# Smt. Ram Dulari & Anr v. Harshit Yadav & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 703
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-25
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 3759 of 2026
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-ram-dulari-anr-v-harshit-yadav-anr-54797
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

3 All. Smt. Ram Dulari & Anr. Vs. Harshit Yadav & Anr.
703
(2026) 3 ILRA 703
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 3759 of 2026

Smt. Ram Dulari & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Harshit Yadav & Anr. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether a tenant can validly invoke the provisions of Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for deposit of
rent in court, in a situation where an S.C.C. suit instituted by the landlord for eviction and recovery of arrears
of rent in respect of the same premises is already pending.

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972- Section 30; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order XV
Rule 5- Section 30 is a pre litigation protective mechanism, enabling a tenant to safeguard himself against
consequences of default in situations of refusal or uncertainty. However, once an eviction suit for arrears of
rent is instituted and the dispute enters the domain of judicial adjudication, the legal regime governing
deposit of rent undergoes a shift. The tenant thereafter becomes subject to the discipline of the court seized
of the matter, and the obligation to deposit rent is regulated by the procedural framework applicable to such
proceedings, particularly Order XV Rule 5 CPC-The further contention that Order XV Rule 5 CPC is inapplicable
is equally untenable. The said provision specifically regulates the obligation of the tenant to deposit admitted
rent and continue to deposit the monthly amount during the pendency of the suit before the court seized of
the matter. Acceptance of the petitioners' contention would render the said provision otiose and defeat the
legislative intent underlying it. The courts below have, therefore, rightly held that once the suit is pending,
deposit of rent must be made in that very proceeding and not under Section 30 before another forum.

Held-The rejection of the petitioners' application under Section 30 is in consonance with the settled legal
position governing the field. Once the dispute between the landlord and tenant has crystallized into a lis
before a competent court by institution of an eviction suit for arrears of rent, the permissibility of deposit can
no longer be determined in isolation under Section 30. The pendency of such proceedings brings the matter
within the exclusive domain of the trial court, and any deposit of rent must necessarily conform to the
procedural discipline governing such proceedings. Petition dismissed. (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Haider Abbas vs. Additional District Judge & Ors 2006 (1) ADJ 197 (All) (DB)

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent
& Eviction) Act, 1972; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

List of Keywords
Section 30 of U.P Act 13 of 1972 pre-litigation protective mechanism; Once an eviction suit for arrears of rent
is instituted; obligation to deposit rent under Order XV Rule 5 CPC
704 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Case Arising From
The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to assail (i) the
order dated 25.10.2021 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division),Moradabad in Misc. Case No. 194 of 2021
(Smt. Ram Dulari and Others vs. Harshit Yadav), and (ii) the order dated 13.11.2025 passed by the Additional
District Judge/Fast Track Court No. 2, Moradabad in Civil Revision No. 21 of 2022, whereby the revision
preferred against the earlier order has been dismissed.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : AKANKSHA MISHRA
Counsel for Respondent(s) :

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Akanksha Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioners.

2. The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India seeking to
assail (i) the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Moradabad in
Misc. Case No. 194 of 2021 (Smt. Ram Dulari and Others vs. Harshit Yadav), and (ii) the order
dated 13.11.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No. 2, Moradabad in
Civil Revision No. 21 of 2022, whereby the revision preferred against the earlier order has been
dismissed.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioners claim to be tenants in the premises in question
since long, where a tailoring shop is being run as a source of livelihood. It is stated that rent was
being regularly paid and after the death of the original tenant, the petitioners continued in
possession and allegedly tendered rent to the respondentlandlord, who had purchased the property
in the year 2010. It is further asserted that the landlord subsequently refused to accept rent,
whereafter a money order dated 19.07.2021 was sent, which was not accepted. Consequently, the
petitioners instituted proceedings under Section 30(1) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 by filing an
application, registered as Misc. Case No. 194 of 2021, seeking permission to deposit rent.

4. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the respondentlandlord brought on record
that prior to the institution of the application under Section 30, an S.C.C. Suit No. 41 of 2021 for
eviction and recovery of arrears of rent had already been instituted on 17.08.2021 before the Judge,
Small Causes Court, Moradabad, and notice thereof had been duly served upon the tenants. On the
basis of the said fact, it was contended that the proceedings under Section 30 were not
maintainable.

