# Smt. Radha Devi & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 28450 of 2019
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-08-06
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 28450 of 2019
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-radha-devi-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-45181
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Evidence Law- Evidence Act (1 of 1872)
- Sections.40, 41, 42, 43 - Acquittal of coaccused - judgment of acquittal of coaccused
in
a
criminal
trial
is
not
admissible under sections 40 to 43 of the
Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of
the absconding co-accused - judgment of
acquittal will be admissible only to show
as to who were the parties in the
proceedings or factum of acquittal
(Para 10)

B. Criminal Law- Criminal Procedure Code
(2 of 1974) - Section 482 - Quashing of
3-5 All. Smr. Radha Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1707
criminal proceeding - Acquittal of coaccused
- no ground to quash the
proceedings against other accused

Securing of acquittal by co-accused in a trial
emanating from same case crime - is no ground
to quash the proceedings - as against those
accused who has not faced the trial - at the pretrial stage by High Court exercising power u/s
482 CrPC - In a trial of co-accused, the
prosecution is not called upon nor it is expected
to adduce evidence against absconding coaccused or such co accused who did not face
trial (Para 6, 12)

Application dismissed (E-5)

List of cases cited :

## Text

1706 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
statement recorded under Section 164
Cr.P.C. and also get her medically
examined. Therefore, on the basis of the
aforesaid, it cannot be said that she was
kidnapped
or
abducted
from
lawful
guardianship.

20. The statement of the victim under
Section 164 Cr.P.C. also goes to show that
no criminal force was applied on the victim
to outrage her modesty and she was not
forced by Nazim to marry her. The victim
has also not spoken anything serious
against the family members of Nazim,
therefore no offence under the relevant
Sections is made out.

21. The Court must in each case
consider the evidence before it and the
surroundings
circumstances
before
reaching a conclusion because each
case has its own peculiar facts which
may have a bearing. The undisputed
facts of the case are that the victim was
18 year old as is clear from the medical
certificate. She was a major grown up
girl and had gone willingly with him
that no force was applied to outrage her
modesty nor she was kidnapped and
that she has married Nazim out of her
own sweet will and is living as husband
and wife with him.

22. In the light of the aforesaid
discussion and looking to the facts and
circumstances, this Court is convinced
that applicants are not guilty of the
offence punishable under Sections 363,
366, 354, 506, 342, 120-B I.P.C., hence
the continuance of the impugned F.I.R.
against
the
applicants
and
other
proceedings pursuant thereto will be
nothing but in abuse of the process of
the Court and the same are liable to be
quashed.

23. Resultantly, the entire proceedings
of Case Crime No. 2287 of 2013, under
Sections 363, 366, 354, 506, 342, 120-B
I.P.C. as well as entire proceeding of S.T.
No. 1200 of 2014 "State Vs. Abid and
another" under Sections 363, 366 I.P.C.,
Police
Station-
Indrapuram,
District
Ghaziabad, are an abuse process of law.
The same are hereby quashed.

24. The present application is
accordingly allowed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
----------
(2020)03-05ILR A1706
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.08.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. No. 28450 of 2019

Smt. Radha Devi & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Arun Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Evidence Law- Evidence Act (1 of 1872)
- Sections.40, 41, 42, 43 - Acquittal of coaccused - judgment of acquittal of coaccused
in
a
criminal
trial
is
not
admissible under sections 40 to 43 of the
Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of
the absconding co-accused - judgment of
acquittal will be admissible only to show
as to who were the parties in the
proceedings or factum of acquittal
(Para 10)

B. Criminal Law- Criminal Procedure Code
(2 of 1974) - Section 482 - Quashing of
3-5 All. Smr. Radha Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1707
criminal proceeding - Acquittal of coaccused
- no ground to quash the
proceedings against other accused

Securing of acquittal by co-accused in a trial
emanating from same case crime - is no ground
to quash the proceedings - as against those
accused who has not faced the trial - at the pretrial stage by High Court exercising power u/s
482 CrPC - In a trial of co-accused, the
prosecution is not called upon nor it is expected
to adduce evidence against absconding coaccused or such co accused who did not face
trial (Para 6, 12)

