# Smt. Pooja v. Virendra Kumar Singh & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 8 ILRA 740
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-08-11
- **Bench:** Surya Prakash Kesarwani
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-pooja-v-virendra-kumar-singh-ors-44381
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXI Rule 97, Order XXI Rule 35 - Objection by third party in execution -
Wife of judgment-debtor claiming possession and adverse possession - Maintainability - Objector having no
independent right, title or interest in property but claiming through judgment-debtor husband - Objection
rightly rejected - Executing court cannot be obstructed by persons claiming under judgment-debtor -
Repeated objections by husband and thereafter by wife to delay execution - Abuse of process of court -
Appeal dismissed.

Where a compromise decree regarding house property had attained finality and execution proceedings were
initiated, the husband of the appellant (judgment-debtor) unsuccessfully filed several applications and writ
petitions to stall execution. Thereafter the appellant-wife filed objection in execution proceedings claiming
ownership by adverse possession and contending that decree could not be executed against her. The Court
held that the appellant had no independent right, title or interest in the disputed property and her
possession, if any, was only through her husband who was already bound by the compromise decree. An
objection under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC can be entertained only when the objector claims an independent
right and not when the claim is derived from the judgment-debtor. Filing of repeated objections after failure of
the judgment-debtor clearly indicated abuse of the process of court intended to delay execution of the
decree. The executing court therefore rightly rejected the objection.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Case Law Discussed:
Meghraj Sah v. Rajansi Lal & Ors., AIR 1958 Pat 546
Babulal v. Raj Kumar & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2050
Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, AIR 1997 SC 856
State of U.P. v. Mangilal Sharma, AIR 1998 SC 743
Gajanan v. Jayamma, AIR 2008 Kar 11
Jagdish Motilal Joshi v. Chandrapal Tulsiram Bhola, 2007 (1) ALLMR 764

## Text

740 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2016) 8 ILRA 740
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI, J.

First Appeal No.- 739 Of 2013

Smt. Pooja ...Appellant
Versus
Virendra Kumar Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Vinay Khare

Counsel for the Respondents:
Anurag Pathak

Headnote:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXI Rule 97, Order XXI Rule 35 - Objection by third party in execution -
Wife of judgment-debtor claiming possession and adverse possession - Maintainability - Objector having no
independent right, title or interest in property but claiming through judgment-debtor husband - Objection
rightly rejected - Executing court cannot be obstructed by persons claiming under judgment-debtor -
Repeated objections by husband and thereafter by wife to delay execution - Abuse of process of court -
Appeal dismissed.

Where a compromise decree regarding house property had attained finality and execution proceedings were
initiated, the husband of the appellant (judgment-debtor) unsuccessfully filed several applications and writ
petitions to stall execution. Thereafter the appellant-wife filed objection in execution proceedings claiming
ownership by adverse possession and contending that decree could not be executed against her. The Court
held that the appellant had no independent right, title or interest in the disputed property and her
possession, if any, was only through her husband who was already bound by the compromise decree. An
objection under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC can be entertained only when the objector claims an independent
right and not when the claim is derived from the judgment-debtor. Filing of repeated objections after failure of
the judgment-debtor clearly indicated abuse of the process of court intended to delay execution of the
decree. The executing court therefore rightly rejected the objection.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Case Law Discussed:
Meghraj Sah v. Rajansi Lal & Ors., AIR 1958 Pat 546
Babulal v. Raj Kumar & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 2050
Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, AIR 1997 SC 856
State of U.P. v. Mangilal Sharma, AIR 1998 SC 743
Gajanan v. Jayamma, AIR 2008 Kar 11
Jagdish Motilal Joshi v. Chandrapal Tulsiram Bhola, 2007 (1) ALLMR 764
(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.)
8 All. Smt. Pooja Vs Virendra Kumar Singh & Ors.
741
(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vinay Khare, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Anurag Pathak, learned
counsel for the respondents.

2. On 21.07.2016, this appeal was heard and judgment was reserved noting the submissions
of learned counsel for the parties as under:

"Heard Sri Vinay Khare, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Anurag Pathak,
learned counsel for the respondents.

