# Smt. Meetu Paruthi Revisionist v. Kushank Paruthi Opp. Party 416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

- **Citation:** (2024) 8 ILRA 415
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-08-30
- **Case number:** Civil Revision No. 75 of 2024
- **Bench:** Neeraj Tiwari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-meetu-paruthi-revisionist-v-kushank-paruthi-opp-party-416-indian-law-52339
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Poorva
Agarwal,
Punit
Kumar
Gupta,
Satyendra Nath Tripathi

A. Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
O. VII R. 11 - Court Fees Act, 1870 -
Deficiency of court fees - Revision against
order allowing the defendant's application
under O. VII R. 11 - Maintainability -
Alternative remedy of appeal under Act,
1870, how far create bar - Held, revision
is
maintainable
and
even
otherwise
alternative remedy is not the absolute bar.
(Para 13)

B. Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
O. VII R. 11 - Court Fees Act, 1870 - S.
7(iv)(a) - Court fees - No court fees was
claimed to be paid on the basis that the suit
is for declaring Will deed void not for
cancellation of the same - Permissibility -
Held, Section 7 (iv) (a) of Act, 1870 clearly
says that either suit is for cancellation or
adjudging it to void, in both eventuality,
court fee is required, therefore, there is no
confusion in the statute - A suit has been
preferred after death of testator, therefore,
in the light of Section 7 (iv-a) of Act, 1870, it
is having money value and court fee is liable
to be paid. (Para 18 and 22)

Revision dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. Smt. Meetu Paruthi Vs. Kushank Paruthi
415
industrialization which itself does not
provide for any restriction or limitations in
its application to any particular segment or
the
industries
given
by
the
State
Government has to be liberally construed
keeping in view the object for such grant of
subsidies or benefits to the industrial units.

16. Sri Sanjay Sarin, learned Standing
Counsel for the State has opposed the
revision. He has submitted that there is no
infirmity in the order passed by the
Commissioner, Commercial Tax as well as
Commercial Tax Tribunal wherein it has
denied the benefit to the revisionist of the
Notification dated 10.08.2017 where it was
found that the revisionist is already taking
benefit of concessional rate of tax as
provided for by the State Government in its
Notification dated 07.12.2019 and they
cannot be given a benefit of transpiration of
sugarcane from the Cane Purchase Centre
to Factory Premises, once the same benefit
has
already
been
obtained
by
the
revisionist.

17. The benefit granted by Notification
dated 07.12.2019 clearly confines to the
industrial
units
who
are
engaged
in
manufacture of sugar after purchasing
sugarcane from the farmers where benefits of
transportation from the Cane Purchase Centre
to the Factory Gate was provided, while by
Notification dated 10.08.2017. Benefit for
concessional rate of tax was provided to all
the industrial units for the purpose of
manufacture of taxable goods. Clearly even
if the revisionist has received benefit under
the Notification dated 07.12.2019 he cannot
be denied the benefits under Notification
dated 10.08.2017 inasmuch as there is no
provision for excluding the revisionist for
being granted benefit under the said
Notification, and no such restrictions could
be placed before us.

18. Had it been the intention of the
Government to deny the benefit of the
Notification dated 10.08.2017 in light of the
fact that the sugar industrial units are already
obtaining benefits under Notification dated
07.12.2019, the said facts would have been
clearly mentioned in the Notification dated
10.08.2017. In absence of any restrictive
clause in the Notification dated 10.08.2017,
the Tribunal as well as the Commissioner,
Commercial Tax had erred in interpreting and
restricting
the
interpretation
of
the
Notification
dated
10.08.2017
in
its
application to the sugar manufacturing units.

19. In light of the aforesaid discussions,
this Court is of the considered view that
Commissioner, Commercial Tax as well as
Commercial Tax Tribunal both have erred in
interpreting the provisions of Notification
dated 10.08.2017, according this Court is of
the considered view that the revisionist
clearly falls within the ambit of provisions
contained in the aforesaid notification and
was entitled to the benefit for purchase of
diesel at the concessional rate of tax as
prescribed therein.

