# Smt. Nanhi Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 1943
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-11-27
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 13347 of 2018
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-nanhi-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45099
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Enquiry Rules, 1997 - Rule 2 (c) and Rule
4 - Suspension - ground of challenge -
serious
irregularities
committed
in
1 All. Smt. Nanhi Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1945
constitution of committee - it is merely
reiteration of the description of the
members
of
the
enquiry
committee
already
constituted
by
the
District
Magistrate
-
the
District
Magistrate
himself
has
constituted
the
enquiry
committee - the contention of petitioner
that the District Magistrate himself has
not constituted the enquiry committee or
that the District Development Officer has
no authority to do the same is baseless-
Held - the petitioner has been rightly
suspended from the post of Gram
Pradhan. (Para 11)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1.Vijay Kumar vs. District Magistrate, 2015 (2) ADJ 145

2.Vivekanand Yadav vs. State of U.P. and
others ,2011 (1) AWC 488 (FB)

3.Narendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Others,
2013 (2) AWC 1663

## Text

1944 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
a Civil/Revenue Court and has passed the
restrain order. To our repeated query to
the learned counsel for the petitioner to
point out the authority of law under which
the Sub Divisional Magistrate has passed
the order but he failed to point out any
provision of the law which cloth the
administrative
officer
to
pass
the
injunction order.

7. The experience reveals that
the
Sub
Divisional
Magistrates
are
passing such type of order in a large
number of cases. We find that the orders
passed by the Administrative Officer
interfering in the matter of property
dispute where title dispute is involved are
wholly
without
jurisdiction.
An
administrative officer cannot direct the
Police to help a party in title dispute."

22. In the present case also the
District Magistrate admittedly has passed
the administrative order in respect of the
property dispute on the ground that there
was apprehension of breach of peace.

23. As discussed above, in such
situation the District Magistrate has no
jurisdiction to pass any order. Only
recourse to the provisions under Cr.P.C
can be taken. On this ground also the order
of the District Magistrate is vitiated.

24.

Lastly,
the
petitioner
in
paragraph nos. 20, 21 and 22 of the writ
petition has averred that the Secretary of
the Azamgarh Development Authority has
cancelled the map without any notice or
opportunity. This averment has not been
denied by the District Magistrate in his
personal affidavit or by the private
respondent. Moreover, from the impugned
order itself it is evident that the order has
been passed without furnishing any
opportunity to the petitioner. It is well
settled law that an order which has civil
consequences
must
be
passed
after
furnishing opportunity to the affected
persons. In this case no opportunity has
been afforded to the petitioner and thus,
the order stands vitiated on this ground
also.

25. In view of the above, the
impugned order dated 02.11.2018 is set
aside. The matter is remitted back to the
Secretary,
Azamgarh
Development
Authority to pass a fresh order after
furnishing opportunity to the petitioner
and the private respondents herein. The
said exercise be undertaken expeditiously
preferably within three months from the
date of communication of this order.

26. The writ petition stands allowed.
----------
(2020)1ILR 1943

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.11.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

Writ-C No. 13347 of 2018

Smt. Nanhi Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Praveen Kumar Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Pankaj Kumar Gupta, Sri
Pradeep Kumar Rai

A. Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal
of Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members)
Enquiry Rules, 1997 - Rule 2 (c) and Rule
4 - Suspension - ground of challenge -
serious
irregularities
committed
in
1 All. Smt. Nanhi Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1945
constitution of committee - it is merely
reiteration of the description of the
members
of
the
enquiry
committee
already
constituted
by
the
District
Magistrate
-
the
District
Magistrate
himself
has
constituted
the
enquiry
committee - the contention of petitioner
that the District Magistrate himself has
not constituted the enquiry committee or
that the District Development Officer has
no authority to do the same is baseless-
Held - the petitioner has been rightly
suspended from the post of Gram
Pradhan. (Para 11)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1.Vijay Kumar vs. District Magistrate, 2015 (2) ADJ 145

2.Vivekanand Yadav vs. State of U.P. and
others ,2011 (1) AWC 488 (FB)

3.Narendra Kumar vs. State of U.P. and Others,
2013 (2) AWC 1663

4. Shashi Kant vs. State of U.P. and Others,
2018 (3) AWC 2674

5. (Mohd. Arif vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others),
Writ- C No. 11594 of 2018

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner and Sri Rajeev Kumar Shukla,
learned Standing Counsel appearing for
the State-authorities. Sri Pankaj Kumar
Gupta, learned counsel for the complainant
is present.