This first appeal has been filed challenging order dated 13.09.2013 in Execution
Case No.1 of 2012 passed by the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.5, Jalaun at Orai,
whereby the application/ objection 21-C filed by the appellant, was rejected.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is wife of one Sri Amit
Kumar and is living separately and as such, the decree dated 13.08.2003 on the basis of
compromise dated 11.08.2003 cannot be executed against her in respect of disputed properties
under Order XXI Rule 97, C.P.C. In support of his submissions, he relies upon judgments in the
case of Meghraj Sah Vs. Rajansi Lal and others, AIR 1958 Patna 546 (paras-3 & 4), Babulal Vs.
Raj Kumar and others, AIR 1996 SC 2050 (paras 4 & 5), Brahmdeo Chaudhary Vs. Rishikesh
Prasad Jaiswal, AIR 1997 SC 856 (para-5) and State of U.P. Vs. Mangilal Sharma, AIR 1998 SC
743 (paras-7 & 10). He also submits that the decree was not executable against the appellant even
otherwise under Order XXI Rule 35, C.P.C. He further submits that the appellant cannot be evicted
by way of execution of the decree in question.

Sri Anurag Pathak, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the appellant is
an imposter and the objection being paper 21-C was filed by her in connivance with her husband
who lost several round of litigation upto this court and thereafter, he had set up his wife, namely,
the present appellant. He submits that the application/ objection 21-C was an abuse of process of
court and, therefore, it was rightly rejected by the impugned order. He further submits that the
impugned order has been passed by the court below in accordance with law and it does not suffer
from any infirmity. He refers to several paragraphs of the counter affidavit and orders of this court
passed in two writ petitions filed by the husband of the appellant. He relies upon a judgment of
Karnatka High Court in the case of Gajanan Vs. Jayamma, , 2008 AIR (Karnatka) 11 (para-16)
and the judgment of Bombay High Court in the case of Jagdish Motilal Joshi Vs. Chandrapal
Tulsiram Bhola, 2007 (1) ALLMR 764 (para-17).

Judgment reserved."

3. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties.
742 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. Briefly stated, facts of the present case are that the respondents No.2 & 3 are the mother
and father of the respondents No.1, 4 & 5. Appellant is the wife of respondent No.4 and thus,
daughter-in-law of respondents No.2 & 3. Fifth respondent Sri Anil Kumar Singh filed O.S. No.136
of 2000 to restrain the respondents No.1, 2, 3 and 4 from evicting him from the house property in
question. The suit was contested by the parties but ultimately they entered into a compromise on
11.08.2003 and a decree in terms of compromise was passed on 13.08.2003 by the court of
Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court-11, Jalaun at Orai in respect of the house property in
question at Rajendra Nagar, Orai. According to the contesting respondents No.1, 2 & 3, all the
respondents were put in possession in the respective portions but on legal advice an Execution Case
No.61 of 2008 was filed by the respondents No.2 and 3 against the respondent No.4. The
respondent No.4 filed an application under Section 151 C.P.C. in the aforesaid Execution Case for
recall of the compromise decree. The application of the respondent No.4 (husband of the appellant)
was rejected by the Additional District Judge vide order dated 27.08.2012. He challenged this order
in Writ-C No.48402 of 2012 which was dismissed by order dated 25.09.2012 as under:

"Heard Sri Sushil Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Anurag
Pathak has appeared for for respondents no. 2 to 5. Respondent no. 1 is represented by learned
Standing counsel.

Respondent no. 2 Anil Kumar instituted a suit claiming share in the property of
Shobha Singh being one of his sons. In the said suit a compromise was arrived at between the sons
of Shobha Singh and the suit was decreed in terms of the compromise. Subsequently, petitioner
applied vide application under Section 151 CPC for recall of the compromise decree on the ground
that at the time of compromise he was not aware that respondent no. 2 was adopted by one Ranvir
Singh and as such he has lost his right in the property of his natural father Shobha singh. The said
application has been rejected by the impugned order dated 27.8.2012 passed by the Additional
District Judge.

Challenging the said order only submission advanced is that at the time of passing
of the compromise decree petitioner had no knowledge that respondent no. 2 was given in adoption.
The compromise is not disputed. It has been signed by the petitioner. A decree on the basis of the
compromise has been passed in his presence and upon hearing the petitioner. Therefore, the said
order decreeing the suit no. 136 of 2000 on the basis of compromise can not be recalled.

In view of the above, the court below has not committed any mistake in rejecting
the application. The remedy, if any, of the petitioner lies elsewhere and not by asking for recall of
the decree.

Petition dismissed."

