# Smt. Neetu Sood v. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors

- **Citation:** (2013) 3 ILRA 1239
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-09-04
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12796 of 2011
- **Bench:** Tarun Agarwala
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-neetu-sood-v-the-state-transport-appellate-tribunal-ors-42669
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Motor Vehicle Act 1988-Section 72-read
with M.V. Rule 1998, Rule 68- Application
for permit to play the bus in two different
states-rejection on ground not residing in
concern
state-held-no
such
statutory
requirement-tribunal committed mistake on
face of record itself-direction for fresh
consideration given.

Held: Para-18
The Court is of the view that the owner of
the vehicle may be a permanent resident of
a particular place, but, at the same time, he
can carry on his business at another place.
There is no bar under any law that a owner
of a vehicle, who is a permanent resident of
a particular place, cannot ply his vehicle in a
1240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
different region and cannot keep his vehicle
in that region for business purposes.

## Text

3 All] Smt. Neetu Sood Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
1239
Hence, this shall not help the petitioners
at all.

24. Be that as it may, since the law
is well settled that vacancies occurring
earlier should be filed in by the procedure
laid down under the statute, operating at
the time of occurrence of vacancies, G.O.
dated 04.09.2012, need not be quashed to
the extent it provides in the last para.
Considering prayer (b), the respondents
need be directed to consider the matter of
appointment on the post of Angan Bari
Karyakartri at village panchayat Sajeti,
Ghatampur Block, district Kanpur Nagar
in the light of selection made according to
procedure laid down, applicable at the
time of occurrence of vacancy, without
being influenced by any subsequent G.O.,
laying down different procedure or
method and the discussion made above.

25. In view of above discussion, the
writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The
impugned
advertisement
dated
04.01.2013 (Annexure-9) to the writ
petition,
published
by
District
Programming Officer, District Kanpur
Nagar, respondent no.3, insofar as it
pertains to the post of Angan Bari
Karyakartri, which is subject matter of
dispute in the present writ petition, is
hereby
quashed.
The
respondent
competent
authority
is
directed
to
consider the claim of petitioner for
appointment to the post of Angan Bari
Karyakartri in the light of her selection
made pursuant to advertisement made on
31.01.2011. However, it is made clear that
this
order
shall
not
preclude
the
competent authority to examine the
matter, with respect to genuineness of any
document relating to eligibility etc. of
petitioner and if anything is found wrong,
therein appropriate order may be passed
by it, giving reason(s), after observing
principles of natural justice.

26. The writ petition stands decided
accordingly in the manner as said above.

27. No costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.08.2013

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE TARUN AGARWALA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 12796 of 2011

Smt. Neetu Sood

 ...Petitioner
Versus
The State Transport Appellate Tribunal &
Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri D.K. Agarwal, Sri Ashok Saxena
Sri Nitin Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri G.K. Singh
Sri V.K. Singh, Sri G.K. Malviya

Motor Vehicle Act 1988-Section 72-read
with M.V. Rule 1998, Rule 68- Application
for permit to play the bus in two different
states-rejection on ground not residing in
concern
state-held-no
such
statutory
requirement-tribunal committed mistake on
face of record itself-direction for fresh
consideration given.

Held: Para-18
The Court is of the view that the owner of
the vehicle may be a permanent resident of
a particular place, but, at the same time, he
can carry on his business at another place.
There is no bar under any law that a owner
of a vehicle, who is a permanent resident of
a particular place, cannot ply his vehicle in a
1240 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
different region and cannot keep his vehicle
in that region for business purposes.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Tarun Agarwala, J.)

1. Heard Sri Alok Saxena, the
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
V.K.Singh, the learned counsel assisted
by Sri G.K.Malviya, the learned counsel
for the respondents.

2. There is an inter-State route
known as Pichhore-Jhansi via Dinara,
Biloa, Panihar which is 70.06 kms. in
length. A major portion of the route, i.e.,
49.06 kms. lies in the State of Madhya
Pradesh and 21 kms. lies in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. As per the reciprocal
agreement arrived at between the two
States, a strength of two permits for four
trips is fixed from the Uttar Pradesh side.

