# Smt. Munni Devi &Ors v. Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth Bahraich &Ors

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 1007
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-05-02
- **Case number:** Rent Control No. 11763 of 2019
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-munni-devi-ors-v-addl-dist-session-judge-ivth-bahraich-ors-44392
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972:
Sections 12, 16, 21(1)(a). Landlord's a
remedy under S.16 does not affect the
maintainability of application U/s 21.

Release application was allowed. Appeal was
dismissed. Petitioner has challenged both the
orders. Dismissing the Petition, the High Court.
Premises had not been let out to a sub-tenant is a
finding of fact, therefore provisions of Sections 12
and 16 are not attracted. (Para 28)

Precedent followed: -
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1.Smt. Padma Devi and others Vs. Prescribed
Authority, Kanpur and others(Para 22)

## Text

1 All. Smt. Munni Devi & Ors. Vs. Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth Bahraich & Ors.
1007
that the issue cannot be denied by the
High Court on the issue of subsquent
event of availability of the shop by the
High Court and remanded the matter for
reconsideration
of
the
relevant
subsequent events by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.

28. This Court, on over-all
consideration of material on record, has
recorded that both the courts below have
failed to record cogent reason to arrive at
the
conclusion
of
the
bonafide
requirement and is of the opinion that by
setting aside the orders, the matter is to
be remanded back to the Prescribed
Authority for fresh consideration with
the further
direction
to take
into
consideration the subsequent events of
availability of the shop to fulfill the
bonafide needs of the landlord.

29. In view of the above, this Court
has arrived at the conclusion that both the
courts
below
have
ignored
the
consideration of bonafide requirement by
not recording cogent reason to arrive at
the conclusion of bonafide requirement.
Thus, the orders dated 24.7.1999 and
11.9.1998 cannot be sustained and are
hereby set aside.

30. Accordingly, this writ petition
succeeds and is hereby allowed.

31. In the interest of justice, the
matter is remanded back to the Prescribed
Authority to reconsider and pass fresh
order permitting the parties to lead
evidence and provide opportunity of
hearing while considering the issue
involved as observed by this Court.

32. It is, however, provided that
question of existence of subsequent shop
shall also be taken into consideration in
the light of the judgment referred
hereinabove in the case of Smt. Raj Rani
Mehrotra (supra).

33. It is however directed that
since the matter is old, therefore, the
exercise
in
this
regard
shall
be
concluded and final order shall be
passed within a period of four months
from the date of production of a
certified copy of this order.

34. No order as to costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.05.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Rent Control No. 11763 of 2019

Smt. Munni Devi &Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth
Bahraich &Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Anurag Narain

Counsel for the Respondents:
M.A. Khan

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972:
Sections 12, 16, 21(1)(a). Landlord's a
remedy under S.16 does not affect the
maintainability of application U/s 21.

Release application was allowed. Appeal was
dismissed. Petitioner has challenged both the
orders. Dismissing the Petition, the High Court.
Premises had not been let out to a sub-tenant is a
finding of fact, therefore provisions of Sections 12
and 16 are not attracted. (Para 28)

Precedent followed: -
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1.Smt. Padma Devi and others Vs. Prescribed
Authority, Kanpur and others(Para 22)

2. Kumari Sarveshwari and others Vs. IIIrd
Addl. DistrictJudge,Lucknow and others,
 (Para 23, 24)

Precedent distinguished: -

1.Revti Raman and others Vs. (Para 15, 16)

2. Suman Wahal Vs.(Para 17, 18, 19)

3.Ram Kishan Das Vs.(Para 20, 21) (E-4)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anurag Narain, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Sri M.A.
Khan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted
by Mohd. Aslam Khan, learned counsel
for the respondent nos.3 to 13.

2. Factual matrix of the case is that
the petitioners are tenant of the disputed
shop. Landlord filed an application under
Section 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 [hereinafter
referred to as the "Act of 1972"] before
the Prescribed Authority for release of the
shop which was allowed vide order dated
24.12.2005.
Feeling
aggrieved,
the
petitioners filed Rent Appeal No.1 of
2006 which has been dismissed vide
judgment and order dated 7.3.2019.
Against the said order, the petitioners
have
approached
this
Court
by
challenging the order passed by the
Prescribed Authority on 24.12.2015 and
the order of the Appellate Authority dated
7.3.2019.