Application dismissed (E-5)

List of cases cited :

1. Rajan Rai Vs St. of Bihar (2006) 1 SCC 191

2. Yanab Sheikh @ Gagu Vs St. of w.B. (2013) 6
SCC 428

3. Dalbir Singh Vs St. of Haryana (2008) 11
SCC425
(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar
Singh, J.)

1. Heard sri Arun Kumar Singh
learned counsel for the applicants and Sri
Virendra Kumar Maurya and Jagdamba
Prasad
Singh
learned
Additional
Government
Advocates
for
the
State/opposite party no.1 and perused the
record with the assistance of learned
counsel for the parties.

2. This application under section 482
Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants
with a prayer to quash impugned Chargesheet dated 01.04.2015 arising out of in
Case Crime No.284 of 2014 and the
proceeding of Session Trial No.375 of 2018
in Case No.2209 of 2016 (State vs. Radha
Devi and others), under sections 323, 506,
315 & 498A I.P.C. read with section 3/4
Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station
Bilhaur, District Kanpur Nagar, pending in
the court of Fast Track Court, Court No.II,
Kanpur Dehat.

3. A splendid question involved in
this case is that "as to whether on the
acquittal of co- accused, the charge sheet
and criminal proceeding pursuant thereto
against the remaining co-accused are liable
to be quashed under section 482 Cr.P.C."?

4. It is submitted by the learned
counsel for the applicant that the applicant
no.1 Smt. Radha Devi is sister-in-law
(Nanad), applicant no.2, Smt. Meenu is
Senior Co-sister (Jethani) and applicant
No.3 Smt. Pan Kumar is mother-in-law
(Saas) of opposite party no.2, namely, Smt
Asha Devi, who lodged FIR on 15.06.2014,
registered as Case Crime No.284 of 2014
against the applicants, namely Smt. Radha
Devi, Smt. Meenu and Smt. Pan Kumar
and two other co-accused, namely, Laxman
(husband) and Ram Naresh brother-in-law
(Jeith). The investigating officer after
investigation has submitted two chargesheets in this case. Charge-sheet dated
29.10.2014 was submitted against the coaccused, Laxman (husband) and Ram
Naresh (Jeith) and charge-sheet dated
01.04.2015 was submitted against the
applicant Radha Devi, Meenu and Smt. Pan
Kumar, who are on bail. It is next
submitted that co-accused Laxman and
Ram Naresh have been acquitted by
judgment and order dated 11.06.2018 by
Additional District & Session Judge/Fast
Track Court No.3 in Session Trial No.53 of
2015, therefore, the applicants are not
entitled to face trial and proceedings
against them are liable to be quashed at the
pre-trial stage by this Court in exercise of
power under section 482 Cr.P.C.

5. Per contra, Sri Virendra Kumar
Maurya and Jagdamba Prasad Singh,
1708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
learned Additional Government Advocates
refuting the aforesaid submissions of the
learned
counsel
for
the
applicants,
vehemently opposed the aforesaid prayer of
the applicants by contending that in this
case charge sheet had been filed on
01.04.2015 against the applicants, but they
have filed the present application under
Section
482
Cr.P.C.
in
July,
2019
challenging
the
charge
sheet
dated
01.04.2015 after four years without any
proper explanation of delay in filing the
present application. The proceeding of the
trial against the applicants cannot be said to
be abuse of the process of Court, and
cannot be quashed merely on the ground
that two other co-accused of this case have
been acquitted. The present application is
liable to be dismissed on merit as well as
on the ground of latches.

6. After having heard the argument of
learned counsel of the parties, this Court is
of the view that every case turns on its own
facts and evidence as may be adduced and
acquittal of co- accused in a trial emanating
from same case crime does not necessarily
entail acquittal of the other co-accused,
who are yet to be put on trial. In a trial of
co-accused, the prosecution is not called
upon nor it is expected to adduce evidence
against absconding co-accused or such co
accused who did not face trial.

