# Smt. Poonam Rani v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 7 ILRA 703
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-05-26
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 6334 of 2022
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla, Vikas Budhwar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-poonam-rani-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48830
- **Pages:** 27

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Constitutional validity -
Misconduct
-
Dismissal/Removal
-
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 -
Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule
3-B(iv).

Locus standi - This Court has laid down in a
number of decisions that in order to have the
locus standi to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction u/Article 226, an applicant should
ordinarily be one who has a personal or
individual right in the subject matter of the
application, though (1) the case of some of
the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto
this rule is relaxed or modified. In other
words, as a general rule, infringement of
some legal right or prejudice to some legal
interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary
to give him a locus standi in the matter. (Para
12 to 15)

The present case also does not come within
the parameters of Public Law Litigation and
further the issue so sought to be raised by
the petitioner is not of any public importance.
The
present
case
is
nothing
but
the
proceedings
relating
to
Public
Interest
Litigation in service matters which as per the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is
not maintainable. (Para 23, 24)

B. Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999:
Rule 3-B(iv) - Constitutional Validity - It
is the settled principal of law that in case any
party asserts and assails the validity of a
provision on the ground that it is violative of
Article 309 and 311 of the Constitution of
India then it is for the said party to not only
make necessary pleadings but also adduce
materials to show that the same is in violation
of Article 309 and 311 of the Constitution of
India. Even otherwise the presumption is
always that legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of the
people and in order to rebut the said
presumption, the onus is upon the party
who alleges it to be unconstitutional.
(Para 28)

The Court should try to sustain its validity
to the extent possible. It should strike
down the enactment only when it is not
possible to sustain it. The Court should not
approach the enactment with a view to
pick holes or to search for defects of
drafting,
much
less
inexactitude
of
language employed. Indeed, any such
defects of drafting should be ironed out as
part
of
the
attempt
to
sustain
the
validity/constitutionality of the enactment.
After all, an Act made by the Legislature
represents the will of the people and that
cannot be lightly interfered with. The
unconstitutionality must be plainly and
clearly established before an enactment is
declared as void. (Para 31)

Grounds
on
which
the
constitutional
validity
can
be
challenged
-
The
Constitutional validity of Act can be challenged
only on two grounds namely (i), lack of
legislative competence and (ii) violation of any
of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III
of the Constitution. A third exception was
carved out with regard to the fact that the
Courts of law can even hold the statutory
enactment to be ultra vires, where there is
"manifest arbitrariness". (Para 35)
704 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C. In view of the provisions contained
under
Article
309
and
311
of
the
Constitution of India, the conditions of
services takes within its ambit, the cases
of dismissal or removal from service. A
conjoint reading of Articles 309 and 311 reveals
that Article 311 is confined to the cases wherein
an inquiry has been commenced against an
employee and an action of penal nature is
sought to be taken. Whereas, Article 309 covers
the broad spectrum of conditions of service and
holds a wider ground as compared to Article

## Text

_Characters 0–39,999 of 91,032. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39999 for what follows._

7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
703
(2022)07ILR A703
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.05.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.

Writ A No. 6334 of 2022

Smt. Poonam Rani ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Constitutional validity -
Misconduct
-
Dismissal/Removal
-
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 -
Sections 7 & 13(1)(d) read with Section
13(2) - Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 - Rule
3-B(iv).

Locus standi - This Court has laid down in a
number of decisions that in order to have the
locus standi to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction u/Article 226, an applicant should
ordinarily be one who has a personal or
individual right in the subject matter of the
application, though (1) the case of some of
the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto
this rule is relaxed or modified. In other
words, as a general rule, infringement of
some legal right or prejudice to some legal
interest in hearing the petitioner is necessary
to give him a locus standi in the matter. (Para
12 to 15)

The present case also does not come within
the parameters of Public Law Litigation and
further the issue so sought to be raised by
the petitioner is not of any public importance.
The
present
case
is
nothing
but
the
proceedings
relating
to
Public
Interest
Litigation in service matters which as per the
law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is
not maintainable. (Para 23, 24)

B. Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999:
Rule 3-B(iv) - Constitutional Validity - It
is the settled principal of law that in case any
party asserts and assails the validity of a
provision on the ground that it is violative of
Article 309 and 311 of the Constitution of
India then it is for the said party to not only
make necessary pleadings but also adduce
materials to show that the same is in violation
of Article 309 and 311 of the Constitution of
India. Even otherwise the presumption is
always that legislature understands and
correctly appreciates the need of the
people and in order to rebut the said
presumption, the onus is upon the party
who alleges it to be unconstitutional.
(Para 28)

