# Smt. Meena Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 9 ILRA 726
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-09-16
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 3471 of 2025
- **Bench:** Manju Rani Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-meena-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53972
- **Pages:** 22

## Headnote

Ashish Kumar Singh, Ashutosh Mishra,
C.S.C.

Issues for consideration
(a) Whether the conduct of the petitioner
amounts to misconduct?
(b) Whether a disciplinary action actuated by
bias or based on mere suspicion can be
sustained?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - Any administrative or
disciplinary proceeding tainted by mala
fides or actuated by bias cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. Proceedings
initiated with a predetermined mind or mala fide
intent stand vitiated. Arbitrariness or malice in
law, even in administrative actions, strikes at
the root of legality. (Para 57)

In the present case, it is evident that the
proceedings against the petitioner were not
guided by lawful consideration but were the
direct
outcome
of
personal
enmity
and
vindictiveness, thereby rendering the same
wholly unsustainable in law. (Para 59)

It is a clear case of unnecessary
harassment of the petitioner, as all
proceedings against her were initiated
only after she lodged a complaint
against the Registrar. Significantly, the
proceedings were founded upon a complaint
allegedly made by a person who, in fact, had
not filed it. This sequence of events
unmistakably reflects the conduct of the
Registrar, who continued in service with the
University, whereas the petitioner has been
removed from employment. (Para 52, 55,
56)

B. Misconduct must involve a wrongful
act or a willful omission which is
blameworthy and not merely an error of
judgment or inadvertence. (Para 54)

A mere assertion of pursuing higher
studies does not amount to a false
claim
of
possessing
the
said
qualification. Unless there is a clear,
deliberate,
and
conscious
misrepresentation with intent to secure
an undue advantage, the same cannot
constitute misconduct. The petitioner has
merely stated that she is pursuing Ph.D.. At
no stage has she either produced any
document or made a categorical claim that
she had completed Ph.D. course. The alleged
fact was specifically denied before the
enquiry officer as well. Despite this, the
petitioner
has
been
held
guilty
of
misconduct. Such a finding cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. (Para 53)

Even if it is assumed that the petitioner
had mentioned in her application that
she was pursuing a Ph.D. and had
prefixed 'Dr.' to her name, the same by
itself
cannot
be
construed
as
misconduct,
particularly
when
these
aspects have neither been examined nor
established in the course of the enquiry.
(Para 67)

C. There is no material available on record,
nor has any finding been returned,
to
establish that possession of a Ph.D.
degree
was
ever
prescribed
as
an
essential qualification for appointment to
the post of Private Secretary to the ViceChancellor or for promotion to the post of
Staff Officer. It further emerges that no
guidelines or administrative instructions were in
existence to suggest that a candidate holding a
higher academic degree would be entitled to
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
727
any preference or advantage in the matter of
appointment or promotion. (Para 60)

In these circumstances, there was neither
occasion nor necessity for the petitioner to
submit or rely upon a Ph.D. degree. (Para 61,
62)

D.
Disciplinary
action
based
on
no
evidence or mere suspicion cannot be
sustained. No material has been produced to
demonstrate that the petitioner ever derived or
was conferred any advantage by mentioning in
her application, at the time of her selection as
Private Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor, that
she was pursuing Ph.D. The authorities have
proceeded merely on surmises and conjectures,
and that too after the petitioner had rendered
several years of unblemished and satisfactory
service. (Para 63)

The bias of the authorities is evident from the
fact that they have relied solely upon the
allegations made by Mr. S.N. Tiwari, the
officiating
Registrar,
against
whom
the
petitioner had already lodged a complaint.
Despite this, the authorities proceeded to
conduct an enquiry in complete

## Text

_Characters 0–39,982 of 74,941. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39982 for what follows._

726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2025) 9 ILRA 726
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.09.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANJU RANI CHAUHAN, J.

Writ A No. 3471 of 2025

Smt. Meena Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Aishwarya Pratap Shahi, Nipun Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
Ashish Kumar Singh, Ashutosh Mishra,
C.S.C.

Issues for consideration
(a) Whether the conduct of the petitioner
amounts to misconduct?
(b) Whether a disciplinary action actuated by
bias or based on mere suspicion can be
sustained?

