# Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors v. Arshad Hussain & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 836
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-04
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-rashida-begum-ors-v-arshad-hussain-ors-49746
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article
- 227,
- The Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Section - 47 - Order
XXI - Rule 15, 16 - Suit for Specific
performance - appeal - second appeal -
Execution of decree - - during appellate stage a
substitution application to substitute the legal
2 All. Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors. Vs. Arshad Hussain & Ors.
837
heirs of first and second party, allowed - at the
stage of admission of execution proceeding -
objection u/s 47 CPC - rejected - revision -
dismissed - draft deed - assignment of their
rights - there is a procedure prescribed for
assignment of decree - assignee cannot get
the decree executed in his favour unless and
until following the provisions contained under
Order XXI Rules 16 of CPC in the light of
Supreme court Judgment rendered in case of
Dhani Ram Gupta's - Enlargement of an
existing right in an un-partitioned property of
a family member at the end of a co-sharer is
not a conveyance and so does not required
registration - court finds that, a deed of
assignment
is
something
different
from
relinquishment deed - Former is in the
category of transfer to a third party that
should precede by a notice to the judgment
debtor but later is not such as a case in the
light of the law discussed - therefore the
judgement in the case of Dhani Ram
Gupta's would not apply to the facts of the
case in hand - hence, petition lacks merit and
is dismissed.(Para - 6, 13, 14, 15)

Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

## Text

836 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
revision was referred to full Bench and the
full Bench of this Court in the case of
Munna Singh @ Shivji Singh and others Vs.
State of U.P. 2011 (9) ADJ 1998 held that

"An order of attachment under Section
146(1) Cr.P.C. is an order of movement
which has effect on the right of party in
possession-cannot therefore, be said to be
mere interlocutory order so as to bar
revisional jurisdiction of High Court.

Invoking of the emergency powers
under Section 146(1) Cr.P.C. is dependent
on satisfaction of Magistrate-When none of
parties are in possession, or Magistrate is
unable to decide as to which of the parties
was in possession, exercise of emergency
power can be resorted to.

Where rights of parties affected, that is
not an interlocutory order of attachment
and depends upon facts of each particular
case.

Order under Sections 145(1) & 146(1)
Cr.P.C. are not in every circumstance,
orders simplicitor- therefore a revision
would be maintainable depending on facts
involved in each case."

In view of the law laid down by the full
Bench of this Court, the contention of
learned A.G.A that impugned order is an
interlocutory order and revision against the
same is not maintainable may not be
accepted and the revision may not be
dismissed as not maintainable. In view of
above case law by Full Bench, the
judgment passed in the case of Yaqub Ali
(supra) by a single judge of Rajasthan High
Court has no force.

10. Considering the submissions of
learned counsel for the parties and on
perusal of materials available on record
including impugned judgement and order
of learned Magistrate, this Court is of the
opinion that learned Sessions Judge had
committed no illegality or infirmity while
passing
the
impugned
order
dated
30.8.2022 and judgement of learned
Magistrate dated 20.7.2022 against which
revision
was
preferred
by
present
respondent no. 3, cannot be termed as an
interlocutory order in the light of the
judgement of this Court cited as above.

11. The petition is devoid of merits
and is liable to be dismissed.

12. The writ petition is dismissed
accordingly.

13. The Revisional court is directed to
decide the revision petition expeditiously in
accordance with law after giving due
opportunity of hearing to the parties.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 836
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Matter Under Article 227 No. 11711 of
2022(Civil)

Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Arshad Hussain & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Akhilesh Chandra Shukla, Sri Jitendra Pratap
Shahi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Namit Srivastava, Sri Kshitij Shailendra

Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article
- 227,
- The Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - Section - 47 - Order
XXI - Rule 15, 16 - Suit for Specific
performance - appeal - second appeal -
Execution of decree - - during appellate stage a
substitution application to substitute the legal
2 All. Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors. Vs. Arshad Hussain & Ors.
837
heirs of first and second party, allowed - at the
stage of admission of execution proceeding -
objection u/s 47 CPC - rejected - revision -
dismissed - draft deed - assignment of their
rights - there is a procedure prescribed for
assignment of decree - assignee cannot get
the decree executed in his favour unless and
until following the provisions contained under
Order XXI Rules 16 of CPC in the light of
Supreme court Judgment rendered in case of
Dhani Ram Gupta's - Enlargement of an
existing right in an un-partitioned property of
a family member at the end of a co-sharer is
not a conveyance and so does not required
registration - court finds that, a deed of
assignment
is
something
different
from
relinquishment deed - Former is in the
category of transfer to a third party that
should precede by a notice to the judgment
debtor but later is not such as a case in the
light of the law discussed - therefore the
judgement in the case of Dhani Ram
Gupta's would not apply to the facts of the
case in hand - hence, petition lacks merit and
is dismissed.(Para - 6, 13, 14, 15)

Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. Dhani Ram Gupta & ors. Vs Lala Sri Ram &
anr. (AIR 1980 SC 157),

2. St. of U.P. Vs Dharam Pal & anr. (2008 10 ADJ
604),

3. Raghvendra Jeet Singh Vs Board of Revenue,
Allahabad & ors. ( 2015 4 ADJ 53),

4. Smt. Balwant Kaur & ors. Vs St. (AIR 1984
INOC) 107 (ALL),

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Akhilesh Chandra
Shukla, learned counsel for the petitioners,
Sri Kshitij Shailendra, learned counsel
appearing for contesting respondent no. 1,
Sri Namit Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for contesting respondent no. 8
and perused the record.

2. The petitioners before this Court
are judgment debtors of judgment and
decree dated 25th of March, 1994 passed in
a suit being O.S. No. 993 of 1985 for
specific performance of contract.

3. The suit was unsuccessfully
appealed against by the present petitioners
before the First Appellate Court and then
before the Second Appellate Court. It
transpires
from
the
record
that
the
appellants moved a substitution application
to substitute the legal heirs of Shamima
Begam,
who
died
issue-less
and
accordingly, the heirs of husband's brother
were brought on record.

4. A counter affidavit was filed on
behalf of the heirs of late Shamima Begum
sworn by Fakhruddin in second appeal
wherein it was stated that Shamima Begum
and Aliya Begum have died. This counter
affidavit was accompanied by a document
of family settlement wherein it was stated
that Saleha Begum died during the
pendency
of
appeal
and
her
legal
representatives were substituted and in
order to avoid dispute amongst the
members of the family an oral settlement
was
reached
between
the
parties
whereunder the heirs of first and second
party, i.e., Shamima Begum and Aliya
Begum, relinquished their claim for 3rd and
4th parties in their favour having obtained
money from them and now they are not
interested in pursuing the matter. When the
execution came to be filed after dismissal
of the second appeal, an objection was filed
under Section 47 of CPC by the judgment
debtor which was rejected on 15th of
January,
2018.
The
same
was
unsuccessfully
challenged
in
revision
before 7th Additional District Judge,
Allahabad and revision petition came to be
dismissed vide judgment and order dated
838 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
25th February, 2019. It is stated at bar that
the said order has been challenged before
this Court in a petition under Article 227
bearing No. 3543 of 2019 in which this
Court did not pass any interim order and
merely parties were directed to exchange
their pleadings. Learned counsel for the
petitioners does not dispute that the matter
is pending simply at the stage of admission.

5. It appears that after the draft deed
was submitted before the executing court
that an objection came to be filed by the
present petitioner taking a ground that the
heirs of Saleha Begum could not have
presented a draft of sale deed in respect of
the entire property which was subject
matter of decree and to which Shamima
Begum and Aliya Begum were equally
entitled to but heirs of Shamima Begum
having not come forward, the decree
holder, namely, the heirs of Saleha Begum
were entitled for execution of sale deed to
the extent of share of Saleha Begum only. It
is argued that no assignment of their rights
as such could have been made by the heirs
of Shamima Begum and Aliya Begum.
However, their objections came to be
dismissed by the executing court vide order
dated 29.7.2022 against which the revision
has been dismissed vide order dated
10.06.2022 and even the review petition
came to be dismissed on 10.12.2022and
now the petitioners are before this Court
challenging all the above three orders in
this petition, filed under Article 227 of the
constitution.

