# Smt. Pinki v. Sri Pushpendra Kumar

- **Citation:** (2024) 9 ILRA 1255
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-09-06
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 155 of 2011
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh, Donadi Ramesh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-pinki-v-sri-pushpendra-kumar-52534
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Civil Law - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 -
Section 13 & 28 - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - Order VIII - Rule 9 - First Appeal -
filed by wife - marriage solemnized in 2006 -
husband filed for divorce in 2008 - alleging
desertion in 2007 and infertility of the wife -
wife contested - filed a Written St.ment (WS) -
during mediation, they initially agreed to
dissolve their marriage by mutual consent -
however, in subsequent mediations, appellantwife agreed to live with the husband - Later, she
contested the proceedings with a second WS,
establishing that she was not infertile and had
two children born in 2008 and 2010 - the trial
court rejected the second WS and decreed the
divorce suit on merits - court finds that no
1256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proven fact to dissolve the marriage under
section 13 (1) of the Act, as a Hindu marriage
can
only
be
dissolved
under
limited
circumstances like proven impotency - the trial
court overlooked this ground and relied on the
initial WS and consent from 2008, ignoring later
developments
-
therefore,
the
impugned
judgment and order, along with the decree,
were set aside - and the matter was remitted to
the lower court for further proceedings - If
mediation fails, the wife can rely on the second
WS, and the husband can file a Replication
St.ment - Appeal is allowed. (Para - 26, 36, 37,
38)

First Appeal Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1255
cited above and on consideration of the
totality of circumstances, we are of the firm
view that the present case does not fall
within the category of 'rarest of rare cases'
attracting death penalty due to presence of
two factors; firstly, the present case,
undisputedly is one of the circumstantial
evidence and secondly, both the appellants
have
no
prior
criminal
antecedent.
Therefore, it appears expedient in the
interest
of
justice
that
the
extreme
punishment of death penalty awarded to the
appellants under Section 302/34 I.P.C. be
substituted with sentence of imprisonment
for life.

(74) In the result :-

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2504 of
2022 and 2524 of 2022

Both appeals are partly allowed.
Though we confirm the conviction of the
appellants, Vijay Sharma and Dheeraj
Sharma, for the offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 I.P.C.
awarded vide impugned judgment dated
13.09.2022, however, we reduce their
sentence awarded vide impugned 16.09.2022
from death penalty to imprisonment for the
whole of the remaining natural life of the
appellants, subject, however, to the condition
that the appellants would be eligible to any
commutation and remissions that may be
granted by the Hon'ble President and the
Hon'ble Governor under Articles 72 and 161
of the Constitution of India or of the State
Government under Section 433-A of the
Code of Criminal Procedure for good and
sufficient reasons.

Capital Sentence No. 2 of 2022

Reference made by the trial Court
for confirmation of death sentence of the
appellants-Vijay
Sharma
and
Dheeraj
Sharma is, decided accordingly with the
sentence modified.

(75) Office is directed to transmit
the record of the Trial Court and a copy of
this judgment be sent to the Court
concerned for information and necessary
compliance through fax/e-mail forthwith.
----------
(2024) 9 ILRA 1255
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.09.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DONADI RAMESH, J.

First Appeal No. 155 of 2011

Smt. Pinki ...Appellant
Versus
Sri Pushpendra Kumar ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Uma Nath Pandey, Sri Vinod Sinha, Sri
Pradeep Kumar, Sri Sushil Kumar Tripathi, Sri
Mahesh Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.N. Pandey, Sri D.R. Kushwaha, Sri Manish
C. Tiwari, Sri Rajesh Kumar Dubey

Civil Law - Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 -
Section 13 & 28 - Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 - Order VIII - Rule 9 - First Appeal -
filed by wife - marriage solemnized in 2006 -
husband filed for divorce in 2008 - alleging
desertion in 2007 and infertility of the wife -
wife contested - filed a Written St.ment (WS) -
during mediation, they initially agreed to
dissolve their marriage by mutual consent -
however, in subsequent mediations, appellantwife agreed to live with the husband - Later, she
contested the proceedings with a second WS,
establishing that she was not infertile and had
two children born in 2008 and 2010 - the trial
court rejected the second WS and decreed the
divorce suit on merits - court finds that no
1256 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proven fact to dissolve the marriage under
section 13 (1) of the Act, as a Hindu marriage
can
only
be
dissolved
under
limited
circumstances like proven impotency - the trial
court overlooked this ground and relied on the
initial WS and consent from 2008, ignoring later
developments
-
therefore,
the
impugned
judgment and order, along with the decree,
were set aside - and the matter was remitted to
the lower court for further proceedings - If
mediation fails, the wife can rely on the second
WS, and the husband can file a Replication
St.ment - Appeal is allowed. (Para - 26, 36, 37,
38)

First Appeal Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs Deepa Bhatnagar,
(2011) 5 SCC 234,

2. Smruti Pahariya Vs Sanjay Pahariya, (2009)
13 SCC 338,

3. Sureshta Devi Vs Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC
25,

4. Kantipudi Adinarayana v. Putta Venkata Satya
Subba Rao & ors.2024, SCC OnLine AP 1503,

5. River Valley Tea Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Assam Gas
Co. Ltd, 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 1168,

6. Ashok Kumar Kalra Vs Wing CDR Surendra
Agnihotri & ors.(2020) 2 SCC 394,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J. & Hon'ble Donadi Ramesh, J.)