2. Present petition has been filed
with following prayers:-

"(i) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari for
quashing the impugned order dated
23.3.2018 passed by District Magistrate,
Moradabad.

(ii) Issue a writ, order or directing
in the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondents to allow this writ petition and to
operate the account not to cease the financial
and administrative power of the petitioner in
pursuance to the impugned order dated
23.3.2018 passed by District Magistrate,
Moradabad.

(iii) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
directing the respondents not to give effect
of the impugned order dated 23.3.2018
passed
by
District
Magistrate,
Moradabad.

(iv) To pass any other suitable
order or direction which this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper under the
circumstances of the case.

(v) To award the cost of the
petition from the respondent."

3. By the impugned order, the
petitioner has been suspended from the
post of Gram Pradhan of Village Mundia
Raja, Block Vikas Khand Bilari, District
Moradabad by the District Magistrate,
Moradabad on the ground that an enquiry
was conducted by a Committee of three
members constituted for this purpose and
she was found guilty. One of the charge
against the petitioner was that she had
taken away the old bricks of 'kharanja' in
the village which were replaced, for her
own use in her residence. This fact that she
has taken away the old bricks was
admitted by her in her reply. However, the
explanation for taking away the bricks was
that it is only for the security of the old
bricks she has taken away the old bricks
and they are still with her and she has not
misused the same and she is willing to
compensate the same in terms of money.
The petitioner was found guilty and was
suspended pending final enquiry as per the
Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj (Removal of
1946 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Pradhans, Up-Pradhans and Members)
Enquiry Rules, 1997 (hereinafter referred
to as the Enquiry Rules, 1997).

4. Challenging the same, submission
of learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the District Magistrate himself has not
constituted the enquiry committee and
therefore, the same is not in accordance
with the Enquiry Rules, 1997 particularly,
Rule 2 (c) and Rule 4 of the Enquiry
Rules, 1997.

5. He submits that on perusal of the
order dated 21.9.2017 passed by the
District Development Officer, Moradabad,
it is clear that in fact, he has constituted
the Committee (Annexure 1 to the counter
affidavit filed by the State-authorities). He
submits that the District Development
Officer is not the authority to appoint the
committee. Drawing attention to Enquiry
Rules, 1997, he submits that such power to
constitute a committee is delegated by
State
Government
to
the
District
Magistrate and it cannot be further
delegated by District Magistrate to District
Development Officer, therefore, such
enquiry committee cannot be constituted
by the District Development Officer and
the enquiry report submitted by such
committee is vitiated in the eye of law.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has also drawn attention of this Court to
the various orders annexed with the
supplementary affidavit as Annexure No.4
to indicate that the District Magistrate, as a
matter of fact, himself has constituted
committee and in the present case this has
not been done and therefore, entire inquiry
proceedings are vitiated. He submits,
therefore, the order based on such inquiry
is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is
liable to be quashed. In support of his
arguments
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner has placed reliance on following
judgments:- (i) Narendra Kumar vs.
State of U.P. and Others 2013 (2) AWC
1663, (ii) Shashi Kant vs. State of U.P.
and Others 2018 (3) AWC 2674 (iii)
judgment dated 30.3.2018 passed in
Writ- C No. 11594 of 2018 (Mohd. Arif
vs. State of U.P. and 2 Others).

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner
also sought to argue the merits of the
petition that her explanation submitted by
the petitioner has not been correctly
appreciated. He submits that it is only in
public interest the old bricks were
removed and she had expressed her clear
and categorical stand that she is willing to
compensate the same in terms of money.

8. The crux of the arguments is that
the District Magistrate himself has not
constituted the three members enquiry
committee and thus, it is violation of the
Enquiry
Rules,
1997
and
therefore,
impugned order based on such enquiry
report submitted by the enquiry committee
so constructed is not sustainable in the eye
of law.

9. Per contra, learned Standing
Counsel
drawing
attention
to
the
Annexure-1 to the counter affidavit, which
is a letter dated 21.9.2017, which is being
highlighted by learned counsel for the
petitioner as an order constituting enquiry
committee and by drawing attention to
Annexure no-3 to the supplementary
affidavit, which is an order dated an
14.9.2017, submitted that at serial no.5 for
Block Baharia, which is admittedly, the
relevant block for the concerned village i.e
Mundaiya Raja, Vikas Khand Bilari,
District Moradabad, a committee of three
members, namely, the District Panchayat
1 All. Smt. Nanhi Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1947
Raj Officer, Moradabad, District Basic
Education
Officer,
Moradabad
and
Assistant Engineer, Pradhanmantri Sadak
Yojna (PIU), had been constituted in the
District Moradabad for the reason that
there were large numbers complaints of
irregularities in constitution of enquiry
committees,
a
committee
of
three
members, which includes two district level
officers, has been constituted. He submits
that it is therefore, clear and as also
highlighted in the letter dated 21.9.2017
issued by the District Development Officer
with a clear reference to this order dated
14.9.2017 that it is only a communication
and as per the directions of the District
Magistrate that this committee has been
constituted to submits its joint enquiry
report. He, therefore, submits that there is
no violation of Rule 2(c) or Rule 4 to the
Enquiry Rules, 1997. He submits that
admittedly, final inquiry is still pending,
therefore, no interference is required in the
impugned order.

10. I have considered the rival
submissions and perused the record.

11. On perusal of the order dated
14.9.2017 I find that it is only because the
complaints are being received at Chief
Minister level, Commissioner level and
Chief Development Officer level as well
as in his own office that serious
irregularities are being committed in
constitution of committee, therefore, for
the purpose of conducting impartial and
technically sound inquiry, the committees
for different blocks have been constituted.
It is not in dispute that for eight different
blocks different committees have been
constituted, which undisputably included
the District Level Officers. I find that in
fact, in all the committees constituted for
different eight blocks, at least two District
Level Officers have been appointed and
the third member appears to be the
technical
hand
for
the
purpose
of
providing the assistance on the technical
aspect of the enquiry. Coming to the
various other orders passed by the District
Magistrate annexed as Annexure No.-4 to
the
Supplementary
Affidavit
dated
16.4.2018, I find that all such orders that
have
been
passed
by
the
District
Magistrate are of the dates prior to the
issuance of the order dated 14.9.2017. The
order at page no. 16 is the order dated
13.9.2017, the order at page no. 17 is the
order dated 17.7.2017 and the order at
page no. 18 is the order dated 19.7.2017.
There is nothing on record to indicate that
after constitution of all such eight
committees for different blocks vide order
dated 14.9.2017 any other order has been
passed by the District Magistrate himself
for constituting the committee. The reason
is obvious as the District Magistrate
himself
has
constituted
the
enquiry
committee in the light of the various
complaints received at the State level,
Commissioner level and at his own level.
Therefore, it is very much clear and as also
reflected in the letter dated 21.9.2017 that
it is nothing but reiteration of the
designation of the officers who have
already been made members of the
committee for inquiry purposes by the
District Magistrate in his own order dated
14.9.2017. There is a clear reference to the
aforesaid order dated 14.9.2017 in the
order/letter dated 21.9.2017. There is no
deviation in the same. Therefore, the
arguments made by learned counsel for the
petitioner that the District Magistrate
himself has not constituted the enquiry
committee
or
that
the
District
Development Officer has no authority to
do the same is baseless, inasmuch as, the
District Development Officer has not
1948 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
exercised any power independently and it
is merely reiteration of the description of
the members of the enquiry committee
already
constituted
by
the
District
Magistrate.