Headnotes
A. Service Law - Any administrative or
disciplinary proceeding tainted by mala
fides or actuated by bias cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. Proceedings
initiated with a predetermined mind or mala fide
intent stand vitiated. Arbitrariness or malice in
law, even in administrative actions, strikes at
the root of legality. (Para 57)

In the present case, it is evident that the
proceedings against the petitioner were not
guided by lawful consideration but were the
direct
outcome
of
personal
enmity
and
vindictiveness, thereby rendering the same
wholly unsustainable in law. (Para 59)

It is a clear case of unnecessary
harassment of the petitioner, as all
proceedings against her were initiated
only after she lodged a complaint
against the Registrar. Significantly, the
proceedings were founded upon a complaint
allegedly made by a person who, in fact, had
not filed it. This sequence of events
unmistakably reflects the conduct of the
Registrar, who continued in service with the
University, whereas the petitioner has been
removed from employment. (Para 52, 55,
56)

B. Misconduct must involve a wrongful
act or a willful omission which is
blameworthy and not merely an error of
judgment or inadvertence. (Para 54)

A mere assertion of pursuing higher
studies does not amount to a false
claim
of
possessing
the
said
qualification. Unless there is a clear,
deliberate,
and
conscious
misrepresentation with intent to secure
an undue advantage, the same cannot
constitute misconduct. The petitioner has
merely stated that she is pursuing Ph.D.. At
no stage has she either produced any
document or made a categorical claim that
she had completed Ph.D. course. The alleged
fact was specifically denied before the
enquiry officer as well. Despite this, the
petitioner
has
been
held
guilty
of
misconduct. Such a finding cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. (Para 53)

Even if it is assumed that the petitioner
had mentioned in her application that
she was pursuing a Ph.D. and had
prefixed 'Dr.' to her name, the same by
itself
cannot
be
construed
as
misconduct,
particularly
when
these
aspects have neither been examined nor
established in the course of the enquiry.
(Para 67)

C. There is no material available on record,
nor has any finding been returned,
to
establish that possession of a Ph.D.
degree
was
ever
prescribed
as
an
essential qualification for appointment to
the post of Private Secretary to the ViceChancellor or for promotion to the post of
Staff Officer. It further emerges that no
guidelines or administrative instructions were in
existence to suggest that a candidate holding a
higher academic degree would be entitled to
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
727
any preference or advantage in the matter of
appointment or promotion. (Para 60)

In these circumstances, there was neither
occasion nor necessity for the petitioner to
submit or rely upon a Ph.D. degree. (Para 61,
62)

D.
Disciplinary
action
based
on
no
evidence or mere suspicion cannot be
sustained. No material has been produced to
demonstrate that the petitioner ever derived or
was conferred any advantage by mentioning in
her application, at the time of her selection as
Private Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor, that
she was pursuing Ph.D. The authorities have
proceeded merely on surmises and conjectures,
and that too after the petitioner had rendered
several years of unblemished and satisfactory
service. (Para 63)

The bias of the authorities is evident from the
fact that they have relied solely upon the
allegations made by Mr. S.N. Tiwari, the
officiating
Registrar,
against
whom
the
petitioner had already lodged a complaint.
Despite this, the authorities proceeded to
conduct an enquiry in complete disregard
to the order dated 29.11.2023 passed by
this Court passed in Writ-A No. 13696 of
2023. This Court had issued no direction for
holding a fresh enquiry. Nevertheless, the
authorities, in disregard of the Court's order,
constituted a three-member external committee
to conduct an enquiry, which clearly reflects the
mala fide intention of the authorities concerned.
(Para 64)

Prior to the so-called complaint allegedly moved
by one Vishnu Pratap Singh, which has in fact
been denied by the complainant himself, there
had
never
been
any
grievance
or
allegation at any point of time regarding
the work or conduct of the petitioner. On
the contrary, her service was consistently
found satisfactory and her integrity was
duly certified. The entire course of events
took an adverse turn only after the petitioner
lodged a complaint against the Registrar,
followed by repeated enquiries, the last of which
was conducted in a manner contrary to the
directions issued by this Court. (Para 65)

Writ petition allowed. (E-4)

Case Law Cited
1. Vishaka Vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC
241 (Para 19)

2. M.S. Bindra Vs. Union of India, (1998) 7 SCC
310 (Para 29)

3. B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India and
others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 (Para 30)

4. Prem Nath Bali Vs. Registrar, High Court of
Delhi and another, (2015) 16 SCC 415 (Para 30)

5. Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India and others,
(1987) 4 SCC 611 (Para 31)

6. Colour-Chem Ltd. Vs. A.L. Alaspurkar and
others, (1998) 3 SCC 192 (Para 31)

7. Sukhbir Singh Vs. The Deputy Commissioner
of Police, New Delhi and others, 1984 SCC
OnLine Del 18; (1984) 2 SLR 149 (Para 31)

8. Shankar Dass Vs. Union of India and another,
(1985) 2 SCC 358; 1986 Supreme Court Cases
(Cri) 242 (Para 31)

9. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. Rajendra D.
Harmalkar, (2022) 17 SCC 361 (Para 34)

10. Kiran Thakur Vs. Resident Commissioner,
Bihar Bhawan Neutral Citation, 2023 DHC 3459
(Para 34)

11. General Manager, Appellate Authority, Bank
of India and another Vs. Mohd. Nizamuddin,
(2006) 7 SCC 410; 2006 SCC (L&S) 1663; AIR
2006 SC 3290 (Para 49)