The Court should try to sustain its validity
to the extent possible. It should strike
down the enactment only when it is not
possible to sustain it. The Court should not
approach the enactment with a view to
pick holes or to search for defects of
drafting,
much
less
inexactitude
of
language employed. Indeed, any such
defects of drafting should be ironed out as
part
of
the
attempt
to
sustain
the
validity/constitutionality of the enactment.
After all, an Act made by the Legislature
represents the will of the people and that
cannot be lightly interfered with. The
unconstitutionality must be plainly and
clearly established before an enactment is
declared as void. (Para 31)

Grounds
on
which
the
constitutional
validity
can
be
challenged
-
The
Constitutional validity of Act can be challenged
only on two grounds namely (i), lack of
legislative competence and (ii) violation of any
of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part-III
of the Constitution. A third exception was
carved out with regard to the fact that the
Courts of law can even hold the statutory
enactment to be ultra vires, where there is
"manifest arbitrariness". (Para 35)
704 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C. In view of the provisions contained
under
Article
309
and
311
of
the
Constitution of India, the conditions of
services takes within its ambit, the cases
of dismissal or removal from service. A
conjoint reading of Articles 309 and 311 reveals
that Article 311 is confined to the cases wherein
an inquiry has been commenced against an
employee and an action of penal nature is
sought to be taken. Whereas, Article 309 covers
the broad spectrum of conditions of service and
holds a wider ground as compared to Article
311. That would also include conditions of
service beyond mere dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank. It holds merit to St. that this
wide ground contemplated u/Article 309 also
takes in its sweep the conditions regarding
termination of service including compulsory
retirement.
The
expression
"conditions
of
service" takes within its sweep the cases of
dismissal or removal from service. (Para 49, 50)

The penalties of dismissal and removal is
nowhere foreign in service jurisprudence as the
said penalties amongst others finds its presence
in almost all the disciplinary Rules throughout
the various services and there difference is
widely accepted. (Para 51)

D. The distinction between 'dismissal' and
'removal' - Under the Constitution 'removal'
and 'dismissal' stand on the same footing except
as to future employment. In this sense removal
is but a species of dismissal. Mentioning thereby
that by no stretch of imagination it can be said
that attachment of a disqualification of future
employment can there be said to be ultra-virus,
arbitrary or discriminatory. (Para 52, 54)

E. Words and Phrases - 'person aggrieved'
- The words 'person aggrieved' do not really
means a man who is disappointed of a benefit
which he might have received if some other
order had been made. A 'person aggrieved'
must be a man who has suffered a legal
grievance, 'a man against whom a decision has
been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived
him of something, or wrong fully refused him
something, or wrongfully affected his title to
something. (Para 12)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs Roshan Kumar, Haji
Bashir Ahmed & ors., (1976) 1 SCC 671 (Para 12)

2. Thammanna Vs K. Veera Reddy & ors., (1980)
4 SCC 62 (Para 13)

3. Dr. Duryodhan Sahu & ors. Vs Jitendra Kumar
Mishra & ors., (1998) 7 SCC 273 (Para 14)

4. Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs St. of Mah.
& ors., (2013) 4 SCC 465 (Para 15)

5. Dr. B. Singh Vs U.O.I. & ors., (2004) 3 SCC
363 (Para 20)

6. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware Vs St. of Mah.,
(2005) 1 SCC 590 (Para 21)

7. Neetu Vs St. of Pun. & ors., (2007) 10 SCC
614 (Para 22)

8. Chiranjit Lal Chaudhary Vs U.O.I., AIR 1951
SC 41 (Para 29)

9. St. of Bihar Vs Sm. Charusila Dasi, AIR 1959
SC 1002 (Para 30)

10. St. of Bihar Vs Bihar Distillery Ltd., AIR 1997
SC 1511 (Para 31)

11. Greater Bombay Coop. Bank Ltd. Vs United
Yarn Tex (P) Ltd., 2007 (6) SCC 236 (Para 32)

12. Zaheer Ahmed Latifur Rehman Sheikh Vs St.
of Mah. & ors., JT 2010 (4) SCC 256 (Para 33)

13. Namit Sharma Vs U.O.I., 2013 (1) SCC 745
(Para 34)

14. Shayara Bano Vs U.O.I., 2017 (9) SCC 1
(Para 35)

15. K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhar) Vs U.O.I., 2019
(1) SCC 1 (Para 36)

16. Noida Employees Assoc. & ors. Vs St. of
U.P., 2019 (5) ADJ 602 (Para 37)

17. Nisha Priya Bhatiya Vs U.O.I., Civil Appeal No.
2365 of 2020, decided on 24.04.2020 (Para 49)
7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
705
18. Shyamlal Vs St. of U.P. & anr., AIR 1954 SC
369 (Para 52)

