# Smt. Maya Niranjan v. Phuleashwar & Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 2 ILRA 1095
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2017-03-31
- **Case number:** Contempt No. 37 of 2006
- **Bench:** Amreshwar Pratap Sahi, Pramod Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-maya-niranjan-v-phuleashwar-anr-43391
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section
19 - Delay in payments by appellant -
wilfully and deliberately disobeying the
orders of the High Court - the subsequent
payments clearly establish that the said
1096 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
payments were wilfully and deliberately
delayed for more than four and a half
years - the appellant has substantially
contributed obstructions for more than
four and a half years - subsequent
payments, therefore, do not absolve the
appellant of the contempt that was earlier
committed - the officers who succeeded
the appellant were also punished. Hence,
the non-compliance of the judgment is
clearly established and therefore the
conviction and punishment have to be
upheld. (Para 4, 5, 7, 16, 22, 24 to 36)

Contempt Appeal Disposed of (E-6)

## Text

2 All. Smt. Maya Niranjan Vs Phuleshwar & Anr.
1095
notice by post is mandatory and in
addition to service by process server, the
above question is answered in favour of
the assessee revisionist and against the
revenue holding that the authority was not
competent to cancel the registration of the
assessee/revisionist without issuing notice
to him by registered post simply on the
basis of service of process server by
refusal."

25. The Division Bench judgement
in the case of petitioner itself and Sri
Balaji
Enterprises
(supra)
a
clear
procedure for service on notice has been
prescribed which has not been followed
by the respondent in the case in hand.

26. The record further reveals that the
notice by affixation has been made on the
earlier address of the petitioner even without
satisfying the conditions as mentioned in the
Rule. Even after service of notice by
affixation, no such report has been brought
on record as provided under the Rules.

27. In spite of the fact being within
the knowledge of the respondent that the
petitioner has changed the place of
business to the new address still notice by
affixation has been made in the earlier
address. This fact is also came to the
notice of this Court in earlier two rounds
of litigation filed by the petitioner in Writ
Nos. 80 and 168 of 2016 and Writ No.
546 of 2016 which has been allowed with
the cost of Rs. 2 lac and Rs. 50,000/-.

28. The record further reveals that
the impugned order has been passed in
gross violation of the provision of the Act
and without proper service of notice upon
the petitioner. The said fact could not also
be disputed by the learned counsel for the
respondent.

29. In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case as stated above,
the impugned order dated 31.3.2017 for
the assessment year 2013-14 under the
U.P. Act 2008 and CST Act are hereby set
aside.

30. It is made clear that respondents
are permitted to initiate the proceeding by
issuing notice at the current address of the
petitioner, if any, in accordance with law.

31. The writ petition is accordingly
allowed.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1095

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.09.2015

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AMRESHWAR PRATAP
SAHI, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Contempt No. 37 of 2006

Smt. Maya Niranjan ...Appellant
Versus
Phuleashwar & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri B.P. Singh, Sri Ram Babu Yadav, Sri
Shashi Nandan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri R.B. Tripathi, A.G.A., Sri Krishan Ji
Khare

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section
19 - Delay in payments by appellant -
wilfully and deliberately disobeying the
orders of the High Court - the subsequent
payments clearly establish that the said
1096 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
payments were wilfully and deliberately
delayed for more than four and a half
years - the appellant has substantially
contributed obstructions for more than
four and a half years - subsequent
payments, therefore, do not absolve the
appellant of the contempt that was earlier
committed - the officers who succeeded
the appellant were also punished. Hence,
the non-compliance of the judgment is
clearly established and therefore the
conviction and punishment have to be
upheld. (Para 4, 5, 7, 16, 22, 24 to 36)

Contempt Appeal Disposed of (E-6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Amreshwar Pratap
Sahi, J. & Hon'ble Pramod Kumar
Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, learned
Senior Counsel for the appellant and Sri
R.B. Tripathi, learned counsel for the
respondent no. 2.