6. The arguments advanced by
learned counsel for the petitioners is that
there is
a procedure prescribed for
assignment of decree and unless and until
there is proper assignment of decree,
assignee cannot get the decree executed in
his favour. He submits that mere filing of
an affidavit before the Court of appeal
would not construe a valid assignment
within the meaning of provisions contained
under Order XXI Rule 16 of CPC. He
submits that the assignment has to be in
writing and is also required to be registered
one as it deals with transfer of rights by
way of assignment of a movable property
and, therefore, such assignment stands
governed by the provisions of the Transfer
of Property Act, 1982. In support of his
argument, learned counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon a judgment of Supreme
Court in the case of Dhani Ram Gupta and
others vs. Lala Sri Ram and another; AIR
1980 SC 157. He has placed reliance upon
para-4 of the said judgment which runs as
under:-

"We are unable to read Order XXI
Rule 16 as furnishing any foundation for
the basic assumption of the learned counsel
for the respondent that property in a decree
does not pass to the transferee under the
assignment until the transfer is recognised
by the Court. Property in a decree must
pass to the transferee under a deed of
assignment when the parties to the deed of
assignment intend such property to pass. It
does not depend on the Court's recognition
of the transfer. Order XXI Rule 16 neither
expressly nor by implication provided that
assignment of a decree does not take effect
until recognised by the Court. It is true that
while Order XXI Rule 16 enables a
transferee to apply for execution of the
decree, the first proviso to Order XXI Rule
16 enjoins that notice of such application
shall be given to the transferor and the
judgment-debtor and that the decree shall
not be executed until the Court has heard
their objections, if any, to its execution. It is
one thing to say that the decree may not be
executed by the transferor until the
objections of the transferor and the
2 All. Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors. Vs. Arshad Hussain & Ors.
839
judgment-debtor are heard, it is an
altogether different thing to say that the
assignment is of no consequence until the
objections are heard and decided. The
transfer as between the original decreeholder and the transferee is effected by the
deed of assignment. If the judgment debtor
has notice of the transfer, he cannot be
permitted to defeat the rights of the
transferee by entering into an adjustment
with the transferor. If the judgment debtor
has no notice of the transfer and enters into
an adjustment with the transferor before the
transferee serves him with notice under
Order XXI Rule 16, the judgment-debtor is
protected. This in our view is no more than
plain good sense. In Dwar Buksh Sirkar v.
Fatik Jali, the decree holder represented to
the Court that the judgment debtor had
satisfied the decree by payment and wanted
his execution application to be disposed of
accordingly. Before satisfaction could be
recorded a transferee of the decree from the
original decree-holder intervened and
claimed that satisfaction could not be
recorded as there was a valid transfer of
the decree in his favour prior to the alleged
payment by the judgment debtor to the
original decree holder. The argument
before the High Court was that the
assignee could not prevent the recording of
the satisfaction of the decree as he had not
filed an execution application and got the
assignment in his favour recognised. The
High Court of Calcutta observed:

"The only provision in the Code
referring expressly to the assignment of a
decree is contained in section 232, and that
no doubt contemplates a case in which the
assignee applies for execution. In such a
case the Court may, if it thinks fit, after
notice to the decree-holder and the
judgment-debtor, allow the decree to be
executed by the assignee. If, how ever, there
is an assignment pending proceedings in
execution taken by the decree-holder, I see
nothing in the Code which debars the Code
from recognising the transferee as the
person to go on with the execution. The
recognition of the Court is no doubt
necessary before he can execute the decree,
but it is the written assignment and not the
recognition which makes him the transferee
in law. The omission of the transferee, if it
was an omission, to make a formal
application for execution, was merely an
error of procedure and does not affect the
merits of the.............................................It
is argued for the respondent that the
transferee's title was not complete as
express notice of the transfer had not been
given to the judgment-debtor. As already
observed,
the
transfer,
as
between
transferor and the transferee, is effected
by
the
written
assignment.
If
the
judgment-debtor had no notice of the
transfer and being otherwise unaware of it
paid the money to the decree-holder, the
payment was, of course, a good payment,
and he cannot again be held liable to the
transferee".