19. Dr. Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni Vs
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,
(1992) 2 SCC 547 (Para 53)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Raju Ramsingh Vasave Vs Mahesh Deorao
Bhivapurkar & ors., (2008) 9 SCC 54 (Para 5 (c),
23)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vikas Budhwar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Chandra Jeet Yadav,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Nand Lal
Mourya,
learned
Standing
Counsel, who appears for the respondents.

FACTS

2. Factual matrix of the case as
worded in the writ petition are that the
petitioner Smt. Poonam Rani claims herself
to be the the wife of Sri Yogesh Kumar,
who was posted as Junior Engineer in
Paschimanchal
Vidyut
Vitran
Nigam
Limited, Victoria Park, Meerut. Records
reveal that certain allegations were levelled
against his performance while discharging
official duty which occasioned laying of a
trap pursuant whereto, he was found
indulged
in
corruption
coupled
with
misconduct pursuant whereto a Criminal
Case No.11 of 2018 was registered on
19.1.2018 purported to be under Sections 7,
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (In
short
Act
of
1988)
Police
Station
Mainather,
District
Moradabad
and
thereafter a first information report was
also
lodged
and
proceedings
for
prosecution was also drawn and he was
placed under suspension on 22.1.2018.
Sanction was also proceeded to be obtained
under Section 17 of the Act of 1988 which
was
accorded
on
15.2.2018.
Simultaneously, a charge sheet was also
issued to the petitioner by the Disciplinary
Authority on 6.8.2019 and thereafter one
Sri Pramod Gogneya was appointed as the
Enquiry Officer and regular departmental
enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry
Officer, who in turn tendered its enquiry
report on 6.1.2021 holding the husband of
the petitioner guilty of the two charges
which was sought to be levelled upon it.
Ultimately, on 7.7.2021 an order was
passed whereby the husband of the
petitioner was dismissed from services.

3. Sri Yadav, learned counsel for the
petitioner has made a statement at bar that
the order dated 7.7.2021 dismissing the
husband of the petitioner has been further
carried in a departmental appeal before the
appellate authority which is stated to be
pending.

4. The petitioner herein claiming
herself to be the wife of Yogesh Kumar,
who had been dismissed by virtue of order
dated 7.2.2021 has approached this Court
while filing the present petition seeking
following reliefs:-

(I) Interpret the JUSTICE, Social,
Economic and Political provided in the
preamble of the Constitution of India,
Article 309 and 311 of the Constitution of
India, in the contest of the involved
substantial
question
of
law
as
to
interpretation of this Constitution framed
as follows:

(a) Does word "Dismissal" used
under Article 311 of the Constitution of
India includes impression or sprit or means
of "Dismissal from the Service which
disqualify from future employment" or
penalty provided under Rule 3-B-(iv) of the
706 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servant
(Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1999 stands
repugnant/ inconsistent to the impression
or sprit or means to the word "Dismissal"
used under Article 311 of the Constitution
of India?

(b) Does in exercise of powers
conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution of India, its permissible or
within
jurisdiction
to
amend/modify/alter/identify or clarify the
word "Dismissal" used under Article 311 of
the Constitution of India as "Dismissal from
the service which disqualify from future
employment" and "Dismissal from service
which does not disqualify from employment"
as
designed
amended/modified/altered/
identified and clarified vide Rule 3-B-(iii)
and (iv) of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal), Rules,
future and 1999 or not?

(c) Does proviso of Article 309 of
the
Constitution
of
India
creates
jurisdiction/authority to design "Rules"
which may regulate the future of the
persons appointed to public services and
posts in connection with affairs of the union
or of any State, after dismissal of service or
penalty provided under Rule 3-B-(iv) of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Government
Servant
(Discipline and Appeal), Rules, 1999 or
Rule 3-B-(iv) of the Uttar Pradesh
Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal),
Rules,
1999
is
repugnant/
inconsistent to the earlier/basic part of
Article 309 of the Constitution of India
specified as "Subject to the provisions of
this Constitution Acts of the appropriate
legislature may regulate the recruitment
and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in
connection with affairs of Union or of any
State?