2. This contempt appeal under
Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971
assails
the
conviction
and
punishment awarded by the learned
Single Judge in Contempt Petition No.
1487 of 2001 whereby the appellant was
sentenced
to
two
months
simple
imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 2000/-
and in case of default to further undergo
one month imprisonment. A direction was
given to send the copy of the order to the
Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar
Pradesh,
Secondary
Education,
U.P.
Lucknow with the hope that the matter
would also be dealt with administratively
against the appellant.

3. The conviction was brought home
on account of the charge that was framed
against the appellant for showing cause as
to the wilful and deliberate violation, and
defiance, of the judgment and order of a
learned Single Judge of this Court dated
21st February, 2000 in Writ Petition No.
2022 of 1995 as confirmed by a division
bench in Special Appeal No. 295 of 2000
vide judgment dated 19th April, 2000.
While proceeding to frame charges, the
learned Single Judge took notice of a
communication
dispatched
by
the
appellant under her signatures dated 9th
May,
2000
which
is
extracted
hereinunder:-

^^v0'kk0 i=kad@ @2000&2001
Jherh ek;k fujatu ftyk fo|ky; fujh{kd 1⁄4f}rh;1⁄2
bykgkcknA

fnukad % 09&05&2000
Lis'ky vihy la[;k&295@2000 iz/kkukpk;kZ] txr
rkju xYlZ ba0dk0] bkykgkckn cuke e.Myh; mi
f'k{kk funs'kd 1⁄4ek/;fed1⁄2 ,oa vU; esa ekuuh; mPp
U;k;ky; }kjk vkns'k fn0% 19&4&2000 ikfjr fd;k
x;k
gS
ftlesa
;kfpdk
la[;k&2022@1995
iz/kkukpk;kZ] txr rkju xYlZ b.Vj dkyst]
bkykgkckn cuke mi f'k{kk funs'kd 1⁄4ek/;fed1⁄2 esa
ikfjr fu.kZ; fn0 21&2&2000 dks lgh ekurs gq;s
ekuuh; ttksa us Lis'ky vihy [kkfjt dj nh gSA
Lis'ky vihy [kkfjt gks tkus ls Jh Qqys'oj
ifjpkjd dks fcuk dke ds fn0 01&08&94 ls
'kklu@foHkkx dks osru nsuk iM+sxk ftlls 'kkldh;
/ku dk nq:i;ksx gksxkA lqyHk lanHkZ gsrq Lis'ky
vihy dh Nk;k izfr] rFkk mlesa ikfjr vkns'k
fnukad 19&4&2000 dh Nk;k izfr] ;kfpdk la[;k&
2022@1995 esa ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk ikfjr vkns'k
fnukad 21&2&2000 dh Nk;k izfr rFkk izdj.k ds
lEcU/k esa laf{kIr bfrgkl vkfn vfHkys[k bl fuosnu
ds lkFk izsf"kr gS fd ekeys dk v/;;u dj vfxze
dk;Zokgh gsrq funsZ'k nsus dk d"V djsaA

pwWfd izdj.k 10 o"kZ rd QthZ
tUefrfFk c<+k ysus ls lEcfU/kr gS ftlls 'kklu ij
vuko';d O;; Hkkj c<+sxkA ,slh fLFkfr esa izdj.k ds
lEcU/k esa vko';d fu.kZ; ysdj vko';d dk;Zokgh
ds fy;s bl dk;kZy; dks funsZ'k nsus dk d"V djsa
rkfd vkids funsZ'k ds vuqikyu esa vko';d
dk;Zokgh dh tk ldsA
layXud% ;FkksDr~A
g0 &
Jh ve`r izdk'k
Jherh 1⁄4ek;k fujatu1⁄2
2 All. Smt. Maya Niranjan Vs Phuleshwar & Anr.
1097
f'k{kk funs'kd 1⁄4ek/;fed1⁄2
mRrj izns'k y[kuÅ
v0'kk0 i`0la0@@2000&2001 rnfnukWd%
mDr dh izfrfyfi fuEu dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d
dk;Zokgh gsrq iszf"krA
Jherh lfjrk ;kno
g0 &
vij f'k{kk funs'kd 1⁄4ek/;fed1⁄2
Jherh 1⁄4ek;k fujatu1⁄2
v0'kk0
i`0la0@&&@2000&2001
rnfnukWd%
mDr dh izfrfyfi fuEu dks lwpukFkZ ,oa vko';d
dk;Zokgh gsrq iszf"krA
Jherh izseyrk flag
g0 &
mi
f'k{kk
funs'kd
1⁄4ek/;fed1⁄2
Jherh 1⁄4ek;k fujatu1⁄2
f'k{kk funs'kky;] mRrj izns'k
bykgkcknA^^