1. This is an old appeal. It has
remained pending for 13 years. List
revised. None appears for the respondent in
either call. On the last date as well, none
had appeared for the respondent. The
appeal is listed peremptorily today. Heard
Shri Mahesh Sharma, learned counsel for
the appellant and perused the record.

2. Present appeal has been filed by
the appellant/wife under Section 28 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act') arising from the
judgement and order dated 30.3.2011
passed by the learned Additional District
Judge,
Court
no.8,
Bulandshahar,
in
Original Suit No. 192 of 2008 (Pushpendra
Kumar vs Smt. Pinki) whereby the learned
Court below has dissolved the marriage
between the parties under Section 13 of the
Act,
at
the
instance
of
the
respondent/husband.

3. The parties were married on
2.2.2006 in accordance with the Act. At
that time, the respondent was employed
with the Indian Army. According to the
plaint allegations, the appellant deserted
her husband on 31.12.2007. On 11.02.2008,
the
respondent/husband
instituted
the
divorce suit, primarily on the ground of
infertility suffered by the appellant. On
such suit being filed, a Written Statement
was filed by the appellant, on 01.04.2008.
Though it is disputed to the appellant, that
document - described as the first Written
Statement, reads as below:

"प्रसति द पत् द्व र प्रसति दी सपिंकी
उत्तरद त सनम्न प्रक र है:-
1- यह सक य सचक की ि र -1, 2, 3,
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 क कथन स्िीक र है।
2- यह सक ि दपत् की ि र -9 क कथन
क नूनी है।
सििेि-कथन
3- यह सक मैं अपनी स्िेच्ि े अपने
सपत के प रह रही ह िं।
4- यह सक यह त्य है सक मेरे अभी तक
कोई िंत न नहीं है।
5- यह सक मैं पसत की प बन्दी में उ के
प रहन नहीं च हती ह िं।
9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1257
6- यह सक तल क की ब बत द ि सडग्री
होने में मुझे भी कोई आपसत्त नहीं है।
 त्य पन :
मैं त्य सपत करती ह िं सक
प्रसति द पत् क मस्त कथन
मेरे ज्ञ न में च ि ही है।
स्थ न - बुलन्दिहर
प्रसति दी / उत्तरद त
श्रीमती सपिंकी द्व र
असििि ।
ह०-अपठनीय
1-4-08
जगिीर स िंह, एडिोकेट
कलेक्रेट एडिोकेट् भ ग र
सदन िंक- 1-4-08
बुलन्दिहर"

4. The matter was referred to
mediation by the learned Court below. On
that, first mediation was attempted by Ms.
Anupama Raghuvanshi. It concluded on
25.4.2008. Paper no. 8C-2 which is the
mediation report, reads as below:

"पर मिा एििं ुलह मझौत केन्र
बुलन्दिहर ।
न्य य लय अपर सजल जज कोटा निं0-2
बुलन्दिहर ।
ओ०स्त० 92/08
पुष्पेन्र कुम र बन म श्रीमती सपिंकी
श्रीम न जी,
दोनों पिक र उपसस्थत आये। दोनों
पिक रों के मध्य मझौत करि ने क प्रय सकय
गय सकन्तु दोनों ही आप ी हमती े एक दू रे े
तल क च हते हैं ।
अतः पत् िली पुनः न्य य लय प्रेसित की
ज ती है ।
पर मिाक
अनुपम रघुििंिी, एडिोकेट
ह०/- अस्पि
ह०/- पी. कुम र
ह०/- सपिंकी
सदन िंक 25-4-08
ह० अस्पि
अपर सजल एििं त् न्य य िीि
न्य य कि िं०-2 बुलन्दिहर ।
25-4-08"

5. The matter remained pending
for two years, thereafter. On 30.7.2010, the
appellant/wife
appears
to
have
filed
another/second Written Statement. It is
Paper no.40A-1. It runs into eleven
paragraphs. It reads as below:

"प्रसति द पत् रेस्पोन्डेन्ट की ओर े
1- यह सक ि र -1 पेटीिन े इन्क र नहीं
है।
2- यह सक ि र -2 पेटीिन स्िीक र है।
3- यह सक पेटीिन की ि र -3 क कथन
समथ्य ि मनगढन्त है तथ स्िीक र नहीं है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट
म ह जून न् 2008 तक पेटीिनर के घर उ के
पररजनों के थ अपने पत्नी िमा क प लन करते हुए
रही है। पेटीिनर के म्पका ि हि े रेस्प न्डेन्ट ने
म ह निम्बर 2007 में गभा ि रण सकय है। पेटीिनर
क यह कथन सक रेस्प न्डेन्ट क सचसकत् कों द्व र
गभाि रण िंबिंिी ईल ज कर य , मनगढन्त सनर ि र तथ
अ त्य है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट क गभािती होने म त् े यह
सनसिाि द है सक रेस्प न्डेन्ट म िं बनने के अयोग्य िंबिंिी
तथ्य कभी मने नहीं आय ।
4- यह सक ि र -4 पेटीिन सनर ि र,
अ त्य एििं मनगढन्त है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट ने कभी पेटीिनर य
अन्य पररजन के थ अभर व्यिह र नहीं सकय बसल्क
 दैि अपने पत्नी के िमा क प लन सकय है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट
की गभ ािस्थ इ ब त स्िमेि प्रम ण है सक रेस्प न्डेन्ट
म िं बनने के योग्य है।
5- यह सक पेटीिन की ि र -5 अ त्य है
तथ स्िीक र नहीं है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट के आचरण की कभी
कोई सिक यत नहीं की गयी।
6- यह सक ि र -6 पेटीिन अ त्य तथ
मनगढन्त है एििं स्िीक र नहीं है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट कभी अपने
पत्नी िमा के सिरुद्ध घर े ब हर नहीं सनकली।
7- यह सक ि र -7 पेटीिन अ त्य है
तथ स्िीक र नहीं है। रेस्प न्डेन्ट म ह जून न् 2008
के मध्य तक पेटीिनर के घर उ के पररजनों के थ
1258 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
रही है। म ह जून में गभ ािस्थ के तिें म ह में म त
सपत के घर कुि सदन रहने के सलए पेटीिनर क भ ई
िोडकर गय थ तथ प्र ि े पूिा ि सप ले ज ने क
ि यद सकय थ सकन्तु अब रेस्प न्डेन्ट को पेटीिनर के
पररजनों के थ रहने में स्ियिं अपन तथ बच्चे के
जीिन को खतर मह ू हो रह है।
8- यह सक ि र -8 पेटीिन स्िीक र नहीं
है। पेटीिन क कोई क रण नहीं है।
9- यह सक ि र -9 पेटीिन स्िीक र ि
अस्िीक र की आिश्यकत नहीं है।
10- यह सक ि र -10 पेटीिन स्िीक र
नहीं है। सिि ह सिच्िेद की आज्ञसप्त प ररत सकये ज ने
क कोई क रण य आि र नहीं है। पेटीिनर को सिि ह
सिच्िेद की आज्ञसप्त प ररत करके जीिन के मूल्यों को
नक रते हुए रेस्प न्डेन्ट ि होनेि ले बच्चों के जीिन े
सखलि ड करने की स्ितिंत्त प्रद न नहीं की ज कती।
पेटीिन व्यय सहत सनरस्त होने योग्य है।
सििेि-कथन
11- यह सक पेटीिन आि रहीन, तुच्ि,
तिंग करनेि ल तथ असनसश्चत है तथ सिच रण े पूिा
खसण्डत होने योग्य है।
मैं रेस्प न्डेन्ट त्य पन करती ह िं सक
प्रसति द पत् की ि र 1 े 11 क
कथन मेरे ज्ञ न में त्य है।
 त्य पन स्थ न-बुलन्दिहर
सदन िंक - 30-7-2010
रेस्प न्डेन्ट
द्व र
मदन मोहन गगा, एडिोकेट
जजी, बुलन्दिहर
सदन िंक"

6. Thereafter, further mediation
appears to have been conducted. It is dated
20.08.2010. That second mediation was
attempted by Mr. Ram Das Sharma. Its
report is Paper No. 44C-2. It reads as
below:

"श्रीम न जी,
सिपिी श्रीमती सपिंकी प्र थी पुष्पेंर के थ
बतौर पत्नी रहन च हती है। परन्तु प्र थी पुष्पेंर सिपिी
को ि रीररक दोि बत कर थ नहीं रखन च हत ।
 मझौत ि त ा िल नही हो क ।
ररपोटा प्रेसित है।
सदन िंक 20/8/2010
 िंसिकरत
र म द िम ा
एडिोकेट "

7. In such status of pleading and
proceeding, it is also borne out from the
record - the oral statement of the appellant
was recorded on 03.02.2011. She was also
cross-examined. That statement reads as
below:

" िी सिपिी सपिंकी ि इि आि पुष्पेन्र
उम्र 24 ििा पेि -गृहणी सनि ी ग्र म बबनपुरी ड ०
ख सजल बुलन्दि हर ।
 िपथ बय न सकय सक :-
xx xx xx xx द्व र ि दी पुष्पेन्र के
 थ मेरी ि दी के करीब 5 ििा हो गये है। मैं 21/2
ििा े अपने म यके में रह रही ह ाँ। मैं ह ई स्कूल प ह ाँ।
मेर बेट ि बेटी दोनों म यके में ही पैद हुए थ । बेटी
ररय ि दी के 2 ल ब द पैद हुई थी उ की जन्म
सतसथ 7-8-08 है । लडके की जन्म सतसथ 12-1010 है । मुझे अपने पसत पुष्पेन्र े कोई सिक यत नहीं
है ।
 िंबिंि खर ब होने की कोई िजह नहीं है
लडकी पैद होने े पहले मेर कही कोई इल ज नहीं
हुआ। ड । सनसि िम ा के यह ाँ पर मेर कोई इल ज नहीं
हुआ । मुझे इ द िे क पत जून ििा 2008 में चल
गय थ । मुझे नहीं पत सक मैं इ द िे में कोई जि ब
द सखल सकय गय हो ।
क गज िंख्य 9ए पर लग िोटो मेर है।
इ पर दस्तखत मेरे है जो कोरे क गज पर कर ए गये थे
ये दस्तखत मेरे कोई क गर्ज़ पर िकील हब ने कर र
थे। मैंने इ को नहीं पढ थ क्योंसक दस्तखत तो कोरे
क गज पर कर ए थे ।
यह कहन गलत है सक मैंने कोई हमसत
तल क के सलए दी हो ।
यह कहन ही है सक इ मुक्दमें में हम
पिक र सदन िंक 25-4-08 को तुबह मझौत केन्र
9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1259
पर उपसस्थत हुए थे। क गज िंख्य 8 ी 2 पर मेरे
हस्त िर है मैंने तल क की हमसत नहीं दी।
मेरे दोनों ब र हुए प्र ि क खच ा मेरे म यके
ि लों ने उठ य थ । िह क्योंसक खच ा नहीं दे रहे थे
इ सलए अपने पसत े प्र ि के सलए खच ा नहीं म ाँग ।
 ेन के असिक ररयों के म्मुख मझौते
की सलखत पढत 17-11-09 को हुई थी। यह
 मझौत ेन के असिक ररयों ने सलख थ । तब तक
की मेरे म्बन्ि खर ब नहीं थे।
मुझे पुष्पेन्र के अल ि उ के घर ि लों े
भी कभी कोई सिक यत नहीं रही । ेन के असिक ररयों
के मने यह मझौत हुआ थ सक पृष्पेन्र अपन के
ि प ले लेग और हम थ थ रहेंगे। उ के ब द
उन्होंने के ि प नहीं सलय ।
मेरे डब्लू.ए . पेपर िंख्य 40ए। के पैर 7
में जो सलख है िह च है क्योंसक उ मय की
पररसस्थसतयों के अनु र मुझे डर थ । अब मुझे कोई
खतर नहीं है ।
यह कहन गलत है सक हम रे िैि सहक
 म्बन्ि 3-4 ल े सबल्कुल खत्म हो रहे हो । यह
कहन भी गलत है सक मैं पुष्पेन्र के पररि र में अपनी
मनम नी चल ती ह ाँ इ ी िजह े हम रे म्बन्ि खर ब
हुए हो ।
 ुनकर त दीक सकय ।
उपरोि कथन मेरे बोलने पर
मेरे पेिक र द्व र सलख गय ।