We express our agreement with the
observations made by the Calcutta High
Court. (emphasis added)"

7. Thus, it is argued by learned
counsel for the petitioners that both the
courts below have manifestly erred in law
in rejecting the objection of the petitioner
with regard to draft deed submitted for
execution of sale deed. He submits that the
rights, if were not properly assigned in
respect of the suit property which was
subject
matter
of
suit
for
specific
performance of sale, would automatically
get reverted back to the defendants of the
suit/judgment debtor and the decree holder,
namely, the heirs of Saleha Begum or even
Aliya Begum, if she is alive, would not be
benefited by way of execution of the sale
840 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
deed of the entire land which includes the
share of Shamima Begum. Thus, according
to learned counsel for the petitioners, it has
become imperative for this Court to arrest
the miscarriage of justice by invoking its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution.

8. Per contra, Sri Khistij Shailendra
and Sri Namit Srivastava, learned counsel
appearing for the contesting respondents
caveator has argued that the draft deed that
was presented before the executing court
by the heirs of late Saleha Begum and
Aliya Begum herself and so the argument
that Aliya Begum had not come forward
would have no merit. A photocopy of the
draft deed has been produced before the
Court which is taken on record. It is further
argued that provisions of Order XXI Rule
16 would not be attracted in the present
case for the simple reason that this is an
assignment of decree by the decree holder
to a third party so as to attract the
provisions. It is argued that the heirs of late
Shamima Begum were very much party in
the second appeal and they have expressed
their relinquishment by filing an affidavit
along with counter affidavit which was
never objected to and the second appeal
was dismissed affirming the judgment and
decree of the trial court. It is submitted that
the relinquishment of rights by the decree
holder in favour of joint decree holder
would be taken to be within the meaning of
relinquishment deed which is not require to
be registered either under the Indian
Registration Act as it is not a case of
transfer of immovable property which is
required otherwise to be a deed of registry
instituted by sale under the Transfer of
Property Act. In this regard, he has placed
reliance upon a judgment of this Court in
the case of State of U.P. vs. Dharam Pal
and
another;
2008
10
ADJ
604,
Raghvendra Jeet Singh vs. Board of
Revenue, Allahabad and other; 215 4 ADJ
53 and Smt. Balwant Kaur and others vs.
State; 1984 ALL. L. J. 305.

9. Having heard the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the
respective parties across the bar, the
undisputed fact that emerges out is that
draft deed for execution of registered sale
deed has been presented by the heirs of
Late Saleha Begum and Alia Begum. There
is also no dispute that to the agreement for
sale Smt. Saleha Begum, Shamima Begum
and Alia Begum were beneficiaries and
their suit being O.S. No.495 of 1981 was
decreed against Mohammad Ahmad vide
judgment dated 25.3.1994 and judgment
debtor lost his Second Appeal also. In the
second appeal, appellant himself moved a
substitution application seeking substitution
of Late Shamima Begum. The heirs of Late
Shamima Begum filed counter affidavit
annexing therein a notary affidavit in which
it was stated that Shamima Begum and Alia
Begum got their money earlier paid to
Mohammad Ahmad back from third and
fourth party i.e. heirs of Saleha Begum and
fifth and sixth party also relinquished their
claim in favour of 3rd and 4th party. The
third and fourth party to the family
settlement reached, were heirs of Saleha
Begum. Neither this settlement deed of
relinquishment of rights was questioned in
appeal nor, any amendment was sought to
raise any ground that any such settlement
was illegal. The appeal was dismissed on
merits and all the rights got crystalised into
a decree. It is this decree which has been
put to execution. Objection filed under
Section 47 C.P.C. was also dismissed and
possibly this was not raised any issue. And
now the draft is being questioned on the
ground that relinquishment deed amounted
to transfer of intent in an immovable
2 All. Smt. Rashida Begum & Ors. Vs. Arshad Hussain & Ors.
841
property and so required to be registered
and then on owner can not get the decree
executed as per Order XXI Rule 15 CPC.