3. Assailing the aforesaid two
orders, submission of learned counsel for
the petitioners is that the application filed
under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act of 1972
was not maintainable in view of the fact
that in paragraph 5 of the release
application, the statement of fact was
made that the shop has been let out to
some other person. Therefore, in view of
the provisions contained under Section 12
of the Act of 1972, the application would
have been filed under Rule 16 of the Act
of 1972. He next submitted that since this
aspect of the matter was not considered
by the Prescribed Authority as well as by
the Appellate Authority, therefore, both
the
courts
below
have
committed
illegality in passing the impugned orders.

4. His next submission is that while
recording the finding on the bona fide
requirement, the comparative hardship and
bona fide requirement were not properly
considered. The petitioners in the light of the
provisions contained under Rule 16 of the
Rules framed under the Act of 1972, are
running a business and both the sons are
involved in the business, therefore, there was
no bona fide requirement of the shop. Thus,
the finding recorded on the point is
misconceived and contrary to Rule 16. In
support of his submission, he placed reliance
upon the following judgments rendered by
this Court:

(i) Revti Raman and others v. The
District
Judge,
Mathura
and
ors
reported in 1990 ARC Page 731.

(ii) Suman Wahal v. Smt. Mukti Sen
and others reported in 2000(1) ARC 493.

(iii)Ram
Kishan
Das
v.
Vth
Additional District Judge, Bijnore and
others reported in Allahabad Rent Cases
1994 (2)

5. He further submitted that both the
courts below have failed to record finding
1 All. Smt. Munni Devi & Ors. Vs. Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth Bahraich & Ors.
1009
on the capital and business of the landlord
while
dealing
with
the
bona
fide
requirement and comparative hardship.

6. On other hand, Sri M.A. Khan,
learned Senior Advocate, submitted that
in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the release
application, it has been stated that the
opposite parties are landlord and the
petitioners are the tenant of the shop in
question, which has not been denied in the
written statement filed by the petitioners.

7. He next submitted that the averment
made in paragraph 5 of the release
application was denied with the specific
stipulation that he has not let out the shop to
the sub-tenant and this question was dealt
with by the Prescribed Authority and finding
has return that the opposite parties in the
present writ petition are landlord and the
petitioners are tenant of the shop in question.
Therefore, the application under Section
21(1)(a) is maintainable and the submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioners in this regard is devoid of merits.

8. He next submitted that both the courts
below, upon consideration of bona fide
requirement and comparative hardship have
recorded cogent reason and the question involved
and raised by the petitioners have duly been
considered and upon recording the findings of facts
arrived at the conclusion that the application under
Section 21(1)(a) is maintainable. His next
submission is that both the courts below have
committed no error in law in deciding the issues in
regard to release of the shop.

9. In support of his submission,
reliance has been placed upon the
judgment rendered by this Court in the
case of Smt. Padma Devi and others v.
Prescribed Authority, Kanpur and
others reported in ARC 1981 Short
Notes of Cases 7. He further placed
reliance upon the judgment rendered by
this Court in the case of Kumari
Sarveshwari and others v. IIIrd Addl.
District Judge, Lucknow and others
reported in ARC 1984 Vol.1 Page 479.

10. After having heard the rival
submissions of learned counsel for the
parties, I perused the material on record
and the judgment relied upon by learned
counsel for the parties.

11. To resolve the controversy in the
present writ petition, Section 21(1)(a) of
the Act of 1972 is quoted below:

"21. Proceeding for release of
building under occupation of tenant. -
(1) The prescribed authority may, on an
application of the landlord in that behalf,
order the eviction of a tenant from the
building under tenancy or any specified
part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the
following grounds exists namely-

(a) that the building is bona fide
required either in its existing form or after
demolition and new construction by the
landlord for occupation by himself or any
member of his family, or any person for
whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purposes or for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the
landlord is the trustee of a public charitable
trust, for the objects of the trust :"

12. On its perusal, it is evident that
on the ground of bona fide requirement,
application would be moved by the
landlord under the aforesaid provisions.

13. Learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance upon the
Section 12 which is being quoted below:
1010 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"12. Deemed vacancy of building
in Certain cases. - (1) A, landlord or
tenant of a building shall be deemed to
have ceased to occupy the building or part
thereof if-

(a) he has substantially removed his
effects therefrom, or

(b) he has allowed it to be occupied
by any person who is not a member of his
family, or

(c) in the case of a residential
building, he as well as members of his
family have taken up residence, not being
temporary residence, elsewhere.

(2) In the case of a non-residential
building, where a tenant carrying on
business in the building admits a person
who is not a member of his family as a
partner or a new partner, as the case may
be, the tenant shall be deemed to have
ceased to occupy the building.

(3) In the case of a residential
building, if the tenant or any member of
his family builds or otherwise acquires in
a vacant state or gets vacated a residential
building in the same city, municipality,
notified area or town area in which the
building under tenancy is situate, he shall
be deemed to have ceased to occupy the
building under his tenancy :

Provided that if the tenant or any
member of his family had built any such
residential building before the date of
commencement of this Act, then such
tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to
occupy the building under his tenancy
upon the expiration of a period of one
year from the said date.

(4) Any building or part which a
landlord or tenant has ceased to occupy
within the meaning of sub-section (1), or
sub-section (2) , or sub-section (3), shall,
for the purposes of this Chapter, be
deemed to be vacant."

14. On its perusal, it is evident that it
is in regard to deemed vacancy in case of
sub-letting of building to some other
person, remedy is to initiate proceeding in
view of the provisions contained under
Section
16,
therefore,
submission
advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner is that Section 16 was violated
and both the courts below have not taken
care of, due to which the orders suffer
from apparent illegality.

15. In the case of Revti Raman
(supra) relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner, the following has been
held by this Court in paragraph 8 of the
judgment:

"8. It was the submission of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that
Section 12(2) could not have retrospective
effect and if anybody was inducted as a
partner in a business upon a premises
held by a tenant prior to 1972 there
having been the bar under the extant law
as to his being a partner, may not to a
reason, after the introduction of Act
No.13 of 1972 for applying the deeming
clause of Section 12. It was stated that
any provision of a legislation must be
taken
to
be
prospective
unless
a
retrospective effect was given specifically
or by necessary implication. He laid
stress on the clause in Section 12 (2) "as a
partner or a new partner" to say that a
person introduced as a partner before
1972 may not be deemed to be a new
partner after 1972. The learned counsel
for the other side submitted that all these
argument are not at all necessary as by
their own act the defendants had
cancelled the partnership deed executed
prior to 1972 and had chosen to
constitute a new partnership on two
occasions after the introduction of the Act
and even accepting that the law is only
1 All. Smt. Munni Devi & Ors. Vs. Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth Bahraich & Ors.
1011
prospective the tenants must be deemed to
have ceased to occupy the building. In
view of the facts pleaded, I feel that this
court may not Government Order into the
question if the provisions of Section 12(2)
are
prospective
or
retrospective.
Admittedly, in 1968 only D-1 and D-3
were the partners in the business. The
defence story as narrated in the judgment
indicates that it was a joint family
business and D-1 was the Karta of the
family. Evidently, introduction of D-3 in
the partnership had taken away the status
of joint family business. In 1973, D-4 was
also introduced as a partner together with
D-1 and D-3. It was argued that as it was
a joint family business. D-4 had every
right to be introduced in the family
business and his introduction did not
violate the conditions of Section 12(1)(b)
read with Section 12(2) of the Act No.13
of 1972. This argument is difficult to
accept as the business ceased to be a joint
family business, there being a outsider
already
introduced
as
a
partner.
However, in 1981, the partnership suffers
a complete change, one could say in lock,
stock and barrel as D-1, the Karta of the
joint Hindu family, dissociates himself
from the business and D-2 as introduced
as a partner. From the trend of events, it
cannot be presumed that with the exit of
D-1 and with the introduction of D-2, it
still remained the same partnership
business, and more so, when the shares
were also redistributed once the Court
comes to the conclusion that the 1981
partnership was not a continuation of the
same old partnership when D-4 becomes
a partner in the business run in the
tenanted premises being an outsider to the
family of the tenant immediately the
situation attracts Section 12(1)(b)and
Section 12(2) of Act 13 of 1972. It may be
looked from another angle. The tenancy
was under the name of D-1 alone. By the
partnership deed of 1981 he removes
himself from the name of D-1 alone. By
the partnership deed of 1981 he removes
himself from the partnership leaving the
business in the premises in the hands of
two persons of his family and another
from outside the family. If a tenant totally
removes himself from the business,there
could not be a better case for application
of Section 12(1)(b) and Section 12(2) of
the Act."