3. It transpires that a vacancy of one
permit for two trips was made available
from the Uttar Pradesh side. For this
purpose, the petitioner applied for grant of
a stage carriage permit on the route in
question under Section 72 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred
to as "the Act") read with Rule 62 of the
Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998
(hereinafter referred to as "the Rules"). In
this application, the petitioner showed her
address of Jhansi. The application of the
petitioner and others remained pending
before the State Transport Authority,
Lucknow. Accordingly, the petitioner
filed Writ Petition No.4485 of 2009
(M/B), before the Lucknow Bench of this
Court, which petition was disposed of
with a direction to the authority concerned
to consider and decide the application of
the petitioner.

4. The State Transport Authority
considered the grant of stage carriage
permit on the route in question in its
meeting, held on 20.5.2009. It transpires
that four applications were received and
was considered by the authority. The sole
criteria adopted by the State Transport
Authority was the model of the vehicle to
be used on the route in question. The
State Transport Authority in its meeting
date 20.5.2009 granted the permit in
favour of respondent No.3, Arvind Kumar
Yadav, on the ground, that he offered a
vehicle which was a 2004 model,
whereas, the petitioner offered a 2002
model.

5. The petitioner, Neetu Sood, being
aggrieved by the grant of stage carriage
permit in favour of respondent No.3, filed an
appeal before the State Transport Appellate
Authority, Lucknow, under Section 89(1)(a)
of the Act. The appeal of the petitioner was
allowed and was remanded to the regional
transport authority to consider the issue of
the superiority of the model of the vehicle
given by respondent No.3. This direction
was issued, on the ground, that the appellant
had also offered a vehicle of 2005 and 2009
model and had sought time to file the papers,
which was granted by the State Transport
Authority and that the appellant had filed the
necessary affidavit on 21.5.2009. It was also
alleged by the petitioner that whereas the
respondents offered a 2004 model, the
vehicle, which was endorsed on the permit,
was of a 2000 model. The Tribunal also
directed the Regional Transport Authority to
consider as to whether the petitioner Neetu
Sood was a resident of Uttar Pradesh or not
and consequently, eligible to apply for a
stage carriage permit.

6. The respondent No.3, being
aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal,
filed Writ Petition No.71620 of 2010,
which was allowed and the order of the
3 All] Smt. Neetu Sood Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
1241
Tribunal was set aside. The Writ Court
directed that since the Appellate Tribunal
had coextensive powers, it should have
decided the matter itself on merits instead
of remitting the matter to the State
Transport Authority.

7. Based on the said direction of the
Writ Court, the Tribunal again heard the
matter and dismissed the appeal by an order
dated 11.2.2011. The Tribunal held, that the
appellant, Neetu Sood, was not a permanent
resident of Uttar Pradesh, inasmuch as, the
appellant had shown her address of Gwalior
which is in the State of Madhya Pradesh in
the memo of appeal and consequently, held
that she was not entitled to hold a permit.
The Tribunal further held, that even though
the appellant had offered a superior model,
but, since she is not a permanent resident of
Uttar Pradesh, she is not entitled for any
relief. The petitioner, being aggrieved by the
order of the Tribunal, has filed the present
writ petition.

8. The learned counsel for the
petitioner contended that the petitioner
has been non-suited only on account of
the fact that she had mentioned her
temporary address of Gwalior in the
memo of appeal, without considering the
other documents filed before the Tribunal,
to indicate that she was a permanent
resident of Jhansi, which is in the State of
Uttar Pradesh. The learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the Tribunal has
not considered these documents nor there
is any discussion about these documents
in the order.

9. On the otherhand, the learned
counsel for the respondents submitted that all
the documents, which had been filed by the
petitioner were procured after the meeting
was held on 20.5.2009 and therefore, such
documents
cannot
be
taken
into
consideration. It was also contended that the
petitioner's application for grant of a permit
was not in accordance with Rule 62 of the
Rules and, therefore, her application was
liable to be rejected and consequently, the
petitioner was not entitled for any relief from
the Writ Court.

10. In rejoinder, the learned counsel
for the petitioner contended that the
application of the petitioner was filed in
accordance with the provision of Rule 62
of the Rules and assuming without
admitting that the petitioner had filed an
incomplete application, the same could
not be rejected on technical grounds.