10. The second issue does not arise as
it is not a case of assignment of decree to a
third party. It is a case of relinquishment of
right to execution in form of other decree
holder and so third party assignment of
decree does not arise.

11. In so far as registration of of
relinquishment deed is concerned, I find
merit in the submission advanced by Sri
Kshitij Shailendra, learned counsel for the
respondents.

12. A Full Bench of this Court in the
case of Smt. Balwant Kaur and others vs.
State; AIR 1984 (NOC) 107 (ALL) held
that within the family, if settlement results
in relinquishment of right by one co-owner
in favour of the other, with whom title also
vests, such relinquishment would be release
and not a conveyance as such. Vide
Paragraphs- 12 and 13 the Court held thus:-

" 12. We are unable to accept the
submission that under the law it is not open
to a co-owner to renounce his rights in
favour of another co-owner. In the case of
Board of Revenue v. V. M. Murugesa
Mudaliar, AIR 1955 Mad 641 (FB), the
executants of a deed were three persons
who along with two persons in whose
favour the deed was executed were partners
of a registered firm. The executants had
ceased to be partners of the firm from and
after 12-4-1949. The preamble of the deed
recited
that
the
releasors,
that
is,
executants
were
co-owners
of
the
immovable property described in the
Schedule to the document as house and
ground bearing Door No. 47 in Coral
Merchant Street, G. T., Madras, entitled to
3/5 share therein. They desired to renounce
all interest in the said property by deed
receiving the proportionate value of the
share in cash. The operative portion of the
deed ran thus:

"This
deed
witnesseth
that,
in
consideration of the sum of Rs. 9,858-9-7
(Rs. nine thousand eight hundred and fiftyeight, annas nine and pies seven) receipt
whereof on or before the date of these
presents through adjustment of accounts
the releasors hereby release, extinguish,
abandon, cancel and otherwise relinquish
all their respective rights, claims, demands
or interest, in any manner or to any extent,
in respect of the property set out and fufly
described in the Schedule hereunder."

Clearly in this case releasors owned
the concerned properties in which they
were seeking to release their interests as
co-owners and not as joint-owners. It was
conceded before the Madras High Court
that had the executants been joint-owners
as distinguished from co-owners, the
document of the nature executed in that
case could have been considered to be a
deed of release. It was argued that the
document having been executed by a cotenant (co-owner) the objective thereof
could only be achieved by conveying
executants' title and as such that document
could not be considered to be a deed of
release. Rajamannar, C. J., speaking for
Full Bench of the Court observed that in
that case it was not the case of any one that
there was a division of the property by
metes and bounds and in accordance with
the said shares. In such circumstances the
document in and by which the co-owner
purported to abandon or relinquish his
claim to the share to which he would be
entitled would be in the nature of release.
According to this decision it is open to a
co-owner of a property which does not
stand partitioned by metes and bounds, to
842 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relinquish or renounce his claim to the
property and if he does so then as a matter
of law the interest of the remaining coowners gets augmented. Law countenances
that the object that some of the co-owners
of an unpartitioned property should be
enabled to enjoy the property without any
let or hindrance or claim made by other coowners can be achieved by such other coowners executing a release deed and that if
such co-owners set out to achieve that
object by executing a release deed, there is
no reason why such release deed should be
construed as a deed of conveyance merely
because such objective could also be
achieved
by
executing
a
deed
of
conveyance.

13. Following observations made by
the Supreme Court in the case of
Kuppuswami
Chettiar
v.
A.S.P.A.
Arumugam Chettiar, AIR 1967 SC 1395,
also go to support the conclusions arrived
at by Rajamannar, C. J., in the case of
Board of Revenue v. V.M. Murugese
Mudaliar (AIR 1955 Mad 641) (at p.
1397):--

"Now it cannot be disputed that a
release can be usefully employed as a form
of conveyance by a person having some
right of interest to another person having
limited estate, for example, by a remainderman to a tenant for life and the release then
operates as an enlargement of the limited
estate."