7. Before delving into this issue, it
would also be useful to set out sections 40,
41, 42 and 43 of The Indian Evidence Act,
1872, which are under the heading
"Judgments of Courts of justice when
relevant", which reads as under :-

Section 40 :- Previous judgments
relevant to bar a second suit or trial.--The
existence of any judgment, order or decree
which by law prevents any Courts from
taking cognizance of a suit or holding a
trial is a relevant fact when the question is
whether
such
Court
ought
to
take
cognizance of such suit, or to hold such
trial.

Section 41 :- Relevancy of certain
judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.--A
final judgment, order or decree of a
competent Court, in the exercise of
probate,
matrimonial
admiralty
or
insolvency jurisdiction which confers upon
or takes away from any person any legal
character, or which declares any person to
be entitled to any such character, or to be
entitled to any specific thing, not as against
any specified person but absolutely, is
relevant when the existence of any such
legal character, or the title of any such
person to any such thing, is relevant. Such
judgment, order or decree is conclusive
proof--

that any legal character, which it
confers accrued at the time when such
judgment, order or decree came into
operation;

that any legal character, to which
it declares any such person to be entitled,
accrued to that person at the time when
such judgment, 3[order or decree] declares
it to have accrued to that person; 3[order
or decree] declares it to have accrued to
that person;

that any legal character which it
takes away from any such person ceased at
the time from which such judgment,
3[order or decree] declared that it had
ceased or should cease; 3[order or decree]
declared that it had ceased or should
cease;

and that anything to which it
declares any person to be so entitled was
the property of that person at the time from
which such judgment, 3[order or decree]
declares that it had been or should be his
property.
3-5 All. Smr. Radha Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1709

(3) Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, sec. 3.

Section 42 :- Relevancy and effect
of judgments, orders or decrees, other than
those mentioned in section 41.--Judgments,
orders or decrees other than those
mentioned in section 41, are relevant if
they relate to matters of a public nature
relevant
to
the
enquiry;
but
such
judgments, orders or decrees are not
conclusive proof of that which they state.

Section 43 :- Judgments, etc.,
other than those mentioned in sections 40
to 42, when relevant.--Judgments, orders
or decrees, other than those mentioned in
sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant,
unless the existence of such judgment,
order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is
relevant under some other provisions of
this Act.

8. The Apex Court in the matter of
Rajan Rai Vs. State of Bihar (2006) 1
SCC
191
has
also
considered
the
provisions of Section 40,41,42 and 43 of
the Indian Evidence Act and held that
judgment
of
acquittal
of
co-accused
rendered in earlier trial arising out of same
transaction was wholly irrelevant in the
case of the accused, who was tried
separately. The relevant paragraph nos. 8
and 10 of the said judgment are reproduced
herein-below:-

"8. Coming to the first submission
very strenuously canvassed by Shri Mishra,
it would be necessary to refer to the
provisions of Sections 40 to 44 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 [in short `the
Evidence Act'] which are under the heading
`Judgments of Courts of justice when
relevant', and in the aforesaid Sections the
circumstances
under
which
previous
judgments are relevant in civil and
criminal cases have been enumerated.
Section 40 states the circumstances in
which a previous judgment may be relevant
to bar a second suit or trial and has no
application to the present case for the
obvious reasons that no judgment order or
decree is said to be in existence in this case
which could in law be said to prevent the
Sessions Court from holding the trial.
Section 41 deals with the relevancy of
certain judgments in probate, matrimonial,
admiralty or insolvency jurisdiction and is
equally inapplicable. Section 42 refers to
the relevancy and effect of judgments,
orders or decrees other than those
mentioned in Section 41 in so far as they
relate to matters of a public nature, and is
again inapplicable to the present case.
Then comes Section 43 which clearly lays
down that judgments, order or decrees,
other than those mentioned in Sections 40,
41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the
existence of such judgment, order or decree
is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some
other provisions of the Evidence Act. As it
has not been shown that the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the High Court in
appeals arising out of earlier sessions trial
could be said to be relevant under the other
provisions of the Evidence Act, it was
clearly "irrelevant" and could not have
been taken into consideration by the High
Court
while
passing
the
impugned
judgment. The remaining Section 44 deals
with fraud or collusion in obtaining a
judgment, or incompetency of a court
which delivered it, and can possibly have
no application in the present case. It would
thus appear that the High Court was quite
justified in ignoring the judgment of
acquittal rendered by it which was clearly
irrelevant.