20. In light of the above, the revision is
allowed.
The
impugned
orders
dated
04.12.2020 and 25.02.2021 are set aside.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 415
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.

Civil Revision No. 75 of 2024

Smt. Meetu Paruthi ...Revisionist
Versus
Kushank Paruthi ...Opp. Party
416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Revisionist:
Shantanu

Counsel for the Opp. Party:
Poorva
Agarwal,
Punit
Kumar
Gupta,
Satyendra Nath Tripathi

A. Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
O. VII R. 11 - Court Fees Act, 1870 -
Deficiency of court fees - Revision against
order allowing the defendant's application
under O. VII R. 11 - Maintainability -
Alternative remedy of appeal under Act,
1870, how far create bar - Held, revision
is
maintainable
and
even
otherwise
alternative remedy is not the absolute bar.
(Para 13)

B. Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
O. VII R. 11 - Court Fees Act, 1870 - S.
7(iv)(a) - Court fees - No court fees was
claimed to be paid on the basis that the suit
is for declaring Will deed void not for
cancellation of the same - Permissibility -
Held, Section 7 (iv) (a) of Act, 1870 clearly
says that either suit is for cancellation or
adjudging it to void, in both eventuality,
court fee is required, therefore, there is no
confusion in the statute - A suit has been
preferred after death of testator, therefore,
in the light of Section 7 (iv-a) of Act, 1870, it
is having money value and court fee is liable
to be paid. (Para 18 and 22)

Revision dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. Pramila Tiwari Vs Anil Kumar Mishra & ors.;
2024:AHC:85067-DB

2. Civil Revision No. 599 of 1988; St. of U.P. Vs
Mahant Shiva Nand Giri & ors.

3. First Appeal From Order No. 344 of 1997;
Kailash Chand Vs Vth A.C.J., Meerut & ors.

4. First Appeal From Order No. 1480 of 2009;
Rajni Swami Vs Shakuntala Sharma

5. First Appeal From Order No. 3382 of 2011;
Sudha Sharma Vs Shashi Bala Sharma
6. Original Suit No. 4 of 2021; St. of West
Bengal Vs U.O.I.decided on 10.07.2024 (SC)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Shantanu along with Sri
Raj Kumar Dhama, learned counsel for
revisionist and Sri Punit Kumar Gupta,
learned counsel for opposite party.

2. Present civil revision has been
filed seeking following relief:-

 "It is, therefore, Most Respectfully
prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
graciously be pleased to stay the effect and
operation of the impugned Judgment and
Order dated 12.03.2024 passed by the
Learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior
Division) Court No. 9, Meerut in Original
Suit No. 1100 of 2023 (Smt. Meetu vs.
Kushank Paruthi) allowing the Application
No. 46 Ga filed by the defendant/respondent
under Order 7 Rule 11 of C.P.C.; during the
pendency of the present revision before this
Hon'ble Court, otherwise the revisionist shall
suffer irreparable loss and injury."

3. At the very outset, Sri Punit
Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for opposite
party has raised preliminary objection and
submitted that against the impugned order,
there is remedy to file appeal under the
provisions of The Court-fees Act, 1870
(hereinafter referred to as ' Act, 1870').

4. Sri Shantanu, learned counsel for
revisionist has objected the submission
made by learned counsel for opposite party
and submitted that present revision has
been filed against the order passed upon the
application filed under Order VII Rule 11
of CPC, therefore, there is no occasion for
the revisionist to file appeal and revision is
the remedy provided under the law.
8 All. Smt. Meetu Paruthi Vs. Kushank Paruthi
417

5. On merits, he submitted that
Original Suit No. 1100 of 2023 has been
filed before learned Civil Judge (Senior
Division), Meerut under sections 34 & 38
of Specific Relief Act, 1963 to declare void
alleged
fraudulent
Will
deed
dated
26.03.2021
registered
on
20.02.2023
executed by Late Naresh Kumar Paruthi
husband of revisionist Smt. Neetu Paruthi.
Further, for seeking declaratory decree and
permanent injunction in half share of the
revisionist in the property belonging to
Late Sri Naresh Kumar Partuthi after his
death. After filing of suit, application under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC has been filed
by defendant, which was partly allowed
with direction to plaintiff to deposit court
fee.