ह० अस्पि
अपर जनपद न्य य िीि
कोटा निं05, बुलन्दिहर ।
3-2-11
ह०/- सपिंकी"

8. As extracted above, in her oral
statement,
the
appellant
referred
to
another/third mediation conducted between
her and the respondent, before the army
authorities, on 17.11.2009. That document
is paper no. 56 C-1/6. We consider it
appropriate to extract the same as well. It
reads:

"JOINT STATEMENT - BY
EFFECTED
PARTY
AND
WITNESSES
ON
CASE
CONSIDERING
ON
PUSHPENDRA KUMAR AND HIS
WIFE SMT. PINKI ON 17 NOV.
2009.
हम
NO
1466
3289
w
cfn/Vm (Apv) पुष्पेन्र कुम र सपिंकी देिी
{पुस्पेन्र की पत्नी} श्री उदयबीर स िंह सपिंकी देिी के
सपत जी और पुष्पेन्र के सपत जी श्री तप ल स िंह हम
 ब ने समलकर त रीख 16-11-2009 और 1711-2009 को क्म न असिक री 23 िील्ड िकाि प
म िात 56 APO के मि दफ्तर में पर मिा के ब द
हम ब समलकर इ सनणाय पहुिंचे है ।
{क} सक हम दोनों पि ि ले सजतने भी
अद लत में के चल रहे िो भी ि सप लेने को तैय र
है। इ तल क के उपर अभी तक ।
{ख}िौज में भी हमने जो दरख स्त सदय
है। िो तभी हमने ि सप लेने क सनणाय सलय है ।
{ग} श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी और cfn -
पुष्पेन्र कुम र की प्र थान है की हमें एक थ रहने के
सलए घर सदय ज ये।
{घ} श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी के पररि र की
तरि े और पुष्पेन्र के पररि र की तरि े इनके सनजी
प ररि ररक जीिन में कोई दखलिंद जी नहीं करेंगे।
{ण} cfn पुष्पेन्र कुम र और श्रीमती
सपिंकी देिी की ि दी त रीख 02 िरिरी 2006 में
हुआ थ । उ ि दी में न ही cfn पुष्पेन्र कुम र के
पररि र ने दहेज सलय है और न ही श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी
के पररि र ने दहेज सदय है। और न ही cfn - पृष्पेन्र
के पररि र ने दहेज म िंग है ।
{च} आज तक जो भी मस्य एाँ इ
तल क के सििय पर हुआ है। उ को हम इिर ही खत्म
करके एक नय िरुआत करन च हते हैं। सज में cfn
पुष्पेन्र और उनकी पत्नी श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी अपने
ि दीिुद सजन्दगी को बरकर र रखे ।
{ि} अब े कुि महीनों तक जब तक
इ तल क के उपर जो अद लत में के खत्म नहीं होत
है और सपिंकी देिी के ुर ल पि और उ के म यके
पििर पररि र ब म सजक पररसस्थय ाँ म न्य नहीं
हो ज ती तब तक िो न ुर ल ज येगी । और न
म यके ज येगी ।
1260 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
{ज} यसद थ थ रहते मय cfn
पुष्पेन्र कुम र और श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी कोई गलती करत
है तो उ क पूणा रूप े उत्तरद सयत्ि पसत पत्नी ही होंगे
। और सिभ गीय क याि ही इनको म न्य होगी ।
 ह०/- पी कुम र
 ह०/- अस्पि
 14663289 डब्लू
 17-11-09
श्री िीरप ल स िंह
ग ाँि के दस्य {गि ह}
निं०
14663289
डब्लू
ह०/- अस्पि
 ीएिएन
पुष्पेन्र
कुम र
पुसनय
 ए ए 42121 एच
केप्टेन - सदनेि कुम र
 ह०/- सपिंकी
 ह० अस्पि श्रीमती सपिंकी देिी
 जे ी 758369 एच
 ुबेद र एम एम रोय

ह०/- त्म ल स िंह

 ह० अस्पि

श्री
 त्म ल
स िंह

 14598953 पी
 एच०ए० ि ई िी.ए . उन रेड््‌डी
 ह०/- उदयिीर स िंह
 श्री उदयबीर स िंह
 ह० अस्पि"

9. Besides the above, the appellant
had further filed certain documents to
establish - neither she suffered from
infertility nor it was true that no children
were born to the parties. Her oral statement
and documents on record indicate - she
twice conceived and two children were
born to her - on 7.2.2008 and 12.10.2010.