12. Ravi Yashwant Bhoir Vs. Collector, (2012) 4
SCC 407; 2012 SCC OnLine SC 237 (Para 50)

13. Union of India and others Vs. J. Ahmed,
(1979) 2 SCC 286 (Para 54)

14. State of Punjab and others Vs. Ram Singh
ExConstable, (1992) 4 SCC 54 (Para 54)

15. State of Punjab Vs. V.K. Khanna and others,
(2001) 2 SCC 330 (Para 57)
728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
16. Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and others Vs.
State of U.P. and others, (1991) 1 SCC 212
(Para 57)

17. Ramesh Chander Singh Vs. High Court of
Allahabad and another, (2007) 4 SCC 247 (Para
57)

18. Union of India Vs. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC
364 (Para 63)

19. Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank
and others, (2009) 2 SCC 570 (Para 63)

List of Acts/Commentaries
P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon, Reprint
Edition 1987 at page 821.

List of Keywords
Service, promotion, terminated, regularized,
appointment, suspension.

Appearances for Parties
For Petitioner: Aishwarya Pratap Shahi, Nipun
Singh
For
Respondent:
Ashish
Kumar
Singh,
Ashutosh Mishra, C.S.C.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manju Rani
Chauhan, J.)

1. The petitioner has preferred the
present writ petition challenging an order
dated 14.12.2024 passed by the Registrar,
Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida,
Gautam Budh Nagar, whereby her services
from the post of Private Secretary, have
been terminated.

2. Facts of the case are that initially,
the petitioner was appointed as Private
Secretary1 to Vice Chancellor, Gautam
Buddha University, Greater Noida, Gautam
Budh Nagar2, on contractual basis on
08.07.2010. At the time of appointment, the
petitioner was fully eligible for the post of
PS as she was having M.Phil, M.Ed. and
M.A. Degrees along with four years of
experience. Her services were regularized
by an order of the Vice Chancellor dated
13.04.2018. Later, the petitioner being
eligible for promotion, was promoted vide
order dated 18.09.2018 as Staff Officer to
Vice
Chancellor.
The
eligibility
for
promotion to the post of Staff Officer is
'Graduation', five years of continuous
service in Gautam Buddha University in
the Grade Pay of Rs. 4800 and good record
of work.

3. The petitioner has been discharging
her duties with utmost sincerity and
devotion. She carried an impeccable
reputation in the University. During her
service period from 2010 to 2017, out of
eight years, in seven she was awarded
'outstanding'
remark
in
her
annual
assessment record and for one year as
'good'.

4. On 18.08.2020, the petitioner was
suspended mentioning about a legal notice
of one Vishnu Pratap Singh moved through
Amit Kumar Agarwal, Advocate, alleging
irregularities in her appointment as Private
Secretary and promotion as Staff Officer.
Aggrieved by the suspension order, the
petitioner preferred Civil Misc. Writ
Petition No. 7156 of 2020. Initially, the
Court directed the University to file a
counter affidavit and no interim order was
granted. Finally, writ petition came to be
disposed of with certain directions, on
21.09.2022.

5. Meanwhile, Sri S.N. Tiwari, the
then Officiating Registrar, lodged a first
information report against the petitioner
through an application moved under
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., bearing Case Crime
No. 166 of 2020, under Sections 420, 467,
468, 471 IPC. Aggrieved thereby, the
petitioner preferred Criminal Misc. Writ
Petition No. 16275 of 2020, which was
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
729
dismissed as not-pressed on 05.01.2021.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed Criminal
Misc. Anticipatory Bail Application U/s
438 Cr.P.C. No. 4389 of 2021, which was
allowed by order dated 06.04.2021. The
matter was investigated and ultimately a
final report was submitted in the said case,
on 09.07.2021.

6. In terms of the suspension order, an
enquiry committee comprising three faculty
members, was constituted by an order dated
21.08.2020. Said order was appended with
'terms of reference' which mentioned five
articles on the basis of charges levelled
against the petitioner.

7. On 27.10.2020, the Vice Chancellor
substituted the enquiry committee by
appointing
a
single-member
enquiry
committee, who again served a new chargesheet upon the petitioner. The petitioner
made a request to the Presenting Officer
through
an
e-mail
dated
31.10.2020
requesting
for
providing
supportive
documents mentioned in Annexure-II to the
said order dated 27.10.2020.

