# Smt. Seema & Anr v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2014) 3 ILRA 1545
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2014-11-28
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 64257 of 2014
- **Bench:** Surya Prakash Kesarwani
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-seema-anr-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43068
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.-226-Protection of
matrimonial life-girl belongs to Hindu
religion-while boy a Muslim religion-in
absence of conversion of religion-such
marriage alleged to be solemn in Maszid-as
per Qurran-no marriage-apart form that
both are residing at Bombay-parent of girl
also at Mumbai-no territorial jurisdictionpetition dismissed.
Held: Para-13 & 14

## Text

3 All]. Smt. Seema & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1545
19(6) of the Constitution. As a part of its policy
of the distribution of its largesse government
have prescribed the eligibility criteria to
the persons to obtain dealership for
distribution of petroleum products. The
distribution of the largesse of the State is
for the common good and to subserve the
common good of as many persons as
possible. The Government of India
intended to group together certain near
relations as a unit and one among that unit
alone was made eligible to apply for and
claim for grant of dealership. Further,
economic and social justice as envisaged
in the preamble of the Construction is
sought to be achieved. Therefore, there is
a reasonable nexus between the object and
the prescription of the eligibility criteria
envisages in the guidelines. All those who
satisfy the eligibility criteria alone are
entitled to apply for the consideration of
the grant of dealership. It is true that in
case of physically handicapped persons,
only three classes of persons were made
ineligible.
Physically
handicapped
persons have been treated as a class by
themselves. Under these circumstances,
any other person other than PH cannot
claim parity with PH persons. As far as
partnership is concerned, if one of the
persons either have a dealership or
relations who were found to be eligible
under the relationship criteria, and had the
dealership, than clause 10 of the said
guidelines
gets
attracted
and
such
partnership also did not become eligible
to apply for dealership/ distributorship.
The object of clause 10 appears to be that
for those partners who either one among
themselves or any of the relations of one
of the partners had a dealership, the other
partner or the specified relations also not
be eligible to apply for grant of dealership
individually or as a member of the
partnership. Therefore the guidelines are
based on public policy to give effect to
the constitutional creed of Part IV of the
Indian Constitution."
7. In view of the decision of the
Supreme Court, noted above, such a
qualification cannot be said to be
arbitrary. Hence, we do not see any merit
in the matter. The writ petition is,
accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.11.2014
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SURYA PRAKASH
KESARWANI, J.
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 64257 of 2014
Smt. Seema & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Dinesh Kumar, Sri A.R. Nadiwal
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Protection of
matrimonial life-girl belongs to Hindu
religion-while boy a Muslim religion-in
absence of conversion of religion-such
marriage alleged to be solemn in Maszid-as
per Qurran-no marriage-apart form that
both are residing at Bombay-parent of girl
also at Mumbai-no territorial jurisdictionpetition dismissed.
Held: Para-13 & 14
13. Since for a valid Muslim marriage both
the spouses have to be Muslim as per
verses of Holy Quran as noted in the
judgment in the case of Dilawar Habib
Siddiqui (supra) and since undisputedaly
the petitioner no. 1 is a Hindu girl and has
1546
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
not embraced Islam and as such it cannot
be said that there was any valid marriage.
14. Besides above both the petitioners
have stated that they and their parents
reside in Mumbai and petitioner no. 2 is
working in Mumbai and as such even no
cause of action has arisen within the
territorial limits of this Court.
Case Law discussed:
2010 (69) ACC 997
(Delivered by Hon'ble Surya Prakash
Kesarwani, J.)
1. Heard Sri Dinesh Kumar, learned
counsel for the petitioners and Sri Dinesh
Kumar Dubey, learned Standing Counsel
for the State- Respondents.
2.
This writ petition has been filed
praying for a writ, order or direction in the
nature of mandamus commanding the
respondent
authorities
to
protect
the
matrimonial life and liberty of the petitioners.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners
submits that the petitioners have married
with each other but the respondent no. 4 is
interfering and as such mandamus may be
issued to the respondents to protect the
matrimonial life and liberty of the
petitioners. Both the petitioners are present
in the Court and have been identified by
their learned counsel.
4.
Learned Standing counsel submits
that there is no religion conversion by
petitioner no. 1 who is a Hindu girl and
therefore there cannot be a marriage of
petitioner no. 2 ( a muslim) as per the Holy
Quran.
5. I have carefully considered the
submission of learned counsel for the
parties.
6. During the course of hearing, the
petitioner no. 1 offered for recording her
statement on oath. Both the petitioners
have given their statement on oath before
this Court which have recorded in open
Court and in presence of learned counsel
for the parties. Learned counsel for the
petitioners
has
also
identified
the
petitioners and also put his signature
below the signatures of the petitioners on
their statement on oath recorded today.
7. The aforesaid statement on oath
of the petitioners recorded today (
28.11.2014) are reproduced below :-
(i) Statement on oath of Seema
(petitioner no.1) :-
;kph la0 1 lhek us le{k U;k;ky; l'kiFk
c;ku fd;k fd vkt fnukWd 28&11&14 dks
fuEufyf[kr c;ku ns jgh gwWA
esjk uke lhek gSA esjs firk th dk uke f'ko
ukjk;.k gSA og eqEcbZ esa jgrs gSa vkSj ogha O;kikj
djrs gSA
eSa d{kk 12 rd i<+h gwW A eSa lqyrku ds lkFk
fnukWd 16&11&2014 dks bykgkckn vkbZA mUgksaus
esjk fudkg 23&11&14 dks gkbZdksVZ ds lkeus
elftn esa djk fn;kA eSaus viuk /keZ ifjorZu ugh
fd;k gSA fQj dgk eSaus viuk /keZ ifjorZu dj
fy;k gSA esjs ikl /keZ ifjorZu dk dksbZ izek.k ugha
gSA fQj dgk eSa /keZ ifjorZu djuk pkgrh gwWA
(ii) Statement on oath of Sultan
(petitioner no.2)
;kph la0 2 lqYrku us le{k U;k;ky; l'kiFk
c;ku fd;k fd vkt fnukWd 28&11&14 dks
fuEufyf[kr c;ku ns jgk gwWA
esjk uke lqYrku gSA esjs firk dk uke blkd
vUlkjh gSA og eqEcbZ esa jgrs gSaA eSa eqEcbZ esa
dkjisUVj dk dk;Z djrk gwWA eSa ;gkWa ij pkj&ikWp
fnu igys lhek dks eqEcbZ ls bykgkckn lkFk ysdj
vk;k gwWA eSaus buls fudkg bykgkckn esa dj fy;kA
eSas bLyke /keZ ekurk gwWA eSaus viuk /keZ ifjorZu ugha
fd;k gSA eSus gkbZdksVZ ds lkeus buls fudkg dj
fy;kA eSus budk /keZ ifjorZu ugha djk;k gSA esjh
tUefrfFk 24&4&93 gSA eSa d{kk 8 rd i<+k gwWA**
3 All]. Smt. Seema & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1547
8. In the statement as reproduced above,
both the petitioners have admitted that their
parents are residing in Mumbai. In paragraph
no. 8 of the writ petition, it is stated that the
petitioners
are
neighbor
at
Thane,
Maharashtra. A photostat copy of an alleged
Adhar Card of the petitioner no. 1 has been
filed in which her address is mentioned as
216/3 , Pushpa Nagar P.P. Marg, Near
Smashan Bhumi, Dongari, Virar ( West),
Thane
Virar,
Maharashtra-401305.
In
photostate copy of an alleged voter ID Card
address of petitioner no. 1 is mentioned as 216
Rajachatra Pati Shiva Ji Marg, Virar is
mentioned. A photostat copy of an alleged
passport of petitioner no. 2 has been filed in
which his address is shown as P.O.
Madhwalia, Mahrajganj ( Uttar Pradesh). It
has not been explained in the writ petition that
if the petitioners and their parents are resident
of Mumbai then in what circumstances, the
writ petition has been filed before this Court
impleading the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Mahrajganj, SHO PS Kothibhar,
District Mahrajganj as respondnets and the
relief in the nature of mandamus has been
prayed against them.
9. In the alleged Nikahnama the date
and place of Nikah is recorded as under :
^^rkjh[k fudkg & 23-11-2014 oDr 4 cts
fnu brokj ojeqdke gkbZdksVZ] bykgkckn**
10. Petitioner no.1 is a Hindu girl and
as per her own statement as reproduced
above, she has neither renounced Hindu
religion nor has embraced Islam prior to the
alleged Nikah. She has also not changed her
original Hindu name. Petitioner no. 2 has
stated that he brought the petitioner no. 1
from Mumbai to Allahabad and performed
Nikah in front of High Court. He also stated
that the petitioner no. 1 has not changed her
religion.
11. From the facts as noted above, it is
clear that the petitioner no. 1 was brought
from Mumbai to Allahabad by the petitioner
no.2. She is a Hindu by religion and has
neither renounced her religion nor embraced
Islam. She has written her original Hindu
name not only in the writ petition but also
stated the same in her statement. She has put
her signature as "SEEMA" in the writ
petition and also on the statement on oath
before this Court. No evidence of religion
conversion of petitioner no. 1 has been filed
along with the writ petition.
12. In the case of Dilbar Habib Siddiqui
Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2010 (69)
ACC 997, a Division Bench of this Court
held as under : -
"The primary question which is to be
adjudicated by us is as to whether the
impugned FIR can be quashed or not on
the peculiar facts of the writ petition? A
perusal of the contents of the impugned FIR
indicates that Khushboo Jaiswal is alleged to
have been abducted by the petitioner three
months prior to the lodging of it. By his
dexterous manuvours and deceit petitioner
had succeeded in not getting the FIR
registered against him for all this period. It is
informant's allegation that petitioner had
abducted her daughter. Writ Petition further
reveals that Khushboo never converted herself
into Islam. There is no document regarding
her such conversion. In our above conclusion
we are fortified by the fact that in the affidavit
and application filed by Khusboo herself
subsequent to her alleged contract marriage
she has described herself as Khushboo and not
by any Islamic name. As Khushboo she could
not have contracted marriage according to
Muslim customs. In those referred documents
she has addressed herself as Khushboo
Jaiswal daughter of Rajesh Jaiswal. Thus what
is conspicuously clear unerringly without any
ambiguity is that Khushboo Jaiswal never
1548
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
converted and embraced Islam and therefore
her marital tie with the petitioner Dilbar Habib
Siddiqui is a void marriage since the same is
contrary to Islamic dicta and tenets of Holy
Quran. It is recollected here that Nikah i.e.
marriage in pre- Islamic Arabia, meant
different forms of sex relationships between a
man and a woman. Prophet Mohammed
brought about a complete change in the
position of woman in society through Holy
Quran, which is the primary and basic source
of Islamic Law. In this respect we can do no
better than to refer the verses of Holy Quran.
Sura 2 Ayat 221 of The Holy Quran as is
mentioned in the text book of Mohammedan
Law by I.Mulla, Ist Edition, 2nd reprint, at
page 162,provides as follows:-
"Do not marry unbelieving women
until they believe...... Nor marry your girls
to unbelievers until they believe" .
Here a believing women is referred
to such a women who has embraced Islam
and has faith in Prophet Mohammed.
Marriage in Muslim law is not only a ritual
but is also "a devotional act" as Dr.M.U.S.
Jang referred it in his book 'Desertion on the
Development of Muslim Law in British India'
(page 1.2.). I. Mulla in his above text book at
page 166 has written thus:-
"Koranic injunctions recognise in Islam,
marriage as the basis of society. Though it is a
contract, it is also a sacred covenant.
Temporary marriages are forbidden. Marriage
as an institution leads to the uplift of man and
is a means for the continuance of human
race."
Thus what is well recognised in Muslim
Law is that marriage is a sacred act. For
essentials of a valid muslim marriage, AL-HAJ
MAULANA FAZLUL KARIM in his
translation and commentary of Mishkat-ulMasabih
,
AL-
HADIS
(BOOK
II),
CHAPTER XXVII, SECTION 2,has written
thus:-
" In tradition, we find that the following
qualifications of a bride should be sought. The
bride should be (1) a Muslim (2) chaste (3)
virgin,(4) beautiful, (5) accomplished, (6)
having sweet tongue, and good manners, (7)
possessing property , (8) having children
bearing capacity and affectionate nature and
(9) equal respectibility."
Thus for a valid muslim marriage both
the spouses have to be muslim. In the present
writ petition this condition is not satisfied as
the
writ
petition
lacks
credible
and
accountable material in this respect on which
reliance can be placed. "
13. Since for a valid Muslim marriage
both the spouses have to be Muslim as per
verses of Holy Quran as noted in the
judgment in the case of Dilawar Habib
Siddiqui (supra) and since undisputedaly the
petitioner no. 1 is a Hindu girl and has not
embraced Islam and as such it cannot be
said that there was any valid marriage.
14.

Besides
above
both
the
petitioners have stated that they and their
parents reside in Mumbai and petitioner
no. 2 is working in Mumbai and as such
even no cause of action has arisen within
the territorial limits of this Court.
15. In view of the above discussion
this Court finds no good reason to grant
any relief in this writ petition.
16. In result writ petition fails and is
hereby dismissed.
--------