12. The order dated 21.9.2017 further
reflects that copy of this order has been
sent to the members of the committee only
for compliance. It is, therefore, only an
order
regarding
communication
of
constitution of committee done by the
District Magistrate vide order dated
14.9.2017 and nothing further. This cannot
be considered as an order constituting the
enquiry committee independently.

13. A reference may also be made to
the judgment of Hon'ble Full Bench in the
case of Vivekanand Yadav vs. State of
U.P. and others 2011 (1) AWC 488 (FB).
Apart from that in case of Vijay Kumar vs.
District Magistrate 2015 (2) ADJ 145,
placing reliance on Vivekanand Yadav
(supra) it has been held that if the enquiry
has been conducted by a District Level
Officer, the same is valid even if the
enquiry officer is not appointed by the
District Magistrate. Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11,
and 12 of Vijay Kumar (supra) are quoted
as under:-

"6. It is contended that no
preliminary enquiry was ordered by
District Magistrate and he did not appoint
any
Enquiry
Officer
to
conduct
preliminary
enquiry
or
fact
finding
enquiry, therefore, aforesaid reports could
not have been relied upon for the purpose
of passing order under Proviso to Section
95(1)(g) of Act, 1947. It is also said that
no Enquiry Officer was appointed by
District Magistrate and therefore, any
preliminary enquiry report submitted by
another person could not have been acted
upon and in this regard reliance is placed
on a Single Judge judgment of this Court
in Rais Ahmad Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.,
2009(1) CRC 139.

7. However, I find that issue, up
for consideration, is squarely answered by
a Full Bench of this Court in Vivekanand
Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Anr., 2010 (10)
ADJ 1 (FB).

8. The law laid down by Full
Bench in Vivekanand Yadav (supra) can
be summarised as under:

(I) Section 95(1)(g) contemplates
removal of Pradhan while Proviso to
Section 95(1)(g) talks of enquiry before
ceasing
financial
and
administrative
powers during pendency of a removal
proceeding. If Pradhan is prima facie
found to have committed financial and
other
irregularities,
preliminary/fact
finding enquiry under Section 95(1)(g)
proviso is necessary, which has to be
conducted under Rule 4 of Rules, 1997.

(II) Proviso to Section 95(1)
would
apply
to
Section
95(1)(g)
contemplating removal but not to any
other provision like Proviso to Section
95(1)(g).

(III) The proviso to Section 95(1)
provides for reasonable opportunity in
removal proceedings of a Pradhan under
Section 95(1)(g) but it does not apply to
Proviso to Section 95(1)(g) providing for
preliminary or fact finding enquiry: the
purpose of this enquiry is to find out if
there is any prima facie case against
Pradhan or not.

(IV) Proviso to Section 95(1)(g)
providing cessation of financial and
administrative powers does contemplate a
preliminary enquiry by a person and
procedure is to be prescribed: the Rules
have to be framed for the same. Rules,
1997 thus have been framed because it is
so mandated in the Proviso to Section
1 All. Smt. Nanhi Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1949
95(1)(g) of Act, 1947 and not because of
95(1)(g) or the Proviso to Section 95(1).

(V) The District Magistrate can
order a preliminary enquiry on the
complaint or report or otherwise. The
word 'complaint' or 'report' refers to the
complaint by a private person or to the
report made by a public servant under
Rule 3.

(VI) The District Magistrate has
power to refer a case for preliminary
enquiry even if there is no complaint or
report. In other words, he has power to act
suo moto.

(VII) Even if a complaint made is
not entertainable in view of Rule 3(5) of
Rules, 1997 yet District Magistrate can
always refer the matter for preliminary
enquiry, if he consider that it should be so
enquired; since he can act suo moto.