5. The trial court, upon consideration of the material on record, including the certified copies
of the S.C.C. suit and proof of service, recorded a finding that the eviction suit between the parties
was already pending and, therefore, the tenants were required to deposit rent before the court where
the eviction suit was pending, in accordance with law, and recourse to Section 30 was not available.
Accordingly, the application filed by the petitioners under Section 30 was rejected by order dated
25.10.2021.
3 All. Smt. Ram Dulari & Anr. Vs. Harshit Yadav & Anr.
705

6. Aggrieved, the petitioners preferred Civil Revision No. 21 of 2022, which has been
dismissed by the revisional court vide order dated 13.11.2025, affirming the reasoning of the trial
court and holding that once an eviction suit is pending, deposit of rent is to be made in the said
proceedings and not under Section 30 of the Act.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the courts below have erred in law in
overlooking that Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 provides a statutory mechanism
enabling a tenant to deposit rent where the landlord refuses to accept the same, and that the
pendency of an S.C.C. suit does not bar recourse to such provision.

8. It is further contended that the view taken by the courts below that rent ought to be
deposited under Order XV Rule 5 CPC is misconceived, inasmuch as the said provision governs
deposits during pendency of the suit, whereas Section 30 operates independently and permits
deposit before the prescribed authority.

9. The principal issue which arises for consideration in the present petition is as to whether a
tenant can validly invoke the provisions of Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for deposit of
rent in court, in a situation where an S.C.C. suit instituted by the landlord for eviction and recovery
of arrears of rent in respect of the same premises is already pending.

10. Before examining the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and the
correctness of the impugned orders, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant statutory provision,
which is reproduced below:

"30. Deposit of rent in court in certain circumstances - (1) If any person claiming to
be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord
and the alleged landlord refuses to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the
prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent
period in respect of such building until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing
to the tenant his willingness to accept it.

(2) Where any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who is entitled to
receive any rent in respect of any building, the tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the
circumstances under which such deposit is made and may, until such doubt has been removed or
such dispute has been settled by the decision of any competent Court or by settlement between the
parties, continue to deposit the rent that may subsequently become due in respect of such building.

(3) The deposit referred to in sub-section (1), or sub-section (2) shall be made in the
Court of the Munsif having jurisdiction.

(4) On any deposit being made under sub-section (1), the Court shall cause a notice of the
deposit to be served on the alleged landlord, and the amount of deposit may be withdrawn by that
person on application made by him to the Court in that behalf.

(5) On a deposit being made under sub-section (2), the Court shall cause notice of the
deposit to be served on the person or persons concerned and hold the amount of the deposit for the
benefit of the person who may be found entitled to it by any competent Court or by a settlement
between the parties, and the same shall be payable to such person.
706 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(6) In respect of a deposit made as aforesaid, it shall be deemed that the person depositing it
has paid it on the date of such deposit to the person in whose favour it is deposited in the case
referred to in sub-section (1) or to the landlord in the case referred to in sub-section (2)."

11. A plain reading of Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 makes it evident that the
provision is designed to operate in limited contingencies where the tenant is unable to pay rent due
to refusal by the landlord or a bona fide doubt as to the person entitled to receive such rent.

12. In Haider Abbas vs. Additional District Judge & Ors.1, the Court had occasion to
examine the interplay between Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and Order XV Rule 5
CPC, particularly in the context of deposits made after the institution of a suit for arrears of rent.
The question which fell for consideration was whether deposits made under Section 30(1)
subsequent to service of summons could be taken into account for determining compliance with the
requirements of Order XV Rule 5 CPC, especially while considering whether the tenants defence
was liable to be struck off. Upon a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions, the Court
delineated the scope and stage-wise applicability of such deposits and held that the legislative
scheme consciously distinguishes between deposits made prior to the institution of the suit and
those made during its pendency.