(d) Does Rule 3-B-(iv) framed
under the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal), Rules,
1999 in exercise of the powers conferred by
the
proviso
to
Article
309
of
the
Constitution of India and in suppression of
the Civil Service (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules, 1930 and Punishment
and Appeal Rules for Subordinate Service
Uttar Pradesh, 1932 is in accordance with
jurisdiction/authority/ limits prescribed as
"Subject
to
the
provisions
of
this
Constitution, Acts of the appropriate
legislature may regulate the condition of
service of persons appointed to the public
services and posts in connection with
affairs of the Union or of any the State"
under Article 309 of the Constitution of
India?

(e) Does jurisdiction/authority of
the
proviso
of
Article
309
of
the
Constitution of India framed/designed
"Rules" like "Dismissal from service which
disqualify from the service from future
employment" for the purpose of regulate
the recruitment and conditions of services
of persons appointed to the public services
and the posts in connection with the affairs
of the Union or of any State, which
substantially and remotely terminates the
mandatory
duty/
responsibility
of
a
Government Servant or Public Servant
coupled with Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 or Rule 3-B-(iv)
of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal), Rules, 1999 is
repugnant/inconsistent to the preamble of
the
Constitution
(JUSTICE,
Social,
economic and political) read with Article
13, 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India
along with Article 5, 23(i) and 25(ii) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
read with Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 guaranteed to
7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
707
the
family
members/dependents
of
a
Government Servant?

(f) Does designing of penalty and
empowerment of the appointing authority/
disciplinary authority with "Dismissal from
the service which disqualify from the future
employment" in exercise of the powers
conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of
the
Constitution,
substantially
makes
appointing authority/disciplinary authority
as supreme controller of life and dignity of
a Government servant and his family
members/dependents, even after dismissal
from service and consequence whereof a
Government servant becomes life time
slaves of appointing authority/disciplinary
authority after dismissal of services?

(g) Does after making "Rules" in
exercise of power conferred by the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution, the necessity
of
making
"Acts"
of/by
appropriate
legislation may regulate the recruitment and
conditions of service of persons appointed to
the public services and posts in connection
with the affairs of the Union or of any State
comes to an end or continuance of such Rules
is in conflict to the Article 85 to Article 111
and Article 174 to Article 200 of the
Constitution of India or not?

(II) Issue an order or direction in
the nature of "Public Law Litigation" to
restrain appointing authorities/disciplinary
PALIEKAMARRAORTAROAK authorities or
other competent authorities from imposing
and implementing penalty provided under 3B-(iv) of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal), Rules, 1999
upon any Government servant.

(III) Issue an order or direction in
the nature of "Public Law Litigation"
commanding
to
appointing
or
other
competent
authorities/disciplinary
authorities authorities, to protect the rights
guaranteed
to
the
family
members/
dependents of the Government servants
through preamble of the Constitution,
Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of
India, Article 5, 23(i) and 25(ii) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 from despotism of Rule 3B-(iv) of the Uttar Pradesh Government
Servant (Discipline and Appeal), Rules,
1999.

(IV)Issue an order or direction in the nature
of "Public Law terminate Litigation" to the
relationship of supreme controller of life and
dignity of a Government servant and slaves
arising out from imposition of penalty
provided under Rule 3-B-(iv) of the Uttar
Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and
Appeal), Rules, 1999 by the appointing
authorities/ disciplinary authorities or other
competent authorities and maintain the
relationship of employer and employee.

(V) Issue an appropriate order or direction to
declare the penalty provided under Rule 3-B-
(iv) of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant
(Discipline and Appeal), Rules, 1999 as void
ab initio/ultra vires to preamble of the
Constitution, Article 13, 14, 21 and 311 of the
Constitution of India.

(VI) Issue any suitable order or direction
which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the fact and circumstances of the
instant case.

(VII) Award cost of the petition in favour of
the petitioner.

5. Sri Yadav, learned counsel for the
petitioner has made manifold submissions
namely:-
708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(a) The provisions contained
under Rule 3-B-(iv) of the Uttar Pradesh
Government
Servant
(Discipline
and
Appeal) Rules, 1999 (In short of the Rules,
1999) in so far as it provides that in case of
dismissal from service then it would
disqualify from further employment is
ultra-virus of Article 309 read with 311 of
the Constitution of India.

(b) Article 311 of the Constitution
of India nowhere envisages any differential
treatment or differentiation with respect to
disqualification from future employment in
the case of dismissal vis-a-vis penalty of
removal where there is no disqualification
for future employment and thus Rule 3-B-
(iv) of the Rules, 1999 is ultra-virus.

(c) The petitioner herein though is
the wife of a dismissed employee (Yogesh
Kumar) but in view of the doctrine so
enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Raju Ramsingh Vasave Vs.
Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar and others
(2008) 9 SCC 54, the writ petition so
instituted by the petitioner herein is
maintainable as the petitioner has locus
standi to institute the present petition.

6. Elaborating the first submission,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
argued that once Article 311 of the
Constitution of India itself provides for
imposition of punishment of dismissal or
removal or reduction in rank without
containing any fetters with respect to any
disqualification so attached thereto, then
1999 Rules which have been enacted under
the
proviso
to Article
309
of
the
Constitution of India cannot provide for
any disqualification in case an officer or
employee is visited with the punishment of
dismissal
while
putting
a
condition
disqualifying him or her from future
employment.

7. Sri Yadav, in order to buttress his
submission with respect to locus standi has
invited the attention of the Court towards
the judgment in the case of Raju
Ramsingh Vasave (Supra) while referring
to paragraph 45 of the judgment so as to
further contend that the present case falls
within the domain of Public Law Litigation
(PLL) as the same may not be a subject
matter of public interest litigation and as an
issue relatable to public importance is
being raised then this Court can suo motu
exercise its jurisdiction.

8. Sri Mourya, learned Standing
Counsel has refuted the submissions of Sri
Yadav, who appears for the petitioner while
arguing that the present writ petition is
nothing but a public interest litigation
involving matters pertaining to service
issues and further the petitioner has no
legal right to maintain the present petition
as even otherwise no cause of action has
arisen.

9. According to Sri Mourya learned
Standing Counsel once the dismissed
employee being the husband of the
petitioner is not before this Court and he
has availed his remedy before appellate
authority by filing appeal against the
dismissal order as stated by the learned
counsel for the petitioner then this petition
need not further retain the board and the
same is liable to be dismissed with heavy
cost.
POINTS OF DETERMINATION

(a) Locus standi of the petitioner to
institute and maintain the proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
709

(b)
The
issue
relating
to
constitutional validity of Rule 3-B-(iv) of
the Rules, 1999.

DISCUSSION

10. We have heard learned counsel for
the parties and perused the record and with the
consent of the parties, the present petition is
being decided without seeking any response
from the respondents.

11. A question arises as to whether the
petitioner qualifies the definition of an
aggrieved person or not in order to not only
institute but to maintain the present petition.
To answer the said question, the petitioner has
to show herself to be an aggrieved party so as
to have some interest while putting into
motion the present proceedings.

12. The words "aggrieved person" have
subject matter of judicial scrutiny in empty
number of judgments of Hon'ble Supreme
Court. To start with reference is being made to
the case of Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vs.
Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and
others (1976) 1 SCC 671 paragraphs 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 30, 34 & 37 quoted hereunder:-

"12. According to most English
decisions, in order to have the locus standi to
invoke certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioner
should be an "aggrieved person" and, in a
case of defect of jurisdiction, such a petitioner
will be entitled to a writ of certiorari as a
matter of course, but if he does not fulfil that
character, and is a "stranger", the Court will,
in its discretion, deny him this extraordinary
remedy, save in very special circumstances.

13. This takes us to the further
question: Who is an "aggrieved per son"
and what are the qualifications requisite for
such a status ? The expression "aggrieved
person" denotes an elastic, and, to an
extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be
confined within the bounds of rigid, exact
and comprehensive definition. At best, its
features can be described in a broad,
tentative manner. Its scope and meaning
depends on diverse, variable factors such
as the content and intent of the statute of
which contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of the petitioner's interest, and the
nature and extent of the prejudice or injury
suffered by him. English Courts have
sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a
wide
construction
on
the
expression
"aggrieved
person".
However,
some
general
tests
have
been devised
to
ascertain whether an applicant is eligible
for this category so as to have the
necessary locus standi or 'standing' to
invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

14. We will first take up that line
of cases in which an "aggrieved person"
has been held to be one who has a more
particular or peculiar interest of his own
beyond that of the general public, in seeing
that the law is properly administered. The
leading case in this line in Queen v.
Justices of Surrey(1) decided as far back as
1870. There, on the application by the
highway
board
the
Justices
made
certificates that certain portions of three
roads were unnecessary. As a result, it was
ordered that the roads should cease to be
repaired by the parishes.

15. E, an inhabitant of one of the
parishes, and living in the neighbourhood
of the roads, obtained a rule for a
certiorari to bring up the orders and
certificates for the purpose of quashing
them on the ground that they were void by
reason of the notices not having been
710 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
affixed at the places required by law. On
the point of locus standi (following an
earlier decision Hex v. Taunton St.
Mary(2), the Court held that though a
certiorari is not a writ of course, yet as the
applicant had by reason of his local
situation a peculiar grievance of his own,
and was not merely applying as one of the
public, he was entitled to the writ ex debito
justitiae.

16. It is to be noted that in this
case was living in the neighbourhood of the
roads were to be abandoned as a result of
the certificates issued by the Justices. He
would have suffered special inconvenience
by the abandonment. Thus had shown a
particular grievance of his own beyond
some inconvenience suffered by the general
public. He had a right to object to the grant
of the Certificate. Non-publication of the
notice at all the places in accordance with
law, had seriously prejudiced him in the
exercise of that legal right.

30. Typical of the cases in which
a strict construction was put on the
expression "person aggrieved", is Buxton
and ors. v. Minister of Housing and Local
Government(4). There, an appeal by a
Company against the refusal of the Local
Planning Authority
of
permission
to
develop land owned by the Company by
digging chalk, was allowed by the Minister.
Owners of adjacent property applied to the
High Court under s. 31(1) of the Town and
Country Planning Act, 1959 to quash the
decision of the Minister on the ground that
the proposed operations by the company
would injure their land, and that they were
'persons aggrieved' by the action of the
Minister. It was held that the expression
'person aggrieved' in a statute meant a
person who had suffered a legal grievance;
anyone given the right under Section 37 of
the Act of 1959 to have his representation
considered by the Minister was a person
aggrieved, thus Section 31 applied, if those
rights were infringed; but the applicants
had no right under the statute, and no legal
rights had been infringed and therefore
they were not entitled to challenge the
Minister's decision. Salmon J. quoted with
approval these observations of James T. J.
in In Re Sidebothem:-

"The words 'person aggrieved' do
not
really
means
a
man
who
is
disappointed of a benefit which he might
have received if some other order had been
made. A 'person aggrieved' must be a man
who has suffered a legal grievance,`a man
against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongfully deprived
him of something, or wrong fully refused
him something, or wrongfully affected his
title to something."

34. This Court has laid down in a
number of decisions that in order to have
the locus standi to invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226, an applicant
should ordinarily be one who has a
personal or individual right in the subject
matter of the application, though (1) the
case of some of the writs like habeas
corpus or quo warranto this rule is relaxed
or modified. In other words, as a general
rule, in fringement of some legal right or
prejudice to some legal interest in hearing
the petitioner is necessary to give him a
locus standi in the matter.

37. It will be seen that in the
context of locus standi to apply for a writ of
certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall
in any of these categories: (i) 'person
aggrieved'; (ii) 'stranger'; (iii) busybody or
meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last
category are easily distinguishable from
7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
711
those coming under the first two categories.
Such persons interfere in things which do
not concern them. They masquerade as
crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in
the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they
have no interest of the public or even of
their own to protect. They indulge in the
pastime of meddling with the judicial
process either by force of habit or from
improper motives. Often, they are actuated
by a desire to win notoriety or cheap
popularity; while the ulterior intent of some
applicants in this category, may be no more
than spoking the wheels of administration.
The High Court should do well to reject the
applications of such busybodies at the
threshold."

13. In Thammanna Vs. K Veera
Reddy and others (1980) 4 SCC 62
paragraphs 15, 16 & 17 are quoted
hereunder:-

"15. It was not obligatory for the
Election-Petitioner to join the appellant as
a respondent. There were no allegations or
claims in the election-petition which would
attract Section 82 of the Act. From that
point of view, the appellant was not a
necessary party to be impleaded. Of
course, if the appellant had made an
application within the time prescribed, in
compliance with Section 86(4) of the Act,
the Court would have been bound to join
him as a respondent. But the question of
Section 86 (4) coming into play never arose
as the Election-Petitioner had already
impleaded the appellant as Respondent 5 in
the election- petition. Even so, Respondent
5 did not join the controversy. He neither
joined issue with the contesting respondent
1, nor did he do anything tangible to show
that he had made a common cause with the
Election-Petitioner against Respondent 1.
In fact, the only parties between whom the
matters in controversy were at issue, were
the Election- Petitioner and Respondent 1.
The other respondents, including the
appellant, did not participate or side with
either contestant in that controversy.

16. Although the meaning of the
expression "person aggrieved" may vary
according to the context of the statute and
the facts of the case, nevertheless, normally
"a 'person aggrieved' must be a man who
has suffered a legal grievance, a man
against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has wrongfully deprived
him of something or wrongfully refused him
something or wrongfully affected his title to
something."

17. In the face of the stark facts of
the case, detailed above, it is not possible
to say that the appellant was aggrieved or
prejudicially affected by the decision of the
High Court, dismissing the electionpetition.

14. In Dr Duryodhan Sahu and
others Vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and
others (1998) 7 SCC 273 paragraphs 16 &
17 are quoted hereunder:-

16. In Thammanna versus K. Veera
Reddy and other (1980) 4 S.C.C. 62 it was
held that although the meaning of the
expression 'person aggrieved' may vary
according to the context of the statute and the
facts of the case, nevertheless normally, a
person aggrieved must be a man who has
suffered a legal grievance, a man against
whom a decision has been pronounced which
has wrongfully deprived him of something or
wrongfully
refused
him
something
or
wrongfully affected his title to something.

17. In Jasbhai Motibhai Desai
Versus Roshan Kumar Haji Bashir Ahmed
712 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and others (1976) 1.S.C.C. 671 the Court
held that the expression 'aggrieved person'
donotes an elastic, and to an extent, an
elusive concept. The Court observed:

"...It cannot be confined within
the bounds of a rigid, exact, and
comprehensive definition. At best, its
features can be described in a broad
tentative manner. Its scope and meaning
depends on diverse, variable factors such
as the content and intent of the statue of
which contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of the petitioner's interest, and the
nature and extent of the prejudice or injury
suffered by him'.

15. In Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan
Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra and
others (2013) 4 SCC 465 paragraphs 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17 are quoted herein
under:-

"9. It is a settled legal proposition
that a stranger cannot be permitted to
meddle in any proceeding, unless he
satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls
within the category of aggrieved persons.
Only a person who has suffered, or suffers
from legal injury can challenge the
act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A
writ petition under Article 226of the
Constitution is maintainable either for the
purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal
right, or when there is a complaint by the
appellant that there has been a breach of
statutory duty on the part of the Authorities.
Therefore, there must be a judicially
enforceable
right
available
for
enforcement, on the basis of which writ
jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of
course, enforce the performance of a
statutory duty by a public body, using its
writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person,
provided that such person satisfies the
Court that he has a legal right to insist on
such performance. The existence of such
right is a condition precedent for invoking
the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is
implicit
in
the
exercise
of
such
extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief
prayed for must be one to enforce a legal
right. Infact, the existence of such right, is
the foundation of the exercise of the said
jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right
that can be enforced must ordinarily be the
right of the appellant himself, who
complains of infraction of such right and
approaches the Court for relief as regards
the same. (Vide : State of Orissa v. Madan
Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12; Saghir
Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC
728; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary)
v. State of West Bengal & others, AIR 1962
SC 1044; Rajendra Singh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736; and
Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders
Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar &
Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784).

10. A "legal right", means an
entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus,
it may be defined as an advantage, or a
benefit conferred upon a person by the rule
of law. The expression, "person aggrieved"
does not include a person who suffers from
a psychological or an imaginary injury; a
person
aggrieved
must
therefore,
necessarily be one, whose right or interest
has been adversely affected or jeopardised.
(Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home
Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC
1719; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361).

11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka
v. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC
1289, a similar view was taken by this
Court, observing that, if a person claiming
7 All. Smt. Poonam Rani Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
713
relief is not eligible as per requirement,
then he cannot be said to be a person
aggrieved regarding the election or the
selection of other persons.

12. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of
A. P. , AIR 2011 SC 3031, this Court held:

"The
expression
''aggrieved
person' denotes an elastic and an elusive
concept. It cannot be confined within the
bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive
definition. Its scope and meaning depends
on diverse, variable factors such as the
content and intent of the statute of which
contravention is alleged, the specific
circumstances of the case, the nature and
extent of complainant's interest and the
nature and the extent of the prejudice or
injury suffered by the complainant."