10. Thus, the appellant sought to
contest the divorce proceedings - on the
strength of her second Written Statement
filed on 30.7.2010 and on the strength of
evidence led by her.

11.

The
respondent
raised
objection that the second Written Statement
filed by the appellant was not maintainable.
He relied on Order VIII Rule 9, Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. In that status of the
proceedings, the below quoted order dated
23.03.2011 was passed by the learned
Court below:

"22-3-2011 आज पेि हुआ। पुक र
पर पिक र ह सजर है। बह सिद्व न असििि गण
पिक र ुनी गयी। ि स्ते सनणाय सदन िंक 29-3-11
को पेि हो।"

12. On the next date - on
28.3.2011, instead of delivering the order,
the learned Court below passed the
following order:

"आज सनणाय सलख ते मय पत् िली के
अिलोकन े यह तथ्य िंज्ञ न में आय सक सिपिी
सपिंकी द्व र त मील के उपर न्त प्रसति द पत् 9A
न्य य लय में द सखल सकय गय थ तथ मझौत केन्र
की ररपोटा भी द सखल हुई लेसकन पेिक र द्व र आदेि
पत् सलख गय तथ पत् िली को ब द सिन्दु हेतु सनयत
सकय गय ।
तत्पश्च त पुनः प्रसति द पत् सिपिी सपिंकी
की ओर े उनके दू रे असििि द्व र 40A द सखल
सकय गय । अतः पररसस्थसतयों में न्य य लय के मि
यह सिसिक प्रश्न है सक क्य पुनः द सखल सकय गय
प्रसति द पत् 40A पोिणीय है?"
क्य उि प्रसति द पत् न्य य लय की
अनुमसत े द सखल सकय गय है? अतः सद० 29-311 को पिक र उि सिसिक सिन्दु पर अपने तका
न्य य लय के मि प्रस्तुत करें।"

13. Clearly, the date 29.03.2011
was fixed for hearing on the objection
raised as to the maintainability of the
second Written Statement filed by the
9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1261
appellant (on 30.07.2010). However, on
that date fixed, the learned court below not
only proceeded to sustain the objection
raised by the respondent and thus rejected
the second Written Statement filed by the
appellant (dated 30.7.2010), but it also
proceeded to hear the divorce suit on
merits. It has decreed the same.

14. In such circumstances, learned
counsel for the appellant would submit, in
the first place, the learned court below has
committed an error in sustaining the
objection raised by the respondent, as to the
maintainability of the second Written
Statement. Second, the learned court below
has erred in proceeding to deal with the
divorce suit proceedings on merits, on
30.03.2011, without fixing another date for
hearing the divorce suit proceedings, on
merits. Third, in any case, the learned court
below has completely erred in decreeing
the divorce suit proceeding.

15. Having heard learned counsel
for the appellant and having perused the
record, it is true - a Written Statement
was first filed by the appellant on
01.04.2008.
In
that,
consent
was
expressed by the appellant to the divorce
being granted. However, it must be
maintained that the instant divorce case
proceeding had not arisen under Section
13-B of the Act. Rather, the divorce case
was instituted by the respondent -
husband under Section 13 of the Act. It
may have been decided/decreed, after
evidence. Allegations made were of
impotency and that the appellant was a
free willed person who used to go out of
her home, on her own. No other fact was
pleaded to assert either that the appellant
had deserted her matrimonial home
and/or that she had formed any immoral
or adulterous relationship or that she had
offered cruel behaviour.

16. Perusal of the record (as has
been referred to above), clearly indicates,
not once but twice mediation took place
during the pendency of the divorce case.
While the first mediation proceeding has
been referred to by the learned court
below, it has completely escaped the
attention of the learned court below that
on the second occasion, vide report dated
20.08.2010
(as
extracted
above),
mediation failed. Then, the learned Court
below completely erred in overlooking
the oral statement recorded by the
appellant and the documents that were on
record - to establish that mediation had
also been attempted before the army
authorities (employer of the respondent).
In that, a clear joint-statement appears to
have been recorded by the parties on
27.11.2009 - to cohabit and revive their
matrimonial relationship, well after filing
the first Written Statement and well after
conclusion of the first mediation, on
25.04.2008.