8. The petitioner submitted her first
reply before the enquiry officer on
09.11.2020. On 21.12.2020, the enquiry
officer was changed and in place of Dr.
Sumati Verma, Sri Ravi Kant Sinha was
appointed as enquiry officer. The petitioner
appeared before the enquiry officer, on
third date of hearing, which was scheduled
for 25.01.2021. She sought time to produce
some witnesses. Whereafter, she submitted
supplementary reply / statement of defence
on 06.03.2021, denying all the charges
levelled against her. She also requested the
enquiry officer to afford her an opportunity to
cross-examine Sri S.N. Tiwari, however, her
request
was
outrightly
rejected.
On
13.03.2021, Sri S.N. Tiwari appeared before
the enquiry officer, but no access was given
to the petitioner to cross-examine him.
Petitioner also sought permission to produce
Sri Umakant Ahirwar as her witness, but the
request was turned down.

9. In the meantime, Sri S.N. Tiwari got a
writ petition of quo-warranto being Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 18675 of 2020, filed
through a practising lawyer Sri Pankaj Kumar
Kesharwani, before this Court, challenging
the petitioner' s appointment. Said writ
petition is still pending.

10. The petitioner was issued a second
show cause notice on 27.09.2022, to which
she submitted her reply on 10.10.2022. Said
reply was examined and forwarded by the
Senior Office Assistant to the Board of
Management. On 01.11.2022, the petitioner
received an e-mail from the Registrar of the
University
enclosing
therewith
her
termination
order
dated
30.10.20226
purportedly
passed
by
the
Board
of
Management,
without
affording
any
opportunity to the petitioner.

11.
First
termination
order
was
challenged by the petitioner by means of
Writ-A No. 19902 of 2022, which was
disposed of by this Court by order dated
08.12.2022, setting aside the termination
order dated 30.10.2022 and granting liberty
to the petitioner to submit a fresh reply to the
second show cause notice dated 27.9.2022
within a period of three weeks. By the said
order, the Board of Management was directed
to communicate a short date for personal
hearing to the petitioner and thereafter pass a
fresh order in accordance with law within a
period of two months from the date of
compliance shown by the petitioner.

12.
In
compliance
with
the
aforementioned order, the petitioner was
730 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
asked to appear before the Board of
Management. She submitted her reply.
However, without considering petitioner's
written reply and oral submissions, an order
dated 02.03.20238 was passed, again
removing
the
petitioner's
services.
Challenging
the
said
order
dated
02.03.2023, the petitioner preferred Writ-A
No. 6339 of 2023, which was disposed of
by order dated 18.04.2023, directing the
competent authority to hear the petitioner
afresh, giving due consideration to her
reply submitted before it, which the
petitioner will be submitting within a
period of two weeks, and pass a fresh order
in the light of observations made therein, as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within
a period of two months from the date of
production of certified copy of the order
along with reply by the petitioner.

13. In terms of the aforesaid order
dated 18.04.2023, the petitioner submitted
her detailed reply along with supportive
documents on 04.05.2023, wherein besides
reiterating her earlier contentions, she
specifically and emphatically asserted that
the Ph.D. degree had no role either in her
initial appointment or in her promotion.
She also pleaded that she has been deprived
of opportunity to cross-examine Sri S.N.
Tiwari and that no oral evidence or witness
proved the charges levelled in the enquiry
report. On 14.06.2023, the petitioner
appeared before the Board of Management
and vehemently raised her contentions.

14. The Board of Management, in its
meeting dated 14.06.2023, resolved to
terminate the services of the petitioner and
consequently, the order dated 27.06.202310
was passed by the Registrar of the
University. Said termination order was
challenged by the petitioner by means of
Writ-A No. 13696 of 2023. This Court by
order dated 29.11.2023 partly allowed the
said writ petition with the following
directions:

(a) The order dated 27.06.2023
as well as the minutes of the Board of
Management, Gautam Buddha University,
Greater Noida, Gautam Budh Nagar dated
14.06.2023 are set aside;

(b) The matter stands remitted
back to the respondents to conduct the
disciplinary
proceedings
against
the
petitioner from the stage of issuing Show
Cause Notice/ Disagreement Note;

(c) The proceedings shall be
concluded within a period of three months
from the date of production of certified
copy of the order subject to cooperation of
the writ petitioner, strictly in accordance
with statutes and ordinances, as applicable
after providing adequate opportunity to the
writ petitioner;

(d) The question of reinstatement
and payment of consequential benefits shall
be subject to final outcome of the
disciplinary proceedings;

(e) In case, the disciplinary
authority proposes to suspend the writ
petitioner, then the writ petitioner shall be
admissible
to
subsistence
allowance,
arrears and current as and when same falls
due subject to compliance of the Rules.