4. The learned Single Judge found
not
only
the
said
letter
to
be
contemptuous
but
also
found
the
affidavits
that
were
filed
in
the
proceedings to be further fortifying the
charge
of
wilful
and
deliberate
disobedience and an attitude of the
appellant
not
to
comply
with
the
directions of the Court. The learned
Single Judge came to the conclusion that
it was the appellant who while acting as
District Inspector of Schools, being the
drawing and disbursing officer, had
created hurdles in the execution of the
order with a reprehensive defiance and it
was her action to resist payments that
were due as is evident from the letter
dated 9th May, 2000 which clearly
indicated her intention to "set the cat
among the pigeons" which resulted in
wilful defiance and non-compliance of the
order of the learned Single Judge for four
and a half years.

5. The learned Single Judge
thereafter also appears to have taken
notice of the career of the appellant and
described her as a veteran of contempt
matters with about 60 contempt petitions
pending against her.

6. Sri Shashi Nandan has then
invited the attention of the Court to the
facts of the case which in a nutshell as
under.

7. Phuleshwar who was a Class IV
employee of an Intermediate College
raised a claim in relation to his
reinstatement and payment of salary. Writ
Petition No. 2022 of 1995 was filed by
the Principal of the Institution contending
that salary was being claimed by
Phuleshwar on the strength of an
alteration in the date of birth as a result
whereof Phuleshwar would receive the
same for a period of extra 10 years. This
challenge raised in the writ petition by the
Principal of the College, who is the
appointing authority of a Class IV
employee under the U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 was rejected and the
writ petition was dismissed on 21st
February, 2000 with a further direction to
the Principal and the District Inspector of
Schools - II, the respondent no. 3 therein
to reinstate Phuleshwar, the respondent
no. 4 in the writ petition, in service and
pay his entire arrears of salary within a
period of two months from the date of
production of a certified copy of the
order.

8. The Principal of the Institution
aggrieved by the said judgment of the
learned Single Judge preferred Special
Appeal No. 295 of 2000 and the same was
also dismissed on 19th April, 2000. Copies
of the said judgments are on record.

9. The said judgment was pressed
into service for compliance by the
1098 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recipient of the salary upon which the
appellant Smt. Maya Niranjan wrote the
letter dated 9th May, 2000 that has been
extracted hereinabove.

10. The said letter taking notice of
the
judgment
of
the
High
Court
categorically states that the Hon'ble
Judges hearing the special appeal have
dismissed the same and as a consequence
thereof Sri Phuleshwar would be entitled
for salary without doing work w.e.f.
1.8.1994 and the department would have
to compulsorily pay the same which
would amount to a misutilization of
government funds. The letter further
recites that the matter is being forwarded
for further examination and action for
which appropriate instructions may be
issued by the Director of Education to
whom the letter was addressed.

11. Thereafter the letter recites that
since the matter relates to a fake and a
forged
date
of
birth
having
been
manipulated increasing the period to 10
years, the same would also amount to an
unnecessary
burden
on
the
State
Exchequer. In such a situation, decision
be taken for appropriate action and
instructions be issued to her office so that
further action be taken in compliance
thereof.