10. A three Judges' Bench of this
Court had occasion to consider the same
very question in the case of Karan Singh vs.
The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1965
SC 1037, in which there were in all 8
1710 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accused persons out of whom accused Ram
Hans absconded, as such trial of seven
accused persons, including accused Karan
Singh, who was appellant before this
Court, proceeded and the trial court
although acquitted other six accused
persons, convicted the seventh accused,
i.e., Karan Singh under Section 302 read
with
Section
149
IPC.
Against
his
conviction, Karan Singh preferred an
appeal before the High Court. During the
pendency of his appeal, accused Ram Hans
was apprehended and put on trial and upon
its conclusion, the trial court recorded
order of his acquittal, which attained
finality, no appeal having been preferred
against the same. Thereafter, when the
appeal of accused Karan Singh was taken
up for hearing, it was submitted that in
view of the judgment of acquittal rendered
in the trial of accused Ram Hans, the
conviction of accused Karan Singh under
Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC
could not be sustained, more so when other
six accused persons, who were tried with
Karan Singh, were acquitted by the trial
court and the judgment of acquittal
attained finality. Repelling the contention,
the High Court after considering the
evidence adduced came to the conclusion
that murder was committed by Ram Hans
in furtherance of the common intention of
both himself and accused Karan Singh and,
accordingly, altered the conviction of
Karan Singh from Section 302/149 to one
under Section 302/34 IPC. Against the said
judgment, when an appeal by special leave
was preferred before this Court, it was
contended that in view of the verdict of
acquittal of accused Ram Hans, it was not
permissible in law for the High Court to
uphold conviction of accused Karan Singh.
This Court, repelling the contention, held
that decision in each case had to turn on
the evidence led in it. Case of accused Ram
Hans depended upon evidence led there
while the case of accused Karan Singh,
who had appealed before this Court, had to
be decided only on the basis of evidence led
during the course of his trial and the
evidence led in the case of Ram Hans and
the decision there arrived at would be
wholly irrelevant in considering merits of
the case of Karan Singh, who was
appellant before this Court. This Court
observed at page 1038 thus:-

" As the High Court pointed out,
that observation has no application to the
present case as here the acquittal of
Ramhans was not in any proceeding to
which the appellant was a party. Clearly,
the decision in each case has to turn on the
evidence led in it; Ramhans's case
depended on the evidence led there while
the appellant's case had to be decided only
on the evidence led in it. The evidence led
in Ramhans's case and the decision there
arrived at on that evidence would be wholly
irrelevant in considering the merits of the
appellant's case."

In that case, after laying down
the law, the Court further considered as to
whether the High Court was justified in
converting the conviction of accused Karan
Singh from Section 302/149 to one under
Section 302 read with section 34 IPC after
recording a finding that the murder was
committed by Ram Hans in furtherance of
common intention of both himself and
accused Karan Singh. This Court was of
the view that in spite of the fact that
accused Ram Hans was acquitted by the
trial court and his acquittal attained
finality, it was open to the High Court, as
an appellate court, while considering
appeal of accused Karan Singh, to consider
evidence recorded in the trial of Karan
Singh only for a limited purpose to find out
as to whether Karan Singh could have
shared common intention with accused
3-5 All. Smr. Radha Devi & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1711
Ram Hans to commit murder of the
deceased, though the same could not have
otherwise affected the acquittal of Ram
Hans. In view of the foregoing discussion,
we are clearly of the view that the judgment
of acquittal rendered in the trial of other
four accused persons is wholly irrelevant in
the appeal arising out of trial of appellant
Rajan Rai as the said judgment was not
admissible under the provisions of Sections
40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. Every case
has to be decided on the evidence adduced
therein. Case of the four acquitted accused
persons was decided on the basis of
evidence led there while case of the present
appellant has to be decided only on the
basis of evidence adduced during the
course of his trial."

