX-A was introduced in
the Constitution by way of enactment of
The
Constitution
(74th
Amendments)
Act,1992.The said provisions came into
operation with effect from First of June,
1993. By introduction of Part IX-A of the
Constitution of India, the Municipalities
were given constitutional status with a view
to strengthen the urban local bodies to
promote the concept of and implement the
idea of better and stronger Local-Self
Governments in the urban areas of the
country.
Article
243-U(1)
of
the
Constitution of India provides the duration
of the urban local bodies according to which
every municipality shall continue for five
years from the date appointed for its first
meeting and no longer. Article 243-U (1) of
the Constitution of India is being quoted
hereunder for ready reference :-

"243U. Duration of Municipalities,
etc.--

(1) Every Municipality, unless sooner
dissolved under any law for the time being
in force, shall continue for five years from
the date appointed for its first meeting and
no longer.

Provided that a Municipality shall be
given a reasonable opportunity of being
heard before its dissolution.

15. So far as the duration of rural local
bodies namely; Village Panchayats, Kshetra
Panchayats and District Panchayats is
concerned,
provisions
similar
to
the
provisions
of
Article
243U
of
the
Constitution exists in Article 243-E of the
816 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Constitution of India. It may be noted that
Article 243-E falls in Part IX which was
introduced in the Constitution by way of
enacting the Constitution(Seventy third
Amendment) Act, 1992 which came into
force with effect from 01.06.1993. Part IX
was added in the Constitution with a view
to promote and strengthen Local Self
Governments in the rural areas. However,
the provisions of Article 243-U of the
Constitution which are in respect of urban
local bodies and those of Article 243-E
which are in respect of rural urban bodies
are akin to each other.

16. Section 10-A of the Uttar Pradesh
Municipalities Act, 1916 also provides that
every municipality shall continue for five
years from the date appointed for its first
meeting and no longer. Section 10-A (1) of
the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916
runs as under :-

"10-A. Term of municipality.--(1)
Every municipality shall, unless sooner
dissolved under Section 39, continue for
five years from the date appointed for its
first meeting and no longer. "

17. The fate of the instant writ
petition, thus, depends on the decision on
the issue as to whether the period of the
Nagar Panchayat for the purpose of
determining its term shall start running from
the date appointed for its first meeting dated
16.01.2007, though no business could be
transacted for want of quorum.

18. A careful reading of the provisions
contained
in
Article
243U
of
the
Constitution of India and Section 10-A of
the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916
makes it clear that the phrase occurring in
both these provisions is "from the date
appointed for its first meeting" .Thus, the
term of the Nagar Panchayat will start
running from the date appointed for its first
meeting.

19. In the instant case, admittedly a
meeting was held on 17.11.2006 and in the
said meeting only the oath was administered
to the members and the Chairperson of the
Nagar Panchayat. As has been held by the
Division Bench of this Court in its judgment
dated 05.12.2011 in the case of Writ
Petition No. 11226(M/B) of 2011 Sandeep
Alias Sandeep Mehrotra and another
Versus
State
of
U.P.
and
others
alongwith
other
connected
matters,
taking oath of office is the condition
precedent and entitles a member to
participate in the meeting of the Municipal
Board or the Municipal Corporation. Thus,
so far as the arguments being raised by Shri
Sharad Pathak, learned counsel for the
petitioner to the effect that the meeting in
which only oath is administered to the
members and Chairperson of the Nagar
Panchayat should not be treated to be the
first meeting for the purpose of determining
the term as provided in Article 243-U of the
Constitution of India and Section 10-A of
the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916
is concerned, the Court is in complete
agreement with the said argument in view
of the law laid down by this Court in its
judgment dated 05.12.2011 in the case of
Writ Petition No. 11226 (M/B) of 2011
Sandeep
Alias
Sandeep
Mehrotra
(Supra). Thus, the meeting of Nagar
Panchayat held on 17.11.2006 cannot be
said to be the first meeting of the Nagar
Panchayat so as to reckon its term of five
years. To this extent the argument advanced
by learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri
Sharad Pathak is accepted.

20. However, the contention raised on
behalf of the petitioner to the effect that
2 All] Smt. Manju V. State of U.P.
817
since in the meetings dated 16.01.2007 and
15.06.2007 no business was transacted for
want of quorum of the Nagar Panchayat, as
such either of these two meetings should not
be treated to be the first meeting of the
Nagar Panchayat does not appear to be
sound and merits rejection for the reasons
discussed below.