12. It is admitted that the appellant
was also holding charge of the post of
District Inspector of Schools - I as well as
District Inspector of Schools - II dealing
with all institutions in the district of
Allahabad both Boys and Girls. The
institution
where
Phuleshwar
was
working
was
admittedly
a
Girls
Institution, namely Jagat Taran Girls
Intermediate College and was under a
direct control of the District Inspector of
Schools - II. The powers for disbursement
of salary are conferred on the District
Inspector of Schools in relation to
employees of aided Secondary institutions
under the Uttar Pradesh High Schools and
Intermediate
Colleges
(Payment
of
Salaries
of
Teachers
and
other
Employees) Act, 1971. The appellant was
thus under a statutory obligation to ensure
payments to the employee.

13. Learned counsel for the
appellant pointed out that the appellant
was holding charge of these two posts
even though she was working as a Deputy
Director of Education, and she handed
over charge of District Inspector of
Schools - I on 4th August, 2000 and
District Inspector of Schools - II on 3rd
October, 2000. Thus on the date when the
judgment
was
delivered
and
even
thereafter when the letter dated 9th May,
2000 was written, the appellant continued
to hold charge as the District Inspector of
Schools - II as well. It may be reiterated
that District Inspector of Schools - II was
the respondent no. 3 in the writ petition.
Thus the responsibility of obedience to
the orders of the High Court was clearly
on the appellant on the delivery of the
judgment and which fact is also evident
from the letter dated 9th May, 2000
written by the appellant herself seeking
instructions in the matter.

14. Since the payment was not
released for a fairly long time, the
employee was left with no option but to
file a contempt application no. 522 of
2001 arraying therein four officials. It
may be remembered that the contempt
was filed much after the appellant had
handed
over
charge
to
the
new
incumbents of the office of District
Inspector of Schools - I and District
2 All. Smt. Maya Niranjan Vs Phuleshwar & Anr.
1099
Inspector of Schools - II, namely Smt.
Santwana Tiwari and Smt. Farhana
Siddiqui. Sri Satyanarain Srivastava was
the Finance and Accounts Officer in the
year 2001 when the said contempt
application was filed arraying these
persons.

15. It appears that thereafter another
contempt application was filed being
Contempt Application No. 1487 of 2011
where the appellant Smt. Maya Niranjan
was arrayed as opposite party. Thus the
appellant was also sought to be proceeded
against and after notices were issued both
contempt matters proceeded together but
later on the contempt petition of the
appellant appears to have been not taken
up when the earlier contempt application
no. 522 of 2001 came to be heard against
the officials referred to hereinabove.

16. It may be also noticed that the
contempt petitions in both matters were
heard by the same learned Single Judge
and decided by him. Contempt Petition
No. 522 of 2001 was ultimately decided
on 20th September, 2004 holding Smt.
Farhana Siddiqui and Sri Satyanarain
Srivastava
of
having
wilfully
and
deliberately
disobeyed
the
judgment
referred to hereinabove and they were
sentenced with two months imprisonment
coupled
with
fine
and
further
compensation was awarded keeping in
view the alleged non-payments to Sri
Phuleshwar.

17. It may be however noticed that
before the delivery of the said judgment,
in the contempt filed against the appellant
namely Contempt Petition No. 1487 of
2001, charges were framed against her on
11th August, 2004. This contempt was
taken up thereafter and the judgment was
delivered giving rise to this appeal on 5th
November, 2004 whereby the appellant
has been convicted and sentenced as
referred to hereinabove.

18. Contempt Appeal No. 16 and
Contempt Appeal No. 17 of 2004 were
filed by Smt. Farhana Siddiqui and
Satyanarain Srivastava arising out of the
judgment dated 20th September, 2004.

19. In the matter of the appellant the
present appeal was filed as a defective
appeal no. 11 of 2004 now given a regular
number as Appeal No. 37 of 2006 in
which an interim order was passed staying
the operation of the judgment on
5.11.2004. Against the said interim order
passed in this appeal Phuleshwar filed
Special Leave to Appeal No. 819 of 2005
before the Apex Court that was dismissed
on 24th January, 2005.

