# Smt. S. Ravis v. The Judge Small Cause Courts & Others

- **Citation:** (2012) 3 ILRA 1631
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2012-11-23
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52749 of 1999
- **Bench:** Sudhir Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-s-ravis-v-the-judge-small-cause-courts-others-42387
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

C.S.C.
Sri Komal Mehrotra,
Sri M.A. Qadeer
Sri Rajesh Tandon
Sri Shamim Ahmad

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting rent and Eviction) Act 1972Section 20 (4) (a)-first date of hearingdate for filing W.S. fixed 10-08-1988entire amount deposited on 04.08.1988non compliance founded on ground of
rate of rent as Rs. 240-while finding
recorded about monthly rent Rs. 40/-
findings can not be said to be perversepetition dismissed.
Held: Para-17

In the present case when I apply the
aforesaid dictum, I find that deposit
made on 4.8.1988 satisfy requirement of
deposit made on the first date of hearing
of the suit. In fact in appears that
dispute
raised
by
petitioner
was
regarding rate of rent and his entire
claim of non compliance of Section 20(4)
was founded on the ground that monthly
rent was Rs.240/- per month while the
Courts below have determined monthly
rent at Rs.40/- per month and this is a
finding
of
fact
in
respect
whereto
nothing has been shown perverse or
contrary to record.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1982 SC 816; 1995 (1) ARC 563; 1993 (4)
SCC 406; (1999) 8 SCC 31; 2002 (3) SCC 49;
AIR 2002 SC 2520; 2001 (2) AWC 1468; 2004
(56) ALR 460; 2004 (57) ALR 233; 2005 (60)
ALR 697; 2006 (3) ARC 657; 2006 (2) ARC
208; Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19834 of
2003 (Sri Om Prakash Vs. Sri Anil Kumar)

## Text

3 All] Smt. S. Ravis V. The Judge Small Cause Courts & Others
1631
instead of getting the dispute adjudicated
by the court.

10. The petitioner can appear and show
cause before the Lok Adalat pursuant to the
above notice.

11. Accordingly, I am of the view that
no case for exercising any extra-ordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is made out.

12. The writ petition is devoid of merit
and is dismissed.
---------
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.11.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52749 of 1999

Smt.S.Ravis

 ...Petitioner
Versus
The Judge Small Cause Courts & Others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri A.D. Saunders

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Komal Mehrotra,
Sri M.A. Qadeer
Sri Rajesh Tandon
Sri Shamim Ahmad

U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting rent and Eviction) Act 1972Section 20 (4) (a)-first date of hearingdate for filing W.S. fixed 10-08-1988entire amount deposited on 04.08.1988non compliance founded on ground of
rate of rent as Rs. 240-while finding
recorded about monthly rent Rs. 40/-
findings can not be said to be perversepetition dismissed.
Held: Para-17

In the present case when I apply the
aforesaid dictum, I find that deposit
made on 4.8.1988 satisfy requirement of
deposit made on the first date of hearing
of the suit. In fact in appears that
dispute
raised
by
petitioner
was
regarding rate of rent and his entire
claim of non compliance of Section 20(4)
was founded on the ground that monthly
rent was Rs.240/- per month while the
Courts below have determined monthly
rent at Rs.40/- per month and this is a
finding
of
fact
in
respect
whereto
nothing has been shown perverse or
contrary to record.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1982 SC 816; 1995 (1) ARC 563; 1993 (4)
SCC 406; (1999) 8 SCC 31; 2002 (3) SCC 49;
AIR 2002 SC 2520; 2001 (2) AWC 1468; 2004
(56) ALR 460; 2004 (57) ALR 233; 2005 (60)
ALR 697; 2006 (3) ARC 657; 2006 (2) ARC
208; Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19834 of
2003 (Sri Om Prakash Vs. Sri Anil Kumar)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.)

1. Heard Sri A.D.Saunders, learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner
and
Sri
M.A.Qadeer, Senior Advocate, assisted by
Sri Shamim Ahmad, Advocate for the
respondents.

2. The suit filed by petitioner for
ejectment
of
respondent
no.3
from
accommodation in question has been
decreed partly to the extent of recovery of
arrears of rent by permitting landlord to
withdraw
the
amount
deposited
by
respondent-tenant under Section 20(4) of
Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation
of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972
(hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") but
the suit for the relief of ejectment has been
dismissed vide order dated 14.10.1996 and
the said order has been confirmed by
dismissing
petitioner's
revision
vide
judgment dated 23.9.1999.
1632 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that there was no deposit on first
date of hearing. The amount paid under
Section 30(1) of Act, 1972 after issuance
of notice could not be given due credit
under Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 and
therefore, impugned orders are liable to be
set aside.

4. The submissions, as advanced, if
considered vis a vis facts of the case, are
thoroughly misconceived.

5. Section 20(4) of Act, 1972 itself
provides that amount, which a tenant
would deposit at the first date of hearing of
the suit should be computed after
deducting therefrom any amount already
deposited by him under Section 30(1) of
Act,
1972.
Therefore,
the
amount
deposited by tenant under Section 30(1)
has to be given due credit for finding out
whether there is compliance of Section
20(4) or not. It is not the case of petitioner
that after deducting such amount, still
deposit made by tenant does not satisfy
requirement of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972.

6. The petitioner's counsel submitted
that deposit was not made on the first date
of hearing, inasmuch as, suit was filed on
31.5.1988 in which 3rd August, 1988 was
the date fixed for filing written statement
and 10th August, 1988 was the date fixed
for hearing. The deposit was made by
tenant on 4.8.1988 and therefore it cannot
be said that the said amount was deposited
on the first date of hearing.

7. The question as to what would be
the first date of hearing of the suit in the
light of the explanation in Section 20 has
been considered by this Court time and
again. The expression "first hearing" has
been
explained
in
Section
20(4)
Explanation (a) and reads as under:

"the expression "first hearing" means
the first date for any step or proceeding
mentioned in the summons served on the
defendant."

8. This expression has been
considered by Apex Court in Ved Prakash
Wadhwa Vs. Vishwa Mohan, AIR 1982
SC 816. It was held that the date of first
hearing would not be before a date fixed
for preliminary examination of parties and
framing of issues. Similar was the view
taken in an earlier judgment also in
Advaita Nand Vs. Judge, Small Causes
Court, Meerut & Ors., 1995(1) ARC
563.

9. A three-Judge Bench of Apex
Court also considered this issue in Siraj
Ahmad
Siddiqui
Vs.
Prem
Nath
Kapoor, 1993 (4) SCC 406 and said as
under

"The date of first hearing of a suit
under the Code is ordinarily understood to
be the date on which the court proposes to
apply its mind to the contentions in the
pleadings of the parties to the suit and in
the documents filed by them for the
purpose of framing the issues to be decided
in the suit. Does the definition of the
expression 'first hearing' for the purposes
of Section 20(4) mean something different?
The "step or proceedings mentioned in the
summons" referred to in the definition
should we think, be construed to be a step
or proceeding to be taken by the court for
it is, after all, a "hearing" that is the
subject matter of the definition, unless
there be something compelling in the said
Act to indicate otherwise; and we do not
find in the said Act any such compelling
3 All] Smt. S. Ravis V. The Judge Small Cause Courts & Others
1633
provision. Further, it is not possible to
construe the expression "first date for any
step or proceeding" to mean the step of
filing the written statement, though the
date for that purpose may be mentioned in
the summons, for the reason that, as set out
earlier, it is permissible under the Code for
the defendant to file a written statement
even thereafter but prior to the first
hearing when the court takes up the case,
since there is nothing in the said Act which
conflicts with the provisions of the Code in
this behalf. We are of the view, therefore,
that the date of first hearing as defined in
the said Act is the date on which the court
proposes to apply its mind to determine the
points in controversy between the parties
to the suit and to frame issues, if
necessary."

10. Again it was considered in
Sudershan Devi & Anr. Vs. Sushila Devi
& Anr., (1999) 8 SCC 31 and held that the
date fixed for hearing of the matter is the
date of first hearing and not the date fixed
for filing of written statement. The Court
observed that emphasis in the relevant
provision is on the word "hearing". The
Court also relied on its earlier decision in
Ved Prakash Wadhwa (supra).

11. The matter again came to be
considered in Mam Chand Pal Vs.
Shanti Agarwal (Smt.), 2002 (3) SCC
49. Therein the suit was filed on
5.12.1988 and summons were issued
fixing 19th January, 1989 for filing of
written statement and 27th January, 1989
for hearing. The defendant was not
served. The order was passed for service
of notice on the defendant by publication
fixing 3.7.1989 for hearing. By mistake in
the publication, the date of hearing was
shown as 26.4.1989 instead of 3.7.1989.
On 26.4.1989, Presiding Officer was not
available having proceeded for training.
The case was thereafter adjourned to
11.5.1989
and
further
gone
on
adjournment for one or the other reasons
on several dates. The Court held that in
the present case 26th April, 1989 would
not be regarded as "first date of hearing"
since on that date the Presiding Officer
was not available. In para 7 the court said,
"where the Court itself is not available it
could not be treated as the date of first
hearing". \

12. In Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs.
Rishi Ram and others, AIR 2002 SC
2520, the Court noticed distinction
between the phraseology in Order XV,
Rule 5 C.P.C. and Explanation (a) to subsection (4) of Section 20 of Act, 1972 and
in para 8, said:

"Rule 1 of Order V speaks of issue of
summons. When a suit has been duly
instituted a summons may be issued to the
defendant to appear and answer the claim
on a day specified therein. Rule 2 thereof
enjoins that the summons shall be
accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if
so permitted, by a concise statement. Rule
5 of Order V says that the Court shall
determine, at the time of issuing the
summons, whether it shall be for the
settlement of issues only, or for the final
disposal of the suit which shall be noted
in the summons. However, in every suit
heard by a Court of Small Causes, the
summons shall be for the final disposal of
the suit. It may be apt to notice here that
Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act
was
deleted
in
U.P.
Civil
Laws
Amendment Act, 1972 with effect from
September 20, 1972 and Rule 5 was
inserted in Order XV of the Civil
Procedure
Code
which
deals
with
disposal of the suit at the first hearing.
1634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2012
Explanation 1 to Rule 5 of Order XV
defines the expression "first hearing" to
mean the date for filing written statement
or for hearing mentioned in the summons
or where more than one of such dates are
mentioned,
the
last
of
the
dates
mentioned. But the said expression, as
noticed above, is defined in Clause (1) of
Explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section
20. Section 38 of the U.P. Act says that
the provisions of the said Act shall have
effect
notwithstanding
anything
inconsistent therewith contained in the
Transfer of Property Act or in Code of
Civil Procedure, therefore, the definition
contained in Clause (a) of Explanation to
Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act
will prevail over the definition contained
in Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code of Civil
Procedure as applicable to the State of
U.P. It is too evident to miss that in
contra-distinction to the "filing of written
statement" mentioned in the definition of
the said expression contained in Rule 5 of
Order XV, the language employed in
Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section
20(4) of the U.P. Act, refers to 'the first
date for any step or proceeding mentioned
in the summons served on the defendant'.
In our view those words mean the first
date when the court proposes to apply its
mind to identify the controversy in the suit
and that stage arises after the defendant
is afforded an opportunity to file his
written statement." (emphasis added)

13. In para 12 of the judgment in
Ashok Kumar (supra), considering the
above observation and also relying on its
earlier decisions in Sudershan Devi
(supra), Advaita Nand (supra) and
Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui (supra), the Court
said:

"Now adverting to the facts of the
case on hand it has been noticed above
that the suit was posted on May 20, 1980
for final disposal but that date cannot be
treated as the first hearing of the suit as
the Court granted time till July 25, 1980
to the tenant for filing written statement.
On July 25, 1980 time was extended for
filing written statement and the suit was
again adjourned for final disposal to
October 10, 1980. Inasmuch as after
giving due opportunity to file written
statement the suit was posted for final
disposal on October 10, 1980 it was that
date which ought to be considered as the
date fixed by the Court for application of
its mind to the facts of this case to identify
the controversy between the parties and
as such the date of first hearing of the
suit."

14. It also held that once the date of
"first
hearing"
is
determined
and
thereafter the case is adjourned, the date
of first hearing of the suit would not
change on every adjournment of the suit
for final hearing.

15. Thus the effective date of first
hearing of the suit should be, when the
Court proposed to apply its mind.
Therefore it would be the date fixed
earliest for final disposal/hearing and not
adjourned for reasons attributable to the
defendant-tenant.
There
are
certain
decisions of this Court also and I need not
to burden this judgment giving in detail
all such judgments except of making
reference to some of those hereto i.e
Mohd. Salim alias Salim Uddin Vs. 4th
Addl. District Judge, Allahabad & Ors.
2001(2) AWC 1468, Har Prasad Vs. Ist
A.D.J., Etah 2004 (56) ALR 460, Jai
Ram Dass Vs. Iind Addl. District
Judge, Jhansi & Ors. 2004(57) ALR
3 All] Dinesh Kumar V. State Of U.P. & Others
1635
233, Chaturbhuj Pandey Vs. VI A.D.J.,
Kanpur & Ors. 2005 (60) ALR 697,
Hira Lal & Ors. Vs. Ram Das 2006 (3)
ARC 657 and Saadat Ali Vs. J.S.C.C.,
Moradabad & ors. 2006 (2) ARC 208.

16.

Considering
the
above
authorities and exposition of law laid
down therein, this Court in Civil Misc.
Writ petition No.19834 of 2003 (Sri Om
Prakash Vs. Sri Anil Kumar) decided
on 30.10.2012 held as to what shall be the
first date of hearing and in para 19 of the
judgment it said as under:

"19. In the present case the written
statement
was
filed
on
25.7.1995
whereafter 24.8.1995 was fixed as the
date for first hearing but on that date
there was some holiday and the matter
was taken up on 25.8.1995 which, in my
view, should have been the first date of
hearing. All deposits made thereon or till
that date are liable to be given due credit
to find out whether there is compliance of
requirement of Section 20(4) of Act, 1972
or not."

17. In the present case when I apply
the aforesaid dictum, I find that deposit
made on 4.8.1988 satisfy requirement of
deposit made on the first date of hearing
of the suit. In fact in appears that dispute
raised by petitioner was regarding rate of
rent and his entire claim of non
compliance of Section 20(4) was founded
on the ground that monthly rent was
Rs.240/- per month while the Courts
below have determined monthly rent at
Rs.40/- per month and this is a finding of
fact in respect whereto nothing has been
shown perverse or contrary to record.

18. I, therefore, find no reason to
interfere with the impugned judgment.
The writ petition therefore lacks merit.
Dismissed.

19. Interim order, if any, stands
vacated.
----------
 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.11.2012

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 56688 of 2008

Dinesh Kumar

 ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.K. Singh
Sri G.K. Singh
Sri P.K.Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Sri Chandra Dutta
Sri Pradeep Kumar
Sri Pradeep Verma
Sri Shailendra Kumar Verma

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226Payment of salary-petitioner appointed
on post of peon-after following the
procedure prescribed under law-salary
not paid as Respondents No. 4 working
on
compassionate
ground-and
the
respondent No. 6 being adopted son
entitled to work on class 4th post-both
appointment
under
compassionate
ground challenged-as Respondent No. 4
on the retirement date was minorlikewise
Respondent
No.
5-under
Mohammedan Law there is no concept of
adoption even otherwise could not be
appointed on age of 65 years-even then
with collusion of Respondent No. 3 and 4
succeeded
to
get
salary-both
appointments
quashed-direction
to
release
salary
to
petitioner
being