# Smt. Shiv Kumari Soni v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 9 ILRA 846
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-09-22
- **Case number:** Misc. Bench No. 14773 of 2021
- **Bench:** Rajan Roy, Ravi Nath Tilhari
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-shiv-kumari-soni-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47405
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - The Executive Engineer,
sultanpur has given work to M/s Variegate
Project private limited, Hyderabad ("the firm").
The firm entered into a rental agreement with
the petitioner and took on lease the petitioner's
premises for storing electrical goods subject to
the terms and conditions mentioned in the
rental agreement. In the meantime, firm was
blacklisted. On blacklisting the official opposite
party stationed the guards at the premises for
safety and paid off the rent for that relevant
period. However, as far as the dues i.e., rent
payable by the firm are concerned, this Court
failed to comprehend as to how the official party
will be held liable when the agreement was
between the petitioner and the firm. (Para 17)

The issue involved in the instant writ petition is
purely based on the question of fact therefore,
this Court directed the petitioner to avail other
civil remedies as may be prescribed by the law.
(para 19)

Writ Petition Rejected.(E-10)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

846 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
subject location, contravenes the principles
of fairness and transparency in the matter
of grant of dealership of the Retail Outlet.

25. In view of the aforesaid, we are
not convinced with the submission of Mr.
Sharad Pathak that the error in publication
of the district name could not be corrected
after two and half years of the publication.
It could not be shown to us that in the mean
time
the
petitioner
acquired
any
indefeasible right by lapse of time and
particularly when the petitioner had yet not
been
selected
and
the
Indian
Oil
Corporation under the Brochure reserved
the right to cancel/withdraw/amend the
advertisement at its sole discretion, which
right of the Corporation has neither been
disputed nor challenged.

26. We are of the further considered
view that the Corporation cannot be
directed to proceed for the subject location
in pursuance of the advertisement, it being
erroneous,
which
gives
incorrect
information about the subject location.

27. We do not find any illegality in
the orders under challenge. The writ
petition is devoid of merits and is hereby
dismissed.
----------
(2021)09ILR A846
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.09.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
HE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

Misc. Bench No. 14773 of 2021

Smt. Shiv Kumari Soni ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Ved Prakash Yadav

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.,Manish Jauhari

A. Civil Law - The Executive Engineer,
sultanpur has given work to M/s Variegate
Project private limited, Hyderabad ("the firm").
The firm entered into a rental agreement with
the petitioner and took on lease the petitioner's
premises for storing electrical goods subject to
the terms and conditions mentioned in the
rental agreement. In the meantime, firm was
blacklisted. On blacklisting the official opposite
party stationed the guards at the premises for
safety and paid off the rent for that relevant
period. However, as far as the dues i.e., rent
payable by the firm are concerned, this Court
failed to comprehend as to how the official party
will be held liable when the agreement was
between the petitioner and the firm. (Para 17)

The issue involved in the instant writ petition is
purely based on the question of fact therefore,
this Court directed the petitioner to avail other
civil remedies as may be prescribed by the law.
(para 19)

Writ Petition Rejected.(E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Hari Krishna Mandir Trust Vs St of Mah & ors.
(2020) 9 SCC 356

2. U.O.I. & anr. Vs V.V.F. Limited & anr. Etc.
2020 SCC Online SC 378

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ravi Nath Tilhari, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ved Prakash Yadav,
learned counsel for petitioner, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel for
State-opposite party No.1 and Shri Manish
Jauhari, learned counsel for opposite
parties no. 2 & 3.

2. This petition has been filed seeking
a writ, order or direction in the nature of
9 All Smt. Shiv Kumari Soni Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
847
mandamus commanding the State of U.P.
through Principal Secretary, Department of
Energy-opposite
party
No.1
and
the
Managing Director, Madhyanchal Vidyut
Vitran Khand-4A, Lucknow-opposite party
No.2 to direct the Executive Engineer,
Madhyanchal
Vidyut
Vitran
Khand-2,
Sultanpur, opposite party No.3 to give the
admitted amount being the total remaining
rental amount with interest to the petitioner
as well as to direct the Managing Director,
Madhyanchal
Vidyut
Vitran
Khand,
Lucknow to consider and take appropriate
decision in pursuance of Annexure Nos. 6
and 7 submitted before him by the District
Magistrate, Sultanpur.

3. The facts of the case as submitted
by the learned counsel for the petitioner are
that for electrification in Rural areas of
District Sultanpur, under the "Rajiv Gandhi
Gramin
Vidyutikaran
Scheme",
the
Executive Engineer, Madhyanchal Vidyut
Vitran Khand-2 Sultanpur had given work
to M/s Variegate Projects Private Limited,
Hyderabad (herein after called as "the
Firm"). The Firm entered into a rental
agreement dated 01.03.2015 with the
petitioner and took on lease the petitioner's
premises for storing electrical goods
subject to the terms and conditions
mentioned in the rental agreement. The
Firm
was
later
on
blacklisted
and
consequently when the opposite party No.3
tried to take possession of the electrical
goods stored by the Firm, to shift it to its
departmental store, the petitioner raised
objection that the Firm had not made
payment of rent and unless the payment
was made, the petitioner would not let the
electrical goods to be lifted and shifted
from her premises. It has been submitted
that the Executive Engineer apprised the
District Magistrate, Sultanpur about the
said situation vide letter dated 06.08.2016
and
in
pursuance
thereof,
the
Sub
Divisional
Magistrate,
Lambhua
was
directed to resolve the dispute. Thereafter
on 08.08.2016 the Executive Engineer
assured the petitioner for payment of the
entire arrears of rent due against the Firm
out of which payment of Rs. 1,10,000/-
vide Cheque No. 039028 and of Rs.
3,97,767/- vide cheque No. 87174, drawn
on
Punjab
National
Bank,
District
Sultanpur, in total amounting to Rs.
5,07,767/-, was paid to the petitioner by the
opposite party No.3 with promise to make
payment of the balance of Rs. 5,32,707/-
after shifting of the electrical goods.
However, despite repeated request as the
payment was not made, the petitioner
submitted representation to the Managing
Director-opposite party No.2 before whom
the District Magistrate Sultanpur had also
submitted its reports vide letters dated
17.11.2020, 02.01.2021 and 25.02.2021,
but till date neither any decision has been
taken by the Managing Director nor the
payment has been made.

4. On our specific query to the
petitioner's counsel, whether opposite party
Nos. 1 to 3 are party to the rental
agreement he submitted that the agreement
is only between the petitioner and M/s
Variegate
Projects
Private
Limited,
Hyderabad. However, he further submitted
that in view of the assurance given and the
promise made by the Executive Engineeropposite party No.3, to make payment of
the entire outstanding rent amount the
opposite parties made themselves liable for
payment of the entire rent amount.

5. Learned Additional Chief Standing
Counsel
submitted
that
the
District
Magistrate, Sultanpur has already sent
letters
to
the
Managing
Director,
Madhyanchal
Vidyut
Vitran
Khand-
848 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Lucknow-opposite party No.2 and the
payment, if any, is to be made by the
opposite party Nos. 2 and 3.

6. Sri Manish Jauhari, learned counsel
for opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 submitted
that the rental agreement was between the
petitioner and the Firm. There is no liability
of the opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 for
payment of the arrears of rent due against
the Firm. He submitted that the payment of
Rs. 5,07,767/- was made by the Executive
Engineer-opposite party No.3 for the period
with effect from 18.01.2016 up to August,
2016, during which, the opposite parties
had deputed its personnel for the safety and
security of the electrical goods stored in the
petitioner's premises by the firm. He further
submitted that there is no statutory or any
contractual liability of the opposite parties
for payment as prayed by the petitioner,
and any promise or assurance, even if given
by the Executive Engineer, cannot bind the
opposite party Nos. 2 and 3 as nothing has
been brought on record to show that any
such promise was made or/and the
Executive Engineer had been authorized to
make any such promise to bind the opposite
party Nos. 2 and 3.

7.

We
have
considered
the
submissions advanced by the learned
counsels for the parties and perused the
material on record.

8. A perusal of the rental agreement,
Annexure 1 to the writ petition, shows that
it is only between the petitioner and M/s
Variegate
Projects
Private
Limited,
Hyderabad. On this point there is no
dispute. Any statutory or even any
contractual liability of the opposite party
Nos. 1 to 3 for payment of the arrears of
rent of the M/s Variegate Projects Private
Limited could not be shown to us.

9. The Sheetanchor of the petitioner is
the letter dated 18.05.2017 and the letter
dated 17.11.2020, Annexure No.6, in
support of the submission that the promise
was made by the Executive Engineeropposite Party No.3 to the petitioner to
make the payment of the entire outstanding
amount of rent of the firm.

10. We have perused the aforesaid
documents. By letter dated 18.05.2017 the
Sub
Divisional
Magistrate,
Lambhua,
District Sultanpur had directed the then
Executive Engineer (Second), Electricity
Distribution Division, Sultanpur to ensure
payment of the balance amount of Rs.
532707/- to the petitioner mentioning in the
said letter that on 08.08.2016 the said
Executive Engineer, in presence of the Sub
Divisional Magistrate, Lambhua, the Circle
Officer, Lambhua and the Station House
Officer Kotwali Dehat had given assurance
to the petitioner that the payment of the
balance amount of Rs. 5,32,707/- would be
made without delay as it was not possible
at that time to make full payment of arrears
of rent amounting to Rs. 1040474/- out of
which an amount of Rs. 5,07,767/- was
paid vide two cheques.

11. The letter No. 283 dated
17.11.2020 of the District Magistrate,
Sultanpur, to the Managing Director
although
refers
to
the
letter
dated
18.05.2017, but also mentions about the
letter of the Superintending Engineer dated
07.10.2020 to the effect, inter alia, that on
08.08.2016 a consensus was arrived at
between the petitioner and the electricity
distribution division for payment of rent for
the period the electricity distribution
division deputed its Guard for security and
safety of the electrical goods stored in
petitioner's premises upto the date i.e.
08.08.2016 at the rate of the same rent as
9 All Smt. Shiv Kumari Soni Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
849
was settled between the petitioner and the
firm, of which full payment was made to
the petitioner. The letter dated 17.11.2020
further mentions that the petitioner had
denied
any
such
agreement
dated
08.08.2016 to have been signed by her.

12. Thus from the perusal of the
record before us, we find that there is a
serious dispute between the parties as
regards promise made or assurance given
by the Executive Engineer-opposite party
No.3 for payment of the entire outstanding
arrears of rent as also that the payment of
Rs. 5,07,767/- was part payment or it was
full
payment
for
the
period
w.e.f.
18.01.2016 up to 08.08.2016 in pursuance
of the alleged agreement dated 08.08.2016
which agreement itself is disputed by the
petitioner.

13. In a petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, the High Court
has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact
and law and merely because in considering
the petitioner's right to relief, question of
fact may fall to be determined, the High
Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to
entertain a writ petition under Article 226.
However,
exercise
of
jurisdiction
is
discretionary and the discretion is to be
exercised on sound judicial principles.
When the petition raises a question of fact
of complex nature requiring the oral
evidence for determination or the nature of
claim is such that it cannot be conclusively
determined on the basis of material
available on the record of the writ petition
or that it would be inappropriate to try such
issues in the writ jurisdiction for analogous
reasons, the High Court may refuse to
exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction.

14. It will be apt to refer the case of
Hari Krishna Mandir Trust vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors. [(2020) 9 SCC
356], wherein in paragraphs 104 & 105,
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"104. The High Court is not
deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under Article 226 merely because
in considering the petitioner's right to relief
questions of fact may fall to be determined.
In a petition under Article 226 the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of
fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is,
it is true, discretionary, but the discretion
must be exercised on sound judicial
principles. Reference may be made inter
alia to the judgments of this Court in
Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal Committee,
Bhatinda 11 and State of Kerala v. M. K.
Jose, this Court held : (SCC pp. 442-43,
para 16)

"16. Having referred to the
aforesaid decisions, it is obligatory on our
part to refer to two other authorities of this
Court where it has been opined that under
what circumstances a disputed question of
fact can be gone into. In Gunwant Kaur v.
Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, it has
been held thus: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16)

"14. The High Court observed
that they will not determine disputed
question of fact in a writ petition. But what
facts were in dispute and what were
admitted could only be determined after an
affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. The
High Court, however, proceeded to dismiss
the petition in limine. The High Court is not
deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a
petition under Article 226 merely because
in considering the petitioner's right to relief
questions of fact may fall to be determined.
In a petition under Article 226 the High
Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of
fact and law. Exercise of the jurisdiction is,
850 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
it is true, discretionary, but the discretion
must be exercised on sound judicial
principles.
When
the
petition
raises
questions of fact of a complex nature,
which may for their determination require
oral evidence to be taken, and on that
account the High Court is of the view that
the dispute may not appropriately be tried
in a writ petition, the High Court may
decline to try a petition. Rejection of a
petition in limine will normally be justified,
where the High Court is of the view that the
petition is frivolous or because of the
nature of the claim made dispute sought to
be agitated, or that the petition against the
party against whom relief is claimed is not
maintainable or that the dispute raised
thereby
is
such
that
it
would
be
inappropriate to try it in the writ
jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

15. From the averments made in
the petition filed by the appellants it is
clear that in proof of a large number of
allegations the appellants relied upon
documentary evidence and the only matter
in respect of which conflict of facts may
possibly arise related to the due publication
of the notification under Section 4 by the
Collector.

16. In the present case, in our
judgment, the High Court was not justified
in dismissing the petition on the ground
that it will not determine disputed question
of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to
determine questions of fact, even if they are
in dispute and the present, in our judgment,
is a case in which in the interests of both
the parties the High Court should have
entertained the petition and called for an
affidavit-in reply from the respondents, and
should have proceeded to try the petition
instead of relegating the appellants to a
separate suit." (emphasis supplied)

105. In ABL International Ltd. v.
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of
India Ltd., this Court referring to previous
judgments of this Court including Gunwant
Kaur (supra) held: (ABL International Ltd.
Case, SCC pp. 568-69 & 572, paras 19 &
27)

"19. Therefore, it is clear from the
above enunciation of law that merely because
one of the parties to the litigation raises a
dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the
court entertaining such petition under Article
226 of the Constitution is not always bound
to relegate the parties to a suit. In the above
case of Gunwant Kaur this Court even went
to the extent of holding that in a writ petition,
if the facts require, even oral evidence can be
taken. This clearly shows that in an
appropriate case, the writ court has the
jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
involving disputed questions of fact and there
is no absolute bar for entertaining a writ
petition even if the same arises out of a
contractual obligation and/or involves some
disputed questions of fact.

27. From the above discussion of
ours, the following legal principles emerge
as to the maintainability of a writ petition:

a) In an appropriate case, a writ
petition
as
against
a
State
or
an
instrumentality of a State arising out of a
contractual obligation is maintainable.

b) Merely because some disputed
questions of fact arise for consideration,
same cannot be a ground to refuse to
entertain a writ petition in all cases as a
matter of rule;

c) A writ petition involving a
consequential relief of monetary claim is
also maintainable."
9 All Smt. Shiv Kumari Soni Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
851

15. In view of the complex nature of
the disputed question of fact as aforesaid,
we consider it not appropriate to try this
question in exercise of our writ jurisdiction.

16. With respect to the submission of
the petitioner's counsel based on the
doctrine of promissory estoppel we are of
the considered view that where the person
acting upon the promise made by the
Government or the public authority has
changed his position, this doctrine can be
pressed into aid to compel the Government
or the public authority to carry out a
representation or promise made, but there
are also well recognized exceptions and as
this doctrine is equitable one it must yield
when the equity so demands, if it can be
shown, having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case that it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or the
public authority to its promise, assurance or
representation.
Most
importantly
the
doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be
invoked in the abstract. To invoke this
doctrine
clear,
sound
and
positive
foundation must be laid in the petition itself
by the party invoking the doctrine. We may
refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of Union of India and
Another Etc. Etc. vs. V.V.F. Limited and
Another Etc. Etc. [2020 SCC Online SC
378] in which, in paragraph 41 it has been
held as under:

"41. In the case of Kasinka
Trading (supra), in paragraphs 12, 20 and
23, it is observed and held as follows:

"12. It has been settled by this
Court that the doctrine of promissory
estoppel
is
applicable
against
the
Government also particularly where it is
necessary to prevent fraud or manifest
injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be
pressed into aid to compel the Government
or the public authority to carry out a
representation or promise which is contrary
to law or which was outside the authority
or power of the officer of the Government
or of the public authority to make. There is
preponderance of judicial opinion that to
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel
clear, sound and positive foundation must
be laid in the petition itself by the party
invoking the doctrine and that bald
expressions,
without
any
supporting
material, to the effect that the doctrine is
attracted because the party invoking the
doctrine has altered its position relying on
the assurance of the Government would not
be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine.
In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract
and the courts are bound to consider all
aspects including the results sought to be
achieved and the public good at large,
because while considering the applicability
of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity
and the fundamental principles of equity
must for ever be present to the mind of the
court, while considering the applicability of
the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when
the equity so demands if it can be shown
having
regard
to
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case that it would be
inequitable to hold the Government or the
public authority to its promise, assurance or
representation.

20. The facts of the appeals
before us are not analogous to the facts In
Indo-Afghan Agencies [(1968) 2 SCR 366 :
AIR 1968 SC 718] or M.P. Sugar Mills
[(1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144 :
(1979) 2 SCR 641]. In the first case the
petitioner therein had acted upon the
unequivocal promises held out to it and
exported goods on the specific assurance
given to it and it was in that fact situation
852 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
that it was held that Textile Commissioner
who had enunciated the scheme was bound
by the assurance thereof and obliged to
carry out the promise made thereunder. As
already noticed, in the present batch of
cases neither the notification is of an
executive character nor does it represent a
scheme designed to achieve a particular
purpose. It was a notification issued in
public interest and again withdrawn in
public interest. So far as the second case
(M.P. Sugar Mills case [(1979) 2 SCC 409 :
1979 SCC (Tax) 144 : (1979) 2 SCR 641])
is concerned the facts were totally different.
In the correspondence exchanged between
the State and the petitioners therein it was
held out to the petitioners that the industry
would be exempted from sales tax for a
particular number of initial years but when
the State sought to levy the sales tax it was
held by this Court that it was precluded
from doing so because of the categorical
representation made by it to the petitioners
through letters in writing, who had relied
upon the same and set up the industry.

23. The appellants appear to be
under the impression that even if, in the
altered market conditions the continuance
of the exemption may not have been
justified, yet, Government was bound to
continue it to give extra profit to them. That
certainly was not the object with which the
notification
had
been
issued.
The
withdrawal
of
exemption
"in
public
interest" is a matter of policy and the
courts would not bind the Government to
its policy decisions for all times to come,
irrespective of the satisfaction of the
Government that a change in the policy
was necessary in the "public interest". The
courts, do not interfere with the fiscal
policy where the Government acts in
"public interest" and neither any fraud or
lack of bona fides is alleged much less
established. The Government has to be left
free to determine the priorities in the matter
of utilisation of finances and to act in the
public interest while issuing or modifying
or withdrawing an exemption notification
under Section 25(1) of the Act."

Thus, it can be seen that this
Court has specifically and clearly held that
the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot
be invoked in the abstract and the courts
are bound to consider all aspects including
the objective to be achieved and the public
good at large. It has been held that while
considering
the
applicability
of
the
doctrine, the courts have to do equity and
the fundamental principles of equity must
forever be present to the mind of the court,
while considering the applicability of the
doctrine. It is further held that the doctrine
must yield when the equity so demands if it
can be shown having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the case that it would
be inequitable to hold the Government or
the public authority to its promise,
assurance or representation. It is further
held that an exemption notification does
not make items which are subject to levy of
customs duty etc. as items not leviable to
such duty. It only suspends the levy and
collection of customs duty, etc., wholly or
partially and subject to such conditions as
may be laid down in the notification by the
Government in "public interest". Such an
exemption by its very nature is susceptible
of being revoked or modified or subjected
to other conditions. The supersession or
revocation of an exemption notification in
the "public interest" is an exercise of the
statutory power of the State under the law
itself. It has been further held that under
the General Clauses Act an authority which
has the power to issue a notification has
the undoubted power to rescind or modify
the notification in a like manner. It has
9 All Bhupendra Singh Vs. Ziladhikari, Amethi & Ors.
853
been observed that the withdrawal of
exemption "in public interest" is a matter of
policy and the courts would not bind the
Government to its policy decisions for all
times
to
come,
irrespective
of
the
satisfaction of the Government that a
change in the policy was necessary in the
"public interest". It has been held that
where the Government acts in "public
interest" and neither any fraud or lack of
bonafides is alleged, much less established,
it would not be appropriate for the court to
interfere with the same."

17. The rent agreement was between
the petitioner and the firm. Admittedly,
official opposite parties were not party to it.
The official opposite parties i.e. Madhyanchal
Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited and its officials
entered into an agreement with the firm
naming Variegate Projects Private Limited for
rural electrification. Petitioner was not a party
to it. It appears in pursuance to the said
contract between the firm and official
opposite parties the firm took the premises of
the petitioner for storing electrical goods etc,
but did not pay the rent. In the meantime, the
firm was blacklisted. On such blacklisting the
official opposite parties stationed guards at
the premises for safety of the electrical goods
kept in the rental premises as they belonged
to them. For that period rent or consideration
whatever it may be called was paid by the
official opposite parties to the petitioners. In
so far as other dues i.e. rent payable by the
firm, it is a dispute between the petitioner and
firm. We fail to comprehend as to how
official opposite parties can be made liable in
this regard. There in nothing on record to
show that the Executive Engineer was ever
authorized by the Corporation to give any
such assurance, even if given, on which
aspect we are not recording any finding, for
payment of such rent.

18. We have already considered above
that the writ petition involves disputed
questions of fact and consequently what we
find is that a clear, sound and positive
foundation has not been laid in the writ
petition for invoking the doctrine of
legitimate expectation.

19. We are of the opinion that such
matters are not amenable to writ jurisdiction
merely because the official opposite parties
are instrumentalities of State, as, essentially, it
is a dispute pertaining to rent involving a
money claim and complicated as also
disputed question of fact as also pinciples of
civil law are involved. The petitioner may
therefore pursue other civil remedies as may
be prescribed in law.

20. Observation made herein are only
for purpose of these proceedings and shall not
have any bearing on such other proceedings,
if initiated by the parties herein.

21. In view of the aforesaid, the writ
petition is dismissed, but with the aforesaid
observations.
----------
(2021)09ILR A853
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 27.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Misc. Single No. 19318 of 2020

Bhupendra Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Ziladhikari, Amethi & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Rudra Mani Shukla, Girish Chandra Sinha,
Mayank Sinha