# Smt. Sarla Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors. Opp. Parties

- **Citation:** (2024) 2 ILRA 1064
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-02-20
- **Case number:** Application u/s 378 (D) No. 138 of 2016
- **Bench:** Rajesh Singh Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-sarla-devi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-opp-parties-51223
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Delay Condonation-Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties-meant with the
objective that parties should not resort to dilatory
tactics and sleep over their rights-must seek remedy
promptly-complete careless and reckless long delay
on the part of appellant-virtually unexplained at allApplication for condonation of delay and
Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

## Text

1064 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
11(2) of the Act as has been held by a
Division Bench of this Court in Dilbagh
Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1978
AWC 393. The existence of another remedy
under the Act cannot validate the
proceedings which are void for lack of
jurisdiction and which have resulted in
the declaration as surplus land of an area
which a person other than the tenure
holder who has been heard, claims. The
fact that the petitioner could have filed
an objection u/s 11(2) will not breath life
into or validate these dead proceedings."

16. The aspect of possession, it
seems that was never discussed before the
Prescribed Authority and accordingly
from the aforesaid facts it is clear that the
order of the Appellate Authority as well
as Prescribed Authority are liable to he
quashed,
as
the
petitioners
have
demonstrated that transfer of land was
made prior to 1971 that is they are in
possession over the said land and further
that their names find mention in C.L.H.
Form-3, strongly suggests that contention
of the petitioners is correct.

17. In the light of above, the
impugned
orders
dated
08.03.1990,
26.03.1996 and 10.11.2006 are set aside.
The matter is remitted back to the
Prescribed Authority for deciding the
matter afresh. It is provided that the
petitioners will have four weeks time
from today to file all the evidence to
demonstrate that they are owners of the
land in question.

18. Considering that much time has
lapsed, let the proceedings be concluded
expeditiously, say within three months,
thereafter, in accordance with law after
giving opportunity of hearing to all the
parties concerned.

19. The writ petition is allowed.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1064
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.02.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Application u/s 378 (D) No. 138 of 2016

Smt. Sarla Devi ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sushil Kumar Rastogi

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A., Shailendra Singh Rajawat

Delay Condonation-Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties-meant with the
objective that parties should not resort to dilatory
tactics and sleep over their rights-must seek remedy
promptly-complete careless and reckless long delay
on the part of appellant-virtually unexplained at allApplication for condonation of delay and
Appeal dismissed. (E-9)

Cases cited:

1. Collector, Land Acquisition Vs Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107

2. P.K. Ramachandran Vs St. of Kerala, AIR
1998 SC 2276

3. Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs Kuntal Kumari, AIR
1969 SC 575

4. Brij Indar Singh Vs Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45
Cal 94

5. St. of Nagaland Vs Lipok AO & ors., AIR 2005
SC 2191

6. Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Vs
Shantaram Baburao Patil & ors., JT 2001(5) SC
608
2 All. Smt. Sarla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1065
7. Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRS. Vs
Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project &
anr.(2008) 17 SCC 448

8.
Maniben
Devraj
Shah
Vs
Municipal
Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC
157

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shamim Ahmed, J.)

(Order
on
C.M.
Application
No.70037
of
2016: Application
for
condonation of delay)

1. List has been revised and the case
is being taken up in the revised call of the
list.

2. Heard Sri Sushil Kumar Rastogi,
learned counsel for the applicant and Sri
Shailendra
Singh
Rajawat,
Advocate
alongwith Ms. Purnima Singh, learned
counsel for the respondent nos.2 & 3 as
well as Sri Hari Shanker Bajpai, learned
A.G.A.-I for the State Opposite Party No.1
and perused the record.

3. This leave to appeal has been filed
with a delay of 2 Years 04 Months and 8
Days, as per the report of the stamp
reporter, challenging the judgment and
order dated 10.06.2013 passed by the
learned
Additional
Chief
Judicial
Magistrate, Court No.2, Kheri in Criminal
Case No.1935 of 2012, Police Station
Kotwali Sadar, District Kheri against the
acquittal of the accused person/opposite
party nos. 2 & 3.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant
in the application for condonation of delay
supported with the affidavit has taken the
ground that the impugned order was passed
on 10.06.2023 by the court concerned and
the appeal was not filed in time as the clerk
of the advocate was ill.