21. There is no dispute as to the fact
that in the meetings dated 16.01.2007 and
15.06.2007 no business by the members of
the Nagar Panchayat could be transacted for
want of quorum. However, it is also noted
at this juncture that there is also no denial of
the fact that the meetings on 16.01.2007 and
15.06.2007 were convened by circulating
agenda for the said meetings . Admittedly,
on 16.01.2007 the members of the Nagar
Panchayat assembled in pursuance of the
agenda circulated for the said meeting dated
16.01.2007 and no business except the
business of postponing the meeting for want
of quorum was transacted by the members
of the Nagar Panchayat. In this view, it
cannot be said that on 16.01.2007 no
meeting was convened. As a matter of fact,
meeting was held as appointed earlier by
way of circulating the agenda but no
business transaction could be made on the
said date. The agenda for the meeting to be
held on 16.01.2007 was circulated for the
purpose of transaction of certain business by
the members of the Nagar Panchayat and
hence, it cannot be held that what occurred
on 16.01.2007 was merely a gathering or an
assembly of members of Nagar Panchayat.
As a matter of fact, it was a meeting of
members of Nagar Panchayat who had
gathered for holding the meeting on a preappointed day i.e. on 16.01.2007 specified
and fixed for the said purpose. The purpose
was to transact the business by the Nagar
Panchayat as per the agenda circulated for
the meeting. Thus, it was not a sudden
gathering or assembly of the members;
rather it was a meeting held as appointed
earlier.

22. As regards the judgments cited by
the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is
observed that none of the judgments is of
any help to the petitioner.

23. In the case of State of Andhra
Pradesh and another Versus Dr.Mohan
Jeet Singh and another reported in 1988
(Supp) SCC 562 it has been held by the
Hon'ble Apex Court that in absence of
quorum any meeting is not entitled to
transact any business. The question as to
whether the business could be or was
transacted does not appear to be relevant in
the instant case for the reason that what is
the material is not the transaction of
business but the date appointed for the first
meeting of the Nagar Panchayat as is
apparent from a perusal of the provisions
contained
in
Article
243-U
of
the
Constitution of India and Section 10-A of
the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916 .
Thus, so far as the legal proposition laid
down in the judgment of State of Andhra
Pradesh and another (Supra) is concerned,
the same does not have any application to
the instant case.

24. The other judgment cited by
learned counsel for the petitioner namely;
The Punjab University Chandigarh Versus
Vijay Singh Lamba and others reported in
(1976) 3 SCC, 344 only defines the quorum
to mean minimum number of members of
any body of persons whose presence is
necessary to transact its business. So far as
the meaning of quorum is concerned, there
is no dispute in the instant case and hence,
the said judgment cited by learned counsel
for the petitioner in the case of The Punjab
818 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
University Chandigarh (Supra) is also of no
avail to him.

25. As regards the judgment reported
in Chandra Kant Khaire Versus Dr.Shanta
Ram Kale and others reported in (1988) 4
SCC 577 which has been relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioner, it would
suffice to note that there Lordships in the
aforesaid judgment have only held that the
Municipal Commissioner under Bombay
Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949
could not adjourn the meeting for another
day or adjourn it sine die. The aforesaid
interpretation as regards the power of the
Municipal Commissioner to adjourn or not
to adjourn the first meeting is based on the
provisions of Maharashtra Act. However, it
is noteworthy that the interpretation to
Section
6(2)
of
Bombay
Provincial
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 has been
given by their Lordships of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Chandra
Kant Khaire (Supra) keeping in view the
fact that the term of the elected Councillors
of
the
Municipal
Corporation
in
Maharashtra also commences on the date of
the first meeting. It is in this background
that their Lordships have held in the said
judgment that since the term of the said
Councillors will start from the date of first
meeting , hence the Chairman could not
adjourn the meeting for another day or Sine
die.

26. The last judgment relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioner is Jayant
Bhai Manu Bhai Patel and others Versus
Arun Subodh Bhai Mehta and others
reported in (1989) 2 SCC 484 . The said
judgment only holds the judgment in
Chandra Kant Khaire (Supra) as per
incurium and further that the Mayor has the
power under the relevant provisions of
Maharashtra Act to hold, cancel or postpone
the first meeting before commencement of
the meeting. The judgment in this case thus,
only
interprets
the
powers
under
Maharashtra
enactment
regarding
postponement or cancellation of first
meeting before it is held and as such in this
view , this judgment also does not have any
application to the facts of the case.