13. This Court, even as regards
the filing of a habeas corpus petition, has
explained that the expression, ''next friend'
means a person who is not a total stranger.
Such a petition cannot be filed by one who
is a complete stranger to the person who is
in alleged illegal custody.

14. This Court has consistently
cautioned the courts against entertaining
public
interest
litigation
filed
by
unscrupulous persons, as such meddlers do
not hesitate to abuse the process of the
court. The right of effective access to
justice, which has emerged with the new
social rights regime, must be used to serve
basic human rights, which purport to
guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a
workable remedy within the framework of
the judicial system must be provided.
Whenever any public interest is invoked,
the court must examine the case to ensure
that there is in fact, genuine public interest
involved. The court must maintain strict
vigilance to ensure that there is no abuse of
the process of court and that, "ordinarily
meddlesome bystanders are not granted a
Visa". Many societal pollutants create new
problems of non-redressed grievances, and
the
court
should
make
an
earnest
endeavour to take up those cases, where the
subjective purpose of the lis justifies the
need for it.

16. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special
Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33, this
Court considered a similar issue and
observed as under:- "There is no dispute
regarding the legal proposition that the
rights under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India can be enforced only by an
aggrieved person except in the case where
the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus or
quo warranto. Another exception in the
general rule is the filing of a writ petition
in public interest. The existence of the legal
right of the petitioner which is alleged to
have been violated is the foundation for
invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court
under the aforesaid article. The orthodox
rule of interpretation regarding the locus
standi of a person to reach the Court has
undergone
a
sea
change
with
the
development of constitutional law in our
country and the constitutional Courts have
been adopting a liberal approach in
dealing with the cases or dislodging the
claim of a litigant merely on hypertechnical grounds. In other words, if the
person is found to be not merely a stranger
having no right whatsoever to any post or
property, he cannot be non-suited on the
ground of his not having the locus standi."
(Emphasis added)

17. In view of the above, the law
on the said point can be summarised to the
effect that a person who raises a grievance,
must show how he has suffered legal injury.
714 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Generally, a stranger having no right
whatsoever to any post or property, cannot
be permitted to intervene in the affairs of
others.

16. Now another fact which needs to
be examined is the fact as to whether the
present petition which is in fact in the guise
of public interest litigation is maintainable
at the behest and instance of the petitioner.

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Raju Ramsingh
Vasave
(Supra)
while
referring
to
paragraph 45.

45. We must now deal with the
question of locus standi. A special leave petition
ordinarily would not have been entertained at
the instance of the appellant. Validity of
appointment or otherwise on the basis of a
caste certificate granted by a committee is
ordinarily a matter between the employer and
the employee. This Court, however, when a
question is raised, can take cognizance of a
matter of such grave importance suo motu. It
may not treat the special leave petition as a
public interest litigation, but, as a public law
litigation. It is, in a proceeding of that nature,
permissible for the court to make a detailed
enquiry with regard to the broader aspects of
the matter although it was initiated at the
instance of a person having a private interest. A
deeper scrutiny can be made so as to enable the
court to find out as Cate "Segy HOW to
whether a party to a lis is guilty of commission
of fraud on the Constitution. If such an enquiry
subserves the greater public interest and has a
far-reaching effect on the society, in our
opinion, this Court will not shirk its
responsibilities from doing so.

18. According to Sri Yadav, the
present proceedings cannot be said to be a
public interest litigation but it is Public
Law Litigation and thus the same is
maintainable.

19. On the other hand, learned
Standing Counsel has referred to certain
judgments of the Apex Court so as to
contend that in service matter Public
Interest Litigation is not maintainable.
Namely:-

20. In Dr. B. Singh Vs. Union of
India and others (2004) 3 SCC 363
paragraph 16 is quoted hereunder:-

"16. As noted supra, a time has
come to weed out the petitions, which
though titled as public interest litigations
are in essence something else. It is
shocking to note that Courts are flooded
with large number of so called public
interest
litigations,
whereas
only
a
minuscule percentage can legitimately be
called as public interest litigations. Though
the parameters of public interest litigation
have been indicated by this Court in large
number of cases, yet unmindful of the real
intentions and objectives, Courts at times
are entertaining such petitions and wasting
valuable judicial time which, as noted
above, could be otherwise utilized for
disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr.
Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra
Kumar Mishra and Ors.