17. Learned court below has also
completely erred in overlooking the fact that
after filing of the first Written Statement
dated 01.04.2008 and the alleged settlement
reached between the parties - to dissolve their
marriage apart, not only another/contrary
settlement was also reached, but two children
were born to the parties, one just after the
institution of the divorce suit proceedings and
the other, two years thereafter, on 12.10.2010
i.e. well after the alleged settlement reached
between them. That status of the pleadings
and evidence clearly contradicted the stand
that may have existed with the parties at the
time of filing of the first Written Statement on
01.04.2008.
1262 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
18. Seen in that light, first, Order
VIII Rule 9 of the CPC reads as below:

9. Subsequent pleadings.-
No pleading subsequent to the
written statement of a defendant
other than by way of defence to setoff or counter-claim shall be
presented except by the leave of the
Court and upon such terms as the
Court thinks fit; but the Court may
at any time require a written
statement or additional written
statement from any of the parties
cut and fix a time of not more than
thirty days for presenting the
same."
(emphasis supplied)

19. Thus, it is true that after filing
of a Written Statement, no further Written
Statement may arise (at the instance of the
defendant), by way of a procedural right -
except with the leave of the Court and upon
such terms as the Court may provide. At the
same time, that fetter placed on the
procedural right of the parties, did not
prevent the learned Court below from itself
requiring additional Written Statement to
be filed - if that appeared necessary to it to
dispense true justice.

20. In the present facts, the learned
Court below may not have proceeded to
dissolve the (Hindu) marriage between the
parties by solely considering the fact
situation that existed up to the stage of
filing of the first Written Statement on
01.04.2008
and
the
first
mediation
proceeding
concluded
on
28.04.2008.
Subsequent conduct of the parties and their
marital relationship as existed over the next
three years could not have been ignored. To
the extent it had material bearing on the
relief sought by the respondent, demands of
justice merited another course to be
adopted by the learned Court below.

21. Being obligated to dispense
justice, the learned court below could not
have turned a blind eye to the fact assertion
(made by the appellant) of revival of the
marriage between the parties. It ought to
have exercised its discretion - to call for
Additional
Written
Statement
of
the
appellant,
to
explain
the
subsequent
developments. Unless that power had been
exercised, the learned Court below may
have felt disabled from delivering justice,
in the status of pleadings and evidence
existing.

22. The nature of power of the trial
Court (under Order VIII Rule 9) was
considered
by
Justice
Mohan
M.
Shantanagoudar in his separate (partly
dissenting) opinion expressed in Ashok
Kumar Kalra Vs. Wing CDR Surendra
Agnihotri and Others (2020) 2 SCC 394,
wherein with reference to Order VIII Rule
9 CPC, it was observed as below:

"33. A plain reading of
Order 8 Rule 9 makes it clear that
the court has the discretion to
allow any subsequent pleading
upon such terms as it thinks fit. It is
important to appreciate here that
such
subsequent
pleading
or
additional written statement may
include a counterclaim. This is
because Rule 9 does not create a
bar on the nature of claims that can
be raised as subsequent pleadings.
As long as the court considers that
it would be proper to allow a
counterclaim
by
way
of
a
subsequent pleading, it is possible
to file a counterclaim after filing
the written statement."
9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1263
23. In River Valley Tea Co. Pvt.
Ltd. v. Assam Gas Co. Ltd, 2018 SCC
OnLine Gau 1168, the Gauhati High Court
had the occasion to consider the same
provision wherein it observed as below:

"18. Having perused the
judgments cited by the learned
counsel for the petitioner, it leaves
this court with no doubt that the
trial
court
must
record
its
satisfaction
to
the
nature
of
subsequent
pleading
which
is
sought to be introduced. If the court
is satisfied that the subsequent
pleadings are required for the just
and fair decision of the case, in
such an event, the trial court even
has suo motu inherent powers
under order VIII, rule 9, CPC to
direct that a rejoinder/replication
be
filed.
However,
if
the
rejoinder/replication is sought to be
filed at the instance of the party, in
that event the proposed replication
is required to accompany the leave
petition envisaged under rule 9,
order VIII, CPC."

24.

Also,
in
Kantipudi
Adinarayana v. Putta Venkata Satya
Subba Rao and Others 2024, SCC
OnLine AP 1503, the Andhra Pradesh High
Court also had the occasion to consider the
same provision. It specifically dealt with
the suo motu nature of power vested in
Courts, to call for additional Written
Statement. In that, it has been observed as
below:

"5. The
situation
contemplated under the first limb of
the provisions of Rule 9 of CPC, is
not attracted in the present case;
the second limb of the provisions of
Rule 9 of CPC, deals with the Suo
moto discretion of the court alone,
to call for an additional written
statement, and not otherwise. In
other words, the same is not
allowable on an application filed
by a party to the suit."

25.

Second,
it
also
merits
acceptance, once the learned court below
had fixed the date 30.3.2011 to deal with
the objections to the filing of the second
Written Statement (by the appellant), it may
not have proceeded to pass the order on
merits on the divorce petition, on the same
date, without the consent of the appellant to
thus proceed in the matter. In view of the
earlier order dated 28.03.2011, in normal
course, another date for hearing may have
been fixed (on 30.03.2011), after the
learned court below sustained the objection
raised by the respondent to the second
Written Statement filed by the appellant.

26. Last, even technically, in
deciding any proceedings under Section 13
of the Act, the learned Court below may
only have acted on proven facts. No ground
of divorce pressed by the respondent was
proven. The respondent did not prove the
plaint pleadings, and the appellant did not
support her first Written Statement, in her
oral evidence. Rather, she disproved it.
Hence, there was no proven fact before the
learned Court below to dissolve the
marriage between the parties, strictly in
terms of section 13 (1) of the Act.

27. To the extent, the learned court
below has dissolved the marriage solely on
the strength of the alleged consent given by
the appellant, after three years of it being
recorded, clearly, a grave error of law has
crept in the impugned order. In that the
learned court below has failed to take note
1264 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of the changed circumstances; of settlement
reached between the parties before the
army authorities; the consequential revival
of their marriage and birth of their second
child. In view of passage of time-more than
eighteen months and subsequent events
seen to exist, the learned Court below has
erred in blindly acting on the consent
recorded on 28.4.2008.

28. Though Section 13 of the Act
contemplates divorce/dissolution of Hindu
marriage
after
full-fledged
contested
proceedings, at times those proceeding may
be concluded on the strength of mutual
consent/settlement/mediation, as well. Yet,
Courts may remain reminded of the
statutory principle contained in Section 13B of the Act. For ready reference, it reads
as below:

"(1)
Subject
to
the
provisions of this Act a petition for
dissolution of marriage by a decree
of divorce may be presented to the
district court by both the parties to
a marriage together, whether such
marriage was solemnized before or
after the commencement of the
Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act,
1976 on the ground that they have
been living separately for a period
of one year or more, that they have
not been able to live together and
that they have mutually agreed that
the marriage should be dissolved.
(2) On the motion of both
the parties made not earlier than
six months after the date of the
presentation of the petition referred
to in sub-section (1) and not later
than eighteen months after the said
date,
if
the
petition
is
not
withdrawn in the meantime, the
Court shall, on being satisfied,
after hearing the parties and after
making such inquiry as it thinks fit,
that
a
marriage
has
been
solemnized and that the averments
in the petition are true, pass a
decree of divorce declaring the
marriage to be dissolved with effect
from the date of the decree.]"
(emphasis supplied)

29. In Sureshta Devi Vs. Om
Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25, it was
observed as below :

"At the time of the petition
by mutual consent, the parties are
not unaware that their petition does
not by itself snap marital ties. They
know that they have to take a
further step to snap marital ties.
Sub-section (2) of Section 13-B is
clear on this point. It provides that
'on the motion of both the parties
... if the petition is not withdrawn
in the meantime, the court shall ...
pass a decree of divorce ...'. What
is significant in this provision is
that there should also be mutual
consent when they move the court
with a request to pass a decree of
divorce. Secondly, the court shall
be satisfied about the bona fides
and the consent of the parties. If
there is no mutual consent at the
time of the enquiry, the court gets
no jurisdiction to make a decree for
divorce. If the view is otherwise,
the court could make an enquiry
and pass a divorce decree even at
the instance of one of the parties
and against the consent of the
other. Such a decree cannot be
regarded as decree by mutual
consent."
(emphasis supplied)
9 All. Smt. Pinki Vs. Sri Pushpendra Kumar
1265
30. Then, in Smruti Pahariya Vs.
Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338, the
principle discussed in Sureshta Devi
(supra) was further considered by a threejudge bench of the Supreme Court. It was
further observed as below:

"40. In the Constitution
Bench decision of this Court in
Rupa Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC
388 this Court did not express any
view contrary to the views of this
Court in Sureshta Devi, (1991) 2
SCC 25. We endorse the views
taken by this Court in Sureshta
Devi (supra) as we find that on a
proper
construction
of
the
provision in Sections 13-B(1) and
13-B(2), there is no scope of
doubting
the
views
taken
in
Sureshta Devi (supra). In fact the
decision which was rendered by the
two learned Judges of this Court in
Ashok Hurra (supra) has to be
treated to be one rendered in the
facts of that case and it is also
clear by the observations of the
learned Judges in that case.
41. None of the counsel for
the
parties
argued
for
reconsideration of the ratio in
Sureshta Devi (supra).
42. We are of the view that
it is only on the continued mutual
consent of the parties that a decree
for divorce under Section 13-B of
the said Act can be passed by the
court. If petition for divorce is not
formally withdrawn and is kept
pending then on the date when the
court grants the decree, the court
has a statutory obligation to hear
the parties to ascertain their
consent. From the absence of one
of the parties for two to three days,
the court cannot presume his/her
consent as has been done by the
learned Family Court Judge in the
instant case and especially in its
fact situation, discussed above.
43. In our view it is only
the mutual consent of the parties
which
gives
the
court
the
jurisdiction to pass a decree for
divorce under Section 13-B. So in
cases under Section 13-B, mutual
consent
of
the
parties
is
a
jurisdictional fact. The court while
passing its decree under Section
13-B
would
be
slow
and
circumspect before it can infer the
existence of such jurisdictional
fact. The court has to be satisfied
about the existence of mutual
consent between the parties on
some tangible materials which
demonstrably
disclose
such
consent."
(emphasis supplied)

31. Last, the above principle was
again reiterated in Hitesh Bhatnagar Vs.
Deepa Bhatnagar, (2011) 5 SCC 234.
After, considering its own power under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the
Supreme
Court
made
the
following
pertinent observation:

"23. It is settled law that
this Court grants a decree of
divorce only in those situations in
which the Court is convinced
beyond any doubt that there is
absolutely
no
chance
of
the
marriage surviving and it is broken
beyond repair. Even if the chances
are infinitesimal for the marriage
to survive, it is not for this Court to
use its power under Article 142 to
dissolve the marriage as having
1266 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
broken down irretrievably. We may
make it clear that we have not
finally expressed any opinion on
this issue.
24. In the present case,
time and again, the respondent has
stated that she wants this marriage
to continue, especially in order to
secure the future of their minor
daughter,
though
her
husband
wants it to end. She has stated that
from the beginning, she never
wanted
the
marriage
to
be
dissolved. Even now, she states that
she is willing to live with her
husband putting away all the
bitterness that has existed between
the parties. In the light of these
facts and circumstances, it would
be travesty of justice to dissolve
this marriage as having broken
down. Though there is bitterness
amongst the parties and they have
not even lived as husband and wife
for the past about 11 years, we
hope that they will give this union
another
chance,
if
not
for
themselves, for the future of their
daughter. We conclude by quoting
the great poet George Eliot.
"What greater thing is
there for two human souls than to
feel that they are joined for life -- to
strengthen each other in all labour,
to rest on each other in all sorrow,
to minister to each other in all
pain, to be one with each other in
silent, unspeakable memories at the
moment of the last parting.""