15. Pursuant to the aforesaid directions
of the order passed by this Court dated
29.11.2023, the petitioner was served with
a show cause notice on 23.03.2024,
wherein she was asked to submit reply
within seven days. Reply to the said notice
was given by the petitioner on 07.04.2024.
Thereafter, the petitioner appeared in the
meetings of the Board of Management on
13.05.2024 and 31.07.2024. Subsequently,
a letter was received by the petitioner from
one Advocate, namely, Mr. S.C. Tripathi
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
731
asking for her presence. Since the petitioner
was not aware about the constitution of the
external committee, she communicated
with the University, whereupon she was
provided the terms of reference and the
order with respect to formation of new
committee. The petitioner submitted her
response to the 'terms of reference' and
placed certain documents in support of her
claim. She also submitted her reply on
07.10.2024. Thereafter, a copy of enquiry
report dated 08.11.2024 was received by
the petitioner along with letter dated
13.11.2024, whereby she was asked to
submit a response within seven days. In
response thereto, the petitioner submitted
her reply on 20.11.2024.

16.
Thereafter,
the
respondent
authority - Registrar of the University
passed
the
impugned
order
dated
14.12.202412, whereby petitioner's services
have been terminated. Said order is being
assailed by the petitioner by means of
present writ petition.

17. I have heard Sri Nipun Singh,
learned Advocate along with Sri Aishwarya
Pratap Shahi, learned counsel for the
petitioner, Sri Ashish Kumar Singh, learned
Advocate along with Sri Ashutosh Mishra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondent
University
and
Sri
Ashish
Kumar
Nagvanshi,
learned
Additional
Chief
Standing Counsel for the State.

18. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner has been
performing her duties with utmost sincerity
and devotion since the date of her initial
appointment as Private Secretary. Having
fulfilled the eligibility criteria for being
promoted
as
Staff
Officer
to
Vice
Chancellor,
she
was
promoted
on
17.04.2018, however, with a malafide
intent to harass the petitioner, on account of
the complaint moved by her against the
Officiating Registrar of the University, Sri
S.N. Tiwari, on 06.08.2020, alleging
misbehaviour and sexual harassment, the
disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against the petitioner.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further submits that in reference to the
guidelines formulated by the Apex Court in
the case of Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan,
the University has constituted an Internal
Complaint Committee (ICC), however, in a
blatant disregard to the directions issued
therein it has failed to conduct any inquiry.
On
the
contrary,
in
retaliation,
the
petitioner has been targeted placing her
under suspension on 18.08.2020, on the
basis of a forged complaint.

20. It is argued by learned counsel for
the petitioner that the alleged complaint
dated 27.08.2020 has been disowned by
Mr.
Vishnu
Pratap
Singh
(alleged
complainant), who stated on oath that he
had neither instructed any advocate to issue
a notice nor he is aware of any such notice.
Relying upon the said affidavit of alleged
complaintant, the disciplinary action should
have been nullified.

21. Stressing upon the ill-intent of Sri
S.N. Tiwari, the then Registrar, learned
counsel for the petitioner further contends
that Sri S.N. Tiwari has himself proceeded
to lodge a first information report against
the petitioner, wherein the proceedings
culminated
in
a
closure
report
on
09.07.2021
and
the
petitioner
was
exonerated from the alleged criminal
liability.

22. To show biased and premeditated
mind of Sri S.N. Tiwari to anyhow harass
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the petitioner, learned counsel for the
petitioner next submits that Mr. Tiwari got
a writ petition of quo-warranto14 filed
before this Court through a practising
Advocate of this Court Sri Pankaj Kumar
Kesharwani, which is still pending.

23. Learned counsel for the petitioner
contends that the petitioner's suspension
and, later on, termination have been made
on account of malafide intent of respondent
authorities whose sole motive was to
anyhow penalize the petitioner so as to
wreck vengeance of filing complaint
against the officiating Registrar, whereas
the enquiry officer in the enquiry report
dated 04.06.2021 himself observed that the
petitioner was indeed pursuing her Ph.D as
stated in the curriculum vitae submitted
along
with
her
application
dated
07.07.2010 for the post of PS/Executive
Assistant. At that time, she did not make
any wrongful claim regarding she being a
Ph.D candidate in order to emphasise her
candidature as competent enough for the
post of PS/ Executive Assistant to VC,
GBU.

24. Laying emphasis on the challenge
to the impugned termination order dated
14.12.2024,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner summarized his submissions,
inter alia, stating that said order has been
passed in total disregard to the specific
directions issued by this Court in the order
dated 29.11.2023 passed in Writ-A No.
13696 of 2023, which are being reproduced
herein below:

"35. Accordingly the writ petition
is decided in the following manner:- (a)
The order dated 27.06.2023 as well as the
minutes of the Board of Management,
Gautam
Buddha
University,
Greater
Noida,
Gautam
Budh
Nagar
dated
14.06.2023 are set aside; (b) The matter
stands remitted back to the respondents to
conduct
the
disciplinary
proceedings
against the petitioner from the stage of
issuing Show Cause Notice/ Disagreement
Note; (c) The proceedings shall be
concluded within a period of three months
from the date of production of certified
copy of the order subject to cooperation of
the writ petitioner, strictly in accordance
with statutes and ordinances, as applicable
after providing adequate opportunity to the
writ petitioner; (d) The question of
reinstatement
and
payment
of
consequential benefit shall be subject to
final
outcome
of
the
disciplinary
proceedings; (e) In case, the disciplinary
authority proposes to suspend the writ
petitioner, then the writ petitioner shall be
admissible
to
subsistence
allowance,
arrears and current as and when same falls
due subject to compliance of the Rules."