11. Having heard the learned
counsel for the parties, the Court finds
that the State Transport Authority can
grant a stage carriage permit under
Section 72 of the Act on such terms and
conditions contained therein. Rule 62 of
the Rules provides that the application for
a permit shall specifically mention about
the ownership of the bus and general
reputation or character of the applicant.

12. Section 69 of the Act is relevant
for
the
purpose
of
deciding
the
controversy involved in the present case.
For facility, the said provision is extracted
therein:

"69. General provision as to
applications for permits- (1) Every
application for a permit shall be made to
the Regional Transport Authority of the
region in which it is proposed to use the
vehicle or vehicles :

Provided that if it is proposed to use
the vehicle or vehicles in two or more
regions lying within the same State, the
1242 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application shall be made to the Regional
Transport Authority of the region in
which the major portion of the proposed
route or area lies, and in case the portion
of the proposed route or area in each of
the regions is approximately equal, to the
Regional Transport Authority of the
region in which it is proposed to keep the
vehicle or vehicles;

Provided further that if it is proposed
to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or
more regions lying in different States, the
application shall be made to the Regional
Transport Authority of the region in
which the applicant resides or has his
principal place of business.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), the State
Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, direct that in the case of
any vehicle or vehicles proposed to be
used in two or more regions lying in
different States, the application under that
sub-section shall be made to the State
Transport Authority of the region in
which the applicant resides or has his
principal place of business."

13. A perusal of the aforesaid
provision indicates, that where the vehicle
is proposed to be used in two or more
regions lying within the same State, the
application would be made to the
Regional Transport Authority of the
region in which a major portion of the
proposed route lies, and in case the
portion of the route is equal, then the
application would be made to the
Regional Transport Authority of the
region in which the applicant proposes to
keep its vehicle. The proviso to sub
section (1) of Section 69 of the Act
indicates that where the vehicle, which is
proposed to be used in two or more
regions lying in different States, the
application would be made to the
Regional Transport Authority of the
region in which the applicant resides or
has his principal place of business.

14. In support of this contention, the
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents
vehemently contended that the word
"resides" means a permanent residence. In
support of his contention, the learned
counsel placed reliance upon a decision of
the Supreme Court in Union of India and
others vs. Dudh Nath Prasad, A.I.R. 2000
SC 525 and Smt. Jeewanti Pandey vs.
Kishan Chandra Pandey, A.I.R. 1982 SC 3.

15. The learned counsel tried to
impress the Court that in view of the
aforesaid decisions, the word "resides"
means where a person has a permanent
residence or has stayed for a considerable
period of time. The submission of the
learned counsel for the respondents
cannot be accepted.

16. The word "resides" used under
Section 45 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939, is pari materia to Section 69 of the
present Act. A Division Bench of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court in Ratan Lal
vs. State Transport Appellate Authority,
Madhya Pradesh and others, A.I.R. 1969
MP 204 held, that having regard to the
object and purpose of Section 45 and the
second proviso, the word "resides" must
be construed as including both permanent
and temporary residence.

17. The Supreme Court in Jagir
Kumar vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC
1521, in the context of the jurisdiction of
the Magistrate under Section 488 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for
entertaining a petition of a wife, for
3 All] Smt. Neetu Sood Vs. The State Transport Appellate Tribunal & Ors.
1243
maintenance, considered the meaning of
the word "resides" and held-

"The said meaning, therefore, takes
in both a permanent dwelling as well as a
temporary living in a place. It is,
therefore, capable of different meanings
including domicile in (sic) and the most
technical sense and temporary residence.
Whichever meaning is given to it one
thing is obvious and it is that it does not
include a casual stay in, or flying visit to a
particular place. In short, the meaning of
the word would, in the ultimate analysis
depend upon the context and the purpose
of a particular statute. In this case the
context and purpose of the present statute
certainly do not compel the importation of
the concept of domicile in its technical
sense. that the said meaning"

18. In the light of the aforesaid, the
Tribunal committed a manifest error in nonsuiting the petitioner, on the ground, that the
petitioner had given her address of Gwalior
in the memo of appeal, without considering
the explanation as to why she had given the
address of Gwalior and without considering
other documents relating to her residence and
Section 69 of the Act. The Court is of the
view that the owner of the vehicle may be a
permanent resident of a particular place, but,
at the same time, he can carry on his business
at another place. There is no bar under any
law that a owner of a vehicle, who is a
permanent resident of a particular place,
cannot ply his vehicle in a different region
and cannot keep his vehicle in that region for
business purposes.