9. The Apex Court in another matter
of Yanob Sheikh @ Gagu Vs. State of
West Bengal (2013) 6 SCC 428 has also
considered the issue that what would be
effect of judgment of acquittal of one
accused on the other co-accused. The
relevant paragraph nos. 24, 25 and 26 of
the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow:-

"24. In the present case, we are
concerned with the merit or otherwise of
the above reasoning leading to the
acquittal of the accused Najrul. We are
primarily concerned with the effect of this
acquittal upon the case of the Appellantaccused. The Trial Court in its judgment
clearly stated that there was direct and
circumstantial
evidence
against
the
accused
implicating
him
with
the
commission of the crime. Finding the
Appellant guilty of the offence, the Trial
Court punished him accordingly. Where the
prosecution is able to establish the guilt of
the accused by cogent, reliable and
trustworthy evidence, mere acquittal of one
accused would not automatically lead to
acquittal of another accused. It is only
where the entire case of the prosecution
suffers from infirmities, discrepancies and
where the prosecution is not able to
establish its case, the acquittal of the coaccused would be of some relevancy for
deciding the case of the other."

"25. In the case of Dalbir Singh
v. State of Haryana (2008) 11 SCC 425,
this Court held as under:

13. Coming to the applicability of
the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus, even if major portion of evidence
is found to be deficient, residue is sufficient
to
prove
guilt
of
an
accused,
notwithstanding acquittal of large number
of other co-accused persons, his conviction
can be maintained. However, where large
number of other persons are accused, the
court has to carefully screen the evidence:

51. ... It is the duty of court to
separate grain from chaff. Where chaff can
be separated from grain, it would be open
to the court to convict an accused
notwithstanding the fact that evidence has
been found to be deficient to prove guilt of
other accused persons. Falsity of particular
material witness or material particular
would not ruin it from the beginning to end.
The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
has no application in India and the
witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus
(false in one thing, false in everything) has
not
received
general
acceptance
in
different jurisdiction in India, nor has this
maxim come to occupy the status of rule of
law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that
it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, and not that
it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely
involves the question of weight of evidence
which a court may apply in a given set of
circumstances, but it is not what may be
1712 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
called 'a mandatory rule of evidence'.(See
Nisar Ali v. State of U.P.) Merely because
some of the accused persons have been
acquitted, though evidence against all of
them, so far as direct testimony went, was
the same does not lead as a necessary
corollary that those who have been
convicted must also be acquitted. It is
always open to a court to differentiate the
accused who had been acquitted from those
who were convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh
v. State of Punjab.) The doctrine is a
dangerous one, specially in India, for if a
whole body of the testimony were to be
rejected, because witness was evidently
speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to
be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead stop.
Witnesses just cannot help in giving
embroidery to a story, however, true in the
main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in
each case as to what extent the evidence is
worthy of acceptance, and merely because
in some respects the court considers the
same to be insufficient for placing reliance
on the testimony of a witness, it does not
necessarily follow as a matter of law that it
must be disregarded in all respects as well.
The evidence has to be sifted with care. The
aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the
reason that one hardly comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain a
grain
of
untruth
or
at
any
rate
exaggeration,
embroideries
or
embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P.
and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar.) An
attempt has to be made to in terms of
felicitous metaphor, separate grain from
the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is
not feasible to separate truth from
falsehood, because grain and chaff are
inextricably mixed up, and in the process of
separation an absolutely new case has to
be reconstructed by divorcing essential
details presented by the prosecution
completely from the context and the
background against which they are made,
the only available course to be made is
discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee
Ariel v. State of M.P. and Balaka Singh v.
State of Punjab.) As observed by this Court
in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki normal
discrepancies in evidence are those which
are due to normal errors of observations,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of
time, due to mental disposition such as
shock and horror at the time of occurrence
and these are always there however honest
and truthful a witness may be. Material
discrepancies are those which are not
normal and not expected of a normal
person. Courts have to label the category
to which a discrepancy may be categorised.
While normal discrepancies do not corrode
the credibility of a party's case, material
discrepancies do so."