25. It is argued by learned counsel for
the petitioner that the respondent authority
has erroneously proceeded to constitute an
external
committee
comprising
of
following members:

(i) Sri Lalloo Singh, District
Sessions Judge (Retired)-Chairman;

(ii) Sri Anurag Ojha, Advocateon-Record, Supreme Court of India; and

(iii)
Dr.
Chandrashekhar
Paswan,
Assistant
Professor,
Gautam
Buddha University.

26. Controverting to the enquiry report
dated 08.11.2024, learned counsel for the
petitioner
submits
that
the
enquiry
committee failed to appreciate the true facts
and reply of the petitioner. He further
submits that there is no dispute regarding
eligibility of the petitioner for the post of
Private
Secretary
as
mentioned
in
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
733
Paragraph No. 20 of the counter affidavit.
The respondent University has also not
disputed the educational qualification of the
petitioner. He further contends that in view
of the prescribed eligibility criteria, Ph.D.
degree does not play any role for the
appointment of a candidate as Private
Secretary or promotion on the post of Staff
Officer to the Vice Chancellor. No benefit
was extended to the petitioner on the basis
of Ph.D. degree.

27.
It
is
also
contended
that
petitioner's application for the post of
Assistant Professor showing a fake Ph.D.
degree does not adversely affect her
minimum educational qualification, which
she
possesses
for
appointment
and
promotion on the post of Private Secretary
and Staff Officer to Vice Chancellor,
respectively. Insofar as the salutation 'Dr.',
said to have been used by the petitioner, it
did not extend any benefit in favour of the
petitioner either at the time of her initial
appointment
as
Private
Secretary
or
thereafter promotion as Staff Officer.

28. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further contended that the impugned order
has been passed without application of
mind and sans taking into consideration of
the
written
objections
filed
by
the
petitioner. Neither any finding nor any
reason has been recorded therein except
treating the report of external committee
dated 08.11.2024 as a gospel truth. The
objections raised by the petitioner in her
detailed
reply,
after
issuance
of
disagreement note or even before passing
the impugned termination order, have not
been considered.

29. Regarding justification to ram an
officer with the label of 'doubtful integrity',
learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn
the attention of the Court to the following
observations of the Apex Court in the case
of M.S. Bindra v. Union of India15:

"13. While viewing this case from
the next angle for judicial scrutiny, i.e.,
want of evidence or material to reach such
a conclusion, we may add that want of any
material is almost equivalent to the next
situation that from the available materials,
no reasonable man would reach such a
conclusion. While evaluating the materials,
the authority should not altogether ignore
the reputation in which the officer was held
till recently. The maxim "nemo firut repente
turpissimus" (no one becomes dishonest all
of a sudden) is not unexceptional but still it
is a salutary guideline to judge human
conduct, particularly in the field of
administrative law. The authorities should
not keep their eyes totally closed towards
the overall estimation in which the
delinquent officer was held in the recent
past by those who were supervising him
earlier. To dunk an officer into the puddle
of "doubtful integrity", it is not enough that
the doubt fringes on a mere hunch. That
doubt should be of such a nature as would
reasonably
and
consciously
be
entertainable by a reasonable man on the
given material. Mere possibility is hardly
sufficient to assume that it would have
happened. There must be preponderance of
probability for the reasonable man to
entertain doubt regarding that possibility.
Only then there is justification to ram an
officer with the label "doubtful integrity".

30. In support of his submissions, with
respect
to
judicial
interference
in
disciplinary matters and consideration of
quantum of punishment, learned counsel
for the petitioner has drawn the attention of
this Court to the relevant paragraphs of
following judgements:
734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of
India and others16:

18. A review of the above legal
position
would
establish
that
the
disciplinary authority, and on appeal the
appellate authority, being fact-finding
authorities
have
exclusive
power
to
consider the evidence with a view to
maintain discipline. They are invested with
the
discretion
to
impose
appropriate
punishment keeping in view the magnitude or
gravity of the misconduct. The High
Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of
judicial review, cannot normally substitute its
own conclusion on penalty and impose some
other penalty. If the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould
the
relief,
either
directing
the
disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider
the penalty imposed, or to shorten the
litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and
rare cases, impose appropriate punishment
with cogent reasons in support thereof."