20. This appeal remained pending,
but the two appeals which were filed by
Farhana
Siddiqui
and
Satyanarain
Srivastava against their convictions and
sentence, were taken up and were decided
by a division bench of this Court on 15th
September, 2005.

21. This appeal has remained
pending for 10 years thereafter.

22. The judgment of conviction and
sentence against Farhana Siddiqui and
Satyanarain Srivastava was upheld in the
above
mentioned
appeals
with
a
modification to the effect that the
conviction was founded on valid grounds
but
the
extreme
punishment
of
imprisonment of two months was held not
to be desirable on the facts as brought
before the Court. Accordingly, while
upholding the conviction, the division
1100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
bench suitably modified the sentence by
reducing the sentence of imprisonment.
Rest of the sentence was maintained. A
copy of the said judgment has been placed
by Sri Shashi Nandan before us.

23. Sri Shashi Nandan has then
advanced his submissions in this appeal
contending that firstly the letter dated 9th
May, 2000 is an interdepartmental letter
written by the appellant in terms of the
instructions contained in the circular of
the Director dated 21st April, 1993. He
has invited the attention of the Court,
particularly to Paragraph 1 of the said
circular which is extracted hereinunder:-

^^1&
U;k;ky;ksa
}kjk
oknksa@fjV
;kfpdkvksa ds izlax esa ;fn Hkqxrku ds ,d i{kh;
vkns'k tkjh fd;s x;s gksa rks rRdky iwjh rF;kRed
fLFkfr ls lEcfU/kr U;k;ky;ksa esa izkFkZuk&i= nsdj
'kkldh; vf/koDrk ds ek/;e ls vkns'k la'kksf/kr
djkus dh dk;Zokgh rRijrk ls dh tk;A ;fn
foHkkxh; vf/kdkjh }kjk U;k;ky; }kjk fn;s x;s
volj dk ykHk ugha mBk;k tkrk gS vkSj 'kklu dk
i{k U;k;ky; esa le; ls izLrqr u djus ds dkj.k
,d i{kh; fu.kZ; gksrk gS rks mlds fy, lEcfU/kr
vf/kdkjh@deZpkjh nks"kh ekus tk;saxs rFkk muds
fo:) dBksj dk;Zokgh dh tk;xhA ;fn U;k;ky; ds
vkns'k dk vuqikyu rRdky fd;k tkuk visf{kr gks
rks U;k;kyh; vkns'k dh lR;kfir izfr Hkstrs gq,
lEiw.kZ fLFkfr dks n'kkZrs gq, /kukoaVu dh ekax
fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k ls dh tkuh pkfg,A ;fn ekeys esa
iqufoZpkjkFkZ izR;kosnu@vihy djus dh vok';drk
le>h
tk;xh
rks
mlds
fy,
leLr
vfHkys[k@i=kofy;kWa fo'ks"k okgd ds ek/;e ls
izsf"kr djds vko';d vkns'k@funsZ'k funs'kky; ls
le; ls izkIr djsaxsA ,sls ekeyksa esa foyEc ds fy;s
dksbZ dkj.k vFkok vk/kkj ekU; ugha gksxkA^^

24. He submits that it is in view of
such interdepartmental instructions that
the appellant in good faith sought
instructions
from
the
Director
of
Education
for
making
payments
to
Phuleshwar. He submits that the said
letter was only seeking instructions and
was in no way intended or designed to
wilfully
and
deliberately
flout
the
directions of the judgment of the learned
Single Judge or the Division Bench. He
therefore submits that this letter does not
in any way convey any perception of a
wilful and deliberate disobedience so as to
constitute a civil contempt making it
punishable under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971. In addition to this, he also
urges that the entire judgment of the
learned Single Judge does not record any
specific finding or reason so as to bring
the act of the appellant within the fold of
deliberate and wilful disobedience.

25. The second contention of Sri
Shashi Nandan is that the entire judgment
of the learned Single Judge is also
overwhelmingly
capped
with
certain
perceptions about the officer and her
functioning as well as her involvement in
other contempt matters which was neither
the basis of the charge nor could it had
been taken into account for having
punished the appellant. He submits that it
appears that the said perception also has
probably weighed with the learned Single
Judge
heavily
to
bring
about
the
punishment of imprisonment.