13. The relevant observations are extracted below:

"15. What has to be noticed in Order XV Rule 5 CPC is that the Legislature while
defining "monthly amount due" which has to be deposited during the continuation of the suit has
deliberately excluded the deduction of any amount deposited under Section 30 of the Act. We are,
therefore, faced with a situation where the same Rule defines "entire amount admitted by him to be
due" and "monthly income due" occurring in the first part and second part respectively of the Rules
and while the former phrase stipulates the deduction of the amount deposited under Section 30 of
the Act, the second part omits to mention such a deduction. It has, therefore, to be inferred that the
Legislature has, in its wisdom, deliberately made a provision for deduction of the deposit of the
amount under Section 30 of the Act only in respect of the amount to be deposited at or before the
first date of hearing and not in respect of the monthly amount to be deposited throughout the
continuation of the suit. This, coupled with the fact that both Explanation 2 and Explanation 3,
referred to above provide "after making no other deduction except...." clearly leads us to no other
conclusion except that only such deductions are to be made which have been specifically provided.
The "monthly amount due" has to be construed in the manner provided for in Explanation 3 to Rule
5 (1) of Order XV CPC and in no other manner.

.....

25. It, therefore, follows that the amount due to be deposited by the tenant throughout the
continuation of the suit has to be deposited in the Court where the suit is filed otherwise the Court
may strike off the defence of the tenant since the deposits made by the tenant under Section 30 (1)
of the Act after the first hearing of the suit cannot be taken into consideration."

14. The Court thus made it explicit that the statutory benefit of adjustment of deposits under
Section 30 is confined only to the stage of initial compliance, and does not extend to deposits
3 All. Smt. Ram Dulari & Anr. Vs. Harshit Yadav & Anr.
707
required during the subsistence of the suit. Emphasizing the mandatory nature of continued
deposits before the court seized of the matter, it was further held :

"37. We, therefore, upon an analysis of the provisions of Rule 5 (1) of Order XV CPC,
hold that while depositing the amount at or before the first hearing of the suit, the tenant can deduct
the amount deposited under Section 30 of the Act but the deposits of the monthly amount thereafter
throughout the continuation of the suit must be made in the Court where the suit is filed for eviction
and recovery of rent or compensation for use and occupation and the amount, if any, deposited
under Section 30 of the Act cannot be deducted."

15. The structure and intent Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 indicates that it is a
protective and enabling provision intended to safeguard a tenant from the consequences of default
in payment of rent in situations where such payment is rendered impossible due to the conduct of
the landlord or due to a bona fide dispute. The provision permits deposit of rent before the
designated Court only in two contingencies-first, where the landlord refuses to accept rent when
tendered, and second, where there exists a genuine doubt or dispute as to the person entitled to
receive such rent. The legislative intent is to ensure that a willing tenant is not penalized merely
because of refusal or uncertainty, and that the obligation to pay rent may be duly discharged
through a legally recognized substitute mechanism.

16. The statutory scheme thus clearly indicates that Section 30 is a pre-litigation protective
mechanism, enabling a tenant to safeguard himself against consequences of default in situations of
refusal or uncertainty. However, once an eviction suit for arrears of rent is instituted and the dispute
enters the domain of judicial adjudication, the legal regime governing deposit of rent undergoes a
shift. The tenant thereafter becomes subject to the discipline of the court seized of the matter, and
the obligation to deposit rent is regulated by the procedural framework applicable to such
proceedings, particularly Order XV Rule 5 CPC.

17. In this context, the deeming fiction under sub-section (6) cannot be extended beyond its
intended field so as to validate deposits made dehors the pending suit, nor can Section 30 be
invoked in a manner that would dilute or defeat the statutory requirement of deposits during the
pendency of eviction proceedings.

18. Consequently, any deposit made by the tenant under Section 30 during the pendency of
such proceedings cannot be treated as valid tender or payment of rent in the eyes of law. Such
deposits neither satisfy the statutory requirement governing deposits during litigation nor enure to
the benefit of the tenant for the purposes of claiming protection against eviction. Permitting such
deposits would defeat the procedural discipline envisaged under the Act and allow the tenant to
circumvent the jurisdiction of the court where the lis is pending.

19. A harmonious construction of Section 30 with the procedural law leads to the inescapable
conclusion that recourse to Section 30 is not permissible once an S.C.C. suit for eviction and
recovery of rent is pending between the parties, and any such deposit would neither constitute valid
compliance of the tenants obligation nor enure to his benefit in resisting eviction on the ground of
default.
708 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

20. It is recognized that once eviction proceedings are instituted, all deposits of rent must be
made before the court seized of the matter, and not before the authority contemplated under Section
30. Any deposit made otherwise, during the continuation of the suit, is of no legal consequence and
cannot be taken into account while determining default or extending the benefit of statutory
protection to the tenant.

21. Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is to be understood as a protective provision
intended to safeguard a tenant at a stage prior to the institution of litigation, in circumstances where
the landlord refuses to accept rent or where there exists a bona fide doubt as to the person entitled
to receive the same. The remedy is thus confined to a pre-litigation field and is designed to ensure
that a tenant, willing to pay rent, is not exposed to the consequences of default due to reasons
beyond his control.

22. The submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners do not merit acceptance. Section 30
of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, though providing a mechanism for deposit of rent in cases of
refusal by the landlord, operates within a narrowly defined field and cannot be invoked once the
dispute has become subject matter of adjudication before a competent court. With the institution of
an S.C.C. suit for eviction and arrears of rent, the relationship between the parties becomes sub
judice, and the tenant is thereafter required to comply with the statutory regime governing such
proceedings.

23. The further contention that Order XV Rule 5 CPC is inapplicable is equally untenable. The
said provision specifically regulates the obligation of the tenant to deposit admitted rent and
continue to deposit the monthly amount during the pendency of the suit before the court seized of
the matter. Acceptance of the petitioners contention would render the said provision otiose and
defeat the legislative intent underlying it. The courts below have, therefore, rightly held that once
the suit is pending, deposit of rent must be made in that very proceeding and not under Section 30
before another forum.

24. The rejection of the petitioners' application under Section 30 is in consonance with the
settled legal position governing the field. Once the dispute between the landlord and tenant has
crystallized into a lis before a competent court by institution of an eviction suit for arrears of rent,
the permissibility of deposit can no longer be determined in isolation under Section 30. The
pendency of such proceedings brings the matter within the exclusive domain of the trial court, and
any deposit of rent must necessarily conform to the procedural discipline governing such
proceedings.

25. It is, therefore, evident that the courts below have rightly appreciated the pendency of the
S.C.C. suit and have correctly applied the law in holding that the proceedings under Section 30
were not maintainable in the facts of the present case.

26. No jurisdictional error, manifest illegality or perversity has been demonstrated in the
impugned orders so as to warrant interference in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India.
3 All. Smt. Doli Vs. Smt. Shakuntla Devi
709

27. The petition is devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2026) 3 ILRA 709
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

First Appeal From Order No. 2057 of 2025

Smt. Doli ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Shakuntla Devi ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Whether the court below was not correct to refuse the permission for selling the land recorded in the name of
minor having 1/4th share in the joint family property and refusal could not be made in view of Section 12 of
The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

Head Notes
The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890- Section 8, 10 & 29; The Hindu Minority and Guardianship
Act, 1956- Section 12- Minor being a Hindu and having an interest in undivided joint family
property is protected by management of an adult member of the family. In the instant case, it is
the mother who is managing the joint family property, thus, the case of the appellant would not
fall within the parameters of Section 29 of the Act of 1890 or Section 8(2) of the Act of 1956,
rather the description of the property mentioned in Schedule of the application moved by
appellant clearly reveals that case falls under Section 12 of the Act of 1956 for consideration-
The appellant had moved the application seeking permission to sell the 1/4th share of undivided
joint family property for higher education of the minor girl Vanshika who at present has
appeared in Class XII examination and wants to pursue her career further for which substantial
amount of money is needed and appellant being the natural guardian under Section 6 of the Act
of 1956 can act as a manager being the adult member of joint family property and sell the share
of the minor girl for her welfare.

Held- The judgment and order dated 17.07.2025 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Muzaffar
Nagar in G.C. Petition No. 249 of 2024 is unsustainable in the eyes of law and the same stands set aside-
Appeal stands allowed and the prayer made is granted. (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Dhanasekaran vs. Manoranjithammal and others, AIR 1992 Madras 214; First Appeal No. 2760 of 2024, Pooja
vs. The State of Maharashtra, decided 24.02.2025; First Appeal From Order No. 272 of 2024, Smt. Preeti
Arora vs. Subhash Chandra Arora and another, decided on 05.03.2024

List of Acts
The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890; The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

List of Keywords