# Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr v. Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr

- **Citation:** (2016) 8 ILRA 1155
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-08-05
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-rashmi-bhatiya-anr-v-smt-geeta-sharma-anr-44152
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Shri Anil Sharma, Shri Sanjay Agrawal

Held -
Background and Parties: The dispute concerns shop No. 341/1-2, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi. Smt. Geeta Sharma
(Respondent No. 1) is the owner and landlady. The original tenant, Naresh Bhatiya, ran a stationery shop;
upon his death, the tenancy passed to his widow (Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya) and two unmarried daughters (Km.
Ritu and Km. Richa).
The Release Application: The landlady filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.
13 of 1972 ("the Rent Act") to establish an Ayurvedic Clinic, either in the shop's existing form or after
reconstruction. The application was contested by the widow and Km. Ritu Bhatiya, while Km. Richa did not
contest.
Lower Court Decisions: The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application on April 10, 2013, and the
tenants' subsequent appeal was dismissed on February 16, 2014. The tenants filed this writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge both lower court orders.
Petitioners' Three Legal Grounds: The petitioners' counsel, Sri Rishikesh Tripathi, challenged the
judgments on three grounds: (1) the release application was unmaintainable because it was filed by a power
of attorney holder, (2) the courts below erred on the "bona fide need" factor, and (3) comparative hardship
favored the tenants.
Core Issue Identified: Both parties agreed that the primary legal question is whether a power of attorney
holder can validly file a release application. The other two issues (hardship and bona fide need) are mostly
factual and limited under Article 226/227 jurisdiction.
Petitioners' Argument on Maintenance: Sri Tripathi argued that under Section 3(j) of the Rent Act and
Rule 15, a release application must be signed and verified strictly by the owner-landlord themselves and none
else. The current application was signed/verified only by the power of attorney holder, Narendra Mukhraiya.
Nature of the Current Application: The High Court observed that the application was explicitly filed on
behalf of the owner, Smt. Geeta Sharma. The bona fide need set up belonged strictly to the owner-landlady,
not to the personal interest of the attorney holder.
Law on Power of Attorney: A power of attorney is an instrument of agency governed by the Contract Act
and the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882. It is a document of convenience that formally empowers a specified
person to represent and act in the name of the principal.
Supreme Court Precedent on Agency: In Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan, the Supreme Court held that acts
1156 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

done by a power of attorney holder are done on behalf of the principal. The agent gains no personal title, and
the legal effect is exactly as if the principal had executed the document themselves.
High Court Precedent on Writ Petitions: A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Syed Wasif Husain
Rizvi) recently affirmed that a person is legally entitled to mainta

## Text

8 All. Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr. Vs Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr.
1155
(2016) 8 ILRA 1155
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

Writ A No.- 1974 Of 2015

Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Shri Rishikesh Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Shri Anil Sharma, Shri Sanjay Agrawal

Held -
Background and Parties: The dispute concerns shop No. 341/1-2, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi. Smt. Geeta Sharma
(Respondent No. 1) is the owner and landlady. The original tenant, Naresh Bhatiya, ran a stationery shop;
upon his death, the tenancy passed to his widow (Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya) and two unmarried daughters (Km.
Ritu and Km. Richa).
The Release Application: The landlady filed a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.
13 of 1972 ("the Rent Act") to establish an Ayurvedic Clinic, either in the shop's existing form or after
reconstruction. The application was contested by the widow and Km. Ritu Bhatiya, while Km. Richa did not
contest.
Lower Court Decisions: The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application on April 10, 2013, and the
tenants' subsequent appeal was dismissed on February 16, 2014. The tenants filed this writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge both lower court orders.
Petitioners' Three Legal Grounds: The petitioners' counsel, Sri Rishikesh Tripathi, challenged the
judgments on three grounds: (1) the release application was unmaintainable because it was filed by a power
of attorney holder, (2) the courts below erred on the "bona fide need" factor, and (3) comparative hardship
favored the tenants.
Core Issue Identified: Both parties agreed that the primary legal question is whether a power of attorney
holder can validly file a release application. The other two issues (hardship and bona fide need) are mostly
factual and limited under Article 226/227 jurisdiction.
Petitioners' Argument on Maintenance: Sri Tripathi argued that under Section 3(j) of the Rent Act and
Rule 15, a release application must be signed and verified strictly by the owner-landlord themselves and none
else. The current application was signed/verified only by the power of attorney holder, Narendra Mukhraiya.
Nature of the Current Application: The High Court observed that the application was explicitly filed on
behalf of the owner, Smt. Geeta Sharma. The bona fide need set up belonged strictly to the owner-landlady,
not to the personal interest of the attorney holder.
Law on Power of Attorney: A power of attorney is an instrument of agency governed by the Contract Act
and the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882. It is a document of convenience that formally empowers a specified
person to represent and act in the name of the principal.
Supreme Court Precedent on Agency: In Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan, the Supreme Court held that acts
1156 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

done by a power of attorney holder are done on behalf of the principal. The agent gains no personal title, and
the legal effect is exactly as if the principal had executed the document themselves.
High Court Precedent on Writ Petitions: A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court (Syed Wasif Husain
Rizvi) recently affirmed that a person is legally entitled to maintain a writ petition through a power of attorney
holder.
Application to the Rent Act: Based on these precedents, because a power of attorney holder can file suits
and writ petitions in the name of a principal, they can also file a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of
the Rent Act, as there is no express statutory prohibition.
Distinction of Landlord Ownership: Under Section 21, the application must reflect the bona fide need of
the landlord or their family. In M.M. Quasim, the Supreme Court clarified that for eviction based on bona fide
need, the "landlord" must be the actual owner with a right to occupy, not just a mere rent collector.
The Scope of "Landlord" in Previous Judgments: The Court noted that past rulings (Smt. Sughra
Begum, Smt. Ved Rani Diwan, Fakaruddin Khan, and Mam Chand) rightly established that a simple rentcollecting agent cannot file a release application for their own personal use, as they cannot substitute the real
owner.
Current Case Distounded from Past Rulings: In this case, the actual owner applied for the release
through the attorney. The attorney did not claim his own personal need. Therefore, the application is fully
maintainable as an action by the principal.
Pleadings and Rule 15 Compliance: The petitioners' objection regarding Rule 15 (signing/verification) was
rejected. Rule 15 references the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) Order VI Rules 14 and 15. The proviso of Order
VI Rule 14 expressly allows an authorized person to sign pleadings if the principal party is unavailable.
Ratification by Owner: Furthermore, the owner-landlady filed her own separate affidavit in court, expressly
accepting that the application was filed on her behalf and explicitly reiterating and verifying its contents. Thus,
the verification is legally sound.
Bona Fide Need Upheld: On the factual question of bona fide need, both lower courts concurrently ruled in
favor of the landlady. The High Court stated that simply being wealthy does not disqualify a landlord from
having a genuine, bona fide need for their property.
Comparative Hardship Upheld: Comparative hardship does not favor the tenants. They made no serious or
active efforts to search for alternative accommodations or apply for a shop allotment. Their approach was
deemed too casual.
Status of the Tenant: Additionally, the record shows that Petitioner No. 1 is a schoolteacher. She cannot
legally or physically run the stationery shop herself, and the tenants did not claim that the daughters or
anyone else would run it on her behalf.
Cantonment Board Sanction Argument: The petitioners argued that since the shop is within cantonment
limits, reconstruction requires prior Cantonment Board approval, making the need a "mere desire." The Court
found this to be a misreading of the case.
Final Ruling: The landlady's primary intent is to use the shop in its existing state, with reconstruction being
only a remote possibility. Seeking prior building sanctions was unnecessary to prove immediate bona fide
need. The writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed.

Case Laws Cited:-

Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and others Vs. M. Chinniyan and another, AIR 2016 SCW 609

State of Rajasthan Vs. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77

Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi Vs. Hasan Raza Khan, 2016 (2) ADJ 571 (LB)(FB)

M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, AIR 1981 SC 1113
8 All. Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr. Vs Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr.
1157
Smt. Sughra Begum Vs. Sri Ram and others, 1982 (2) ARC 143

Smt. Ved Rani Diwan and another Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others,
1996 (2) ARC 14

Fakaruddin Khan Vs. Xth Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others, 1998 (1) ARC 449

Mam Chand and others Vs. Pramodini Srivastava and others, 2014 (5) ALJ 106

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.)

1. The dispute is about a shop No.341/1-2, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi.

2. Smt. Geeta Sharma the respondent No.1 is the owner and landlady of the said shop. It
was under the tenancy of Naresh Bhatiya who was running a stationary shop. On his death the
tenancy devolved upon his widow Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya and the two unmarried daughters.

3. The owner and landlady, respondent No.1 applied for release of the above shop under
Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rent Act") for her
bona fide need to establish an Ayurvedic Clinic in its existing form or, if necessary, after
demolition and its reconstruction. The release application was contested by Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya
by filing a written statement. Later the two daughters of the deceased-tenant were also impleaded
and one of them, petitioner No.2 Km. Ritu Bhatiya filed a separate written statement. The other
daughter Km. Richa Bhatiya, proforma respondent No.2 did not contest.

4. The release application was allowed vide judgment and order dated 10.4.2013 passed by
the Prescribed Authority and the appeal preferred on behalf of the tenants was dismissed on
16.2.2014. These two orders have been impugned through this writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

5. I have heard Sri Rishikesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Anil
Sharma along with Sri Sanjay Agarwal for the contesting respondent No.1. The respondent No.2 is
a formal party who had not participated in the proceedings in the courts below.

6. Sri Tripathi in assailing the impugned judgments has raised the following three points:-

(1) The release application was filed by the power of attorney holder of the
landlady and, as such, was not maintainable;
(2) The courts below have erred in holding the need set up in the release
application to be bona fide; and
(3) The comparative hardship is in favour of the petitioners.

7. Learned counsel for the parties accept that the principal issue for consideration is
whether a power of attorney holder of the owner-landlord can file the release application and that
1158 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

the other two points are more or less factual in nature and probably may not require to be dealt with
in view of the limited scope under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

8. Sri Tripathi in addressing the first point submitted that the release application can only
be filed by the landlord who is the owner of the property and that the power of attorney holder has
no right to file it. In order to elaborate his argument he relied upon the definition of the landlord
given under Section 3(j) of the Rent Act and certain decisions of the Court. He has also submitted
that Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Rent Act contemplates signing and verification of the
release application in the manner prescribed in C.P.C. and provides that where there are more than
one landlords it should be signed by all the co-landlords which mean that it has to be signed by the
landlord i.e. the owner and by none else.

9. The release application as filed by the respondent No.1 is Annexure - 1 to the petition.
The said release application has been filed in the name of the respondent No.1, Smt. Geeta Sharma
through special power of attorney holder Narendra Mukhraiya. The release application in the end
has been signed and verified by the aforesaid power of attorney holder. It does not bear the
signatures of the owner-landlady/respondent No.1.

10. A reading of the release application amply demonstrates that it is an application on
behalf of the owner and landlady of the shop through the power of attorney holder. The need set up
in the application is also of the owner and landlady and it is not for any personal right or interest of
the power of attorney holder.

11. A power of attorney is ordinarily a document of convenience empowering a person to
act for in the name of the principal. It is an instrument of agency covered by the Contract Act in
general.

12. There is a specific Act governing the powers of attorney i.e. the Powers of Attorney
Act, 1882. It defines the "powers of attorney" to include any instrument empowering a specified
person to act for in the name of the person executing it.

13. In common parlance a "power of attorney" means a formal instrument by which one
person empowers another to represent him or to act in his place for certain or all purposes.

14. Recently, the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the powers of attorneys in
the case of Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan and others Vs. M. Chinniyan and another AIR 2016
SCW 609. In the said case one V. Dhanapal was power of attorney holder of A. Radhakrishnan. He
executed a tenancy agreement on his behalf in favour of respondent No.1. The question arose as to
whether any tenancy had come into existence between V. Dhanapal and respondent No.1. The court
applying the well settled principles of law held that when Dhanapal, who was acting as an agent of
A. Radhakrishnan on the strength of power of attorney, executed the tenancy agreement with
respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises then he did such execution for and behalf of his
principal - A Radhakrishnan, which resulted in creating a relationship of landlord and tenant
8 All. Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr. Vs Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr.
1159
between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises. In this execution,
Dhanapal being an agent did not get any right, title and interest of any nature either in the suit
premises or in tenancy in himself. The effect of execution of tenancy agreement by an agent was as
if A. Radhakrishnan himself had executed it with respondent No.1.

15. The Supreme Court therein quoting from State of Rajasthan Vs. Basant Nahata (2005)
12 SCC 77 and considering the provisions of Power of Attorney Act, 1882 held that it is well
settled that an agent acting under a power of attorney always acts, as a general rule, in the name of
his principal. Any document executed or thing done by an agent on the strength of power of
attorney is as effective as if executed or done in the name of principal, i.e., by the principal himself.
An agent, therefore, always acts on behalf of the principal and exercises only those powers, which
are given to him in the power of attorney by the principal. Any act or thing done by the agent on the
strength of power of attorney is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have been done by the
agent in his personal capacity so as to create any right in his favour but is always construed as
having done by the principal himself. An agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit of any
nature.

16. More recently a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Syed Wasif Husain Rizvi
Vs. Hasan Raza Khan 2016 (2) ADJ 571 (LB)(FB) was ceased of a question whether a writ
petition can be filed through a power of attorney holder. The Court after considering entire law on
the subject came to the conclusion that a person is entitle to maintain a writ petition through a
power of attorney.

17. In view of the aforesaid decisions there is no legal bar for a power of attorney holder in
presenting a suit or filing a writ petition in the name of the principal. Accordingly, when a power of
attorney holder is authorised to file a writ petition in the name of the principal the inference is clear
that he can also file a release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Rent Act on behalf of the
principal owner-landlord as there is no specific prohibition.

18. Section 21 of the Rent Act envisages an application of the landlord for eviction of a
tenant if the premises is bona fide required by him for occupation by him or any member of his
family.

19. In view of the above, the application for release has to be an application by the landlord
for bona fide need of himself or any member of his family. In such circumstances, the need cannot
be of anyone else, much-less that of the agent or the power of attorney holder.

20. The decision in the case of M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others AIR
1981 SC 1113 is only to the effect that the word 'landlord' may include a person who is receiving or
is entitle to receive rent of a building but for the purposes of claiming possession on the ground of
bona fide need he must show that he is landlord in the sense that he is the owner of the building and
has a right to occupy it in his own right. A mere rent collector may not be sufficient for such an
application.
1160 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. The aforesaid decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in connection with the Bihar
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act which contains provisions analogous to the Rent
Act in U.P.

22. The definition of the 'landlord' in the rent enactments is of vide amplitude which not
only covers the owner of the property who has the right to occupy it but also the person receiving or
collecting rent on his behalf. But for the purposes of release of the property from the tenant the
word 'landlord' was interpreted in a narrower sense excluding the rent collector and confining it to
the owner of the property.