26. The third argument of Sri Shashi
Nandan is that even assuming though not
admitting that disobedience was allegedly
committed by the appellant and there was
some
default
in
payment
to
Sri
Phuleshwar then in that event the
judgment of the division bench in
contempt appeal no. 16 and contempt
appeal no. 17 of 2004 dated 15.9.2005
should be taken into account at least to
reduce the punishment, particularly with
regard to the sentence of imprisonment.
He therefore submits that the incident of
the alleged disobedience being at par with
2 All. Smt. Maya Niranjan Vs Phuleshwar & Anr.
1101
that of Farhana Siddiqui and Satyanarain
Srivastava, this Court may not be justified
in
upholding
the
sentence
of
imprisonment, as a coordinate bench has
deleted the said sentence after taking into
account the circular dated 21.4.1993 of
the Director, and the interdepartmental
procedure. He contends that the validity
of such actions on the basis of the circular
has been upheld in that case and to that
extent the same reasoning should be
adopted for the purpose of setting aside
the imposition of sentence on the
appellant.

27. The fourth argument of Sri
Shashi Nandan is that the presumption
drawn by the learned Single Judge of
deliberately and wilfully forestalling any
attempt of payment by the appellant is
also not justified, inasmuch as, unless the
funds were released by the Directorate,
the payment was not possible and which
actually took place during the pendency
of these proceedings under the order of
the Director of Education dated 31st July,
2004 whereafter the entire dues to the
employee were paid on 2nd August, 2004.

28. The submission of Sri Shashi
Nandan, therefore, is that when the
learned Single Judge proceeded to frame
the charges on 11th August, 2004 against
the appellant the judgment had already
been complied with, with payment to Sri
Phuleshwar on 2nd August, 2004 prior to
that. He therefore submits that this
mitigating circumstance does not appear
to have been taken into account while
imposing the punishment on the appellant.

29. Having heard Sri Shashi Nandan
and having considered the submissions
raised, the first question is as to whether
the learned Single Judge has arrived at
any conclusion of wilful and deliberate
disobedience or not. To this extent, we
clearly find a clear recital contained in the
judgment after discussion of the entire
material on record that the act of the
appellant including the contents of the
letter dated 9th May, 2000 and her
affidavits filed on record before the
learned Single Judge clearly resulted in
wilful defiance and non compliance of the
order for four and a half years, though it
was to be complied within one month.
This satisfaction has been categorically
recorded by the learned Single Judge at
internal page 16 of the impugned
judgment. The contention therefore of Sri
Shashi Nandan that the learned Single
Judge has not recorded any such finding
or satisfaction does not appear to be
correct.

30. The second question is about the
argument advanced as to whether the
letter dated 9th May, 2000 and its
contents are a mere communication
seeking instructions or they do convey
any wilful or deliberate disobedience. We
have hereinabove appropriately to the best
of our ability translated the contents of the
letter highlighted above and we find in no
unequivocal terms that the appellant has
time and again asserted in the letter that
the payment as a result of the judgment of
the
High Court
would
amount
to
misutilization of government funds on
account of the alleged manipulation in the
date of birth of the employee Phuleshwar
which would result ultimately in an
unnecessary
burden
on
the
State
Exchequer. We are amazed at this
expression of the officer who was clearly
trying to sit in appeal and give an opinion
as if she was under some authority to
reverse what had been directed to be
delivered under the judgments of this
1102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court in the writ jurisdiction. The
expressions used in the letter clearly
establish that the appellant was not
seeking instructions for compliance but
was suggesting a loss that was to be
caused on account of the judgment. The
appellant, who was the drawing and
disbursing
officer
obliged
to
make
payments, instead of compliance was
resisting payment and proceeding not as
per the judgment but was seeking a
direction from the Director without even
referring to the circular of 1993, as if the
Director
could
have
exercised
his
authority contrary to the judgment of the
High Court.