(ii) Prem Nath Bali v. Registrar,
High Court of Delhi and another17:

20. It is a settled principle of law
that once the charges levelled against the
delinquent employee are proved then it is
for the appointing authority to decide as to
what punishment should be imposed on the
delinquent employee as per the Rules. The
appointing authority, keeping in view the
nature and gravity of the charges, findings
of the inquiry officer, entire service record
of the delinquent employee and all relevant
factors relating to the delinquent, exercised
its discretion and then imposed the
punishment as provided in the Rules.

21. Once such discretion is
exercised by the appointing authority in
inflicting the punishment (whether minor or
major) then the courts are slow to interfere
in the quantum of punishment and only in
rare and appropriate case substitutes the
punishment. Such power is exercised when
the court finds that the delinquent employee
is able to prove that the punishment
inflicted on him is wholly unreasonable,
arbitrary and disproportionate to the
gravity of the proved charges thereby
shocking the conscience of the court or
when it is found to be in contravention of
the Rules. The Court may, in such cases,
remit the case to the appointing authority
for imposing any other punishment as
against what was originally awarded to the
delinquent employee by the appointing
authority as per the Rules or may substitute
the punishment by itself instead of remitting
to the appointing authority."

31. Emphasising upon 'doctrine of
proportionality',
while
considering
punishment for the misconduct, learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon
the following judgements:

(i) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India
and others18:

"25. Judicial review generally
speaking, is not directed against a decision,
but is directed against the "decisionmaking process". The question of the
choice and quantum of punishment is
within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
court-martial. But the sentence has to suit
the offence and the offender. It should not
be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not
be so disproportionate to the offence as to
shock the conscience and amount in itself
to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine
of proportionality, as part of the concept of
judicial review, would ensure that even on
an aspect which is, otherwise, within the
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
735
exclusive province of the court-martial, if
the decision of the court even as to
sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,
then the sentence would not be immune
from
correction.
Irrationality
and
perversity are recognised grounds of
judicial review. In Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 19
Lord Diplock said:

"Judicial review has I think
developed to a stage today when, without
reiterating any analysis of the steps by
which the development has come about,
one can conveniently classify under three
heads the grounds on which administrative
action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground I would call
'illegality', the second 'irrationality' and the
third 'procedural impropriety'. That is not
to say that further development on a case
by case basis may not in course of time add
further grounds. I have in mind particularly
the possible adoption in the future of the
principle of 'proportionality' which is
recognised in the administrative law of
several of our fellow members of the
European Economic Community;. . ."

(ii) Colour-Chem Ltd. v. A.L.
Alaspurkar and others20:

"10.
For
resolving
the
controversy centering round this point it is
necessary to have a look at the relevant
statutory provisions of the Act. The Act was
passed by the Maharashtra Legislature in
1971 as Act 1 of 1972. Amongst its diverse
objects and reasons one of the reasons for
enacting the said Act was for defining and
providing for prevention of certain unfair
labour practices, to constitute courts (as
independent machinery) for carrying out
the purposes mentioned therein one of
which being enforcing provisions relating
to unfair labour practices. "Unfair labour
practices" is defined by Section 3 subsection (16) of the Act to mean, "unfair
labour practices as defined in Section 26".
Section 26 of the Act lays down that,
"unless the context requires otherwise,
"unfair labour practices" mean any of the
practices listed in Schedules II, III and IV".
We are not concerned with Schedules II
and III which deal with unfair labour
practices on the part of the employer and
trade unions. We are directly concerned
with Schedule IV which deals with general
unfair labour practices on the part of the
employers. The relevant provisions of Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Act read as under:

"1. To discharge or dismiss
employees-

(a) by way of victimisation;

(b)-(f) * * *

(g) for misconduct of a minor or
technical character, without having any
regard to the nature of the particular
misconduct or the past record of service of
the employee, so as to amount to a
shockingly disproportionate punishment."