19. In the light of the aforesaid, the
Tribunal has not considered the provision
of Section 69 of the Act. It is not
necessary that the petitioner should be a
permanent resident of that region where
she has filed an application for grant of a
stage carriage permit. The order of the
Tribunal on this issue cannot be sustained.

20. The learned counsel for the
respondents contended that the finding of
the Appellate Tribunal, on the question of
superiority of the vehicle offered by the
petitioner, was incorrect and that the
petitioner could not challenge this finding
as there was no occasion for the
respondents to challenge it since the
appeal of the petitioner was dismissed.
The learned counsel submitted that the
vehicle offered by the petitioner, which
has led the Appellate Tribunal to give a
finding that the petitioner offered a
superior model vehicle could not be taken
into consideration since the said vehicle
was already being used in a permit
granted to the petitioner for another route.
The learned counsel submitted that the
same vehicle cannot be used for two
routes. In support of this submission, the
learned counsel placed certain documents
before the Court to prove that the vehicle
offered by the petitioner was already
being used on another route. The learned
counsel
further
submitted
that
the
application
of
the
petitioner
was
incomplete and was liable to be rejected.
The said application could not be cured
by filing an affidavit after the date of the
consideration for the grant of permit by
the State Transport Authority.

21. In the light of the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the
respondents, the Court finds, that since
the impugned order of the Tribunal, on
the question of permanent residence,
cannot be sustained, the Court is of the
opinion that the entire order has to be set
aside
and
the
matter
has
to
be
reconsidered by the Tribunal afresh. The
1244 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court is of the view that the order of the
Tribunal, relating to the superiority of the
model, offered by the petitioner shall also
be reconsidered afresh.

22. In the light of the aforesaid, the
impugned order of the Tribunal dated
11.2.2011 is quashed. The writ petition is
allowed. The matter is again remitted to
the Tribunal to decide the appeal of the
petitioner afresh within three months from
the date of the production of a certified
copy of the order, on the question of
residence and model of the vehicle. It
would be open to the parties to file fresh
evidence on the question of residence and
superiority of model of vehicle.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.09.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.13918 of 1996

Ram Awatar Mishra and Ors. ..Petitioners
Versus
Uttar Pradesh Basic Shiksha Parishad
and Ors.... Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri B.R. Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Constitution of India, Art.-226- claim about
training-without being validly appointedwithout
possessing
minimum
requisite
qualification-can not be enforced by writ
court-petition dismissed.

Held: Para-5
In view of above decision of Division
Bench, after promulgation of statutory
rules, mandating that no appointment
shall be made if a person does not
possess requisite minimum educational
qualification
including
training,
the
question of engagement of an untrained
person after promulgation of rule and
thereafter directing him to sent for
training, does not arise.

Case Law discussed:
Special Appeal No. 10 of 2007.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioners and perused the record.

2. The petitioners admittedly were
not trained upto 1981 and claimed that
they were sent for inservice training in
1983 though such training was meant for
only those teachers who were validly
appointed at the time when statutory rules
providing
minimum
qualification
including training were not existed.

3. This aspect has been considered in
the light of relevant Government order by a
Division Bench of this Court (in which I was
a member) in Special Appeal No. 10 of
2007, State of U.P and others Vs. Shailesh
Kumar Dwivedi and others, decided on
17.12.2008. This Court held as under:

"In view thereof, this appeal is
disposed of directing the competent
authority to consider the case of the
petitioners-respondents in the light of two
conditions provided in the judgment of
the Hon'ble Single Judge, impugned in
this appeal, as well as in the light of the
conditions provided by the Division
Bench in its judgment in the case of Kali
Charan Singh Arya (supra). Further, if the
petitioners have been appointed after the
enforcement of 1975 Rules of 1970 Rules
in Junior Primary School or Junior High
School, as the case may be, in violation of
the
provisions
thereof
and
without
possessing training qualification, such
petitioners cannot be allowed to undergo