31. The recitals contained in the said
letter were therefore clearly designed to
obviate the execution of the judgment of
the High Court and which fact has been
correctly construed by the learned Single
Judge in the impugned judgment. We,
therefore, find that the letter dated 9th
May, 2000 is not only unhappily worded
but is also a clear indication of the intent
of
the
appellant
to
wilfully
and
deliberately forestall the execution of the
judgment which is a clear defiance and
therefore constitutes a civil contempt as
defined under Section 2(c) read with
Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971. The learned Single Judge was,
therefore, absolutely justified in framing
the charge and arriving at the conclusion
that the act of the appellant amounted to
wilful
and
deliberate
disobedience,
inasmuch as, this is admitted on record
that she on the said date was already
holding charge of District Inspector of
Schools - II.

32. The contention next raised by Sri
Shashi Nandan is about the perceptions of
the learned Single Judge in relation to the
conduct and service and career of the
appellant. It is correct that the same was
not a matter of charge that was to be tried
but that was a matter of record and that
was also indicated in the judgment of the
learned Single Judge which facts have not
been explicitly denied. The institution of
contempt petitions against the appellant
does reflect on her attitude in either not
understanding the orders of the High
Court or her being incapable of trying to
understand the judicial orders which in
our opinion cannot be said to be an
irrelevant consideration for the purpose
punishing her for wilful and deliberate
disobedience.
Her
bold
and
open
expressions, therefore, amount to an
obstinate
act
in
trying
to
create
obstructions in the implementation of
judicial orders wilfully and deliberately. It
is a different matter that the officer may
have been exonerated in any other matter
but this reflects on the career of an officer
who is enjoined with the duty to comply
with the judgment of the High Court
especially where the officer has been
arrayed as a party respondent and
directions have been issued. The said
perceptions of the learned Single Judge
therefore may not have been necessary to
prove the charge but they were absolutely
necessary for the consideration of the
imposition of punishment.

33. Coming to the argument of
subsequent compliance of the directions
of the High Court and the payments made
prior to the framing of the charge against
the appellant, suffice it to say that a delay
in the framing of the charge cannot be a
ground or an excuse to absolve the
appellant of her act of having committed
the contempt in the year 2000 itself. The
delay in the framing of the charge or the
payments having been made is not a
2 All. Smt. Maya Niranjan Vs Phuleshwar & Anr.
1103
relevant
factor
for
judging
the
commission of an act by the appellant of
wilfully and deliberately disobeying the
orders of the High Court. To the contrary,
the subsequent payments clearly establish
that the said payments were wilfully and
deliberately delayed to the recipient who
was entitled to receive the same under a
valid judgment of this Court towards
which the appellant has substantially
contributed obstructions. The same was
delayed for more than four and a half
years for which the appellant was also
responsible in the circumstances indicated
above. It is for this reason that the officers
who succeeded the appellant namely
Farhana
Siddiqui
and
Satyanarain
Srivastava were also punished and their
punishment has been upheld by the
division bench. This factor also therefore
clearly traverses against the appellant and
not in her favour. The subsequent
payments, therefore, do not absolve her of
the contempt that was earlier committed.

34. We now come to the submission
raised by Sri Shashi Nandan regarding the
sentence of imprisonment and compared
with that in the case of Farhana Siddiqui
and Satyanarain Srivastava. We have
carefully perused the judgment of the
division bench dated 15.9.2005 and we
find that the division bench while deleting
the sentence of imprisonment of the
aforesaid two officers has taken notice of
the communication sent by them pleading
justification on the strength of the circular
dated 21st April, 1993. We have not been
able to find any adverse observation by
the division bench in relation to the
language utilised by the aforesaid two
officers in the letters sent by them to the
Director to be offensive or contemptuous.
The finding recorded is that the said
officers had sent letters only for guidance
and financial release and disbursement of
payments under the circular dated 21st
April, 1993 which was justified. There is
no finding recorded by the division bench
that the said contemnors had used any
such language which can be compared
with that of the appellant as expressed in
her letter dated 9th of May, 2000. No such
material has been placed before us.
Consequently, the contention of Sri
Shashi Nandan that the said factors should
be taken into account keeping in view the
judgment of the division bench does not
on parity appeal to us at all. The reason
being that the contents of the letter dated
9th May, 2000 has been found by us to be
clearly contemptuous and intended to
disobey the orders of this Court which
does not appear to be in the case of
Farhana
Siddiqui
and
Satyanarain
Srivastava.

35. Now coming independently to
the issue as to whether the sentence
should be reduced or not, for the reasons
indicated not only hereinabove but also in
the judgment of the division bench dated
15th September, 2005 the non compliance
of the judgment is clearly established and
therefore the conviction and punishment
has to be upheld. However, on the facts
and circumstances of the present case we
while upholding the conviction of the
appellant
reduce
the
sentence
of
imprisonment only to a period of one
month. For this the reasons, apart from
the contents of the letter dated 9.5.2000,
are also that this officer was found by the
learned Single Judge to have returned
back after a couple of months managing
her stay at Allahabad that has been
narrated in the judgment. Her conduct
cannot be compared with that of the other
officers who have been punished. The
appellant therefore deserves the extreme
1104 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
punishment of imprisonment as well. The
appeal stands disposed of with the said
modification.

36. Learned counsel for the
appellant prayed that sometime may be
granted as the appellant may seek her
remedy against our judgment before a
higher forum. We, therefore, provide that
the
our
judgment
delivered
today,
resulting in the coming into effect of the
punishment order shall remain suspended
for a period of fifteen days. In the event
the appellant does not succeed in getting
any further redressal within fifteen days,
she shall surrender to serve out the
sentence thereafter.
----------

(2019)10ILR A 1104

REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.09.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.

S.C.C. Revision No. 86 of 2019

Munnu Yadav ...Defendant/Revisionist
Versus
Ram Kumar Yadav & Anr.
 ...Plaintiff/Respondent

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Sri Ayush Khanna, Sri Atul Dayal

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Manish Tandon

A. U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 -
U.P. Act 13 of 1972 - Section 3(i) - A
small roofless portion of house and
surrounded by boundary wall let out by
the landlord to the tenant - is a building
within the meaning of Section 3(i) of
U.P. Act 13 of 1972 - Roof is not
necessary and indispensable adjunct for
a building.
Held:-A structure or edifice enclosing a space
within its walls, and usually, but not necessarily,
covered with a roof is a building - Roof is not
necessary and indispensable adjunct for a
building because there can be roofless buildings -
An open land including any garden, garages and
out-houses, appurtenant to a roofed structure for
its beneficial engagement shall be a building
within the meaning of Section 3(i) of U.P. Act 13
of 1972. (Para 15)
B. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887
- Section 25 - Practice and procedure -
Objection to jurisdiction/competence of
the court - for the first time in revision -
cannot be allowed to be raised in view of
the provisions of Section 21 of Civil
Procedure Code.
Held: -An objection to the competence of the
court below to decide the SCC Suit cannot be
raised in Revision under Section 25 of the Act,
1887, inasmuch as such an objection could
have been taken by the tenant in the Court of
first
instance
at
the
earliest
possible
opportunity. (Para 17)
Revision dismissed (E-5)
List of cases cited: -
1.Krishna Bhagwan Vs D.J. Bareilly & ors.
1999(2) ARC 248 (Para Nos.6 to 11)
2.Raj Kishore Tandon & ors. Vs D.J. Etawah &
ors. (2006) 1 ARC 880 (Para 4)
3.Surya Kumar Govindjee Vs Krishnammal 7
ors. (1990) 4 SCC 343 (Para 17).
4.Harshad Chiman Lal Modi Vs DLF Universal
Ltd. & anr. (2005) 7 SCC 791 (Para Nos. 30 to
33)
5.Hasham Abbas Sayyad Vs Usman Abbas
Sayyad & ors. (2007) 2 SCC 355 (Paragraph
Nos.
22
and
23)