5. Thereafter, the husband of the appellant (respondent No.4 in the present appeal) filed
some more applications in the Execution Case including an objection under Section 47 C.P.C.
which were rejected. Then, he filed a Writ-C No.811 of 2014 challenging orders dated 21.10.2013,
8 All. Smt. Pooja Vs Virendra Kumar Singh & Ors.
743
19.03.2013, 24.05.2013 and order dated 06.07.2013. The aforesaid writ petition was dismissed by
order dated 13.01.2014 as under:

"Heard Sri Anurag Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Sri
Anurag Pathak has appeared for respondent no. 2.

It appears that suit no. 136 of 2000 was decreed on the basis of the compromise.
Petitioner filed an application under Section 151 CPC for recall of the compromise decree and the
said application was rejected and the order was upheld upto the High Court.

In pursuance of the said decree execution case no. 1 of 2012 has been initiated by
Virendra Kumar Singh. In the said execution petitioner filed an application paper no. 27Ga-2
contending that the land on which the petitioner is having possession does not tally with the land in
respect of which the suit was decreed. The said application has been rejected by one of the
impugned orders dated 21.10.2013.

The executing court has held that in respect of the objections taken by the
petitioner in the above application, the court has already taken decision earlier which has attained
finality and therefore he can not be permitted to raise the identical objection again and again.

I find no illegality in the said order.

The aforesaid decree was also put in execution by Shobha Singh by means of
Execution Case No. 61 of 2008. In the said execution petitioner raised objections under Section 47
CPC. The said objections have been rejected by order dated 19.3.2013. The said order is revisable
and as such can not be permitted to be challenged directly by invoking the writ jurisdiction.

The third order which has been assailed by the petitioner in the order dated
24.5.2013 filed in Misc. case no. 10 of 2013 registered on the objection of the petitioner under
Section 47 CPC. By the said order petitioner's application for summoning the original record of the
suit has been rejected. It is purely an interlocutory order which does not adjudicate any rights of
the parties and therefore requires no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

The last order which has been impugned is the order dated 6.7.2013 which has
been passed in Misc. Case No. 10 of 2013 rejecting the petitioner's application paper no. 25Ga to
submit originals of the documents by which he has purchased the plot in dispute.

The submission of the originals of the documents in the execution is not necessary
as the executing court can not go behind the decree. The verification/examination of the originals is
the job of the court while hearing the suit. Therefore, filing of original is not necessary in
execution.
744 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

In view of the above, there is no illegality in rejection of the aforesaid application
also.

The writ petition is dismissed with the above observations."

6. It is also noteworthy that the respondent No.1 lodged an FIR against the appellant and
the respondent No.4 on 25.11.2010 being Case Crime No.2235 of 2010 under Sections 379, 352,
448, 504, 506 I.P.C.

7. It is also relevant to note that after the husband of the appellant (respondent No.4) was
unsuccessful as aforementioned, the appellant wife filed O.S. No.257 of 2013 for injunction against
the contesting respondents. Her temporary injunction application 7-C-2 was rejected by the court of
Civil Judge (S.D.) Jalaun at Orai by a detail order dated 30.10.2013.

8. During pendency of the aforesaid suit, the appellant filed an objection dated 24.07.2013
being paper No.21-kha in the Execution Case No.1 of 2012 claiming herself to be the owner of the
disputed property by adverse possession. The objection was rejected by the impugned order dated
13.09.2013 passed by the court of Additional District Judge, Court No.5, Jalaun at Orai.

9. In the impugned order, the court below briefly discussed the facts and came to the
conclusion that the appellant is abusing the process of the court and not allowing the execution of
the decree on one ground or the other.

10. It is wholly undisputed that husband of the appellant (respondent No.4) holds a portion
of the disputed property as owner in terms of the compromise decree dated 13.08.2003. Even if she
has somehow occupied a portion of the disputed property, the same is based on the rights of her
husband, namely, the respondent No.4 in the disputed property. The husband of the appellant filed
several applications in the execution case so as to delay the execution of the decree but was
unsuccessful upto the stage of the High Court. It is thereafter that the appellant filed O.S. No.257 of
2013 for injunction against the contesting respondents but her temporary injunction application
being paper No.7-C-2 was rejected by the court of Civil Judge (S.D.), Jalaun at Orai by order dated
13.10.2013. The appellant also filed an objection in the execution case after rejection of multiple
applications of her husband. The impugned order has been passed rejecting the objection of the
appellant. All these facts clearly indicate that the court below has not committed any error of law or
facts to come to the conclusion that the appellant has abused the process of the court and is making
every effort on one ground or the other that the execution of the decree may not be proceeded. The
appellant has no independent right in the disputed property. Her possession in the disputed
property, at best, is based on the rights of her husband, namely, the respondent No.4.

11. The judgments relied by the appellant as aforenoted are on different set of facts and
clearly distinguishable on the facts of the present case. In the case of Gajanan (supra), the
Karnatka High Court held as under:
8 All. Smt. Pooja Vs Virendra Kumar Singh & Ors.
745
"16. Order 21 Rule 97 of CPC is applicable to only person who is claiming
independent right, title and interest and not under the judgment debtor. The HRRP filed by the
landlord against the dismissal of his case under Section 21(1)(h)(f) and (p) of the Rent Control Act,
this Court in view of the provision of Section 70(2)(c) of the Rent Act had disposed of the HRRP.
But as far as the relationship of the landlord and tenant arrived at by the HRC Court, is neither set
aside nor the obstructer did challenge the said finding. If the obstructer is claiming under the
judgment debtor, he has no right to maintain the application and in addition to this, though the
obstructer alleges that the judgment debtor is not in talking terms with him, however the judgment
debtor as well as the obstructer are represented by the same advocate, the Trial Court noticing the
said fact held that these issues have already been decided and did not entertain the said
application. Decree holder is fighting the litigation for eviction of tenant from 1990. Though the
suit filed by the obstructer for declaration that he is tenant is dismissed and confirmed by this
Court. The obstructer without having any independent right and being the son of the judgment
holder debtor and having suffered findings in HRC case, is still resisting the decree. I do not find
any justification to interfere with the order of the Executing Court. Accordingly, appeal fails and
the same is dismissed."

12. In Jagdish Motilal Joshi (supra), the Bombay High Court held as under:

"17. The scope and nature of enquiry shall always depend on the nature of claim of
source of title, which an objection pleads. Now on facts, this Court finds on showing by the objector
that she has no independent status and enquiry of fact finding as to her status becomes wholly nunecessary. On her showing, she is an imposter to be an objector in disguise. It can be concluded on
the very face of it that the objector is et up by the judgment debtor. Even as an independent
trespasser during the pendency of suit, the objector does not have a claim against a rightful
claiming who has a decree in his favour. Law, equality or any other known or newly emerged
doctrine do not come to the rescue of the objector respondent No.2 herein."

13. In both the afore-noted judgments, the Karnatka High Court and Bombay High Court
have held that objector who has no independent right, does not have a claim against the person,
who has a decree in his favour.

14. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any infirmity or any illegality in the
impugned order. The appeal is totally devoid of merit and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

15. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed with costs.
------------
746 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2016) 8 ILRA 746
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No.- 2690 Of 2016

Abdul Ahmad ...Petitioner
Versus
Haq Nawaz Ahmad ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Salil Kumar Rai

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Arpit Agarwal

Headnote:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order VI Rule 17 - Amendment of written statement - Withdrawal of
admission - Eviction suit under Section 20(2)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 - Defendant sought amendment
after commencement of evidence to deny landlord-tenant relationship despite categorical admission in written
statement - Amendment amounted to withdrawal of clear admission and was not merely explanatory or
typographical correction - Such amendment, if allowed, would materially prejudice plaintiff - Trial Court
justified in rejecting amendment application.

Article 227 of the Constitution of India - Scope of interference - Order rejecting amendment application -
High Court held that refusal of amendment in present facts does not finally decide the lis between parties -
Issue of landlord-tenant relationship still open to be decided on evidence - However, no ground made out to
interfere with trial court's discretionary order rejecting amendment.

Landlord-Tenant Relationship - Admission in written statement - Defendant cannot be permitted to
withdraw a categorical admission at stage of evidence through amendment of pleadings.

Petition dismissed. Defendant is, however, at liberty to dispute the landlord-tenant relationship by leading
evidence and the trial court shall decide the suit independently without being influenced by observations made
in the amendment order.

Case Law discussed:

Usha Balashaheb Swami & Ors. v. Kiran Apaso Swami & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 1663.

Sushil Kumar Jain v. Manoj Kumar & Anr., AIR 2009 SC 2544.

Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 659.

Transmarine Corporation v. Zensar Technologies Ltd., (2009) 10 SCC 750.