"26. The cumulative effect of the
above discussion is that the acquittal of a
co-accused perse is not sufficient to result
in acquittal of the other accused. The Court
has to screen the entire evidence and does
not extend the threat of falsity to universal
acquittal. The Court must examine the
entire prosecution evidence in its correct
perspective before it can conclude the
effect of acquittal of one accused on the
other in the facts and circumstances of a
given case."

10. In view of above discussion, it is
clear that the judgment of acquittal of coaccused in a criminal trial is not admissible
under sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act
to bar the subsequent trial of the
absconding co-accused and cannot hence
be deduced as a relevant document while
considering the prayer to quash the
proceedings against remaining co-accused
under section 482 Cr.P.C. The judgment of
acquittal will be admissible only to show as
3-5 All. Vikas Kumar Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1713
to who were the parties in the proceedings
or factum of acquittal. As such securing of
acquittal
by
co-accused
cannot
be
considered as relevant circumstances and
ground for exercising power under section
482 Cr.P.C., to quash the proceedings as
against those accused who has not faced the
trial. The judgment not inter parties cannot
justify the invocation of the doctrine of
issue stopple under the Law.

11. It is also well settled that power of
quashing the criminal proceedings at the
pre-trial stage should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that
too in the exceptional and rare case. The
extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court
to act according to its whim or caprice. As
such the inherent powers of the High Court
cannot normally be invoked, unless such
materials are of an unimpeachable nature,
which can be translated into legal evidence
in the course of trial.

12. As a fallout and consequences of
aforesaid discussion, I have no hesitation in
holding that even on the acquittal of coaccused, the charge sheet and criminal
proceeding pursuant thereto against the
remaining co-accused cannot be quashed
under section 482 Cr.P.C.

13. The application sans merit and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------

(2020)03-05ILR A1713
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SHAMIM AHMED, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 33012 of 2019
Vikas Kumar ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Manvendra Narain Pathak

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

Criminal Law- Criminal Procedure Code (2
of 1974)- Sections. 451, 457 - Excise Act
Sections
60,
63,
72
-
Release
of
confiscated Vehicle - mere pendency of
confiscation
proceedings
before
the
District Magistrate u/s 72 of the U.P.
Excise Act shall not operate as a bar
against the release of the seized vehicle
which is required for trial under Section
60 of the U.P. Excise Act
 (Para 17,18, 19)

 Applicant registered owner of seized vehicle -
vehicle detained by police alleging it was
transporting liquor - release application rejected
by Judicial Magistrate only on the ground that
the
investigation
was
going
on
&
the
confiscation proceedings U/s 72 of UP Excise Act
were pending before the District Magistrate -
neither the State or any other person claimed
their ownership over the vehicle - Held - no
useful purpose will be served in keeping the
vehicle stationed at the police station in the
open yard for a long period allowing it to be
damaged with the passage of time. (Para 22)

Appeal allowed (E-5)

List of case cited :

1. Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai & C.M. Mudaliar
Vs. St. of Gujrat AIR 2003 SC 638

2. Nand Vs St. of UP 1996 Law Suit (All) 423

3. Jai Prakash Vs. St. of U.P. 1992 AWC 1744

4. Kamaljeet Singh Vs St. of U.P. 1986 U.P. Cri.
Ruling 50 (Alld)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)