# Smt. Qamrunnisa & Ors v. Smt. Tamizan & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 124
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-10
- **Case number:** Second Appeal No. 1905 of 1978
- **Bench:** Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-qamrunnisa-ors-v-smt-tamizan-ors-54736
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

124 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
any delay. He has specifically mentioned that he is not passing award in respect of crops and trees
standing on the land, as it will delay the matter of passing the award in respect of the land and
therefore he reserved his rights to pass supplementary award in respect of the trees and the crops
standing on the land.

11. Even otherwise if the District Court come to the conclusion that it was incumbent on the
Land Acquisition Officer to pass award in respect of the trees and crops then he could have to be
passed award for the trees and crops standing on the land as he has already recorded evidence on
this point. Therefore, he has committed error in remanding the matter. Thus, I find that the District
Court has committed error in treating the award as interim award.

12. Moreover, as per the provisions of law, discussed above the District Court has no power of
remand while hearing the application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act because it is a
reference Court and not an appellate Court. (emphasis supplied)

12. Similarly, in the Act of 2013, the Reference Court can only affirm the award of the
Collector or enhance the compensation awarded by it, but it cannot set aside the award of the
Collector and remand the matter to the Collector for deciding it afresh.

13. It is apparent that the Reference Court has acted beyond its jurisdiction by setting aside the
award of the Collector and remanding the matter to it for deciding it afresh, which is contrary to the
provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as well as the Act of 2013. In no circumstances
whatsoever, the Reference Court could have passed the impugned order, which is unsustainable in
law.

14. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment and award
dated 25.03.2023 is set aside and L.A.R. No.1 of 2021 stands restored on its original number before
the Reference Court.

15. The Reference Court is directed to decide the reference on merits in accordance with law
after hearing the parties within a period of six months from the date of production of certified copy
of this order, without affording any unnecessary adjournments to either of the parties.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 124
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J.

Second Appeal No. 1905 of 1978

Smt. Qamrunnisa & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
Smt. Tamizan & Ors. ...Respondents
4 All. Smt. Qamrunnisa & Ors. Vs. Smt. Tamizan & Ors.
125
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing the first appeal without framing
points for determination under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC; and whether the appeal involved any
substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.
HEADNOTE
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - s.100 - Order XLI Rule 31 - Second appeal admitted on grounds
treated as substantial questions of law - Challenge on the ground that First Appellate Court had
not framed points for determination and that trial court lacked pecuniary jurisdiction -
Maintainability of second appeal.
Held: Section 100 CPC provides appeals from appellate decrees and it shall lie only if the High
Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law - To be "substantial", a
question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way,
insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned - The High Court should be satisfied
that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. It is settled
law that findings of fact howsoever erroneous cannot be reopened and disturbed in second
appeal which is required to be adjudicated only upon a substantial question of law, if any, arisen
therein - Once the Court found that no substantial question of law or even a question of law
worth consideration arose in the second appeal, there is no occasion to re-appreciate the
evidence so as to come to a different conclusion.
It is not always mandatory to frame points for determination and it would depend how the judgment was
written - Whether in a particular case there has been substantial compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 CPC
should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered in each case - Non-compliance with the
provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make it wholly void and may be ignored if there has
been substantial compliance with it. If First Appellate Court has display conscious application of mind and
record findings supported by reasons on all issues and contentions, the object of Section 96 CPC got satisfied.
In the instant case the First Appellate Court considered the order passed in suit whereby it was decreed and
rejected all grounds - It was a judgment where there was no necessity to frame points for determination
since it were not involved - Issue regarding valuation and court fee was corrected after amendment of plaint
and deficiency was made good - It was held that suit was not under valued - No such issue was pressed in
first appeal . Second appeal dismissed. (E-5)
CASE LAW CITED
R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through Lrs. and another v. Rajmani and others, 2025 INSC 478.
Chandraban (deceased) through Lrs. and others v. Saraswati and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273.
Nafees Ahmad and another v. Soinuddin and others, 2025 INSC 520.
Malluru Mallappa (D) Thru. Lrs. v. Kuruvathappa and others, 2020 INSC 173.
Rusi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Bhavna Seth and others, 2026 INSC 339.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
List of Keywords
126 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Second Appeal; Section 100 CPC; Substantial Question of Law; Order XLI Rule 31 CPC; Points for
Determination; First Appellate Court; Findings of Fact; Re-appreciation of Evidence; Pecuniary Jurisdiction;
Court Fee; Valuation of Suit.
CASE ARISING FROM
Judgment and decree of the Trial Court dated 18.08.1973, affirmed by the judgment of the First Appellate
Court dismissing the defendants' first appeal.
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner: R.U. Ansari
Advs. for the Respondents: Hari Narayan Singh, Pankaj Kumar Mishra, Rajendra Kumar Srivastava
(Delivered by Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.)