(VIII) The word "otherwise" in
Rule 4 means that District Magistrate has
suo motu powers to order a preliminary
enquiry, and, he may order a preliminary
enquiry even if there is no complaint or
report; or a defective complaint, not in
accordance with Rules 3(1) to 3(4).

(IX) A Pradhan has no right to
object that a complaint is not in
accordance with Rules 3(1) to 3(4) of
Rules, 1997 and hence no inquiry can be
ordered.

(X) A Pradhan is neither entitled
to be associated in preliminary enquiry
nor entitled to get copy of preliminary
enquiry report. His only right is to have
his explanation or point of view or version
to the charges considered before the order
for
ceasing
his
financial
and
administrative power is passed.

(XI) It is not only necessary that
explanation or point of view or version of
affected pradhan should be obtained but
should also be considered before being
prima facie satisfied of his being guilty of
financial and other irregularities and
ceasing his powers. The consideration of
explanation does not have to be a detailed
one but there should be indication that
mind has been applied.

(XII)
The
proceeding
for
removal
has
to
be
conducted
in
accordance with Rules 6 onwards of
Rules, 1997, irrespective of the fact
whether right to exercise financial and
administrative power was ceased or not.
However, where right to exercise financial
and administrative power is also to be
ceased then procedure in Rules 3 to 5 has
to be followed, otherwise there is no
necessity to follow them.

(XIII)
In
other
words,
preliminary enquiry may not be necessary
if the proceeding for removal is to be
undertaken without ceasing power of
pradhan in respect to administrative and
financial matters.

(XIV) In order to exercise power
under Rule 5, to cease administrative and
financial
powers
of
Pradhan under
Proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of Act, 1947,
District Magistrate can pass order in the
following contingencies:

(i) A complaint can be made
directly to the District Magistrate who
may ask the enquiry officer as defined
under Rule 2 (c) to conduct a preliminary
inquiry under Rule 4 ; or

(ii) A complaint can be made
directly to the enquiry officer defined
under Section 2 (c), who may submit a
report without the District Magistrate
asking for it ; or

(iii) A complaint can be made to
the District Magistrate with a copy to
enquiry officer, who may submit a report,
without the District Magistrate asking for
it ; or

(iv) A District Magistrate can
himself conduct a preliminary enquiry.
1950 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(XV) Any other report can be
considered by District Magistrate under
Rule 3(6) of Rules, 1997 for ordering
preliminary enquiry but final enquiry with
cessation of power cannot be ordered on
its basis. In other words, action under
Proviso to Section 95(1) (g) can also be
taken on the preliminary report of District
Magistrate as well as on a report of a
person defined as enquiry officer under
Rule 2(c) of Rules, 1997. Only these
reports would be covered in the word
'otherwise' of Rule 5.

11. Though, in Rais Ahmad
(supra) also, the order under Proviso to
Section 95(1)(g) was passed on 30.6.2008
i.e. after the said amendment but it
appears that Hon'ble Court was not
apprised of the fact that Rule 2(c), as was
initially framed, has already undergone an
amendment in 2001 and this amended rule
was not considered by this Court.
Apparently judgment in Rais Ahmad
(supra) is per incurium. The amended
definition has been considered in Full
Bench judgment in Vivekanand Yadav
(supra) and exposition of law laid down
therein has already been noted above.
Therefore, even if District Magistrate has
not appointed Enquiry Officer, report
submitted by District Basic Education
Officer and District Panchayat Raj Officer
can be acted upon by treating it to be a
preliminary enquiry report since they were
all "district level officer" and do satisfy
definition of "Enquiry Officer" under the
Rules.