It is true that in the case of
Kuppuswami
Chettiar
v.
A.S.P.A.
Arumugam Chettiar (supra) the question
that came up for consideration before the
Supreme Court was whether a document
styled as a document of release was to be
treated as a document conveying title. The
Supreme Court eventually came to the
conclusion that the said document was a
deed of conveyance; but that was because
it found that, the said deed had been
executed in favour of person who had
absolutely no interest in the properties
released. In the instant case, however, it
cannot be said that the mother and
brother of the two executants who were
co-owners of the property had no interest
in the property.

(Emphases added)"

13. So the principle of law that
emerges is that a surrender of right in
favour of a co-owner in a joint property
would be a release whereas a surrender of
right in favour of a third party, having no
right in the property which is surrendered
then such surrender will be a conveyance.
Enlargement of an existing right in an
unpartitioned property of a family member
at the end of a co-sharer, therefore, is not a
conveyance and so does not require
registration as such. Summarizing the
principle vide Paragraph 16 and 17 the Full
Bench held thus:-

"16. It is thus clear that under the
law it is open to a person holding property
as a tenant-in-common to execute a
release deed in favour of the other coowner renouncing his claim to interest in
the unpartitioned property and for this
purpose it is not necessary for him to
execute
a
deed
of
conveyance.
Accordingly, where in fact such a deed is
executed whereby the person in whose
favour the property has been released is
given a right to enjoy the property without
any let or hindrance or claim to be made
by the persons so releasing the property,
there will be no justification in reading or
construing the said document as a deed of
conveyance.
17. So far as the instant case is concerned,
the recitals made by the two sisters in the
document dated 9th March, 1970, clearly
Amount to renunciation of their interest in
2 All. Bharat Singh Chauhan Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
843
the properties left by their deceased father.
They do not contain any stipulation whereunder they seek to convey their title to their
mother and brother. The two sisters were
fully competent to release 'heir undivided
interest in the property in favour of their
mother and brother. When their objective
could be achieved merely by executing a
release deed, there is no reason to think
that they in fact were executing a deed of
conveyance misdescribing it as a release
deed. Question No. 2, therefore, has to be
answered
by
saying
that
on
plain
interpretation, the document dated 9th
March, 1970 was a deed of release and not
a conveyance deed within the meaning of
the Indian Stamp Act.
(Emphasis added)"

14. This judgment was later on
followed by the Co-ordinate Benches of
this Court in State of U.P. vs. Dhanpal
and another; 2008 10 ADJ 604 and
Raghvendra Jeet Singh vs. Board of
Revenue Allahabad and others; 2015 4
ADJ 2015. A deed of assignment is
something different from relinquishment
deed. Former is in the category of transfer
to a third party that should precede by a
notice to the judgment debtor but later is
not such as a case in the light of the law
discussed
above
and,
therefore,
the
judgment in the case of Dhani Ram Gupta
and others vs. Lala Sri Ram and another
(supra) would not apply to the facts of the
case in hand.

15. In view of the above, I do not find
any fault in the orders passed by the Courts
below, impugned herein this petition.
Petition lacks merit and is accordingly,
dismissed, consigned to record.

16. There will be no order as to cost.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 843
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAM MANOHAR NARAYAN
MISHRA, J.

Matter Under Article 227 No. 12244 of
2022(Criminal)

Bharat Singh Chauhan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Saurabh Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Raj Kumar Kesari

Criminal Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article - 227, - Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 - Sections 138 & 139 - Dishonour
of cheque - Quashing of Summoning order as
well as order of revision court - Even 'stop of
payment' instructions issued to bank are held to
make a person liable for offence punishable
under S. 138 - Question whether any money is
paid by the accused to the complainant had
discharged its obligations is a matter of
evidence - Accused has ample opportunity to
Probabilise his defence - Impugned orders
cannot be quashed under the petition preferred
under Article 227 - hence, dismissed.(Para - 8,
9)

Petition Dismissed.(E-11)

List of Cases cited: -

1. M/s Indus Airways Pvt. Ltd. & ors. Vs M/s Magnum
Aviation Pvt. Ltd. & anr. (2014 12 SCC 539),

2. Pulsive Technologies Prvt. Ltd. Vs St. of Guj.
(2014 (13) SCC 18).

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ram Manohar
Narayan Mishra, J.)