# Smt. Savitri Devi v. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur and others

- **Citation:** (2003) 2 ILRA 394
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2003-03-31
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25104 of 1996
- **Bench:** Dr. B.S. Chauhan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-savitri-devi-v-civil-judge-senior-division-gorakhpur-and-others-40119
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 39-Rule-
2A-Suit for permanent injution-both the
Parties restrained from alienating the
disputed land- Respondent no. 3 sold his
share to the Respondent no. 4 to 6 -
whether the purchasers can put any
claim for possession? - held no. but can
be punished for violation of interim order
passed by the Trial Court.

Held. Para - 26

Petition
succeeds
and
is
allowed.
Learned trial court is directed to attach
the entire land in dispute and force the
respondent no. 3 to comply with the
order passed by that court on 18.8.1992
and further to conclude the trial of the
suit expeditiously.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1953 SC - 487, AIR 1966 SC - 470
AIR 1990 SC - 845, 1995 (6) SCC - 625
AIR 1967 SC - 1386, 2000 (4) SCC - 625
AIR 1961 SC - 221, AIR 1970 SC - 1767
1975 CR.L.J. 1283, 1987 CR. L.J. 1240
AIR 1998 SC - 2765, AIR 1971 ALLD. - 231
AIR 1981 ALLD.-231, AIR 1989 (NOC) 50
AIR 1967 - GUJ. - 124, AIR 1985 P & H. 299
AIR 1961 - 221, AIR 1973 ALLD - 449
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
2 All] Smt. Savitri Devi V. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur and others
395
AIR 1986 Ker. 63, AIR 1915 PC - 106
AIR 1936 PC - 141, AIR 1954 SC - 186
AIR 1976 SC - 859, 2001 (7) SCC. 530

(B) code of Civil Procedure - O. 39 Rule 2
A-Provisions
fro
punishment
on
disobedience of Interim Order - Whether
the special provisions of C.P.C. can
override
effect
upon
the
general
provisions of contempt of court Act ?
held yes.

Held - para 18

Thus, it is evident from the above
discussion that the proceedings are
analogous to the proceedings under the
Act, 1972. The only distinction is that as
the Legislature, in its wisdom, has
enacted a special provision enacting the
provisions of O. 39 R. 2A, it would prevail
over the provisions of the Contempt of
Court Act. Though the High Court, by
virtue of the provisions of Section 10 of
the Act 1972 can initiate the contempt
proceeding even for disobedience of the
injuction order granted by the civil court,
but the exercise of such power is
discretionary and generally does not
require to be exercised in view of the
special power conferred upon the civil
court itself as held by the Division Bench.

## Text

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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
394
appointment on compassionate ground
under the scheme as a matter of right by
the authorities at the same time were
bound to apply liberally the object of
beneficial legislation and to traverse upon
all the relevant aspects in order to
determine whether the applicant was
entitled
to
get
appointment
on
compassionate ground. In these matters,
the decision tempered with compassion is
the requirement and not the blinkered
approach unconcerned with fair play,
compassion and justice. The recording of
reason is yet another aspect constituting
an essential competent of natural justice,
which all the authorities exercising power
under the scheme or rules are required to
do. As stated supra, a laconic order has
been passed and no reasons have been
assigned. The laconic order cannot be
upgraded to the pedestal of an order based
on reasons. The basis principle of
Constitution makes it imperative for
administrative authorities clothed with the
duty to decide something on consideration
of policy or scheme, to act judicially as a
hedge against arbitrariness. It is in this
conspectus that reasons are the imperative
requirement
for
an
administrative
authority and in the instant case, the
authorities having not assigned any
reason, have acted in antagonism of the
basic principles of the Constitution and as
such the order cannot be sustained.

14. As a result of the foregoing
discussion, the writ petition succeeds and
is allowed and the Competent authority is
directed to consider the case of the
petitioner in accordance with the scheme
and the observation made in the body of
this judgment.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 31.3.2003

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 25104 of 1996

Smt. Savitri Devi

...Petitioner
Versus
Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur
and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.K. Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri A.P. Tewari
Sri S.S. Tripathi
S.C.

Code of Civil Procedure-Order 39-Rule-
2A-Suit for permanent injution-both the
Parties restrained from alienating the
disputed land- Respondent no. 3 sold his
share to the Respondent no. 4 to 6 -
whether the purchasers can put any
claim for possession? - held no. but can
be punished for violation of interim order
passed by the Trial Court.

Held. Para - 26

Petition
succeeds
and
is
allowed.
Learned trial court is directed to attach
the entire land in dispute and force the
respondent no. 3 to comply with the
order passed by that court on 18.8.1992
and further to conclude the trial of the
suit expeditiously.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1953 SC - 487, AIR 1966 SC - 470
AIR 1990 SC - 845, 1995 (6) SCC - 625
AIR 1967 SC - 1386, 2000 (4) SCC - 625
AIR 1961 SC - 221, AIR 1970 SC - 1767
1975 CR.L.J. 1283, 1987 CR. L.J. 1240
AIR 1998 SC - 2765, AIR 1971 ALLD. - 231
AIR 1981 ALLD.-231, AIR 1989 (NOC) 50
AIR 1967 - GUJ. - 124, AIR 1985 P & H. 299
AIR 1961 - 221, AIR 1973 ALLD - 449
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
2 All] Smt. Savitri Devi V. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur and others
395
AIR 1986 Ker. 63, AIR 1915 PC - 106
AIR 1936 PC - 141, AIR 1954 SC - 186
AIR 1976 SC - 859, 2001 (7) SCC. 530

(B) code of Civil Procedure - O. 39 Rule 2
A-Provisions
fro
punishment
on
disobedience of Interim Order - Whether
the special provisions of C.P.C. can
override
effect
upon
the
general
provisions of contempt of court Act ?
held yes.

Held - para 18

Thus, it is evident from the above
discussion that the proceedings are
analogous to the proceedings under the
Act, 1972. The only distinction is that as
the Legislature, in its wisdom, has
enacted a special provision enacting the
provisions of O. 39 R. 2A, it would prevail
over the provisions of the Contempt of
Court Act. Though the High Court, by
virtue of the provisions of Section 10 of
the Act 1972 can initiate the contempt
proceeding even for disobedience of the
injuction order granted by the civil court,
but the exercise of such power is
discretionary and generally does not
require to be exercised in view of the
special power conferred upon the civil
court itself as held by the Division Bench.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed
for issuing direction to the respondent
no.2 to attach the properties of the
respondent no.3, including those sold to
the respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 as
described at the foot of the plaint in Suit
no. 1586 of 1992 and for quashing the
order
dated
10.11.1995,
passed
by
respondent no. 2 of the extent that it
exempted the property of respondent no. 3
from attachment which has been sold to
the respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 in
contravention of the interim order passed
by the trial court.
2. Facts and circumstances giving
rise to this case are that petitioner and
respondent no. 3 are mother and son and
that they had inherited the bhumidari
rights in the agricultural land and there
was some apprehension of both the sides
that the other party may alienate the land
in dispute. Suit No. 1586 of 1992 was
filed by the petitioner in the trial court,
wherein application for interim relief
under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code
of civil Procedure (hereinafter called
CPC) was also filed for restraining the
defendant-respondent no. 3 to alienate the
property. After receiving the notice of the
court, subsequent to passing of the
exparte interim order, respondent no. 3
appeared in the court on 18.8.1992 and
made a similar application that the
petitioner be also restrained from
alienating any part of the land. On
18.8.1992 the trial court passed an order
restraining the parties in the suit, the
petitioner and other sons, including
respondent no. 3, from selling the
property or any part thereof to any other
person till the decision of the suit. The
respondent no. 3 alienated his undivided
share in the land in dispute on 19.8.1992
and 27.8.1992 executing sale deeds in
favour of the respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6.
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied, the
petitioner-plaintiff filed an application to
implead respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 in her
suit and further prayed to initiate the
proceeding under the provisions of Order
39, Rule 2-A C.P.C.. As the said sale
deeds had been executed in contravention
of the interim order dated 18.8.1992, the
learned court directed attachment of the
property of respondent no. 3 other than
those which had been sold to respondent
nos. 4, 5 and 6 and further respondent no.
3 was directed to be detained in civil
imprisonment
vide
order
dated
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
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10.11.1995 the petitioner preferred an
appeal which has been dismissed vide
order dated 19.4.1996, hence this petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that any action taken in
contravention of the order of the court is a
nullity. Therefore both the courts below
have
failed
to
appreciate
that
the
properties allegedly sold should also have
been attached as the sale deeds have been
executed in contravention of the interim
order passed by the Court. Therefore, the
impugned order requires interference.

4. However, learned counsel for
private respondents has submitted that
once the land had been sold and a 3rd
party right had been created and they had
been given possession of the land, the
question of attachment of the property did
not arise and non interference is called
for.

I
have
considered
the
rival
submission made by the learned counsel
for the parties and perused the record.

5.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent has made a submission that
after execution of the sale deed the
purchaser-respondent nos. 4, 5 and 6 had
been put into possession of the land sold
to them. In fact, the sale deeds have not
been placed on record, but it remains an
admitted fact that it was the respondent
no. 3 who had merely sold the undivided
1/4th share in the property in dispute, and
therefore, it is beyond imagination how
the respondent nos. 4 to 6 in pursuance of
the alleged sale deeds could be put to
possession if there had been no partition
prior to execution of the sale deeds, and
no partition had taken place subsequent
thereto.
6. It is settled legal proposition that
a co-sharer can transfer/alienate his share
but possession of the same cannot be
handed over to the transferee unless the
properties partition by metes and bounds.
Therefore, a transferee is not permitted to
take the possession of the share unless
partition takes place (vide Sidheshwar
Mukharjee Vs. Bhubneshwar Prasad
Narain Singh, AIR 1953 SC 487; M.V.S.
Mkanikayala
Rao
Vs.
M.
Narasimhaswami & Ors. AIR 1966 SC
470; and Kartar Singh Vs. Harjinder
Singh, AIR 1990 SC 845).

Hon'ble Apex Court held as under:-

"Equally, it is settled law that a
coparcener has no right to sell his
undivided share in the joint family
property and any sale of undivided and
specified items does not bind the other
coparceners. Since the specific properties
were purchased prior to the institution of
the
suit
for
partition,
though
the
appellants have no right to equities, it
could be said that the respective share to
which their principal alienor was entitled
would be allottable to them as a special
case."

7. Therefore, in view of the above,
even if the respondent nos. 4 and 6 have
been put in possession of the land as it
was not legally permissible for them to
take possession thereof, it may be
presumed that they had taken possession
illegally, and without any authority of
law.

8. Admittedly, there was an order
dated 18.8.1992 for both the parties not to
alienate any part of the property in
dispute. Respondent no. 3 had executed
two sale deeds in favour of respondent
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2 All] Smt. Savitri Devi V. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur and others
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nos. 4 to 6. It is settled legal proposition
that sale deeds so executed are a nullity as
having been executed in disobedience of
the interim order of the Court. In Mulraj
Vs. Murti Raghunathji Mharaj, AIR
1967 SC 1386 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered the effect of action
taken subsequent to passing of an interim
order it its disobedience and held that any
action taken in disobedience of the order
passed by the Court would be illegal
subsequent action would be a nullity.

9. Similar view has been reiterated
in Surajit Singh & Ors. Vs. Harbans
Singh & Ors., 1995 (6) SCC 50; Govt. of
A.P. Vs. Gudepu Sailoo & Ors. 2000 (4)
SCC 625; Hansraj Tirathram Vs. The
Administrator,
Municipality
Jammu,
AIR 1963 Kerala 18.

10. Therefore, there is no doubt that
the alleged sale deeds are nullity, meaning
thereby unenforceable and in executable
and deserve to be ignored.

11. So for as the scope of Order 39,
Rule 2-A is concerned, the issue has been
considered by the Court from time to
time. The said provisions are of a
different nature altogether. A Constitution
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme court, in
State of Bihar vs. Rani Sona Bati Kumari,
AIR 1961 SC 221, has categorically held
that the said provisions deal with the
willful defiance of the order passed by the
Civil Court. The Apex Court. Held that
there must be willful disobedience of the
injunction passed by the court and order
of punishment be passed unless the court
is satisfied that the part was, in fact,.
Under a misapprehension as to the scope
of the order of there was an unintentional
wrong for the reason the order was
ambiguous and reasonably capable of
more than one interpretation or the party
never intended to disobey the order but
conducted himself in accordance with the
interpretation
of
the
order.
The
proceedings are purely quasi-criminal in
nature and are, thus, punitive. Even the
corporate
body
like
municipality/
government can be punished though on
officer of it be a party by name. A similar
view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Aligarh Muncipal
Board & ors. Vs Ekka Tonga Mazoor
union & ors., AIR 1970 SC 1767; by the
Allahabad High court in Ratan Narain
Mulla vs The chief Secretary, Govt. of
U.P. & ors, 1975 Cr. L.J. 1283; and by
the Delhi High court in M/s Jyoti Limited
vs. Smt. Kanwaljit Kaur Bhasin & Anr.,
Cri. L.J. 1281.

12. In Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla
& ors. Vs Hind Rubber industries Pvt.
Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1240, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court dealt with a case of
disobedience of an injunction passed
under O. 39 R. 1 and 2 of the Code,
wherein the contention was raised that the
proceedings under O., 39 R. 2A cannot be
initiated and no punishment can be
imposed for disobedience of the order
because the civil court, which granted the
injunction, has no jurisdiction to entertain
the suit. The Apex Court rejected the
contention holding that a party aggrieved
of the order has a right to ask the court to
vacate the injuction pointing out to it that
it had no jurisdiction or approach the
higher court for setting aside that order,
but so long the order remains in force, the
party cannot be permitted to disobey it or
avoid punishment of disobedience on any
ground, including the court had no
jurisdiction, even if ultimately the court
comes to the conclusion that the court had
no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
398
party, who willingly disobeys the order
and acts in violation of such an injunction,
runs the risk for facing the consequence
of punishment.

13. In the Samee Khan vs. Bindu
Khan, AIR SC 2765, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that in Exercise of
the power under O, 39 R. 2A of the Code,
the civil court has a power either to orders
detention
for
disobedience
of
the
disobeying party or attaching his property
and if the circumstances and facts of the
case so demand, both steps can also be
resorted to. The Apex Court held as
under:-

"But the position under R. 2A order
39 is different. Even if the injunction
order was subsequently set aside the
disobedience does not get erased. It may
be a different matter that the rigour of
such disobedience may be toned down if
the order is subsequently set aside. For
what purpose the property is to be
attached in the case of disobedience of the
order injunction? Sub-rule (2) provides
that if the disobedience of breach
continues beyond one year from the date
of attachment the Court is empowered to
sell the property under attachment and
compensate the affected party from such
sale proceeds. In other words, attachment
will
continue
only
till
the
breach
continues or the disobedience persists
subject to limit of one year period. If the
disobedience cases to continue in the
meanwhile the attachment also would
cease. Thus, even under Order 39 Rule 2A the attachment is a mode to complex
the opposite party to obey the order of
injunction. But detaining the disobedient
party in civil prison is a mode of
punishment for his being guilty of such is
obedience"
14. Thus, in view of the above, it
becomes crystal clear that the proceedings
are analogous to the contempt of court
proceedings but they are taken under the
provisions of O. 39 R. 2A of the Code for
the reason that the special provision
inserted in the Code shall prevail over the
general law of contempt contained in the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1972 (for short,
"the Act, 1972"). Even the High court, in
such a case, shall not entertain the petition
under the provisions of Act, 1972. (Vide
Ram Roop Pandey vs. R.K. Bhargave &
ors., AIR 1971 All 231; Smt. Indu teari
vs. Ram, Bahadur Chaudhari & ors.,
AIR 1981 All. 309; and Rudraiha vs.
State of Karnataks & ors. AIR 1982 Kar.
1982)

15. In Md. Jamal Paramanik & ors.
Vs Md. Amanullah Munshi, AIR 1989
(NOC) 50 Gau), the Gauhati High court
held that it is not permissible for the court
to impose a fince or compensation as one
of the punishments for the reason that the
provisions of O. 39 R. 2A do not provide
for it. In Thakorlal Parshottamdas vs.
Chandulal Chunital, AIR 1967 Guj. 124,
Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.N. Bhagwati (As
His
Lordship
then
was)
held
the
punishment
for
breach
of
interim
injunction could not be set-aside even on
the ground that the injunction was
ultimately vacated by the appellate court.
In Rachhpal Singh Vs. Gurdarshan
Singh, AIR 1985 P & H 299, a Division
Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court
held that if an interim injunction had been
passed and is alleged to have been
violated and application for initiating
contempt proceeding under O. 39 R. 2A
has been filed but during its pendency the
suit itself is withdrawn, the court may not
be justified to pass order of punishment at
that state. Thus, it made a distinction from
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2 All] Smt. Savitri Devi V. Civil Judge, (Senior Division), Gorakhpur and others
399
the above referred Gujarat High Court's
decision in Thakorlal Parshottamdas
(supra) that contempt proceedings should
be initiated when the interim injunction is
in operation.

16. A constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in The State of
Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR
1961 SC 221 observed that the purpose of
such proceedings is for the enforcement
or effectuation of an order of execution.
Similarly, in Sitarami Vs. Ganesh Das,
AIR 1973 Alld. 449 the Court held as
under ;-

"The purpose of Order 39, Rule 2-A,
Civil P.C. is to enforce the order of
injunction. It is a provision which permits
the Court to execute the injunction order.
Its provisions are similar to the provisions
of Order 21, Rule 32, Civil P.C. which
provide for the execution of a decree for
injunction. The mode of execution given
in Order 21, Rule 32 is the same as
provided in Rule 2-A of Order 39. In
either case for the execution of the order
or decree of injunction attachment of
property is to be made and the person who
is to be compelled to obey the injunction
can be detained in civil prison. The
purpose is not to punish the man but to
see that the decree or order is obeyed and
the wrong done by disobedience of the
order is remedied and the status quo ante
is brought into effect. This view finds
support from the observations of the
Supreme Court in the case of State of
Bihar Vs. Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961
SC 221; while dealing with O. 39, Rule
2(iii), Civil P.C. (without the U.P.
Amendment) the Court held that the
proceedings are in substance designed to
effect enforcement of or to execute the
order, and a parallel was drawn between
he provisions of O. 21, R. 32 and of O.
39, R. 2 (iii), C.P.C. which is similar to
Order 39, R. 2-A. This curative function
and purpose of rule 2-A of Order 39, Civil
P.C. is also evident from the provision in
Rule 2-A for the lifting of imprisonment,
which normally would be when the order
has been complied with and the coercion
of imprisonment no longer remains
necessary. Hence, even if Sitaram had
earlier been sent to the civil imprisonment
he would have been released on the
tinshed being removed, and it would
therefore now serve no purpose to sent
him to Prison. For the same reason the
attachment of property is also no longer
needed. The order of the Court below has
lost its utility and need no longer be kept
alive."

17. In Kochira Krishnan Vs. Joseph
Desouza, AIR 1986 Ker. 63, it has been
held that violation of injuction or even
undertaking given before that court is
punishable under O. 39 R. 2 A of the
code. The punishment can be imposed
even if the matter stood disposed of, for
the reason that the court is concerned only
with the question whether there was a
disobedience of the order of injuction or
violation of an undertaking given before
the court and not with the ultimate
decision in the matter. While deciding the
said case, the Court placed reliance upon
the judgement of the Privy Council in
Eastern Truct Co. vs. Makenzie Mann &
Co. Ltd., AIR 1915 PC 106, wherein it
had been observed as under :-

"An injuction, although subsequently
discharged because the plaintiff's case
failed, must be obeyed while it lasts..."

This Court had taken a similar view
in Magna Vs. Rustam, AIR 1963 Raj.3
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 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2003
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18. Thus, it is evident from the
above discussion that the proceedings are
analogous to the proceedings under the
Act, 1972. The only distinction is that as
the Legislature, in its wisdom, has enacted
a
special
provision
enacting
the
provisions of O. 39 R. 2A, it would
prevail over the provisions of the
Contempt of Court Act. Though the High
Court, by virtue of the provisions of
Section 10 of the Act 1972 can initiate the
contempt
proceeding
even
for
disobedience of the injuction order
granted by the civil court, but the exercise
of such power is discretionary and
generally does not require to be exercised
in view of the special power conferred
upon the civil court itself as held by the
Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
in Dr. Bimal Chandr sen Vs. Mrs. Kamla
Mathur, 1983 Cri.L.J. 494.

19. In Andre Paul Terence Ambard
Vs. Attorney General for Trinidad and
Tabogo, AIR1936 PC 141, the Privy
Council has observed that the proceedings
under the Contempt of Courts Act are
quasi-judicial in nature and orders passed
in those proceedings are to be treated as
order passed in criminal cases. In
Sukhdeo Singh Vs. Hon'ble the Chief
Justice Teja Singh & Hon'ble Justice the
Par Pepsu High Court at Patila, AIR
1954 SC 186, the Supreme Court has
taken the same view.

20. A Full Bench of Punjab &
Haryana High Court, in Sher Singh Vs.
R.P. Kapoor, AIR 1968 Pb. 217, has held
that the contempt proceedings are, by all
means a quasi-criminal in nature. The
applicant must prove his allegations
beyond reasonable doubt and the alleged
contemnors are entitled to the benefit of
doubt. The same view has been taken by
the Division Bench of Madras High Court
in B. Yegnaryaniah, AIR 1974 Mad.313,
and the Lahore High Court in Homi
Rustom
G.
Pardiawala
Vs.
Sub.
Inspector Baig & others AIR 1941 Lah.
196.

21. In S. Abdul Karim vs. M.K.
Prakash, AIR 1976 SC 859, the Hon'ble
Apex court has held that the standard of
proof required to establish a charge in
contempt proceeding is the same as in any
other criminal proceedings. It is all the
more necessary to insist upon strict proof
of such charged act complained of is
committed by
a person performing
judicial/quasi-judicial proceedings.

22. In Jawand Singh Hakum Singh
Vs. Om Prakash, AIR 1959 Pb. 632, the
Punjab & Haryana High Court, while
delaing with a contempt matter, had
observed that a guilt of a person of having
committed contempt of court must rest on
reasonable certainty. Suspicion, no matter
how strong and speculative, however,
suspicions must not form the basis for
contempt.

23. In Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi
Gulati & ors. (2001) 7 SSC 530, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court held that burden
and standard of proof in contempt
proceeding,
being
quasi-criminal
in
nature, is the standard of proof required in
criminal proceedings for the reason that
contempt proceedings are quasi criminal
in nature.

24. In view of the above discussion
one reaches the inescapable conclusion
that proceedings under O.39 R.2A are
quasi criminal in nature and are meant to
maintain the dignity of the court in the
eyes of the people so that the supremacy
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2 All] National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Naresh Kumar and others
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of law may prevail and to deter the people
for mustering the courage to disobey the
interim injuction passed by the court.

25. To sum up the case, the sale
deeds
allegedly
executed
by
the
respondent no. 3 in favour of respondent
nos. 4 to 6 are nullity as had been
executed in disobedience of the interim
order passed by the trail court on
18.8.1992. Secondly respondent nos. 4 to
6 could not be in possession of the land as
there has been no partition by metes and
bounds between co-sharers. If they are in
possession, it is to be ignored and thirdly
as the alleged sale deeds have to be
ignored the learned court below ought to
have attached the entire property which,
including the land sold vide two sale
deeds.

26. Petition succeeds and is allowed.
Learned trial court is directed to attach the
entire land in dispute and force the
respondent no. 3 to comply with the order
passed by that court on 18.8.1992 and
further to conclude the trial of the suit
expeditiously.

27. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, the respondent nos. 4 to 6 shall
pay a sum of Rs.5000/- as a cost to the
petitioner.
---------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.03.2003.

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.P. SRIVASTAVA, J.
THE HON'BLE M.P. SINGH, J.

F.A.F.O. No. 736 of 2003

National Insurance Company Limited

 ...Defendant-Appellant
Versus
Naresh Kumar and others
 ...Claimant-
 Respondent.

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Satish Chaturvedi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri J.J. Munir

Motor Vehicles Act 1988-Section 170 -
Appeal filed by Insurance Company -No
permission obtained before filing the
Appeal held Quantum of Compensation
can not be questioned.

Held - Para 8
Case law discussed:
J.t. 2002 (7) SC -251
2003 ALJ 247

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.P. Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Satish Chaturvedi
learned counsel for the insurer-Appellant
and Sri J.J. Munir, learned counsel for the
claimants-caveators.

2. The appellant feels aggrieved by
the award of the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, determining an amount of
Rs.2,42,726/- (Rupees two lacs forty two
thousands, seven hundred and twenty six
only) as just compensation, to which the
claimant Naresh Kumar was found
entitled to on account of the grievous