6. He next submitted that so far as
deficiency of stamp fee is concerned, it
may not be decided upon the application
under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC rather
issue is required to be framed after
submission of written submissions and
should have been decided along with other
issues so framed.

7. He firmly submitted that as present
suit has been filed to declare the Will deed
void and not for cancellation of the same,
therefore, no court fee is required and only
court fees of Rs. 200/- as paid by the
plaintiff is sufficient. He next submitted
that similar issue was before the Division
Bench judgment of this Court in the matter
of Pramila Tiwari vs. Anil Kumar Mishra
and
4
others;
Neutral
Citation.-
2024:AHC:85067-DB
as
to
whether
provisions of compulsory registration of
Will is prospective or retrospective and the
Court has held that registration of Will is
not required in State of Uttar Pradesh.
Based upon said judgment, learned counsel
for revisionist submitted that once the
registration of Will is not necessary, it shall
not required to be cancelled and only
declaration of void is sufficient.

8. He further submitted that while
deciding the application under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC, only plaint is required to
be seen and no defence may be considered
by the Court. Here in present case, Court
has considered the defence so raised by
defendant in application under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC, therefore, order is bad and
liable to be set aside.

9. Per contra, Sri Punit Kumar Gupta,
learned counsel for opposite party firmly
submitted that after filing of suit, once the
issue of court fees is raised, it is required to
be decided first and then Court may
proceed to decide the remaining issues, so
framed. In support of his contention, he has
placed reliance upon the judgment of this
Court in the matter of State of U.P. vs.
Mahant Shiva Nand Giri and others (Civil
Revision No. 599 of 1988).

10. He next submitted that in case
Will deed having money value, its
cancellation or declaring the said void is
having same meaning and effect. Once a
Will deed is put-forth for execution either
registered or unregistered, it shall be treated
an instrument having money value and
court fees is required to be paid. In support
of his contention, he placed reliance upon
the judgment of this Court in the matter
Kailash Chand vs. Vth A.C.J., Meerut and
others (Case No. F.A.F.O. No. 344 of
1997), Rajni Swami vs. Shakuntala
Sharma (Case No. : F.A.F.O. No. 1480 of
2009) and Sudha Sharma vs. Shashi Bala
Sharma ( Case No. : F.A.F.O. No. 3382 of
2011). He also pointed out that in light of
Section 7 Sub-Section iv(a) of Act, 1870, it
is very clear that either suit is for
418 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cancellation or adjudging it to void, in both
eventuality, court fee is required, therefore,
argument raised by learned counsel for
revisionist is having no force.

11. He further submitted that so far as
last argument of counsel for revisionist
about the consideration of plaint only,
while deciding application under Order VII
Rule 11 of CPC is concerned, there is no
dispute on this point. It has to be decided
only from the plaint and it is required on
the part of Court concerned to test the
plaint on the principles of Order VII Rule
11 of CPC even if no application is filed. In
support of his contention, he has placed
reliance upon the judgment of Apex Court
in the matter of State of West Bengal vs.
Union of India passed in Original Suit
No.4 of 2021, delivered on 10.07.2024.

12.

I
have
considered
rival
submissions made by learned counsels for
parties and perused the records as well as
judgments cited above.

13. So far as preliminary objection is
concerned, this Court is of the view that as
the revisionist has challenged the impugned
order based upon the application under
Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, therefore,
revision is maintainable and even otherwise
alternative remedy is not the absolute bar.
Therefore, Court is proceeded to decided
the case on merits.

14. The defendant-respondent has
filed application under Order VII Rule 11
of CPC, which was partly allowed in light
of Order VII Rule 11 (c) of CPC, which is
quoted below:-

"11. Rejection of plaint.- The
plaint shall be rejected in the following
cases:-

(c) where the relief claimed is
properly valued but the plaint is written
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to
supply the requisite stamp-paper within a
time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do
so;"

15. From the perusal of Order VII
Rule 11 (c) of CPC, it is apparently clear
that in case it is found that the relief
claimed is under valued, Court may provide
liberty to correct valuation within the time
and in case of failure, plaint may be
rejected. In the present case, Court while
partly allowing the application has granted
time to remove deficiency of stamp.

16. First issue is as to whether the
valuation of plaint has to be seen at the first
instance or after framing the issue on this
point. Law is very much clear that once the
objection is raised about insufficiency of Court
fee, it is required on the part of Court to decide
the same first and then proceed to decide other
issues.

17. The very same view has been taken
by this Court in the matter of Mahant Shiva
Nand Giri (Supra). Relevant paragraph No. 12
is quoted below:-

"12. Sub-section (4) of Section 6
gives aright to the defendant to raise an
objection about insufficiency of the court fee.
Before proceeding with the suit, the court is
bound to dispose of the said objection. If the
defendant fails to raise any such objection or if
he raised but failed to satisfy the court then the
field of objection gets occupied by Section
6(3). It requires an objection to be filed by an
officer mentioned in Section 24-A of the Act."

18. The second issue raised by
learned counsel for petitioner about the
8 All. Smt. Meetu Paruthi Vs. Kushank Paruthi
419
filing of suit for void and not for
cancellation, therefore, no court fee is
required is also squarely covered itself
from section 7 sub-section iv(a) of Act,
1870, which clearly says that either suit is
for cancellation or adjudging it to void, in
both eventuality, court fee is required,
therefore, there is no confusion in the
statute. For ready reference, Section 7 subsection iv(a) of Act, 1870 is being quoted
below:-

 "For cancellation or adjudging
void instruments and decrees.- (iv-A) In
suit for or involving cancellation of or
adjudging void or voidable a decree for
money or other property having a market
value, or an instrument securing money or
other property having such value"

19. Apart that, this issue has also been
considered by Division Bench of this Court
in the matter of Rajni Swami (Supra).
Relevant paragraph is quoted below:-

"5. The question is whether a
Will can be regarded as a legal document
which makes any property secure or safe.
Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act,
defines a Will as a "legal declaration of the
intention of the testator with respect to his
property which he desires to be carried into
effect after his death. "It is well known that
during the life-time of the executant, the
Will is ambulatory. It could be revoked by
him at his will. Accordingly, a Will does
not secure any property during the lifetime
of the executant. Section 7(iv-A) does not
require that an instrument should secure
money or property having money value
from the moment of its birth. It seems to us
that whether an instrument secures money
or property having money value within the
meaning of Section 7(iv-A) is to be decided
with reference to the date of the institution
of the suit. It is to be seen whether a
particular instrument secures on the date of
the institution of the suit money or property
having
money
value.
This
reference
necessarily follows from a collocational
reading of this Section with Section 39 of
the Specific Relief Act. If this is so, as we
think, then there is little doubt that on the
date of the institution of the suit in this case
the Will did secure property. Ganga Prasad
the testator had died, and after his death the
Will became irrevocable. Upon his death
his estate would be disposed of in
accordance with his directions in the Will.
Accordingly it can be said that on the death
of the testator the Will secures money or
property
having
money
value.
We,
therefore, hold that the court-fee paid on
the plaint and the memorandum of appeal is
insufficient. The amount of deficiency
mentioned in the office report should now
be paid by the plaintiff within three
months.

15. We have considered the law.
It is our duty to fit the law into the fact to
come to a definite finding. There is a big
gap between the declaration simplicitor and
relief in the garb of declaration. If a person
makes a prayer to declare right, title or
interest of a property in his favour then it
can be construed as declaration simplicitor
but when a plaintiff seeks any declaration
to disentitle others" right into a property,
such type of circumvent prayer cannot be
treated to be declaration simplicitor. In
other words, he is not asking any relief for
himself but want to prevent his opponent
from enjoying fruit of the property.
Therefore, such type of relief is virtually in
the nature of injunction at first with the
nomenclature
of
the
"declaration."
Therefore, it is required for the Court to go
into the real nature of dispute arising out of
the plaint to ascertain the cause and
incidental cause which helps it. A Will is
420 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
execution of document of a testator to give
his property to a person of his choice. Such
Will will be enforceable only after the
death of the testator. In some of the States
of India, grant of probate by the appropriate
court of law on the Will is compulsory and
some of the State it is optional. In the State
of U.P., obtain probate on the Will is
optional, therefore, as soon as the testator
dies and Will comes into light, it operates
as a valuable instrument in favour of the
person in whose favour property is
devolved by such Will. If such person
seeks a probate before the Court by filing
it, no question of ad valorem court-fee will
be applicable but it will be paid as soon as
Court will grant such probate in his favour.
In the present
case, the defendantrespondent never approached to the Court
to obtain a probate but enjoying the
property as successor under the Will. Now,
if such Will is declared by the Court as null
and void, right of the person in the property
or properties under the Will, will be
extinguished. Therefore, the principle of
securing property under the Will will be
attracted. Therefore, under no stretch of
imagination we can hold and say that the
suit can be entertained on the basis of the
fixed court-fees."

20. Again, in the matter of Kailash
Chand (Supra), Court has taken similar
view. Relevant paragraph is quoted below:-

 "19. We have already held above
that so long as the will has not become
operative on account of death of the
testator, the will is not a document or an
instrument securing property having money
value but once the testator dies and a suit is
filed after the death of the testator, that will
become an instrument securing the property
having money value. As in the instant case,
admittedly the suit has been filed long after
the death of the testator, the will has
become operative and, therefore, the will is
an
instrument
or
document
securing
property having money value. Since
Section 7 (IVA) (U. P. Amendment)
specifically provides for payment of
court fee in case where the suit is for or
involving cancellation or adjudging void
or voidable an instrument securing
property having money value. Article 17
(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act
shall not be applicable. In our view,
therefore, there is no error in the order
passed by the trial court.
 20. Consequently the appeal fails
and is hereby dismissed. We, however,
make no order as to costs."

21. In the matter of Sudha Sharma
(Supra), Court has taken similar view.
Relevant paragraph is quoted below:-

 "10. Now as regards the argument
of learned counsel for the appellant with
regard to applicability of Article 17(iii)
Court Fees Act is concerned, it would be
useful to quote para-10 of the report of
Kailash Chand's case (supra), which is
reproduced as under:

10. On a bare perusal of Article
17(iii), it would appear that this Article
shall be applicable in cases where the
plaintiff seeks to obtain a declaratory
decree without any consequential relief and
there is no other provision under the Act
for payment of fee relating to relief
claimed. The question is whether in case
where a decree declaring the will as null
and void is sought, there is any provision
under the Court Fees Act to cover the
question of payment of Court Fees on the
relief of such declaration. In case the
answer to the question is that there is no
other provision under the Act in case of a
suit
involving
cancellation
or
8 All. Smt. Meetu Paruthi Vs. Kushank Paruthi
421
adjudging/declaring void or voidable a will
on the question of payment of Court fees,
then Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the
Court Fees shall be applicable and if such
relief is covered by any other provisions of
the Court Fees Act, then provisions of
Article 17 (iii) of Schedule II will not be
applicable. Careful reading of Section 7(ivA) makes it abundantly clear that it also
covers suits for or involving cancellation or
adjudging/declaring null and void decree
for money or an instrument securing money
or other property having such value. The
question, therefore, is whether a will would
be treated as an instrument securing money
or other property having such value. This
question specifically arose before the Full
Bench of this Court in the case of Smt.
Bishnu Shri v. Smt. Suraj Mukhi and
others, AIR 1966 All 563 (supra). The
Majority
view
of
the
Court
after
considering the provisions of Indian
Succession Act and the Court Fees Act was
that the word 'instrument' in Section 7(ivA) includes formal or legal documents in
writing. It is sufficiently broad to include
wills also. In para 7 the Court held that:

The question is whether a will
can be regarded as a legal document which
makes any property secure or safe. Section
2(h) of the Indian Succession Act define a
will as a "legal declaration of the intention
of the testator with respect to his property
which he desires to be carried into effect
after his death. It is well known that during
the life-time of the executant, the will Is
ambulatory. It could be revoked by him at
his will. Accordingly a will does not secure
any property during the lifetime of the
executant. Section 7(iv-A) does not require
that an instrument should secure money or
property having money value from the
moment of its birth. It seems to us that
whether an Instrument secures money or
property having money value within the
meaning of Section 7(iv-A) is to be decided
with reference to the date of the institution
of the suit. It is to be seen whether
particular instrument secures on the date of
the institution of the suit money or property
having
money
value.
This
reference
necessarily follows from a collocational
reading of this section with Section 39 of
the Specific Relief Act. If this is so we
think, then there is little doubt that on the
date of the institution of the suit in this case
the will did secure property. The Court
further held that:
 "the word "securing" is the
present participle from of verb "to secure".
It has got various meanings (Words and
Phrases) (Permanent Edition), Vol. 38 page
45-8) "Secures" as used in a contract
whereby a vendor agrees to execute a
conveyance thereof as soon as the vendee
secures the payment of purchase money,
means not a payment in money but the
giving by the vendees of something by
means whereof payment at some future
time can be procured or compelled (Ibid),
Webster defines "secures" to mean "to
make certain" "to put beyond hazard". To
secure" is to make safe, to put beyond
hazard of losing or of not receiving, as to
secure a debt by a mortgage; it also means
to get safely in possession, to obtain to
acquire
certainly,
as
to
secure
an
inheritance or a price [Ibid 459]."

22. Now coming to the present case.
The facts are akin to the facts of judgment
reproduced here-in above. In the present
case too, alleged Will deed was executed
on 26.03.2021 by the husband of revisionist
and also registered on 20.02.2023 and to
declare the void, present suit has been filed
restraining others to claim any right over
the half of the property referred in Will
deed. Certainly, a suit has been preferred
after death of testator, therefore, in the light
422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of Section 7 (iv-a) of Act, 1870, it is having
money value and court fee is liable to be
paid.
23. Another issue was as to
whether while deciding the application
under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC, defence
was taken care of by the Magistrate or not.
From the perusal of application as well as
impugned order, it is apparently clear that
so far as defence is involved, the court has
not accepted the same, but partly allowed
the application only on the ground of
insufficiency of court fee, which is strictly
in accordance with Order VII Rule 11(C) of
CPC. Therefore, I found no infirmity in the
impugned order on this point also.

24. Not only this, even if there is no
application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC, it is required on the part of Court to
see the ingredients of Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC and if it is found, plaint may be
rejected.

25. Apex Court has also taken
similar view in the matter of State of West
Bengal (Supra),. Relevant paragraph is
quoted below:-

"26. In view of the word 'shall'
used in the provisions, a duty is cast on the
court to examine as to whether the plaint is
hit by any of the infirmities provided in the
six clauses of Order VII Rule 11 of the
CPC. A duty is cast on the court to reject
the plaint even without the intervention of
the defendant. Reference in this respect
could be made to the judgment of this
Court in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable
(supra)."

26. Therefore, in the light of law as
well as facts discussed here-in above, I
found no infirmity or illegality in the
impugned order.
27. Writ petition lacks merit and is
accordingly dismissed. No order as to
costs.
----------
(2024) 8 ILRA 422
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.08.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.

Civil Revision No. 96 of 2024

Punjab National Bank ...Revisionist
Versus
Ikram Khan & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Ashok Shankar Bhatnagar

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
Tarun Agarwal

A.
Civil
Law
-
Civil
Procedure
Code,1908 - O. I R. 10 & O. VII R. 11(a)
- Rejection of plaint - No cause of
action
was
shown
against
few
defendant - Remedy available to such
defendant - Held, where there is no
other cause of action against one of the
defendants, but there is cause of action
against other defendants, application
under
Order
VII
Rule
11
is
not
maintainable and suit shall proceed -
Revisionist-defendant is having remedy
to move application to strike out its
name from the array of defendants as
its name has been joined improperly as
neither there is any cause of action
shown nor relief has been claimed
against the revisionist-defendant. (Para
13, 16 and 22)

Revision dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:

1. I.T.C. Ltd. Vs Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal & ors.; AIR 1998 SC 634