1. Heard Sri R.U. Ansari, learned counsel for appellants. None appeared on behalf of
respondents.

2. This is a defendants' second appeal of the year 1978 and pending for last more than 48
years.

3. Present second appeal was admitted vide order dated 07.04.1979 on substantial questions of
law as stated in Grounds No. 1 and 6 of memo of appeal, which are reproduced hereinafter:

'i) Because the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. are mandatory, the Court below has
acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction in completely violating the provisions of aforesaid
Rule, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the court below is not sustainable in law.

vi) Because the Valuation of the suit for the purpose of the jurisdiction was fixed Rs. 19,500/-,
the learned Munsif where the suit was instituted by the plaintiff could entertain the suit upto
valuation of Rs. 5000/- only. The suit was instituted by the plaintiffs in a court which had no
pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The defect of institution could not be cured by transfer
of case to the court of S.C.C. under Section 24 C.P.C., the view taken to the contrary by the trial
court and the finding recorded on issue no. 5 was wholly illegal, the court below has acted illegally
in completely ignoring this aspect of the matter in spite of the fact that the same was pressed before
him.

4. Section 100 CPC provides appeals from appellate decrees and it shall lie only if the High
Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Sub-clause 3 of Section 100
CPC further provides that memorandum of appeal shall precisely state substantial question of law
involve in appeal, whereas in present case in memorandum of appeal only grounds were mentioned
and no substantial question of law was even mentioned therein. Therefore, the way this second
appeal was admitted on basis of grounds treating them to be substantial questions of law was not
4 All. Smt. Qamrunnisa & Ors. Vs. Smt. Tamizan & Ors.
127
appropriate (See, R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through Lrs. and another vs. Rajmani and others, 2025 INSC
478).

5. Still considering that this second appeal is pending for last more than 48 years, the Court
proceed that above grounds are deemed to be substantial questions of law mentioned in memo of
appeal but one consideration is still left that, whether said questions are substantial questions of law
or not in terms of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of Chandraban (deceased)
through Lrs. and others vs. Saraswati and others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1273 wherein the law with
regard to 'what is the substantial question of law' was discussed and relevant part of the judgment
is reproduced hereinafter:

'31. To be 'substantial', a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of
the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, insofar as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of
law 'involving in the case' there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the
question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must
be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely
new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case or not, the
paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the
indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation
in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [Santosh Hazari v.Purushottam
Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179] .)

32. The principles relating to Section 100CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus:

32.1. An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But
the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document
involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is
misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document,
it gives rise to a question of law.

32.2.The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law,
and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the
case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a
substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal
principle emerging from binding precedents and involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial
question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on
account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the
matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the
substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision
rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.
128 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

32.3.The general rule is that the High Court will not interfere with findings of facts arrived at
by the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are
where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts
have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts
have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to decision based on no evidence, it not
only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the
evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.

33.In this case, it cannot be said that the first appellate court acted on no evidence. The
respondents in their second appeal before the High Court did not advert to any material evidence
that had been ignored by the first appellate court. The respondents also could not show that any
wrong inference had been drawn by the first appellate court from proved facts by applying the law
erroneously.

6. Learned counsel for appellants vehemently pressed the first purported question of law, i.e.,
whether First Appellate Court was justified in dismissing first appeal without framing points for
determination and has placed reliance on a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of
Nafees Ahmad and another vs. Soinuddin and others, 2025 INSC 520, however, the Court finds
that said judgment is in fact against the submission of counsel for appellants.

7. In Nafees Ahmad (supra) the High Court while considering a second appeal has formulated
a similar nature of question of law and held that since First Appellate Court has not framed points
for determination, therefore, appeal was returned back for fresh consideration. However, a
challenge to it before Supreme Court was allowed and it was held that it is not always mandatory to
frame points for determination and it would depend how the judgment was written. For reference
entire judgment passed by Supreme Court in Nafees Ahmad (supra) is quoted hereinafter:

'1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 4-9-2017 in Second Appeal No.69/2008, by which the Second
Appeal filed by the respondents herein came to be partly allowed and the matter was remitted to
the First Appellate Court on the ground that the First Appellate Court failed to comply with the
provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).

3. The High Court, while deciding the Second Appeal, formulated the following substantial
question of law:-

'Whether it is incumbent upon the Appellate Court to frame the point of determination as per
the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC while deciding the first appeal or not?

4. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC reads thus:

'Rule 31. Contents, date and signature of judgment.─
4 All. Smt. Qamrunnisa & Ors. Vs. Smt. Tamizan & Ors.
129

The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state ─

(a) the points for determination;

(b) the decision thereon;

(c) the reasons for the decision; and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is
entitled, and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the
Judges concurring therein.

5. It appears that the High Court relying upon few decisions took the view that Order 41 Rule
31 CPC is mandatory and the failure on the part of the Appellate Court to frame the points for
determination as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC would vitiate the entire judgment and
make it wholly void.

6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the
materials on record, we are in complete disagreement with the view taken by the High Court.