16. In the case of Revti Raman
(supra), the question is in regard to
applicability of Section 12 (2) that
whether
it
is
an
application
with
retrospective effect and if anybody was
inducted as a partner in a business upon a
premises held by a tenant prior to 1972
there having been the bar under the extant
law as to his being a partner, may not to a
reason, after the introduction of Act
No.13 of 1972 for applying the deeming
clause of Section 12. It was stated that
any provision of a legislation must be
taken
to
be
prospective
unless
a
retrospective effect was given specifically
or by necessary implication. He laid stress
on the clause in Section 12(2) "as a
partner or a new partner" to say that a
person introduced as a partner before
1972 may not be deemed to be a new
partner after 1972. Here in the present
case, the matter of consideration is
entirely different. In the present case the
shop in dispute was not let out to any
other person, therefore, his submission is
that the provisions of Section 12 (b) and
Section 12(2) of the Act No.13 of 1972
was
applicable.
Accordingly
the
submission would have been misplaced.

17. In the case of Suman Wahal
(surpa) relied upon by learned counsel for the
1012 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner, this Court has held in paragraph 9
of the judgment as under:

"9. The vacancy can be declared either
under Section 15 of the Act when the tenant
vacates or is likely to vacate it and it can
also be declared vacant under Section 12 of
the Act when the conditions mentioned
therein exist. If the tenant has substantially
removed his effects from the disputed
accommodation or has allowed it to be
occupied by any person who is not member
of his family or in case of non-residential
building where a tenant carrying on
business in the building admits a person
who is not a member of his family as a
partner or a new partner, as the case may
be, the tenant shall be deemed to have
ceased to occupy the building."

18. In the aforesaid case, in regard to
applicability of Section 12, it was
considered and held that if the tenant has
substantially removed his effects from the
disputed accommodation or has allowed it
to be occupied by any person who is not
member of his family or in case of nonresidential building admits a person who
is not a member of his family as a partner
or a new partner, as the case may be, the
tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to
occupy the building.

19. Here, in the present case, facts
and circumstances are totally different.
The landlord moved an application under
Section 21(1)(a) setting out a case of bona
fide requirement of the shop, thus the
judgment is not attracted to the present
case.

20. In the case of Ram Kishan Das
(supra) relied upon by learned counsel
for the petitioner, this Court has held in
paragraph 7 of the judgment as under:

"So far as the ground floor is
concerned, I am of the opinion that the
Appellate
Court
has
not
properly
considered this matter. Admittedly, the
landlord is now about 66 or 67 years of
age and the Appellate Court should have
carefully examined whether he really
intends to do business at this old age or it
is a mere pretext to get the shop released.
I do not mean to say that an old cannot
start business. But then the Appellate
Court should have carefully examined the
matter and asked the landlord to furnish
full details as to what is the exact nature
of the business he intends to do in the
ground floor, what steps he has taken in
this connection, what contacts he has
made, what capital he proposes to invest
etc. A mere averment by the landlord that
he intends to do business is surely not
enough.
The
landlord
had
merely
contended that he intends to do business
of Agro-Engineering on the ground floor
for which he is qualified. In my opinion,
this bald averment is not sufficient to hold
that the landlord has bona fide need for
business purpose. If an old man alleges
that he has bona fide need of the
accommodation as he intends to start
business,
the
Court
must
carefully
examine whether this allegation is true or
a mere pretext to get the shop released.
Surely there is a difference between a
youngman and old man. A youngman can
more readily be believed fit is contended
that it is intended to start business. In the
present case, it is not clarified what
exactly the landlord means by saying that
he
wants
to
do
Agro-Engineering
business. Does he mean that he intends to
sell agricultural machinery in the said
shop? If so, what particular machinery
does
he
intends
to
sell,
which
manufacturing
company
has
been
contacted and what steps has he taken in
1 All. Smt. Munni Devi & Ors. Vs. Addl. Dist. & Session Judge IVth Bahraich & Ors.
1013
this connection? Has he got any agency
for doing such business? All these and
other relevant questions should have been
enquired into by the Appellate Court
before holding that the need of the
landlord for doing business is genuine.
Unfortunately, the Appellate Court has
believed the bald averment of the landlord
that landlord that he wants to do AgroEngineering business without probing
deeper into the matter. Hence, I set aside
the impugned judgment dated 17.7.1993
so far it has been held in the said
judgment that the need of the landlord for
the ground floor for doing business is
genuine and I remand the case to the
Lower Appellate Court so far as this
question of alleged need of the landlord
for doing business in the ground floor is
concerned. It is no doubt true that a
finding of bona fide need is a finding of
fact and ordinarily this Court does not
interfere with findings of fact, but if the
said finding is arbitrary or without
considering the relevant material then
this Court can certainly set aside the
same and remand the matter to the Lower
Appellate Court for a fresh finding in
accordance with law. Hence the matter,
so far as it relates to the ground floor of
the deputed accommodation, is remanded
to the Lower Appellate Court for
considering the matter afresh in the light
of the observations made above and for
giving afresh decision as to whether the
need of the landlord for the ground floor
for doing business is genuine or not."

21. The ratio of judgment relied
upon in the case of Ram Kishan Das
(supra) is also not attracted to the present
case.

22. Reverting the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Senior Advocate- Sri
M.A. Khan has placed reliance upon the
judgment rendered in the case of Smt.
Padma Devi (Supra). Relevant portion of
the judgment is quoted below:

"The landlord's application was filed
against Brij Raj Singh (Original tenant)
as well as Gopal Ram on grounds which
are relevant for allowing an application
under Section 21 of the Act. Brij Raj
Singh's tenancy admittedly continued even
through it is asserted that he had vacated
the accommodation and allowed it to be
occupied by Gopal Ram. The application
of the landlord being directed against a
tenant was clearlymaintainable under
Section 21. Under Section 23 of the Act
not only the tenant but all those who
might be occupying the building on his
behalf are liable to be evicted. On the
facts found by the courts below, the
application of the landlord was clearly
maintainable. The landlord might have
had an alternative remedy under Section
16 of the Act, but that fact by its cannot
effect
the
maintainability
of
the
application under Section 21 of the Act."

23. In the case of Kumari
Sarveshwari relied upon by learned
Senior Advocate, Sri M.A. Khan this
Court has held in paragraphs 3,4 and 5 of
the judgment as under:

"3. The learned appellate court has held
that Section 16 was attracted because of the
petitioner's pleading that the opposite parties
were not living in the house for the last
several years. One of them was in Zambia and
the other was living at Dehradun. Only some
strangers were living in the premises. The
implied that a deemed vacancy has occurred
within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act.
1014 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Accordingly the remedy to the petitioners was
only under Section 16.

4. It is noteworthy that the case was
contested by the tenants before the Prescribed
Authority. It was the tenants who had filed an
appeal. It was thus not a case in which the
tenants had admittedly ceased to have any
concern with the house. It was, therefore,
surprising that an argument passed on behalf
of the tenants that the house was vacant in the
eye of law should have been accepted by the
appellate Court for throwing out the
landlord's petition under Section 21. If the
tenants had really ceased to occupy the
accommodation and the house was to be
deemed to be vacant then they have no locus
standi to maintain the appeal and the appeal
should have been dismissed on that ground
instead of being allowed. Indeed in para 7 of
the counter affidavit filed in this court also, the
tenants have stated that their case was that the
deponent, namely, opposite party no.2 had
temporarily gone to Zambia on deputation by
the Government of India for a fixed term and
that his luggage was kept therein and his
daughters stayed in the house along with his
real elder sister and her sons. In view of this
assertion of the opposite parties the tenants'
plea which has found favour with the
appellate court was clearly untenable. The
tenants could not be permitted to blow hot and
cold in the same breath.