12. This Court has also said that
even if enquiry has not been ordered by
District
Magistrate
but
if
such
a
preliminary report is available, it can be
acted upon for the purpose of passing an
order under Proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of
Act, 1947. Moreover, powers exercisable
by State Government under Section
95(1)(g)
have
been
delegated
upon
District
Magistrate
vide
notification
No.1684/XXXIII-1-1997-123-97,
dated
30.4.1997 issued under Section 96-A of
Act, 1947, which reads as under:

"96-A. Delegation of powers by
State Government.- The State Government
may delegate all or any of its powers
under this Act to any officer or authority
subordinate to it subject to such conditions
and restrictions as it may deem fit to
impose." (emphasis supplied)

14. In such view of the matter, I do
not find any substance in the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner insofar
as it relates to the formation of the enquiry
committee being without authority is
concerned.

15. Coming to the merits of the
order, suffice it to note that in her reply the
petitioner has clearly admitted that she has
taken away the old bricks to his residence,
although, it has been explained that the old
bricks were removed and were kept in her
residence from security point of view only
and she has not misused the same.
However, it is further reflected from the
reply that there is no averment that such
bricks are still lying in her residence and
the same can be recovered. On the
contrary, she has offered to refund the
amount of the old bricks. This clearly
indicates the admission on the part of the
petitioner that the bricks were removed
and kept by her in her residence.

16. It is not in dispute that final
inquiry
is
still
pending,
therefore,
additionally for this reason also I am not
inclined to interfere in the matter.

17. Petition is devoid of merits and is
accordingly, dismissed.
1 All. Smt. Nanhi Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1951

18. In view of the discussion made
hereinabove the judgments on which the
reliance has been placed by the learned
counsel for the petitioner are of no help to
him.

19. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, it is provided that in fact the final
inquiry has not been concluded till date,
the same shall be concluded as per the
Rule 6 of the Rules, 1997 within time
bound period and, if possible, within a
period of three months.
----------
(2020)1ILR 1950

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.12.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Writ-C No. 21892 of 2016
Connected With
Writ-C No. 21801 of 2016 & Writ-C No. 21847
of 2016 & Writ-C No. 21891 of 2016

Alchemist Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Dinesh Chandra Tripahthi & Anr.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shashwat Kishore Chaturvedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Krishan Chandra Tripathi

A. Payment of Wages Act, 1936 - Section
15 (2) - Claims arising out of deductions
from wages or delay in payment of wages
- the authority under Section 15 of the
Act,
1936
is
a
tribunal
of
limited
jurisdiction - mere denial of existence of
relationship of employer and employee
may not be sufficient to oust the
jurisdiction of the authority under the
Act, 1936 - it would only be in a case
where a serious dispute is raised with
regard to the existence of the contract of
employment that the authority would
cease to have jurisdiction to entertain the
claim
as
the
same
may
involve
adjudication upon complicated questions
of law and fact - orders passed by the
Prescribed Authority set aside. (Para 4, 12,
30, 33 & 38)

The Industrial Tribunals while deciding matters
relating to labour disputes in proceedings
which are summary in nature are to dispose of
the issues, whether preliminary or otherwise, at
the same - where the claim had been made
under Section 15 of the Act, 1936 raising a
grievance with regard to delay in payment of
wages and as per terms of the first proviso to
sub-section (3) of Section 15 the authority
under the Act, 1936 is enjoined to dispose of
the claim as far as applicable within a period of
three months from the date of registration of
the claim by authority - The second proviso to
sub-section (3) mandates that the period of
three months may be extended if both parties
to the dispute agree for any bonafide reason to
be recorded by the authority that the said
period of three month may be extended to
such period as may be necessary to dispose of
the application in a just manner. (Para 36)

Held: - In a claim filed under Section 15 of the Act,
1936 arising out of deductions from wages or delay
in payment of wages time is of essence and the
matter cannot be lingered on the pretext of deciding
preliminary issues. (Para 37)

Writ Petitions allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1. A.V.D'costa Vs. B.C. Patel and Ors.,2

2. Shri Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. Shri S.B.Bhatt
and another3

3. Payment of Wages Inspector Vs. Surajmal
Mehta and Ors.,4

4. M/s E.Hill & Company (P) Ltd., Mirzapur Vs.
City Magistrate Mirzapur & Anr5