# Smt. Shalu Sharma v. State Of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2016) 5 ILRA 1414
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2016-05-27
- **Bench:** Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-shalu-sharma-v-state-of-u-p-anr-43763
- **Pages:** 10

## Text

1414 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
perform his duties. Since the resignation was not accepted by the competent authority, and it had
been withdrawn before its acceptance, as such, the order impugned cannot be sustained, but the
petitioner would not be entitled to full back wages.

20. In the opinion of the Court, as the respondents could not have accepted the resignation
after it stood withdrawn, the order impugned dated 30.12.1998 is set aside. Petitioner would be
entitled to reinstatement alongwith continuity of service. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the present case, petitioner would be entitled to a consolidated sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards back
wages.

21. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. No order as to costs.
 ---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SINGH BAGHEL, J.

Writ A No.- 25227 Of 2016

Smt. Shalu Sharma ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner:
Jeevanjee Srivastava

Counsel for Respondents:
C.S.C.

Service Law - Compassionate Appointment - Married Daughter - Definition of "Family" - Rule
2(c)(iii) of U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules,
1974 - Word "Unmarried" Struck Down - Binding Effect of Division Bench Judgment -
Authorities Bound by Law Declared by High Court - Rejection Order Illegal - Contemptuous
Conduct - Impugned Orders Quashed - Matter Remitted

The petitioner, a married daughter of a deceased government servant, sought compassionate appointment
under the U.P. Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. Her claim
was rejected by the District Magistrate solely on the ground that she was a married daughter and thus
excluded from the definition of "family" under Rule 2(c)(iii).

Held that the Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. had declared the word
"unmarried" occurring in Rule 2(c)(iii) to be unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution, and had struck down the same. Once a provision of subordinate legislation is declared ultra
vires, it becomes inoperative for all purposes and binds all authorities within the jurisdiction of the Court,
irrespective of whether they were parties to the earlier proceedings.
5 All. Smt. Shalu Sharma Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

1415
Further held that the view taken by the District Magistrate that the benefit of the judgment in Smt. Vimla
Srivastava could not be extended to the petitioner as she was not a party, and that no direction had been
issued by the State Government pursuant thereto, was wholly misconceived, illegal and contemptuous.
Authorities subordinate to the High Court are bound to follow the law declared by it and cannot await
executive instructions.

Reiterated that the law declared by the High Court is binding on all courts, tribunals and authorities under its
superintendence, and non-compliance amounts to judicial indiscipline and undermines the rule of law.

Accordingly, the impugned orders rejecting the petitioner's claim were quashed and the matter was remitted
to the District Magistrate to reconsider the claim for compassionate appointment afresh in accordance with
law, expeditiously.

The writ petition was allowed. No order as to costs.

Case listed
Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(1) ADJ 21 (DB).
La Roche & Co. A.g. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 1128.
K.N. Raghwan v. Habeeb Moahmmed and others.
Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar and others v. The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable
Endownments, Mysore and another.
Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and others.
St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council of Teacher Education
and another.
Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member Secretary, National Council for Teacher
Education and another.
Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Limited and another.
Somwati @ Girija and another v. State of U.P. & another, Special Appeal No. 236 of 2016
Km. Shehnaj Begum v. State of U.P. and others.
M/s. East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs Calcutta.
Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Commercial Tax Officer and another, (1988) 169 ITR 564.
K.N. Agrawal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1991) 189 ITR 769.
Dr. Rohit Gupta v. Principal, S.N. Medical College, Agra and others.
Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J.)

1. The petitioner is a married daughter. Her father late Mangal Sen Sharma was a Wasil
Baqi Nawis (WBN) (Senior Assistant) in Tehsil Office, Hapur. She has preferred this writ
proceedings for quashing the order dated 01st March, 2016 passed by the second respondent, the
District Magistrate whereby her application for compassionate appointment has been rejected on
the ground that she is a married daughter thus she is not entitled for appointment.

2. A brief reference to the factual aspects would suffice.
1416 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3. Late Mangal Sen Sharma was working as WBN (Senior Assistant) in Tehsil Office,
Hapur. He unfortunately died on 10th January, 2014 leaving behind his wife Smt. Asha Sharma,
one son Prashant Mohan Sharma and two daughters, namely, Smt. Parul Sharma and the petitioner.
The petitioner moved an application for her appointment on compassionate ground with no
objection of other members of the family. She is a postgraduate in Economics. Her marriage was
solemnized with one Ashwani Sharma and she is living with her mother, who is alone after the
death of petitioner's father. It is stated that financial position of her husband, who is in small job of
a private company, is not sufficient to support her and her mother.

4. The mother of the petitioner moved an application to the District Magistrate, Hapur on
20th January, 2016 for petitioner's appointment on compassionate ground. In her representation,
she has stated that she does not have any source of income and she is dependent on the petitioner
who is living with her. Her mother has also enclosed the judgement of this Court in the case of
Smt. Vimla Srivastava v. State of U.P. and another, 2016(1) ADJ 21 (DB). A similar
application has been filed by the petitioner also before the District Magistrate. The District
Magistrate by the impugned order has rejected the application of the petitioner on the grounds that
under Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradeh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants Dying-inHarness Rules, 19741, the petitioner is not entitled for her appointment as under the said provision
only unmarried daughter is entitled for compassionate appointment. Insofar as the judgement of
this Court in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) is concerned, the District Magistrate was of the
opinion that in the said case the petitioner was not party, therefore, no benefit can be granted to the
petitioner on the basis of the said judgement. It is also stated that the State Government has not
issued any direction pursuant to the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava's case.

5. Along with the impugned order a minutes of meeting has also been served upon the
petitioner, wherein the aforesaid grounds are mentioned and it has been signed by Additional
District Magistrate (Finance & Revenue), Prabhari Adhikari, Collectorate, Administrative Officer,
Collectorate, Hapur and the concerned clerk.

6. Dissatisfied with the order of the District Magistrate the petitioner has preferred this writ
petition. As the grounds mentioned in the impugned order are purely legal and do not raise any
factual dispute, learned Standing Counsel has not proposed to file any counter affidavit. Thus, the
matter is taken on the board for final disposal, at this stage, with their consent as the pure question
of law is to be answered.

7. Concededly, the petitioner is a married daughter. Rule 2(c) of the Rules, 1974 defines
the family, which reads as under:

"2(c) "family" shall include the following relations of the deceased Government
servant:

(i) Wife or husband;
5 All. Smt. Shalu Sharma Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

1417

(ii) Sons/ adopted sons;

(iii) Unmarried daughters, unmarried adopted daughters widowed daughters and
widowed daughter-in-law;

(iv) Unmarried brothers, unmarried sisters and widowed mother dependent on the
deceased Government servant, if the deceased Government servant was unmarried;

(v) aforementioned relations of such missing Government servant who has been
declared as "dead" by the competent Court.

Provided that if a person belonging to any of the above mentioned relations of the
deceased Government servant is not available or is found to be physically and mentally unfit and
thus ineligible for employment in Government service, then only in such situation the word
"family" shall also include the grandsons and the unmarried granddaughters of the deceased
Government servant dependent on him."

8. As can be seen from the aforesaid Rule, married daughter is not included in the
definition. However, vires of the said rule was challenged by a married daughter Vimla Srivastava.
The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) has considered the
provisions of Rule 2(c) of the Uttar Pradesh Recruitment of Dependents of Government Servants
Dying-in-Harness Rules, 1974. This Court found that the word 'unmarried' used under Rule 2(c)(iii)
of the Rules, 1974 is arbitrary and has consequently struck down the same and directed the
respondents for reconsideration of the claim of the petitioner, Smt. Vimla Srivastava, in the light of
its judgement. The relevant part of the judgement in Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) is extracted
herein below:

"25. During the course of submissions, our attention was also drawn to the judgment
rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Mudita v. State of U.P., 2015(9) ADJ 16. The
learned Single Judge while proceeding to deal with an identical issue of the right of a married
daughter to be considered under the Dying-in-Harness Rules observed that a married daughter is a
part of the family of her husband and could not therefore be expected to continue to provide for the
family of the deceased Government servant. The judgment proceeds on the premise that marriage
severs all relationships that the daughter may have had with her parents. In any case it shuts out the
consideration of the claim of the married daughter without any enquiry on the issue of dependency.
In the view that we have taken we are unable to accept or affirm the reasoning of the learned Single
Judge and are constrained to hold that Mudita does not lay down the correct position of the law.

26. In conclusion, we hold that the exclusion of married daughters from the ambit of
the expression "family" in Rule 2 (c) of the Dying-in-Harness Rules is illegal and unconstitutional,
being violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
1418 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

27. We, accordingly, strike down the word 'unmarried' in Rule 2 (c) (iii) of the
Dying-in-Harness Rules.

28. In consequence, we direct that the claim of the petitioners for compassionate
appointment shall be reconsidered. We clarify that the competent authority would be at liberty to
consider the claim for compassionate appointment on the basis of all the relevant facts and
circumstances and the petitioners shall not be excluded from consideration only on the ground of
their marital status."

 (emphasis supplied)

9. The question which falls for consideration is, what will be the effect of striking down the
word 'unmarried' from the definition of family under Rule 2(c)(iii) of the Rules, 1974. It is a well
settled law that while considering the vires of subordinate legislation there is presumption that the
rule is intra-vires. In case there is possibility of two interpretations then the Court must endeavor to
save it. It is also open to the Court to read down such provision in a manner to avoid it being
declared ultra-vires. However, if the Court declared the provision ultra-vires then the consequence
of declaration will follow. This principle has been considered in the case of La Roche & Co. A.g.
v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 1128, wherein it has been held
that a subordinate legislation is presumed to be valid until declared invalid by a court in a
proceeding initiated by a proper person. The consequence of declaration of invalidity is to render
the same incapable of ever having had any legal effect. But till the presumption of validity
continues, it has to be obeyed.

10. The Supreme Court has also considered the effect of declaring a provision ultra vires in
the case of K.N. Raghwan v. Habeeb Moahmmed and others2 and held as under:

"7. This submission suffers from patent illegality as there could be no question of
fixing a fair rent under provisions which are held to be ultra vires. The only reason submitted for
accepting fixation of rent by the Rent Controller is, since the appellant was not party to the
proceedings in which the High Court declared the said provisions as ultra vires, hence not binding.
The submission has no merit. When any provision is held to be ultra vires, it covers the field as
against all its subjects who are within the jurisdiction of the said legislation and the court. Thus this
submission to us looks strange that as he was not a party to it hence would not bind him, has no
merit and is rejected."

11. If the Court declares a provision ultra vires, it collapses automatically, and it need not
to be set aside. If only a rule is declared ultra vires, that part of the rule will be severed from the
rule. After a provision it declared ultra vires, it is always open to legislature to alter or omit the
provision declared by the Court ultra vires or it may enact / make new provision with a view to
make the enactment consistent with the law declared by the Court. Reference may be made to the
judgement in the case of Sudhindra Thirtha Swamiar and others v. The Commissioner for
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments, Mysore and another3
5 All. Smt. Shalu Sharma Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

1419
12. The Supreme Court in a recent case Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and
others4 has also considered the resultant effect of declaring a provision of law illegal or void. It
has been held that no legislative body has disobeyed and disrespected the order passed by the Court
declaring a legislation illegal or void, if the order has attained finality. The relevant observation of
the Court reads as under:

"16.1 The Supreme Court has been vested with the power to decide substantial
questions of law, as also, to interpret the provisions of the Constitution of India. The Supreme
Court exercises jurisdiction to determine, whether or not, laws made by Parliament or by a State
Legislature, are consistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India. And in case any
legislation is found to be enacted in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India, this
Court is constrained to strike it down. The resultant effect is, that a law enacted by the Parliament
or by a State Legislature, is declared illegal or void. After a Court's verdict has attained finality, not
once, never and never, has any legislative body ever disobeyed or disrespected an order passed by a
court declaring a legislation, illegal or void."

13. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution has also plenary power to declare
a statute ultra vires and illegal. The effect of declaring the provision invalid, illegal or void by the
High Court will be same as in the case of Supreme Court.

14. The similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the cases of St. Johns
Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council of Teacher Education and
another5; Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member Secretary, National Council
for Teacher Education and another6, and Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board v.
Indraprastha Gas Limited and another7. Hence the effect of striking down the word 'unmarried'
is that the said word may remain on the statute but it is inoperative. The State Government has not
made any further amendment thus the effect will be that the married daughter would be entitled for
appointment on compassionate ground. The judgement of the Division Bench in Smt. Vimla
Srivastava (supra) has consistently been followed by this Court.

15. Another Division Bench in the case of Somwati @ Girija and another v. State of
U.P. & another, Special Appeal No. 236 of 2016, decided on 28th March, 2016, has followed the
judgement of Smt. Vimla Srivastava's case. The said special appeal arose against the judgement
of the learned Single Judge dated 15th February, 2016 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 40877 of
2015 (Somwati @ Girija and another v. State of U.P. & others). The learned Single Judge has
taken a view that in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra) the Division Bench failed to notice
the Full Bench judgement in the case of Km. Shehnaj Begum v. State of U.P. and others8.
However, in special appeal the Division Bench has followed Smt. Vimla Srivastava's case on the
ground that in Km. Shehnaj Begum (supra) the validity of Rule 2(c)(iii) was not in issue. The
Court on the basis of plain reading of the definition held that the married daughter is not entitled for
compassionate appointment in terms of definition given under Rule 2(c) of the Rules, 1974. Before
the Full Bench the question of vires of word 'unmarried' was neither raised nor decided. Hence the
Division Bench in Somwati (supra) has held that Smt. Vimla Srivastava's case is binding on a
1420 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
coordinate Bench wherein the issue with regard to the validity of word 'unmarried' was raised and
the Court found that it was ultra vires and has struck down the said word.

16. Insofar as the view taken by the District Magistrate that the petitioner was not a party in
Smt. Vimla Srivastava's case hence the benefit of the said judgement cannot be extended to her is
concerned, it is completely misconceived. The High Court is an Apex Court of the State, the law
declared by it is binding on all the Tribunals/ Courts/ Authorities under its supervision.

17. Article 141 of the Constitution of India provides that the law laid down by the Supreme
Court is binding on all the courts, authorities and tribunals. True, there is no such provision in the
Constitution in respect of the High Courts. However, by the judicial pronouncements the Supreme
Court has laid down the law that the similar power which Article 141 of the Constitution confers to
the Supreme Court is also available with the High Courts. In the case of M/s. East India
Commercial Co. Ltd. Calcutta and another v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta9, the Supreme
Court held as under:

"29. ....The division Bench of the High Court held that a contravention of a condition
imposed by a licence issued under the Act is not an offence under S. 5 of the Act. This raises the
question whether an administrative tribunal can ignore the law declared by the highest court in the
State & initiate proceedings in direct violation of the law so declared. Under Art. 215, every High
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to
punish for contempt of itself. Under Art. 226, it has a plenary power to issue orders or writs for the
enforcement of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose to any person or authority,
including in appropriate cases any Government, within its territorial jurisdiction. Under Art. 227 it
has jurisdiction over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it
exercises jurisdiction. It would be anomalous to suggest that a tribunal over which the High Court
has superintendence can ignore the law declared by that court and start proceedings in direct
violation of it..... We, therefore, hold that the law declared by the highest court in the State is
binding on authorities or tribunals under its superintendence, and that they cannot ignore it either in
initiating a proceeding or deciding on the rights involved in such a proceeding. If that be so, the
notice issued by the authority signifying the launching of proceedings contrary to the law laid down
by the High Court would be invalid and the proceedings themselves would be without jurisdiction."

18. M/s. East India Commercial Co. (supra) has been quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court in the case of Shri Baradakanta Mishra v. Shri Bhimsen Dixit10, wherein the
Court has held as under:

"14. Under Art. 227 of the Constitution, the High Court is vested with the power of
superintendence over the courts and tribunals in the State. Acting as a quasi judicial authority under
the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, the appellant was subject to the superintendence of
the High Court.
5 All. Smt. Shalu Sharma Vs State Of U.P. & Anr.

1421

Accordingly the decisions of the High Court were binding on him. He could not get
away from them by adducing factually wrong and illegitimate reasons. In East India Commercial
Co. Ltd. Calcutta v. The Collector of Customs, Calcutta, (1963) 3 SCR 338= (AIR 1962 SC 1893),
Subba Rao, J. observed...."

19. Similar view has also been taken by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Commercial Tax Officer and another, (1988) 169 ITR 564; and by
this Court in K.N. Agrawal v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, (1991) 189 ITR 769.

20. The Division Bench of this Court in K.N. Agrawal (supra), has held that a judgement
of the High Court is binding on all authorities and it cannot be ignored. The Court held that even if
appeal is pending against the order of the High Court in Supreme Court, and in case there is no
interim order then the order of the High Court is binding on the authorities. Permitting an authority
to ignore the judgement on the ground that it is under appeal before the higher court would
introduce judicial indiscipline and it would lead to an chaotic situation. The Division Bench
speaking through Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, Chief Justice (as His Lordship then was)
held as under:

"...Just because an appeal is pending, the decision of this court cannot be treated as
not final, nor can it be ignored. It is binding upon the authorities within the territories of this State.
The Income-tax Officer had no option but to follow this decision of this court in the case of this
assessee.

...Permitting him to take such a view would introduce judicial indiscipline, which is
not called for even in such cases. It would lead to a chaotic situation..."

21. In the case in hand, it has not been brought to the notice of the Court that any Special
Leave Petition has been preferred by the State Government against the judgement in Smt. Vimla
Srivastava (supra).

22. The aforesaid law clearly leaves no ground of doubt that even an authority who is not a
party in the writ petition, is bound by the law laid down by the High Court. He cannot take a plea
that the authority concerned was not a party in the writ petition.

23. The next ground taken by the District Magistrate in his order is that pursuant to the
judgement of the High Court in the case of Smt. Vimla Srivastava (supra), the State Government
has not issued any direction. In my considered opinion, the view taken by the District Magistrate is
not only arbitrary and illegal but is contemptuous also. The District Magistrate or any authority in
the State is subordinate to the jurisdiction of the High Court.

24. Under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the Court can issue a direction to any
person or authority including in appropriate case any Government and the Subordinate Court. It has
also power of superintendence on all the Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation
1422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
to which it exercises jurisdiction. It includes the administrative officers as well as officers who
performs the quashi judicial functions. If a provision has been declared ultra vires by the Court then
it becomes inoperative and if an authority ignores the law laid down by the High Court, he can do it
on his own peril. This issue has been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in somewhat
same facts in the case of Dr. Rohit Gupta v. Principal, S.N. Medical College, Agra and
others11, wherein the Court has expressed its deep anguish on conduct of a Principal of a Medical
College, who had passed an order that he will comply with the order of the Court only when he
receives some directions from the State Government. Relevant part of the said order is quoted
below:

"5. We are distressed to note from annexure-7 to the petition that the Principal has
taken a stand that he will take action in respect of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court only
when he receives some communication from the State Government. This action of the Principal, in
our opinion, amounts to contempt of court. No authority can say that it will not comply with the
judgment of this court unless it has received a communication from the State Government. The
judgments of this court are binding on all authorities automatically and it is not that they become
finding only when approved by the State Government. It is surprising that the Principal of a
medical college has taken a wholly illegal and untenable stand in annexure-7 to the writ petition.
We were inclined to issue contempt notice but we refrained ourseleves from doing so as we feel that
he has issued the letter which is annexure-7 in ignorance of the legal position but we will grant no
further indulgence to him in future. The Principal of S. N. Medical College, Agra and all other
authorities in the State must know that orders of this court are binding on them automatically and
must be faithfully and punctually complied with, and such authorities cannot take a stand that they
will comply with the judgment of this court only when they receive some communication from the
State Government. In future this court will not tolerate this kind of attitude from any authority and
all authorities are cautioned against taking up such attitude in respect of the orders or judgments
of this Court."

 (emphasis supplied)

25. From the aforesaid law laid down by the Division Bench, it appears that the District
Magistrate has committed a contempt of this Court despite warning issued to the authorities that the
order of this Court is automatically binding.

26. The Supreme Court has also considered this issue in the case of Commissioner,
Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah12 and held that a direction issued by the competent
court has to be obeyed and implemented. Relevant part of the order reads as under:

"32. We are of the considered opinion that once a direction is issued by a competent
court, it has to be obeyed and implemented without any reservation. If an order passed by a court of
law is not complied with or is ignored, there will be an end of rule of law. If a party against whom
such order is made has grievance, the only remedy available to him is to challenge the order by
5 All. Jagdish Narain Vs Subhash Chandra Gupta & Anr.

1423
taking appropriate proceedings known to law. But it cannot be made ineffective by not complying
with the directions on a specious plea that no such directions could have been issued by the court.
In our judgment, upholding of such argument would result in chaos and confusion and would
seriously affect and impair administration of justice. The argument of the Board, therefore, has no
force and must be rejected."

27. Before taking the said view, the District Magistrate ought to have taken a legal opinion.
The officials / functionaries of the State are assisted by a battery of lawyers of the State. If they
have any doubt regarding application of law or the judgement of the High Court/ Courts, they ought
to take legal opinion. Their casual approach to the law laid down by the highest Court of the State
cannot be countenanced.

28. As a sequel to the above, I find that the impugned communication and order dated
26.02.2016 and 01.03.2016 need to be quashed. Accordingly, they are quashed. The matter is
remitted to the District Magistrate to decide afresh in the light of the judgement in Smt. Vimla
Srivastava (supra) expeditiously, but not later than three months from the date of communication
of this order. He shall pay regard to the fact that in the matter of compassionate appointment, there
should not be any loss of time.

29. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed.

30. No order as to costs.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.05.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL, J.

Writ A No.- 26279 Of 2016

Jagdish Narain ...Petitioner
Versus
Subhash Chandra Gupta & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner:
Suresh Chandra Verma, Devesh Kumar Verma

Counsel for Respondents:
C.S.C.

RENT CONTROL - Amendment of Written Statement - Ex parte Decree - Affidavit - Scope of
Interference under Article 226