32. Thus, by way of a guiding
principle, the learned Court below should
have examined and verified, on 30.03.2011,
if the consent of the appellant (as noted by
it on the strength of the first Written
Statement filed on 01.04.2008 and as
recorded
before
the
Mediator
on
25.04.2008), continued to exist without any
change of mind made by the parties.

33. In granting the divorce on the
strength of mutual consent, the learned
Court below may have dissolved the
marriage between the parties only in the
event of that consent continuing to exist on
the date of the order being passed. Once the
appellant claimed to have withdrawn her
consent and that fact was on the record, it
never became open to the learned court
below to act on that (withdrawn) consent,
belatedly. In any case, it never became
open to the learned court below to force the
appellant to abide by the original consent
given by her that too almost three years
later. To do that would be travesty of
justice. Here, it may be noted, no money
was paid to the appellant by way of
permanent alimony etc., in lieu of her
consent.

34. Thus, even if these were
Section 13-B proceedings, the learned court
below could not have ignored the statutory
principle enshrined therein - that other
thing apart, free consent to dissolve the
marriage must not only arise at the stage of
first motion of a proceeding under Section
13-B of the Act but it must survive and
sustain at the stage of second motion. In
that, the learned court below may presume
that the consent may not continue to exist
after expiry of 18 months from the date of
it being given, unless the party giving such
consent specifically maintains it, after
expiry of eighteen months period.

35. Here, the appellant gave
consent on 01.04.2008 and 25.04.2008.
Eighteen months therefrom elapsed in the
October 2009. She certainly withdrew from
9 All. The Catholic Diocese of Gorakhpur Vs. Bhola & Ors.
1267
her consent in February 2011, at the stage
of oral evidence. Therefore, no consent (to
dissolve the marriage between the parties)
existed on 30.03.2011 - when the learned
court below first relied on the same to
dissolve the marriage between the parties.

36. It requires no elaboration that a
Hindu marriage is not to be dissolved or
terminated as a contract. The sacrament
based Hindu marriage may be dissolved (in
law), in limited circumstances. In the first
place, a Hindu marriage may be declared
void on an allegation of impotency suffered
by either spouse only on the strength of
evidence led. To that extent the learned
court below has completely ignored that
such ground pressed in the plaint, was not
proven.

37. As to the other ground if any,
the learned court below ought to have
examined the matter holistically. The
divorce suit having been instituted in the
year 2008 and it having remained pending
for three years, an over simplistic approach
has been adopted-in relying only on the
bald (first) Written Statement filed by the
appellant,
and
the
consent
dated
28.04.2008, as recorded in the proceedings
before the mediation centre attached to the
learned
court
below
while
ignoring
subsequent
developments
brought
on
record. We may have attempted to help the
parties to resolve their dispute at this stage.
However,
since
respondent
had
not
appeared, that course is not available to us.

38. Seen in that light, the
impugned judgement and order dated
30.03.2011 and the consequential decree
cannot stand. Those are set aside. Matter is
remitted to the learned court below to
proceed in accordance with law. If no
mediation may arise or be successful,
necessarily the appellant may be allowed to
rely on the second Written Statement in
terms of later part of Order VIII Rule 9 of
the C.P.C., with corresponding right to the
respondent to file Replication Statement.
Thus, the present appeal is allowed. No
order as to costs.
----------
(2024) 9 ILRA 1267
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.09.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KSHITIJ SHAILENDRA, J.

Second Appeal No. 461 of 2014

The Catholic Diocese of Gorakhpur
 ...Appellant
Versus
Bhola & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Sanjiv Singh, Sri A.P. Tiwari, Sri Namwar
Singh, Sri S.S. Tripathi, Sri Subhash Ghosh, Sri
Raghvendra Nayar, Ms. Saraswati Yadav, Sri
Navin Sinha (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.P.K. Tripathi, Sri Arvind Srivastava III, Sri
Ashish Kumar Srivastava, Sri Manish Kumar
Nigam, Sri Pramod Kumar Singh, Sri Praveen
Kumar, Sri Sri Sanjay Goswami, Sri Vinod Kumar
Sahu (Addl. C.S.C.)

Civil Law - Civil Procedure Code, 1908 -
Sections - 9 & 100 - Order 41- Rule 27-
Order 41 - Rule 33 - Order 42 - Rule 1 -
Urban Land Ceiling and Regulations Act,
1976 - Sections 10, 10(3), 10(5), 8(4), 26
& 26(2) - U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act, 1950 - Sections 161, 183,
184, 185, 186, 190, 191, 192, 193 & 194 -
Specific Relief Act, 1963 - Sections 41(g)
& 41(i) - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 -
Sections 54 & 118 -

Second appeal, by the defendants - original suit
- dismissed - first appeal - allowed - leading a