5. Sri Hari Shanker Bajpai, learned
A.G.A.-I for the State Opposite Party No.1
as well as Sri Shailendra Singh Rajawat,
learned counsel for the opposite party nos.2
& 3 jointly submit that this leave to appeal
is time barred by 2 Years 04 Months and 8
Days and the reasons shown in the affidavit
supported with application for condonation
of delay do not appear to be justified.

6. After considering the arguments
advanced by learned counsel for the parties
as well as after perusal of record, this Court
finds that the explanation given in affidavit
accompanying
delay
condonation
application filed under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963 is neither acceptable
nor trustworthy.

7. The expression "sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of Act, 1963 has been held to
receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally a
delay
in
preferring
appeal
may
be
condoned in interest of justice where no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fide is imputable to parties,
seeking condonation of delay. In Collector,
Land Acquisition Vs. Katiji, 1987(2)
SCC 107, the Court said, that, when
substantial
justice
and
technical
considerations are taken against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred, for, the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non deliberate delay. The
Court
further
said that
judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.

8. In P.K. Ramachandran Vs. State
of Kerala, AIR 1998 SC 2276 the Court
said:
1066 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"Law of limitation may harshly affect
a particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribe and the Courts have no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable
grounds."

9. The Rules of limitation are not
meant to destroy rights of parties. They
virtually take away the remedy. They are
meant with the objective that parties should
not resort to dilatory tactics and sleep over
their rights. They must seek remedy
promptly. The object of providing a legal
remedy is to repair the damage caused by
reason of legal injury. The statute relating
to limitation determines a life span for such
legal remedy for redress of the legal injury,
one has suffered. Time is precious and the
wasted time would never revisit. During
efflux of time, newer causes would come
up, necessitating newer persons to seek
legal remedy by approaching the courts. So
a life span must be fixed for each remedy.
Unending period for launching the remedy
may lead to unending uncertainty and
consequential
anarchy.
The
statute
providing limitation is founded on public
policy. It is enshrined in the maxim
Interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it
is for the general welfare that a period be
put to litigation). It is for this reason that
when an action becomes barred by time,
the Court should be slow to ignore delay
for the reason that once limitation
expires, other party matures his rights on
the subject with attainment of finality.
Though it cannot be doubted that refusal
to
condone
delay
would result
in
foreclosing the suiter from putting forth
his cause but simultaneously the party on
the other hand is also entitled to sit and
feel carefree after a particular length of
time, getting relieved from persistent and
continued litigation.

10. There is no presumption that
delay in approaching the court is always
deliberate.
No
person
gains
from
deliberate delaying a matter by not
resorting to take appropriate legal remedy
within time but then the words "sufficient
cause" show that delay, if any, occurred,
should not be deliberate, negligent and
due to casual approach of concerned
litigant, but, it should be bona fide, and,
for the reasons beyond his control, and, in
any case should not lack bona fide. If the
explanation does not smack of lack of
bona fide, the Court should show due
consideration to the suiter, but, when
there is apparent casual approach on the
part of suiter, the approach of Court is
also bound to change. Lapse on the part
of litigant in approaching Court within
time is understandable but a total inaction
for long period of delay without any
explanation whatsoever and that too in
absence of showing any sincere attempt
on the part of suiter, would add to his
negligence, and would be relevant factor
going against him.

11. I need not to burden this
judgment with a catena of decisions
explaining and laying down as to what
should be the approach of Court on
construing
"sufficient
cause"
under
Section 5 of Act, 1963 and it would be
suffice to refer a very few of them besides
those already referred.

12. In Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs.
Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 a
three Judges Bench of the Court said,
that, unless want of bona fide of such
inaction or negligence as would deprive
a party of the protection of Section 5 is
proved, the application must not be
thrown out or any delay cannot be
refused to be condoned.
2 All. Smt. Sarla Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1067

13. The Privy Council in Brij Indar
Singh Vs. Kanshi Ram ILR (1918) 45 Cal
94 observed that true guide for a court to
exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal. This
principle still holds good inasmuch as the
aforesaid decision of Privy Council as
repeatedly been referred to, and, recently in
State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok AO and
others, AIR 2005 SC 2191.

14. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai
Baburao Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil
and others, JT 2001(5) SC 608 the Court
said that under Section 5 of Act, 1963 it
should adopt a pragmatic approach. A
distinction must be made between a case
where the delay is inordinate and a case
where the delay is of a few days. In the
former case consideration of prejudice to
the other side will be a relevant factor so
the case calls for a more cautious approach
but in the latter case no such consideration
may arise and such a case deserves a liberal
approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid
down in this regard and the basic guiding
factor is advancement of substantial justice.

15. In Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by
LRS. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon
Medium Project and Anr. (2008) 17 SCC
448, in para 17 of the judgment, the Court
said :

"...The
evidence
on
record
suggests neglect of its own right for long
time in preferring appeals. The court
cannot enquire into belated and state
claims on the ground of equity. Delay
defeats equity. The court helps those who
are vigilant and "do not slumber over their
rights."

16. In Maniben Devraj Shah Vs.
Municipal
Corporation
of
Brihan
Mumbai, 2012 (5) SCC 157, in para 18 of
the judgment, the Court said as under:

"What needs to be emphasised is
that even though a liberal and justice
oriented approach is required to be
adopted in the exercise of power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other
similar statutes, the Courts can neither
become oblivious of the fact that the
successful litigant has acquired certain
rights on the basis of the judgment under
challenge and a lot of time is consumed at
various stages of litigation apart from the
cost. What colour the expression 'sufficient
cause' would get in the factual matrix of a
given case would largely depend on bona
fide nature of the explanation. If the Court
finds that there has been no negligence on
the part of the applicant and the cause
shown for the delay does not lack bona
fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on
the other hand, the explanation given by
the applicant is found to be concocted or he
is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
cause, then it would be a legitimate
exercise of discretion not to condone the
delay. In cases involving the State and its
agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can
take note of the fact that sufficient time is
taken in the decision making process but no
premium can be given for total lethargy or
utter negligence on the part of the officers
of
the
State
and
/
or
its
agencies/instrumentalities
and
the
applications filed by them for condonation
of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of
course by accepting the plea that dismissal
of the matter on the ground of bar of
limitation will cause injury to the public
interest."
1068 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. In my view, the kind of
explanation rendered herein does not
satisfy the observations of Apex Court that
if delay has occurred for reasons which
does not smack of mala fide, the Court
should be reluctant to refuse condonation.
On the contrary, I find that here is a case
which shows a complete careless and
reckless long delay on the part of appellant
which has remain virtually unexplained at
all. Therefore, I do not find any reason to
exercise my judicial discretion exercising
judiciously so as to justify condonation of
delay in the present case.

18. Accordingly, the application for
condonation of delay is rejected.

19. Application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.

20. Consequently, the appeal does not
survive and is accordingly dismissed.

21. No order as to costs.

22. Consign to record.

23. Let a copy of this judgment be
transmitted to the learned trial court for its
compliance.
----------
(2024) 2 ILRA 1068
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.01.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJESH SINGH CHAUHAN, J.

Application u/s 482 No. 629 of 2024

Informant/Father of Victim ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties
Counsel for the Applicant:
Rehan Ahmad Siddiqui, Dildar Khan

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A.

Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code,
1973 - Section 482 - Indian Penal Code,
1860 - Sections 376-D & 506 - Juvenile
Justice Act, - Sections 94 & 94(2) -
Information
Technology
Act,
2000
-
Sections 67-A - Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Sections
5-G & 6 - Application u/s 482 - challenging the
Juvenile Justice Board's order dated 16.11.2023
- which declared the accused (opposite party
no. 2) as a juvenile involving serious charges
under IPC, IT Act, and POCSO Act - The
petitioner argued that the Board ignored
discrepancies in age records, particularly the
implausible five-month age gap between the
accused and his sister, and relied on a medical
report instead of school certificates as mandated
under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act - St.
opposed the petition, asserting that the Board acted
within legal bounds by ordering a medical
examination due to doubts over the age - held -
although the petition was maintainable under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process, there was
no illegality in the Board's decision, which followed
due procedure - consequently, present application is
dismissed, with liberty granted to the petitioner to
raise all relevant issues before the trial court, which
may consider them in accordance with law, especially
given the gravity of the allegations.
(Para - 6, 7, 9)

Application Dismissed. (E-11)

List of referred Cases: -
1. Dhariwal Tobacco Products Limited & ors. Vs
St. of Mah. & anr. - (2009) 2 SCC 370,

2. Prabha Chawla Vs St. of Rajasthan & anr. -
(2016) 16 SCC 30,

3. Dr. Mohd. Iqbal Gaji Vs St. of U.P. & anr. -
Application U/S 482 No. 20368/2017 - order dt.
7.4.2023,

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rajesh Singh
Chauhan, J.)