So far as the aforesaid clause (g)
is concerned the Labour Court has held
that the misconduct alleged against the
respondents and held proved before it was
not misconduct of minor or technical
character as they were found sleeping on
duty and were also guilty of negligence in
keeping the machine in working state
without putting necessary raw material
therein. As the aforesaid finding of the
Labour
Court
about
the
nature
of
misconduct of Respondents 3 and 4 was
confirmed by the revisional court and as
that finding was not challenged by the
respondents before the High Court we shall
proceed for the present discussion on the
basis that Respondents 3 and 4 were guilty
of major misconduct. The moot question,
therefore, which falls for consideration is
whether on the express language of clause
736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(g) the said provision gets attracted or not.
A conjoint reading of different sub-parts of
the aforesaid provision, in our view, leaves
no room for doubt that it deals with an
unfair labour practice said to have been
committed by an employer who discharges
or dismisses an employee for misconduct of
a minor or technical character and while
doing so no regard is kept to the nature of
the misconduct alleged and proved against
the delinquent or without having regard to
the past service record of the employee so
that under these circumstances the ultimate
punishment imposed on the delinquent
would be found by the court to be a
shockingly disproportionate punishment. It
is not possible to agree with the contention
of
learned
Senior
Counsel
for
the
respondent-workmen that the said clause
would also cover even major misconduct if
for
such
misconduct
the
orders
of
discharge or dismissal are passed by the
employer without having regard to the
nature of the particular misconduct or the
past record of the employees and if under
these circumstances it is found by the court
that
the
punishment
imposed
is
a
shockingly disproportionate one. It is true
that after the words "for misconduct of a
minor or technical character" there is
found a comma in clause (g), but if the
contention of learned Senior Counsel is to
be accepted the comma will have to be
replaced by "or". That cannot be done in
the context and settings of the said clause
as the said exercise apart from being
impermissible
would
not
make
a
harmonious reading of the provision. Even
that apart, in the said clause (g) the
legislature has used the word "or" while
dealing with the topic of non-consideration
by the employer while imposing the
punishment the relevant factors to be
considered,
namely,
either
the
nonconsideration
of
the
nature
of
the
particular misconduct or the past record of
service of the employee, which would make
the punishment appear to be shockingly
disproportionate
to
the
charge
of
misconduct
held
proved
against
the
delinquent. Thus the term "or" as employed
by the legislature in the said clause refers
to
the
same
topic,
namely,
nonconsideration of relevant aspects by the
employer while imposing the punishment.
Consequently it cannot be said to have any
reference to the nature of the misconduct,
whether minor or major. It must, therefore,
be held that the comma as found in the
clause after providing for the nature of the
misconduct only indicates how the same
nature of the misconduct referred to in the
first part of the clause results in a
shockingly disproportionate punishment if
certain relevant factors, as mentioned in
the subsequent part of the clause, are not
considered
by
the
employer.
If
the
contention of learned Senior Counsel for
the respondents was right all the sub-parts
of clause (g) have to be read disjunctively
and not conjunctively. That would result in
a very anomalous situation. In such an
eventuality the discharge or dismissal of an
employee in case of a major misconduct
without regard to the nature of the
particular misconduct or past record of
service may by itself amount to shockingly
disproportionate punishment. Consequently
for a proved major misconduct, if past
service record is not seen, the punishment
of discharge or dismissal by itself may
amount to a shockingly disproportionate
punishment. Such an incongruous result is
not contemplated by clause (g) of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Act. Such type of
truncated operation of the said provision is
contra-indicated by the very texture and
settings of the said clause. Once the said
clause deals with the topic of misconduct of
a minor or technical character it is difficult
9 All. Smt. Meena Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
737
to appreciate how the said clause can be
construed
as
covering
also
major
misconduct for which there is not even a
whisper in the said clause. On a
harmonious construction of the said clause
with all its sub-parts, therefore, it must be
held that the legislature had contemplated,
while enacting the said clause, punishment
of discharge or dismissal for misconduct of
minor or technical character which, when
seen in the light of the nature of the
particular minor or technical misconduct
or the past record of the employee, would
amount to inflicting of a shockingly
disproportionate
punishment.
In
this
connection we may mention that the same
learned Judge B.N. Srikrishna, J., in a
latter decision in the case of Pandurang
Kashinath Wani v. Divisional Controller,
Maharashtra SRTC21 has taken the view
that clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of
the Act refers to minor or technical
misconduct only. The same view was also
taken
by
another
learned
Judge
Jahagirdar, J., in the case of Maharashtra
SRTC v. Niranjan Sridhar Gade22. So far
as this Court is concerned the same Act
came up for consideration in the case of
Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu
Kate23. It is, of course, true that the
question with which this Court was
concerned was a different one, namely,
whether before any final discharge or
dismissal order is passed, a complaint
could be filed under the Act on the ground
that the employer was contemplating to
commit such unfair labour practice, if
ultimately the departmental proceedings
were likely to result into final orders of
dismissal or discharge attracting any of the
clauses of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act.
However, while considering the scheme of
the Act especially the very same Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Act a Bench of this
Court consisting of G.N. Ray, J. and one of
us S.B. Majmudar, J. in para 26 of the
Report assumed that the said clause would
cover minor misconduct.

11. Learned Senior Counsel for
the respondents was right when she
contended that this being a labour welfare
legislation liberal construction should be
placed on the relevant provisions of the
Act. She rightly invited our attention to
para 41 of the Report of the aforesaid case
in this connection. She also invited our
attention to a decision of this Court in the
case of Workmen v. Firestone Tyre and
Rubber Co.