5. Moreover, even if a tenant may induct
some outsiders in a building and as such,
proceedings may possibly be initiated under
Section 16 on the ground of deemed vacancy
having occurred under Section 12 it does not
follow that a suit on the ground of sub-letting
canot lie under Section 20 or that an
application under Section 21 on the ground of
balance of hardships cannot lie at the instance
of the landlord. It is open to the landlord to
pursue either of the remedies and one cannot
be defeated merely on the ground that another
remedy was also available to him."

24. In the judgment rendered in the
case of Kumari Sarveshwari (supra)
relied by the learned counsel for the
respondents, it has been held that in case
tenancy is allowed to continue, the same
is liable to be evicted by initiating
proceeding under Section 21(1)(a) and in
case the ground was taken that the
opposite parties were not living in the
house for the last several years, one of
them was in Zambia and other were living
at Dehradun and only some other were
living in premises then it implied that
there is a deemed vacancy occurred
within the meaning of Section 12 of the
Act. Accordingly, the remedy was only
under Section 16.

25. In the present case, there is no
such circumstance. The petitioners were
tenant of the shop and after recording
finding of bona fide requirement, the
court has proceeded to decide the
application filed under Section 21(1)(a).

26. I have carefully examined the
material available on record and the lawreports relied upon by learned counsel for
the parties.

27. On thoughtful consideration of
the order impugned, it is evident that the
prescribed authority, on the basis of
averments made in the application filed
under Section 21(1)(a) as well as written
statement and material evidence led by
the parties, came to the conclusion that
there is relationship of landlord and tenant
and by holding the application to be
maintainable, recorded cogent reason and
finding to arrive at conclusion to evict the
shop.

28. In regard to applicability of the
Section 12 and Section 16, I have perused
1 All. Rajendra Singh & Anr. Vs. District Magistrate Raebareli & Ors.
1015
the material on record and found that the
provisions contained under Section 12
and Section 16 are not attracted to the
present facts and circumstances of the
case and the pleadings placed before the
Prescribed Authority as well as before the
Appellate Court. I am of the considered
opinion that the judgments relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioners are
distinguishable
and
do
not
have
applicability to the present case.

29. The Prescribed Authority, while
dealing with the issues framed and material
placed on record, recorded cogent reason
and after considering the bona fide
requirement and comparative hardship as
well as other ingredients required for
consideration of claim for release of the
shop, proceeded to pass the order dated
24/12/2005.
He
also
considered
the
statements of facts made in paragraphs 1
and 2 of the release application filed under
Section 21 (1)(a) and written statement filed
by the opposite parties.

30. On perusal of the statements of
facts made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
application moved under Section 21(1)(a)
by the landlord, the Prescribed Authority,
considering the statement of fact made in
written statement, has return finding of
fact that there is relationship of landlord
and tenant between the parties and on the
basis of bona fide requirement and
comparative hardship has decided the
issue in favour of the landlord which was
affirmed
by
the
Appellate
Court
dismissing the appeal filed by the
petitioners.

31. This Court, upon consideration,
came to the conclusion that there are
concurrent findings and cogent reasons
recorded in passing the orders and there is
no ground made out by the petitioners for
interference in the orders impugned. Both the
courts below have duly considered the
judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the
parties and thereafter, allowed the application
filed under Section 21 (1)(a) and dismissed the
appeal vide the orders impugned.

32. In the opinion of this Court, both
the courts below have committed no
illegality nor the impugned orders suffer
from any infirmity. Therefore, this Court
declines to interfere in the impugned
orders.

33. Accordingly, this writ petition
lacks merits and is hereby dismissed.

34. It is, however, directed that the
petitioner shall evict the shop in dispute
within a period of four months from the
date of production of a certified copy of
this order ensuring payment as directed by
the Appellate Court.

35. No order as to costs.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 05.09.2019
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ KUMAR JAISWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE JASPREET SINGH, J.

Land Acquisition No. 174 of 2015
alongwith
Land Acquisition No. 175 of 2015

Rajendra Singh &Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
District Magistrate Raebareli &Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Apporva Tewari

Counsel for the Respondents: