# Smt. Saavan v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 4 ILRA 815
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-03-30
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 5791 of 2022
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-saavan-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48349
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 226, - U.P. Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Sale and
Distribution
Control)
Order,
2016
-
Clause
13,
13(1),
13(3)
-
On
complainant made by petitioner - Fair
Price Shop Agreement of respondent
agent - first cancelled - later on restored
by virtue of order passed in Appeal filed
by License holder (Agent)
- being
aggrieved Complainant (Petitioner) filed
present writ petition - no locus -
complainant has no right of Appeal -
writ petition dismissed. (Para - 33, 34, 35)

(B) Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 226, - U.P. Essential Commodities
(Regulation
of
Sale
and
Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 - Clause 13, 13(1),
13(3) - Word & Phrases - difference between
a 'Aggrieved person' or 'Person aggrieved'
- a person who is wrongly deprived of his
entitlement which he has legally entitled
or whose right have been prejudice by
such order - complainant is not that
person - he is a 'person annoyed' not an
'aggrieved person'. (Para - 34, 35)

(C) Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 226, - U.P. Essential Commodities
(Regulation
of
Sale
and
Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 - Clause 13, 13(1),
13(3) - A beneficiary - has only right to
receive essential commodities - he cannot
choose his fair price shop Agency.(Para -
35)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)
816 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of Cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,984 of 49,373. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39984 for what follows._

4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
815
therefrom. That finding is not perverse.
Undisputedly, he was more than 18 years
of age during the policy term. Therefore, he
was a person covered under the Insurance
Policy as a bread winner of his family
though he may not have been its ''Mukhiya'.
He was a bachelor, contributing to his
family's meagre income below Rs. 75,000/-
per annum.

56. To that extent his entire family
including his father Rajkumar would have
been partly dependent (on deemed basis),
on his frugal material contributions, as a
means of their daily survival, as a unit. To
that extent, his father Raj Kumar would
also have been partly-dependent on him.
Since Rahul Kumar died during his father's
lifetime and the claim therefrom arose first,
the
Permanent
Lok
Adalat
has
not
committed any error in allowing the same.
The challenge raised in the writ petition is
found lacking in merit. Sri Ojha has also
stated, similar claim made upon the death
of Rajkumar was rejected by the Permanent
Lok Adalat. It has attained finality.

57. It is however provided, in the
event, petitioner pays up the awarded
amount within a further period of one
month from today, the petitioner would not
be liable to pay any interest. If however
such payment is not made within the time
thus extended, the petitioner shall remain
exposed to interest liability provided under
the impugned award.

58. With the aforesaid observations,
present petition stands disposed of.
----------
(2022)04ILR A815
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.03.2022

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

Writ-C No. 5791 of 2022

Smt. Saavan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vishal Tandon

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Pankaj Kumar Gupta

(A) Civil Law - Constitution of India,
1950 - Article 226, - U.P. Essential
Commodities (Regulation of Sale and
Distribution
Control)
Order,
2016
-
Clause
13,
13(1),
13(3)
-
On
complainant made by petitioner - Fair
Price Shop Agreement of respondent
agent - first cancelled - later on restored
by virtue of order passed in Appeal filed
by License holder (Agent)
- being
aggrieved Complainant (Petitioner) filed
present writ petition - no locus -
complainant has no right of Appeal -
writ petition dismissed. (Para - 33, 34, 35)

(B) Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 226, - U.P. Essential Commodities
(Regulation
of
Sale
and
Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 - Clause 13, 13(1),
13(3) - Word & Phrases - difference between
a 'Aggrieved person' or 'Person aggrieved'
- a person who is wrongly deprived of his
entitlement which he has legally entitled
or whose right have been prejudice by
such order - complainant is not that
person - he is a 'person annoyed' not an
'aggrieved person'. (Para - 34, 35)

(C) Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950
- Article 226, - U.P. Essential Commodities
(Regulation
of
Sale
and
Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 - Clause 13, 13(1),
13(3) - A beneficiary - has only right to
receive essential commodities - he cannot
choose his fair price shop Agency.(Para -
35)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)
816 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of Cases cited: -

1. Smt. Farzana Vs St. of UP & ors.(2018 (7)
ADJ 767),

2. Ram Surat Mishra Vs St. of UP (2016 (6) ADJ
503 (FB) (LB)),

3. Commissioner of Trade Tax UP Vs Associated
Distributors Ltd. (2008 Vol. 7 SCC 709),

4. Akhlaq Vs St. of UP & ors.(Writ - C No.
43188/2017 decided on 05.02.2019),

5. Smt. Muneeta Vs St. of UP & ors.(Writ - C
No. 21915/2019 decided on 06.02.2020),

6. Ashfaq Vs St. of UP & ors.(2008 (4) ADJ 416),

7. Dharam Raj Vs St. of UP & ors.(2009 (77)
ALR 564),

8. Sriram Prasad & anr. Vs St. of UP & ors.(2016
(3) ALJ 308),

9. Neeraj Kumar Mishra Vs Dy. Commissioner
(Food) Region Allahabad & ors.(2017 (3) ADJ
834),

10. Gram Vikash Sewa Samiti Vs St. of UP &
ors.(Writ - C No. 19941/2018 decided on
30.08.2018),

11. M/s Park Leather Industry (P) Ltd. & anr. Vs
St. of UP & ors.(2001 (3) SCC 135),

12.
Smt.
Shahjanah
Baigam
Vs
District
Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar & ors.(AIR 2017
Uttrakhand 200),

13. Ram Rati & ors.Vs Gram Samaj Jehwa &
ors.(AIR 1974 (All) 106),

14. Yogendra Singh Vs St. of UP & ors.(Misc.
Single No. 23298/2016 decided on 27.09.2016.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal
Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vishal Tandon learned
counsel for the petitioner, Ms. Archana
Tyagi learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel for the State respondents and Sri
Pankaj Kumar Gupta learned counsel for
the Gaon Sabha.

2. Present writ petition has been filed
against the order dated 28.12.2021 passed
by the Additional Commissioner (Judicial)
Aligarh Division, Aligarh. whereby the said
authority has allowed Appeal No. 00288 of
2021 (Sarvesh Vs. State of U.P.). It has set
aside the order dated 25.1.2021, passed by
the SDM, Jalesar and restored the fair price
shop agreement of respondent No.4.

3. At the outset, a preliminary
objection has been raised by learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel and
learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha, to the
maintainability of the present petition. It
has been thus submitted; the petitioner was
the complainant before the licensing
authority;
acting
on
his
complaint,
proceedings
were
initiated
by
the
competent authority against the original fair
price shop agent - Sarvesh/respondent
No.4; thereafter, the fair price shop
agreement of the said respondent was
cancelled on 25.1.2021; the said respondent
preferred Second Appeal No. 00288 of
2021; it has been allowed. Therefore, the
petitioner
-
who
was
merely
the
complainant, has no locus to maintain the
present writ petition.

4. Meeting that preliminary objection,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed heavy reliance on Clause-13 of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Essential
Commodities
(Regulation of Sale and Distribution
Control) Order, 2016 (hereinafter referred
to as 'the Control Order'). Relying on the
Hindi version of clause 13(1) of the Control
Order, it has been vehemently urged, the
right of appeal has been created by the
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
817
Control Order against an order of ''Bahali'
i.e. restoration of a fair price shop
agreement, besides creating a right of
appeal against an order of suspension and
cancellation of a fair price agreement. In
support
of
such
submission,
learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied on a
decision of a learned Single Judge of this
Court in Smt. Farzana Vs. State of U.P.
and Others, 2018(7) ADJ 767, to contend,
in case of ambiguity in the English version
of a Notification or statute etc., the Hindi
version of the same may be looked into and
relied to cure that ambiguity. In the same
vein, reliance has also been placed on a
Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram
Surat Mishra Vs. State of U.P., 2013(6)
ADJ 503 (FB)(LB). Reliance has also been
placed on a decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of Commissioner of Trade Tax
Uttar
Pradesh
Vs.
Associated
Distributors Limited, (2008) 7 SCC 709.

5. By way of second limb to his
submission,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner would submit, in any case, the
law that existed earlier - giving the
complainant no right of appeal against an
order or restoration of fair price shop, is no
longer good law, in view of statutory
change made by the Control Order. Thus,
referring to clause 13(3) of the Control
Order, it has been submitted, the right of
appeal has been given to 'any person
aggrieved'. Earlier, the right of appeal was
conferred exclusively on the fair price shop
agent and on no other person. Therefore,
the remedy of appeal has now been made
available to a larger body of individuals
who may be aggrieved by an order of
''Bahali'/restoration,
suspension
or
cancellation of a fair price shop agreement.
Clearly, the complainant who may have
brought evidence before the licensing
authority and/or the appeal authority -
against an erring fair price shop agent was
a person having a grievance against the fair
price shop agent. Therefore, he would be a
person aggrieved by the order granting
restoration of fair price shop agreement.
Such view is stated to have been taken by a
learned Single Judge of this Court in
Akhlaq Vs. State of U.P. and Others,
Writ-C No. 43188 of 2017 decided on
05.2.2019 and Smt. Muneeta Vs. State of
U.P. and Others, Writ-C No. 21915 of
2019, decided on 06.2.2020.

6. Last, it has also been submitted, the
appeal authority has grossly erred in
allowing the appeal on merits. The only
defect noted by it was with respect to
procedural compliance. If the enquiry
report had not been confronted to the
private respondent, the only course open to
the appeal authority was to remit the matter
to the original authority or to entertain the
matter on merits itself and, pass a reasoned
order, thereafter.

7. On the other hand, vehemently
opposing the petition, learned Additional
Chief Standing Counsel and the learned
counsel
for
the
Gaon
Sabha
have
submitted, it is no longer res integra that a
complainant has no right of appeal.
Consequently, he can never claim to be a
person aggrieved by the order passed by the
appeal authority. In that regard, reliance has
been first placed on a decision of a learned
Single Judge of this Court in Ashfaq Vs.
State of U.P. and Others, 2008(4) ADJ
416. Then, reliance has been placed on a
decision of the Division Bench of this
Court in Dharam Raj Vs. State of U.P.
Through District Magistrate and Others,
2009(77) ALR 564. Doubt, if any, in that
regard is stated to have been removed by a
further decision of the learned Single Judge
in the case of Sriram Prasad and another
818 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others, (2016) 3
ALJ 308 and Neeraj Kumar Mishra Vs.
Dy.
Commissioner
(Food)
Region
Allahabad and Others, 2017(3) ADJ 834
and Gram Vikash Sewa Samiti Vs. State
of U.P. and 4 Others, Writ-C No. 19941
of 2018, decided on 30.8.2018. Thus, it has
been submitted, the decision of the learned
Single Judge referred to and relied upon by
learned counsel for the petitioner in the
cases of Akhlaq (supra) and Smt.
Muneeta (supra) are per incuriam. Those
decisions have not considered the binding
ratio of the division bench decision in
Dharam Raj (supra). As to the distinction
attempted by learned counsel for the
petitioner, based on the difference of
language used in the English and Hindi
versions of the Control Order, it has been
submitted, the Hindi version of the official
legislative publication, be it an Act,
Notification etc., may be relied only in the
event of an ambiguity arising upon reading
of such publication in English itself.

8. Thus, reliance has been placed on a
decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Park
Leather Industry (P) Ltd and Another
Vs. State of U.P. and Others, (2001) 3
SCC 135 as also a division bench decision
of the Uttarakhand High Court in Smt.
Shahjahan
Baigam
Vs.
District
Magistrate Udham Singh Nagar and
Others, AIR 2017 Uttarakhand 200. To
that extent the decision of the learned
single-Judge in the case of Smt. Farzana
(supra) is described as not laying down the
correct law.

9. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the record,
in the first place, it would be appropriate to
quote and compare the provisions of Clause
13 of the Control Order, as published in the
English and Hindi. They read as below:
Clause 13 of the Control Order
English
Hindi
Appeal.-(1) Appeal in
relation to action or
subject covered under
the
National
Food
Security Act,
2013
and
rules
framed
under
it
shall
lie
before the authority
mentioned
in
subclause (10) of Clause
11 of this order but
appeal
against
appointment,
suspension
and
cancellation of fair
price shop by the
competent
authority
shall lie before the
Divisional
Commissioner.
13.
अप़ील-
(1)
राष्टऱीय िाद्य सुरक्षा
असधसनयम,
2013
और उसके अध़ीन
बनाय़ी
गय़ी
सनयमावलो
के
अध़ीन
आच्छासदत
कायावाई या सवषय
के सम्बन्ध में इस
आदेश के िि 11
के उपिि (10) में
उण्डल्लण्डित
प्रासधकाऱी के समक्ष
अप़ील क़ी जायेग़ी,
सकन्तु
सक्षम
प्रासधकाऱी
द्वारा
उसचत
मूल्
क़ी
दुकान क़ी बिाल़ी,
सनलम्बन
और
सनरस्त़ीकरण
के
सवरुद्ध
सम्भाग़ीय
आयुक्त के समक्ष
अप़ील क़ी जायेग़ी।
(2)
Any
person
aggrieved by an order
of
the
Designated
Authority denying the
issue or renewal of a
ration
card
or
cancellation
of
the
ration card under the
National
Food
Security Act,
2013
may appeal to the
Appellate
Authority
within thirty days of
the date of receipt of
the order.
(2)
राष्टऱीय
िाद्य
सुरक्षा
असधसनयम,
2013
के
अध़ीन
सकस़ी राशन काडा
को जाऱी करने या
नव़ीकरण करने से
इन्कार या राशन
काडा
का
सनरस्त़ीकरण करने
से
सम्बण्डन्धत
पदासिसित
असधकाऱी के आदेश
द्वारा व्यसर्थत कोई
व्यण्डक्त आदेश क़ी
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
819
प्राण्डि के सदनांक के
त़ीस सदनों के ि़ीतर
अप़ील़ीय प्रासधकाऱी
को
अप़ील
कर
सकता िै।
[(3)
Any
person
aggrieved by an order
of
the
Competent
Authority denying the
issue or renewal of the
agreement to the fair
price
shop
owner,
suspension
or
cancellation
of
the
agreement may appeal
to
the
Appellate
Authority namely the
Divisional
Commissioner or the
Divisional Additional
Commissioner,
Joint
Commissioner/Deputy
Commissioner (Food)
authorized by him in
writing to hear and
dispose appeal within
thirty days of the date
of receipt of the order
and
the
Appellate
Authority shall, as far
as practicable, dispose
the appeal within a
period of sixty days:
Provided that once an
appeal
has
been
disposed of by the
Appellate
Authority,
the time for issue or
renewal
of
the
agreement of the fair
price shop owner by
the
Competent
authority referred to
in sub-Clause (9) of
(3) उसचत मूल् क़ी
दुकान स्वाम़ी को
अनुबन्ध जाऱी करने
या नव़ीकरण करने,
अनुबन्ध
को
सनलण्डम्बत
या
रद्द
करने
िेतु
सक्षम
प्रासधकाऱी के सकस़ी
आदेश द्वारा व्यसर्थत
कोई
व्यण्डक्त
अप़ील़ीय प्रासधकाऱी
अर्थाातु्
सम्भाग़ीय
आयुक्त
या
सम्भाग़ीय
अपर
आयुक्त या उसके
द्वारा सलण्डित रूप में
अप़ील क़ी सुनवाई
और
सनपिान
के
सलए
प्रासधकृत
संयुक्त
आयुक्त/उपायुक्त
(िाद्य) के आदेश
प्राि
िोने
क़ी
ताऱीि से त़ीस सदन
के ि़ीतर अप़ील कर
सकेगा
तर्था
अप़ील़ीय प्रासधकाऱी,
जिाँ तक व्यविाया
िै, साठ सदन के
ि़ीतर अप़ील का
सनपिान करेगा:
परन्तु
यि
सक
अप़ील़ीय असधकाऱी
द्वारा
एक
बार
Clause 10 shall begin
from
the
date
of
decision
of
the
Appellate
Authority
on the appeal.]

Provided further that
an
appeal
pending
before an Appellate
Authority
appointed
under
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Schedule
Commodities
Distribution
Order,
2004
shall
be
disposed of by such
authority as if this
Order had not been
made.
अप़ील का सनपिान
सकए जाने पर िि-
10 के उपिि (9)
में
सनसदाष्ट
सक्षम
प्रासधकाऱी
द्वारा
उसचत
मूल्
क़ी
दुकान स्वाम़ी का
अनुबन्ध जाऱी करने
या उसका नव़ीकरण
करने
का
समय
अप़ील
प्रासधकाऱी
द्वारा अप़ील़ीय पर
सवसनिय क़ी ताऱीि
से प्रारम्भ िोगा :
परन्तु यि और सक
उत्तर प्रदेश अनुसूच़ी
वस्तु
सवतरण
आदेश, 2004 के
अध़ीन
सनयुक्त
सकस़ी
अप़ील़ीय
प्रासधकाऱी
के
सम्मुि
लण्डम्बत
सकस़ी अप़ील का
सनपिान
ऐसे
प्रासधकाऱी
द्वारा
सकया जायेगा मानो
यि आदेश न सकया
गया िो।]
(4) No appeal shall be
disposed of unless the
aggrieved person has
been
given
a
reasonable
opportunity of being
heard.
(4) सकस़ी अप़ील
का
सनपिान
तब
तक
नि़ीं
सकया
जाएगा जब तक सक
व्यसर्थत सकस़ी व्यण्डक्त
को सुने जाने का
उसचत अवसर न
सदया गया िो।
(5)
Pending
the
disposal of an appeal,
the
Appellate
(5)
अप़ील़ीय
प्रासधकाऱी,
सकस़ी
अप़ील के सनपिान
820 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Authority may direct
that the order under
appeal shall not take
effect for such period
as the authority may
consider necessary for
giving a reasonable
opportunity
to
the
other party under subclause (4) or until the
appeal is disposed or,
whichever is earlier.
के लण्डम्बत िोने पर
यि सनदेश दे सकेगा
सक अप़ील के अध़ीन
आदेश उस अवसध
के सलए प्रिाव़ी नि़ीं
िोगा, जो प्रासधकाऱी
उपिि-(4)
के
अध़ीन अन्य पक्षकार
को सुने जाने का
उसचत अवसर प्रदान
करने
के
सलए
आवश्क समझे या
जब तक सक अप़ील
का सनपिारा न िो
जाए, इसमें से जो ि़ी
पूवोत्तर िो।

10. The dispute in the present case
revolves around interpretation to be given
to Clause 13(1) of the Control Order.
Admittedly, there is no ambiguity or
discrepancy arising from reading of the
Hindi and/or English versions of Clause
13(3) of the Control Order.

11. Read in entirety, Clause 13(1) of
the Control Order seeks to provide for two
different forums of appeal. In the first
place, a forum of appeal has been provided
in relation to action or subject matter
covered under the National Food Security
Act 2013 and the Rules framed thereunder.
That forum of appeal has been provided
before the Officer appointed or designated
as the District Grievance Redressal Officer
under the U.P. Food Security Rules, 2015.
In that regard, the description of Clause
11(10) of the Control Order [in Clause
13(1)] appears to suffer from an apparent
typographical/print error. There is no
Clause 11(10) of the Control Order. That
appeal forum appears to exist under Clause
9(10) of the Control Order. The other forum
of appeal created is with respect to orders
against
appointment,
suspension
and
cancellation of fair price shop agreement,
described in the Hindi version of the
Control Order as ''Bahali'; ''Nilamban' and
''Nirastikaran'. That appeal forum has been
created
before
the
Divisional
Commissioner.

12. By very nature, different rights are
to be contested before the two different
forums provided under Clause 13(1) of the
Control Order. Before the first forum, the
rights of the beneficiaries are to be
contested with respect to issuance of ration
cards etc. Before the other/second forum,
the rights with respect to the fair price shop
agency alone are to be contested. On a
plain reading of Clause 13(1) of the Control
Order (either in English or Hindi), there
appears no legislative intent to confer a
right of appeal on any person. The said
Clause only speaks of appeal forums, with
respect to two entirely different rights,
vested in two entirely different class of
citizens.

13. It may have been another case if
Clause 13(1) existed without Clause 13(3)
of the Control Order. That situation may
have been akin to the one that existed
under the earlier Control Order dated
03.07.1990. Under Clause 11 thereof, it
was not specified, to whom the right of
appeal was granted. For ready reference,
Clause 11 of that Government Order is
quoted below:

"सजलासधकाऱी
द्वारा
दुकान
सनयुण्डक्त/सनलंबन/सनरस्त़ीकरण/नव़ीऩीकरण
न
करने संबंध़ी पाररत आदेश के सवरुद्ध अप़ील
संबंसधत क़ी जाएग़ी। इन मामलों में सद्वत़ीय
अप़ील क़ी वयवस्र्था नि़ीं िोग़ी।"
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
821

14. However, in the present case,
Clause
13(3)
of
the
Control
Order
specifically provides such right of appeal to
'any person aggrieved' against an order of
the competent authority. That right of
appeal has been given with respect to
orders of denial or renewal of agreement to
a fair price shop owner or an order of
suspension or an order of cancellation of
agreement of fair price shop. No other or
further order has been made appealable.
Thus, an order of revocation of suspension
of a fair price shop agreement is not made
appealable under Clause 13 (3) of the
Control Order.

15. Other than that, the said subclause provides for period of limitation to
avail that right of appeal, being 30 days
from the date of receipt of the order passed
by the competent authority. Then subclause 4 of the said Clause 13 of the
Control Order further stipulates, no appeal
(filed under Clause 13) shall be decided
unless 'aggrieved person' has been given
reasonable opportunity of being heard.
Last, sub-clause 5 grants power to the
Appeal Authority, to grant stay, pending an
appeal.

16. Examined in that light, the first
issue that may be dealt with is the
interpretation to be given to Clause 13(1) of
the Control Order in that it describes the
nature of orders that may be appealed
before the Divisional Commissioner. If the
Hindi version of the Control Order were to
be read to confer a right of appeal against
an order of revocation of a suspension
order, a conflict would arise between
Clause 13(1) and 13(3) of the Control
Order with respect to the right of appeal
given against certain orders passed by the
Competent Authority. While sub-clause (1)
would provide for a forum of appeal
against such order, sub-clause (3) would
restrict/prevent filing of such appeal. A
court may never read a statute in a manner
as may give rise to a conflict between two
provisions of the same enactment, existing
for the same purpose.

17. While the English version of
Clause 13(1) of the Control Order uses the
words
'appointment',
'suspension'
and
'cancellation', the Hindi version chooses to
use the words 'bahaali', 'nilamban' and,
'nirastikaran' to describe the nature of
orders against which appeal may lie to the
Divisional Commissioner. There is no
dispute between the parties that the word
suspension translates accurately to the word
'Nilamban' and the word cancellation
translates
accurately
to
the
word
'Nirastikaran'. The parties are at variance as
to the meaning to be given to the word
'appointment' as compared to the word
'Bahaali' used in the Hindi version under
Clause 13(1) of the Control Order.

18. Appointment of a fair price shop
agent
is
an
executive
act.
The
selected/preferred applicant enters into an
agreement with the respondent State
authorities to run the designated fair price
shop agency. Under Section 16 of the U.P.
General Clauses Act, 1904, the power to
appoint includes the power to suspend,
dismiss, remove etc. On the other hand,
''Bahaali' is a Hindi word only. It means
and refers to an act of restoration or revival
of a thing, arrangement, status, right etc. It
is always used with reference to what
existed before - that which had been
interrupted or obstructed or removed or
changed or replaced, immediately before it
was restored or revived. Therefore, the
genus is ''appointment', ''Bahaali' i.e.,
restoration
or
revival,
is
a
species.
Therefore,
appointment
would
always
822 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
include ''Bahaali', yet ''Bahaali' does not
include original appointment made.

19. Therefore, ''Bahaali' may arise
only in the event of a pre-existing fair price
shop agreement - because of revocation of
the earlier order of suspension passed by
the Competent Authority. The event of
revocation of a suspension order (passed
earlier) may be described as ''Bahaali'. If
the word appointment appearing in Clause
13(1) of the Control Order is read to
include ''Bahali', necessarily, clear conflict
would emerge from a plain reading of the
English and the Hindi versions of Clause
13 (1) of the Control Order.

20. On the other hand, it may be noted
here itself, a plain reading of the English
version of the Control Order gives rise to no
ambiguity. For any ambiguity to exist, it must
be first inferred by the Court that there are
plural interpretation/meaning possible or
permissible to be given to the language used
by the legislature. If only one meaning can be
inferred from the reading of the statute and
the legislative Act remains functional on that
reading, the Court may never explore a
possibility of, or cull out an ambiguity in the
legislative enactment. In that case, the
interpretative exercise must remain simple
and clear to read the intent of the legislature
from the plain meaning of the words chosen
by it. No other intendment is to be searched
where the words used by the legislature offer
a unique or clear grammatical and functional
sense. No unworkability may ever be claimed
because the legislature did not provide a right
of appeal against an order of revocation of
suspension order. It is so because appeal is a
creature of statutes and not an inherent right.

21. Even in the Full Bench decision of
this Court in Ram Rati & Ors. Gram
Samaj, Jehwa & Ors., AIR 1974 (All)
106 referred to in Smt. Farzana (supra),
the question framed was as below:

"Whether it will be a sound rule of
interpretation or construction of Statutes
that if there appears to be some doubt or
ambiguity in the authorized text in English
language of an Act enacted in Hindi by the
Legislature of Uttar Pradesh, then for
resolving the ambiguity or doubt and for
ascertaining the correct meaning thereof,
reference can be made to the corresponding
Hindi text and reliance placed thereon?"

22.

Having
considered
the
submissions advanced, the Full Bench
observed as below:

10. We may, at the very outset, mention
that if the distinction between "conflict" in
the Hindi text and the authoritative text in
English and "ambiguity or doubt" in the
authoritative text in English is kept in mind,
the apparent conflict in the decisions of this
Court will disappear. A "conflict" between
the Hindi text and the authoritative English
text is different from a "doubt or ambiguity"
in the authoritative English, text. There will
be conflict between the provisions of the
two texts when it is not possible to
reconcile or harmonize them and then the
question will arise as to which of the two
shall prevail. Such a conflict does not by
itself result in a "doubt or ambiguity" in the
authoritative English text. The principles
applicable to the resolution of "conflict"
are not applicable to the resolution of
"doubt or ambiguity". The normal rules of
interpretation of statutes will have to be
applied in the case of "doubt or ambiguity"
in any provision of the authoritative
English text.

17. We are, therefore, of opinion that
where there is some doubt or ambiguity in
any provision in the authoritative English
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
823
text, it is permissible to look into the Hindi
text to remove the doubt or ambiguity. We
accordingly answer the question referred to
this Bench in the affirmative."
(emphasis supplied)

23. Then, in M/s Park Leather
Industry (P) Ltd (supra) the issue was
resolved thus:

"Of course an English version is
simultaneously published. Undoubtedly, if
there is conflict between the two then the
English version would prevail. However, if
there is no conflict then one can always
have assistance of the Hindi version in
order to find out whether the word used in
English includes a particular item or not.
In the Hindi version the word used is
"Chamra". There can be no dispute that the
term "Chamra" would include "leather" in
all its forms.

In this view of the matter the appeal
stands dismissed. There will, however, be
no order as to costs."

24. In face of the above dictum of the
Supreme Court and of the seven- Judge
Full Bench decision of this Court, the
following ratio in Ram Surat Mishra
(supra) runs contrary to that binding law.
Therein, it has been observed as below:

"Since the official language of the
State of U.P., has been declared Hindi
Devnagri script in pursuance of power
conferred
by
Article
345
of
the
Constitution, and the original bill passed
by the Legislature is also in Hindi, in the
event of conflict between Hindi and English
version, the Hindi version of the statute
shall prevail over the English version. The
English version of the statutory provisions
are mere translation of the Hindi version.
Since entire proceeding of State Legislature
is executed in Hindi and notifications are
issued accordingly, the English version is
mere
translation
of
Hindi
version.
Therefore, in the event of language conflict,
the Hindi version of statutory notification
shall prevail over the English version."

25. As to Associated Distributors
Limited (supra), it was observed as under:

"It is pertinent to mention here that the
official language of the State of Uttar
Pradesh is Hindi. If any difference is found
between the notifications in English and
Hindi, the notification issued in Hindi will
be applicable. On the said notification, the
courts have decided that confectionery
comes
within
sweets
(mithai)
and
sweetmeat, but it has not been mentioned
that bubblegum comes within the category
of a sweet."

26. It may be noted, in that decision,
the Supreme Court did not consider the
issue of conflict between the official
English and Hindi versions of legislative
publications rather, that ratio arose upon a
''difference' noted in those publications. A
difference may give rise to both, ambiguity
and conflict. In so far as the Supreme Court
has not spoken any further, it must be
assumed, it had applied the rule - rely on
the Hindi text to cure the ambiguity, only.
Any other reading of that decision of the
Supreme Court would create a conflict
between two decisions of the Supreme
Court. The real issue was as has been noted
in the opening passage of judgement.

27. Therefore, the true rule to be
applied remains one, being - in case the
English
version
of
the
legislative
publication, read on its own offers any
ambiguity or doubt, its Hindi version may
be read to cure that ambiguity, and no
824 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
further. If however, no ambiguity emerges
from a plain reading of the English version
of the legislative publication, then, despite
any conflict arising on a comparative
reading of the English and Hindi version of
the same legislative publication, its English
version would prevail. That is the only
consistent
ratio
pronounced
and
consistently applied by the Supreme Court
and the larger Full Bench of this Court.

28. Thus, with all respects, I am
unable to subscribe to the view taken by the
learned single-Judge in Smt. Farzana
(supra). That view appears to have arisen
contrary to the binding decision of the
Supreme Court and the seven-Judge Full
Bench decision of this Court. Therefore, I
also do not find it necessary to refer the
matter to a larger bench strength.

29. Being bound by the dictum of the
Supreme Court and the Full Bench of this
Court, the true meaning to be given to the
Clause 13(1) of the Control Order is found
to be a one contained in the English version
of the Control Order. Consequently, the
word 'Bahaali' used in the Hindi version of
the Control Order being in conflict with the
world ''appointment' used in the English
version of that Control Order must and
would necessarily, be read as 'appointment'
only. No right of appeal has been granted
(under that clause of the Control Order),
against an order of revival or restoration of
a fair price shop agreement. That beside the
reason, Clause 13(1) of the Control Order
only provides a forum of appeal but does
not seek to create a right of appeal. Thus,
provisions of Clause 13 (1) and 13 (3) of
the Control Order are found to be wholly
consistent to each other.

30. Consequently, Clause 13(1) of the
Control Order does not grant a right of
appeal, to any person, against any order
contrary to such right provided under
Clause 13(3) of the Control Order. Clause
13 (1) only refers to the nature of orders
made appealable by referring to their genus
- appointment, suspension, and cancellation
whereas Clause 13(3) of the Control Order
refers to the species of such orders, made
appealable, by any person who may be
aggrieved by such order/s. Thus, both -
denial of issuance and denial of renewal of
a fair price shop agreement, have been
made appealable. However, other types of
appointments
such
as
revocation
of
suspension have not been made appealable.

31. As to the right of appeal to be
availed, the same has been granted only to
any 'aggrieved person'. As to the true
meaning to be given to the words
'aggrieved person' (synonymous to ''person
aggrieved'), there is a consistent line of
decisions. While the decision in the case of
Ashfaq (supra) may no longer be good law
in view of the changed provision of the
Control Order viz-a-viz the right of appeal
given to 'any person aggrieved' yet, that
inherent principle in the earlier Control
Order/s survives. Specifically, to the
interpretation to be given to the word
'person aggrieved', I am bound by the
dictum of the division bench of this Court
in Dharam Raj (supra). In that case, the
fair price shop agreement of the original
agent was first suspended but later restored.
Against such order, the writ petition had
been filed by the complainant. The
observations made in that decision are
pertinent to the dispute at hand. Mainly, in
paragraph nos.9, 10, 12 and 17, it was
observed as below:

"9. As evident from narration of the
facts given above, it is evident that the
petitioner was one of the complainants in
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
825
the complaint made against the respondent
no. 4 on 12.13.2008. The action has since
been taken on the complaint so made by the
petitioner
and
others
against
the
respondent no. 4, and fine of Rs. 5,000/-has
been imposed.

10. In the circumstances, the petitioner
cannot have any grievance in the matter,
and he is not an aggrieved person, rather
he is a person annoyed.

12. According to our opinion a
"person aggrieved", means a person who
is wrongly deprived of his entitlement
which he is legally entitled to receive and
it
does
not
include
any
kind
of
disappointment
or
personal
in
convenience. "Person aggrieved" means a
person who is injured or he is adversely
affected in a legal sense.

17. The view taken by us that the
petitioner is not a person aggrieved, thus
he has no locus standi to file the present
writ petition thereby challenging the order
dated 16.3.2009 passed by Sub-Divisional
Magistrate,
Jal
Singh
Pur,
District
Sultanpur is also supported by the decision
of this Court in the case of Suresh Singh v.
Commissioner,
Muradabad
Division,7
where it was held that in an inquiry under
section 95 (g) of the V.P. Panchayat Raj
Act, 947, the complainant who was VpPradhan could be a witness in an inquiry
but had no locus standi to approach this
Court against the order of the State
authorities, for the reasons that none of his
personal statutory right are affected."

32. The issue was then dealt with
elaborately by a learned single-Judge of
this Court in Sriram Prasad (supra)
wherein besides the following the division
bench decision in Dharam Raj (supra),
the learned Single Judge made pertinent
observation as below:

"The meaning of the expression person
aggrieved will have to be ascertained with
reference to the purpose and the provisions
of the statute. One of the meanings is that
person will be held to be aggrieved by a
decision if that decision is materially
adverse to him. The restricted meaning of
the
expression
requires
denial
or
deprivation of legal rights. A more legal
approach is required in the background of
statutes which do not deal with the property
rights
but
deal
with
professional
misconduct
and
morality.
(Refer-Bar
Council of Maharashtra v. M.V.Dabholkar,
(1975) 2 SCC 702, 710-11, paras 27 & 28).

Broadly, speaking a party or a person
is aggrieved by a decision when, it only
operates directly and injuriously upon his
personal, pecuniary and proprietary rights
(Corpus Juris Seundem. Edn. 1, Vol.IV,
p.356, as referred in Kalva Sudhakar Reddy
v.Mandala Sudhakar Reddy, AIR 2005 AP
45,49 para 10) The expression 'person
aggrieved' means a person who has
suffered a legal grievance ie a person
against whom a decision has been
pronounced which has lawfully deprived
him of something or wrongfully refused him
something. The petitioner is not an
aggrieved person by merely filing a
complaint. The order of revocation of
cancellation of fair price shop license do
not affect him in any manner.

The Division Bench in Dharam Raj
Versus State of U.P. and others, 2010 (2)
AWC 1878 (LB), held that the petition on
behalf of the complainant against the
licensee
of
fair
price
shop
is not
maintainable against the final order passed
by
the
competent
authority
as
the
complainant cannot be said to have any
grievance in the matter being not an
aggrieved person rather is a person
annoyed.
826 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Recently Supreme Court in Ravi
Yashwant Bhoir versus District Collector,
Raigad and others (2012) 4 SCC 407 was
dealing with the removal of the President of
Uran
Municipal
Council
under
the
Maharashtra Municipal Councils, Nagar
Panchayats and Industrial Townships Act,
1965.
The
ex-President
was
the
complainant, the Court was of the opinion
that the complainant cannot be party to the
lis as he could not claim the status of an
adversarial litigant. The relevant extract is
as follows:

"58.
Shri
Chintaman
Raghunath
Gharat, Ex-President was the complainant,
thus, at the most, he could lead the
evidence as a witness. He could not claim
the status of an adversial litigant. The
complainant cannot be the party to the lis.
A legal right is an averment of entitlement
arising out of law. In fact, it is a benefit
conferred upon a person by the rule of law.
Thus, a person who suffers from legal
injury can only challenge the act or
omission. There may be some harm or loss
that may not be wrongful in the eyes of law
because it may not result in injury to a
legal right or legally protected interest of
the complainant but juridically harm of this
description is called damnum sine injuria.

59. The complainant has to establish
that he has been deprived of or denied of a
legal right and he has sustained injury to
any legally protected interest. In case he
has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to
hang on, he cannot be heard as a party in a
lis. A fanciful or sentimental grievance may
not be sufficient to confer a locus standi to
sue upon the individual. There must be
injuria or a legal grievance which can be
appreciated and not a stat pro ratione
valuntas reasons i.e. a claim devoid of
reasons.

60. Under the garb of being necessary
party, a person cannot be permined to
make a case as that of general public
interest. A person having a remote interest
cannot be permitted to become a party in
the lis, as the person wants to become a
party in a case, has to establish that he has
a proprietary a right which has been or is
threatened to be violated, for the reason
that a legal injury creates a remedial right
in the injured person. A person cannot be
heard as a party unless he answers the
description of aggrieved party. (Vide: Adi
Pherozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seerval,
Advocate General of Maharashtra, AIR
1971 SC 385; Jasbihai Motibhai Desai v.
Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed & Ors,
AIR 1976 SC 578; Maharaj Singh v. State
of Uttar Pradesh & Ors, AIR 1976 SC
2602; Ghulam Qadir x. Special Tribunal &
Ors., (2002) 1 SCC 33; and Kabushiki
Kanha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances
Company & Ors, (2008) 10 SCC 766). The
High Court failed to appreciate that it was
a case of political rivalry. The case of the
appellant has not been considered in
correct perspective at all."

Similarly, the Supreme Court in
Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan versus State
of Maharashtra and others (2013) 4 SCC
465, 466 was dealing with the issue of caste
certificate being challenged by a person
who did not belong to the reserved
category.
The
Apex
Court
imposed
exemplary cost of one lakh upon the
stranger to the lis as he abused the process
of the Court to harass the appellant.

The Court held as follows:

"9. It is a settled legal proposition that
a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in
any proceeding, unless he satisfies the
Authority/Court, that he falls within the
category of aggrieved persons. Only a
person who has suffered, or suffers from
legal
injury
can
challenge
the
act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A
writ petition under Article 226 of the
4 All. Smt. Saavan Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
827
Constitution is maintainable either for the
purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal
right, or when there is a complaint by the
appellant that there has been a breach of
statutory duty on the part of the Authorities.
Therefore, there must be a judicially
enforceable
right
available
for
enforcement, on the basis of which writ
jurisdiction is resorted to.