23. In Smt. Sughra Begum Vs. Sri Ram and others 1982 (2) ARC 143 His Lordship of this
Court (Later Chief Justice) relying upon M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others
(supra) held that an agent or attorney of the owner of the house may realise rent and may be
considered to be landlord within the meaning of Section 3(j) of the Rent Act but such a person
would not be entitle to move an application for release under Section 21 of the Rent Act.

24. The aforesaid decision was followed by another judge of this Court in the case of Smt.
Ved Rani Diwan and another Vs. VIIIth Additional District Judge, Ghaziabad and others 1996
(2) ARC 14 wherein it was laid down that a person taken as a landlord for the purposes of realising
rent under Section 3(j) of the Act if not entitle to occupy the building let out to a tenant in his own
right as landlord, cannot be recognized as a landlord for the purposes of filing application for
release under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act for his own use.

25. A similar view was expressed in Fakaruddin Khan Vs. Xth Additional District Judge,
Kanpur and others 1998 (1) ARC 449.

26. In Mam Chand and others Vs. Pramodini Srivastava and others 2014 (5) ALJ 106 it
has been held that an application under Section 21 of the Rent Act cannot be filed by mere agent or
attorney as he cannot substitute the real owner or the landlord for the purposes of adducing
evidence. The right to get a building demolished and reconstructed cannot be allowed to be
exercised at the instance of a person who has been authorised to collect rent. The authority of the
person empowered to collect the rent must be much more than mere collection of rent which
necessarily means that of an owner or the person entitle to occupy the property in his own right.

27. All the aforesaid decisions deal with the definition of landlord as contained in various
statutes including the Rent Act in question and it is held to be narrower for the purposes of applying
for release of the accommodation. Even in the narrower sense, as explained by the aforesaid
authorities, it is the owner who has been held to be entitle to apply for release of the building.

28. In the instant case, it is the owner who has applied for release under Section 21 of the
Rent Act through power of attorney. The application through power of attorney is as if it is by the
principal. The power of attorney has not set up his own need and has not filed the release
8 All. Smt. Rashmi Bhatiya & Anr. Vs Smt Geeta Sharma & Anr.
1161
application in his own name. Therefore, the submission that the release application is not
maintainable as it has been filed through the power of attorney holder has no force.

29. The power of attorney holder acts on behalf of the principal and not for any of his
personal rights. There is no express prohibition under the Rent Act debarring the owner-landlord
from applying for release through power of attorney holder.

30. The submission that the release application is not signed and verified by the owner and
landlady as contemplated by Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Rent Act is also without
substance.

31. Rule 15 of the Rules provides that the application for release must be signed and
verified in the manner prescribed under Rules 14 and 15 of Order VI of the First Schedule to the
Code of Civil Procedure.

32. Rule 14 of Order VI C.P.C. states that every pleading shall be signed by the party and
his pleader, if any. Under the proviso it lays down that if a party is not available it may be signed by
any person duly authorised by him to sign the same or to sue or defend on his behalf. It by
necessary implication means that ordinarily pleadings/release application are required to be signed
by the party concerned but in his absence a person duly authorised to sign on his behalf may also
sign it which definitely includes the power of attorney.

33. Thus, there is no bar for the power of attorney holder to sign and verify the pleadings as
contemplated by Rule 14 Order VI C.P.C. referred to in Rule 15 of the Rules framed under the Rent
Act.

34. The release application in the case at hand as stated earlier, has been filed in the name
of the owner-landlady through the power of attorney holder. It has been signed and verified by the
power of attorney holder on behalf of the owner-landlady. The owner-landlady by her own affidavit
(paper No.74A-2) has accepted that the release application has been filed on her behalf through the
power of attorney holder and that she reiterates and verifies the contents of the release application.

35. In view of the above, there is no illegality in signing and verifying the release
application by the power of attorney holder.

36. Now adverting to the bona fide need of the owner-landlady, the courts below have
concurrently held in her favour. The mere fact that the owner-landlady is a rich person is not
enough to deny the release of the shop to her when otherwise her need is found to be genuine and
bona fide. The finding in this regard is not shown to be perverse which may permit any interference
by this Court.

37. The comparative hardship as held by the courts below does not tilt in favour of the
petitioners for the simple reason that they have not made any serious effort to search out any
1162 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

alternative accommodation. They have not even applied for allotment of any shop which clearly
indicates their casual approach, if any, in searching out an alternative shop.

38. This apart, it has come on record that petitioner No.1 is a Teacher in a school. She,
therefore, cannot run the shop despite tenancy having devolved upon her. It is not their case that the
shop would be run by the daughter of the deceased-tenant or by someone onher behalf.

39. Sri Rishikesh Tripathi had argued that the need of the landlady-respondent No.1 is for
establishing an Ayurvedic Clinic in place of the shop. The shop is situate within the cantonment
limits where no new construction can be done without prior permission of the Cantonment Board as
envisaged under Section 234 of the Act. The landlady-respondent No.1 has not applied for sanction
of the map, her need is not imminent and is a mere desire.

40. The argument is based upon a complete misreading of the plaint case. The landladyrespondent No.1 in her release application has clearly stated that on the release of the shop in
dispute she would open an Ayurvedic Clinic/Spa therein for which she has no other place and the
shop in dispute is ideal for it. In paragraph 7 of the release application it has clearly been stated that
she requires the shop in its existing state and only, if necessary, she will undertake some changes or
its reconstruction. The reconstruction of a new building after demolition of the shop was only a
remote possibility. The permission for reconstruction would be necessary only after a final decision
is taken for the demolition of the existing shop and its reconstrution. The said situation has not
arisen. In these circumstances, seeking permission for reconstruction of the shop was not necessary
to establish bona fide need.

41. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, there is no merit in the petition and the
same is dismissed.
-----------
8 All. Shankar Shah @ Shankar Shahu Vs State Of U.P.
1163
(2016) 8 ILRA 1163
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.08.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Criminal Revision No.- 2297 Of 2016

Shankar Shah @ Shankar Shahu ...Revisionist
Versus
State Of U.P. ...Opposite party

Counsel for the Revisionist:
Shri Anish Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Opposite Party:
G.A.

Held -

Paragraph 1: This criminal revision challenge is filed against the trial court's judgment (dated 27.2.2012 by the
ACJM, Ghazipur) and the lower appellate court's judgment (dated 26.7.2016 by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Ghazipur) convicting the revisionist under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

Paragraph 2: The High Court heard arguments from the revisionist's counsel, the Additional Government
Advocate (AGA), and thoroughly examined the case records.

Paragraph 3: The revisionist was charged for selling adulterated namkeen (containing Khesari dal) and
violating packaging rules. The trial court found that the prosecution followed all legal procedures, proved the
adulteration and lack of proper packaging labels, gave the accused a fair defense opportunity, and sentenced
him to one year of simple imprisonment with a Rs. 2,000 fine.

Paragraph 4: The revisionist appealed the conviction, but the lower appellate court dismissed it, finding no
technical or factual errors. The appellate court confirmed that the accused was properly questioned under
Section 313 CrPC, chose not to test a second sample, and upheld the sentence despite noting the accused's
advanced age and health issues.

Paragraph 5: The High Court concluded that there are no factual, legal, or procedural errors in the concurrent
findings of the two lower courts, thereby officially confirming the revisionist's conviction.

Paragraph 6: The Court noted that awarding an appropriate and adequate sentence based on the nature,
motive, and planning of the crime is a judicial duty, which is why sentencing hearing provisions (Sections
235(2) and 248(2) CrPC) exist.

Paragraph 7: The Court observed that the lower courts failed to properly evaluate the mitigating factor of the
revisionist's old age. Rather than sending the case back and delaying it further, the High Court decided to
modify the sentence itself.