27. As discussed above, the phrase
occurring
in
Article
243-U
of
the
Constitution of India and Section 10-A of
the Uttar Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1916
is "from the date appointed for its first
meeting". The word "date appointed" in
our view would mean the date fixed i.e. to
say the date fixed for the first meeting of the
Nagar Panchayat. On the "date appointed"
or on the date fixed, if for some valid reason
no business could be transacted ( as in the
present case, for want of quorum), it cannot
be said that the meeting held on 16.012007
was not the first meeting for the purpose of
determining the term of Nagar Panchayat in
question. Admittedly, there is no dispute
that on 16.01.2007, a meeting was
scheduled i.e. to say 16.01.2007 was the day
appointed for the meeting of the Nagar
Panchayat. In view of the admitted position
that an agenda was circulated and a day i.e.
16.01.2007 for holding the meeting was
fixed, in other words, the meeting was
scheduled to be held on 16.01.2007 , the
Court is of the opinion that the said date
shall be the "date appointed" for first
meeting of the Nagar Panchayat and as such
it is 16.01.2007 which will be the date from
which the term of the Nagar Panchayat
concerned would commence.

28. For the discussions made and the
reasons given above, the Court comes to the
definite conclusion that the date appointed
for the first meeting of the Nagar Panchayat,
Fatehpur Chaurasi, District Unnao was
2 All] Akhtar Ali V. State of U.P. and others
819
16.01.2007, hence, the term of the said
Nagar Panchayat as also that of the
petitioner being its Chairperson would
come to an end on 15.01.2012.

29. In view of the aforesaid, the writ
petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
However, there will be no order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.07.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE RAJIV SHARMA, J.,
THE HON'BLE S.V.S.RATHORE, J.

Writ Petition No. 575 (SB) of 2002

Akhtar Ali

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & others ...Opposite Parties

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226Dismissal
order-passed
on
basis
of
enquiry report-form of question-answer
of
examination-in-chief
and
cross
examinations
without
supply
of
documents-held in utter disregard of
procedure as well as principle of Natural
Justice-dismissal order as well as order
of Appellate authority-not sustainablequashed with all consequential benefits.

Held: Para 12

Taking the holistic view of the matter,
we have no hesitation in saying that the
inquiry has been conducted in utter
disregard to the principles of natural
justice. Since the impugned order has
been passed on the basis of the inquiry
report, which suffers from procedural
illegality and violative of principles of
natural justice, the order of punishment
vitiates. The Appellate Authority has also
not dealt with the pleas raised by the
petitioner but rejected the appeal in a
cursory manner. The Appellate Authority
ought to have applied its independent
mind and should have recorded reasons
for
rejecting
the
pleas/submissions
raised by the petitioner in his appeal.
Case law discussed:
AIR 2010 SC 3131; Writ Petition No. 8876 (SB)
of 1987; (1986) 3 SCC 229; [2003] (21) LCD
610; JT 2008 (9) SC 205

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, J.)

1. Heard learned Counsel for the
parties.

2. Petitioner was initially appointed on
the post of Cashier/Clerk in the Aryavrat
Grameen Bank in the year 1981. Later on,
due to his good conduct and work
performance, he was promoted as an
Officer in the Bank. While the petitioner
was posted as an Officer in Kursi Branch of
the Bank, he was placed under suspension
vide order dated 12.2.2000 for certain
irregularities. On the basis of the enquiry
report,
the
petitioner
was
awarded
punishment of dismissal from service vide
order dated 3.8.2001. The validity of the
said punishment order was questioned by
the petitioner in appeal but the same was
also rejected vide order dated 13.2.2002.
Hence the petitioner has filed the instant
writ petition, assailing the aforesaid two
orders.

3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner
has vehemently contended that the order,
impugned in the petition, imposing the
punishment of dismissal from service is
nullity having been passed in utter disregard
of the principles of natural justice inasmuch
as the petitioner has not been furnished with
a copy of audit compliance report, copy of
the covering schedule credit note 2400 and
the copy of the stationary delivery register
from Head Office of Credit No. 2400
through the said credit note no. 2400 though
the said credit note 2400 is the basis of
charge. He also clarified that even the