7. We propose to follow the dictum as laid by this Court in the case of 'G. Amalorpavam And
Others v. R.C. Diocese of Madurai And Others' reported in (2006) 3 SCC 224, wherein this Court
observed that whether in a particular case, there has been substantial compliance, with the
provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC should be determined on the nature of the judgment delivered
in each case. Non-compliance with the provisions, by itself, may not vitiate the judgment and make
it wholly void and may be ignored if there has been a substantial compliance with it.

8. We may elaborate the issue a little further from a different angle.

9. The Privy Council observed in 'Mt. Fakrunisa v. Moulvi Izarus' reported in AIR 1921 PC
55, at p. 56, as under:

'In every appeal it is incumbent upon the appellants to show reason why the judgment
appealed from should be disturbed; there must be some balance in their favour when all the
circumstances are considered, to justify the alteration of the judgment that stands. Their Lordships
are unable to find that this duty has been discharged.

10. The Privy Council decision referred to above was looked into by a three-Judge Bench in
the case of 'Thakur Sukhpal Singh v. Thakur Kalyan Singh and Anr.' reported in (1963) 2 SCR
733, wherein this Court observed as under:

'With respect, we agree with this and hold that it is the duty of the appellant to show that the
judgment under appeal is erroneous for certain reasons and it is only after the appellant has shown
this that the appellate court would call upon the respondent to reply to the contention. It is only then
130 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that the judgment of the appellate court can fully contain all the various matters mentioned in Ruel
31, Order 41.

11. This Court observed in 'Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, Bhurey Lal Baya'
reported in (1955) 2 SCR 1, at page 8: 'Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is
procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: ... Too technical
construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should
therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means
designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.

12. The provisions of Rule 31 should therefore be reasonably construed and should be held to
require the various particulars to be mentioned in the judgment only when the appellant has
actually raised certain points for determination by the Appellate Court, and not when no such
points are raised.

13. We must also look into the provisions of Rule 30 of Order 41 for the purpose of fortifying
our interpretation of Rule 31. Order 41 Rule 30 CPC reads thus:

'30. Judgment when and where pronounced.─ (1) The Appellate Court, after hearing the
parties or their pleaders and referring to any part of the proceedings, whether on appeal or in the
court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, to which reference may be considered necessary,
shall pronounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which notice shall
be given to the parties or their pleaders.

(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall be sufficient if the points for
determination, the decision thereon and the final order passed in the appeal are read out and it shall
not be necessary for the Court to read out the whole judgment, but a copy of the whole judgment
shall be made available for the perusal of the parties or their pleaders immediately after the
judgment in pronounced.

14. Thus, this Rule does not make it incumbent on the Appellate Court to refer to any part of
the proceedings in the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred. The Appellate Court can
refer, after hearing the parties and their pleaders, to any part of these proceedings to which
reference be considered necessary. It is in the discretion of the Appellate Court to refer to the
proceedings. It is competent to pronounce judgment after hearing what the parties or their pleaders
submit to it for consideration.

It follows therefore that if the appellant submits nothing for its consideration, the Appellate
Court can decide the appeal without any reference to any proceedings of the courts below and, in
doing so, it can simply say that the appellants have not urged anything which would tend to show
that the judgment and decree under appeal were wrong. [See : 'Thakur Sukhpal Singh' (supra)]

15. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we allow this appeal.

16. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside.
4 All. Ram Laut Yadav & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
131

17. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

8. In order to consider above submissions including a submission that Trial Court has returned
a perverse finding and has not appreciated the evidence on record, Court also takes note of
judgment passed by First Appellate Court which has considered the order passed in suit whereby it
was decreed and has rejected all grounds, as such, it was a judgment where there was no necessity
to frame points for determination since it were not involved.

9. In above background Court also takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in
Malluru Mallappa (D) Thru. Lrs. vs. Kuruvathappa and others, 2020 INSC 173 that if First
Appellate Court has display conscious application of mind and record findings supported by
reasons on all issues and contentions, the object of Section 96 CPC got satisfied.

10. So far as second purported ground/ question of law is concerned that the suit was decided
by Trial Court vide order dated 18.08.1973, that concerned issue in suit was under valued and
Court fee paid was insufficient, however, later on plaintiffs have amended suit and thereby
corrected valuation and also made good deficiency, therefore, it was held that suit was not under
valued. No such issue was pressed in first appeal. Memo of First Appeal is not on record.
Otherwise also, it cannot be considered as a substantial question of law.

11. The Court also takes note of a very recent judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case
of Rusi Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. Bhavna Seth and others, 2026 INSC 339 that it is settled
law that findings of fact howsoever erroneous cannot be reopened and disturbed in second appeal
which is required to be adjudicated only upon a substantial question of law, if any, arisen therein.
Therefore, once this Court has found that no substantial question of law or even a question of law
worth consideration in present second appeal, there is no occasion for this Court to re-appreciate
the evidence so as to come to a different conclusion.

12. In aforesaid circumstances, this second appeal is dismissed, since it does not involve
substantial question of law purportedly framed when present second appeal was admitted. Interim
order, if any, is vacated.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 131
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ A No. 5764 of 2015

Ram Laut Yadav & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents