# Smt. Tasneem & Ors v. The State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 331
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-10-18
- **Case number:** First Appeal No. 692 of 2001
- **Bench:** Vivek Kumar Birla
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-tasneem-ors-v-the-state-of-u-p-ors-45063
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 96 -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 51-A-
registered
document-presumption
of
genuineness-rebuttable-raising
a
presumption doses not amount to proof- it
only shifts the burden of proof against whom
the presumption operates for disproving ittransactions recorded in the document may
be treated as evidence-it is for the court to
weigh all the pros and cons to decide the real
price of the land concerned-the parties shall
not be permitted either to produce any
additional evidence or lead any further
evidence except rebuttal evidence in regard
to certified copies of the sale deeds already
produced. (Para 17 to 28)

First Appeal allowed. (E-6)

List of cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,954 of 42,188. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39954 for what follows._

1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
331
the principal. He acquires no right or
interest whatsoever for himself in such
property irrespective of his long stay or
possession."

59. In the wake of the preceding
narrative, the substantial question of law
no. 2, is answered as follows:

A. The learned appellate court
acted in conformity with law by granting
the decree of eviction against the plaintiffappellant and in favour of the defendant
no. 2-respondent no. 2 on the counterclaim
of the latter. The defendant no. 2respondent no. 2 was not required to file a
separate suit for eviction of the plaintiffappellant.

B. The import of the phrase
"eviction in accordance with law" in a
matter where the claim of eviction of an
unauthorized occupant is made by the true
owner, mandates the courts to adjudicate
such claim within the following stipulated
periods of time:

a. The suit for eviction or
counterclaim for eviction, as the case may
be, shall be decided within a period of one
year from the date of institution of such
suit or claim in all circumstances.

b. The appeal against such
decree shall be decided within a period of
four months from the date of institution of
such appeal.

c. The execution case shall be
decided and the decree shall be executed
within a period of six months from the date
of institution of the execution proceedings.

d. If necessary, the court shall
proceed with the hearing on day to day
basis to ensure strict compliance with the
aforesaid timeline in all circumstances.

60. The second appeal is dismissed.
----------
(2020)1ILR 331

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.10.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIVEK KUMAR BIRLA, J.

First Appeal No. 692 of 2001
connected with
First Appeal No. 691 of 2001

Smt. Tasneem & Ors. ...Appellants
Versus
The State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Ashutosh Srivastava, Sri Iqbal Ahmed

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri S.K. Singh, S.C.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section 96 -
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 51-A-
registered
document-presumption
of
genuineness-rebuttable-raising
a
presumption doses not amount to proof- it
only shifts the burden of proof against whom
the presumption operates for disproving ittransactions recorded in the document may
be treated as evidence-it is for the court to
weigh all the pros and cons to decide the real
price of the land concerned-the parties shall
not be permitted either to produce any
additional evidence or lead any further
evidence except rebuttal evidence in regard
to certified copies of the sale deeds already
produced. (Para 17 to 28)

First Appeal allowed. (E-6)

List of cases cited: -

1. Union of India Vs. Dyagala Devamma & Ors
2018 (11) SCC 485

2. Vinod Bansal Vs. St. of Haryana & Anr. 2013 (5)
SCC 622

3. Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (regd.) Faridkot &
Ors. Vs. St. of Punjab & Ors. 2012 (5) SCC 432
332 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
4. Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar Vs. St. of Mah.
2009 (11) SCC 141

5. Lal Chand Vs. Union of India 2009 (15) SCC 760

6. Chimanlal Hargovinddas Vs. Special Land
Acquisition Officer Poona of Punjab & Ors.
1988 (3) SCC 751

7. Vijay Kumar Moti Lal Vs. St. of Mah. 1981
(2) SCC 719

8. State of Haryana Vs. Ram Singh 2001 (6) SCC 254

9. Krishan Kumar Vs. Union of India & Ors.
2015 (1) SCC 220

10. Himmat Singh & Ors Vs. St. of M.P. & Ors.
2013 (16) SCC 392

11. A.P. Housing Board Vs. K. Manohar Reddy
& Ors. 2010 (12) SCC 707

12. Lal Chand Vs. Union of India & Ors. 2009
(15) SCC 769

13. Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, Gujarat
& Ors. Vs. Madhubai Gobarbhai & Ors. 2009
(15) SCC 125

14. Cement Corporation of India Limited Vs.
Purya & Ors. 2004 (8) SCC 270

15. Land Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue
Officer 2001 (3) SCC 530

16. Ram Phal & Ors. Vs. St. of U.P. & Ors. 2019
(5) ADJ 649

17. Vimal Kumar Misra & Ors. Vs. Collector
Mainpuri & Ors. 2019 (4) ADJ 463

18. Bajaj Hindustan Limited Vs. Rajendra Singh
& Ors. 2019 (1) ADJ 271

19. Jasvir Singh Vs. Land Acquisition Officer,
Rampur & Anr. 2014 SCC Online All 15658

20. Indian Oil Corporation Limited Vs. Risal
Singh & Ors. Manu/Ph/0073/2019

21.
Special
Deputy
Collector
Vs.
Kurra
Sambasiva Rao 1997 (6) SCC 41
22. Land Acquisition Officer and Mandal
Revenue Officer Vs. V. Narasaiah 2001 (3) SCC
530

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Kumar Birla, J.)

1. Heard Sri Ashutosh Srivastava,
learned counsel for the appellant and Sri
K.R. Singh, learned Standing Counsel
appearing for the respondent no. 3.

2. Both the appeals are admittedly
arising
out
of
the
same
acquisition
proceedings and learned counsel appearing
for both the parties agree that the appeals may
be decided together by taking the First Appeal
No. 692 of 2001 as a leading case.

3. First Appeal No. 692 of 2001 has
been filed challenging the judgment and
order
dated
19.2.2001
passed
by
Additional District Judge, Court No. 4,
Gorakhpur in Land Acquisition Reference
No. 150 of 1987 (Smt. Tasneem and others
vs. State of U.P. and others) arising out of
LA Case No. 32/8 of 1986 in respect of
acquisition of land in Village Daudpur
Tappa, Pargana Haveli, Tehsil Sadar,
District Gorakhpur.

4. Plot Nos. 169/2 and 167/2 total
area 3.78 acres were acquired by the
Gorakhpur Development Authority for the
purpose of development of IInd Phase
Ramgarh Tal Pariyojana of Gorakhpur
Development
Authority.
Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act) was issued on 14.5.1983. Notification
under Section 6(1) of the Act was issued
on 5.5.1986. Possession was taken on
28.10.1986. The Special Land Acquisition
Officer (hereinafter referred to as SLAO)
vide award dated 7.10.1986 awarded
compensation @ Rs. 1,24,193.53. Not
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
333
being satisfied with the compensation
awarded by the SLAO the claimants herein
filed LAR No. 150 of 1987. Several other
references were also filed against the
impugned award. LAR No. 150 of 1987
was taken as a leading case. The reference
was dismissed in toto by the reference
court mainly on the ground that the
exempler sale deed dated 1.7.1982 relied
on by the SLAO for determination of
market value was correctly relied on.
Certified copies of the sale deed dated
9.12.1982 Ex. 4 (wrongly mentioned as
22.11.1982) in respect of Plot No. 225
filed by the claimants was discarded on the
ground that the vendor and vendee were
not examined. Another sale deed dated
9.2.1981 Ex. 5 (wrongly mentioned as
10.10.1980) in respect of Plot No. 125/1
area 1890 sq. ft. filed by the claimants was
discarded on the ground that it was for a
very small piece of area.

5. Submission of learned counsel for
the appellant is that extremely low award
@ Rs. 2.84 per sq. ft. has been awarded by
the SLAO as against Rs. 60/- per sq. ft.
claimed by the claimants. He further
submits that even assuming that the land
acquired was agricultural in nature, it has
great potentiality because of its location as
the same is located in the heart of city of
Gorakhpur. He further submits that it is
not in dispute that the land was acquired
for the purpose of construction of open
area theatre, hotel, restaurant, cafeteria,
aquarium, bird santuary, children park,
petrol pump, skating rink stadium, deer
park, camping ground etc., which itself
goes to prove that the acquisition was for
the
purpose
of
further
developing
developed area and as such the claimants
were
entitled
to
higher
rate
of
compensation than what was determined
by the SLAO. The court below has
miserably failed to take note of these
aspects of the matter which has vitiated the
entire judgment and order. He further
submits that oral evidence of DW-1 itself
is sufficient to prove that the land was in
close proximity to the heart of the city.
Apart from the facts that have been
asserted regarding potentiality of the land
and its proximity with the city it has
further been submitted that the exempler
sale deed dated 1.7.1982, relied on by the
SLAO for determination of market value
and as affirmed by the reference court, is
not even on record and therefore, merely
because the same was included in the list
of documents it could not have been relied
on by the SLAO for determination of
market value. He further submits that his
certified copies of sale deed dated
9.12.1982 Ex. 4 were discarded on the
ground that the vendor and vendee were
not examined. He submits that the law in
this regard is well settled and Section 51-A
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) clearly
provides that such exempler sale deed
could have been relied on or at least was
liable to be considered even without
examining the vendor and vendee.

6. Broadly speaking, the submission
of learned counsel for the appellant is two
fold: (1) the SLAO has relied on the
exempler sale deed dated 1.7.1982, which
is not even on record and therefore, it was
no evidence in the eye of law, which could
have been relied on by the SLAO for
determining the market value of the
acquired land and; (2) the exempler given
by the claimants has incorrectly been
discarded on the ground that vendor and
vendee were not examined, which is
contrary to the law settled by the Hon'ble
Apex Court. He also sought to make
submission
for
the
purpose
of
334 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
determination of market value as per
Section 23 of the Act.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant
has placed reliance on judgments on
Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Union
of India vs. Dyagala Devamma and
others 2018 (11) SCC 485, Vinod Bansal
vs. State of Haryana and another 2013
(5) SCC 622, Mehrawal Khewaji Trust
(registered) Faridkot and others vs.
State of Punjab and others 2012 (5)
SCC 432, Mahesh Dattatray Thirthkar
vs. State of Maharashtra 2009 (11) SCC
141, Lal Chand vs. Union of India 2009
(15) SCC 760, Chimanlal Hargovinddas
vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer
Poona of Punjab and others 1988 (3)
SCC 751, Vijay Kumar Moti Lal vs.
State Maharashtra 1981 (2) SCC 719
and State of Haryana vs. Ram Singh
2001 (6) SCC 254.

8. Per contra, Sri K.R. Singh, learned
counsel appearing for the acquiring body
Gorakhpur
Development
Authority,
insofar as first argument is concerned,
fairly admitted that the exempler sale deed
dated 1.7.1982 is not on record of the court
below. He, however, submits that since the
details of such sale deed were available
and therefore, no illegality was committed
by the SLAO in placing reliance on the
same for the purpose of determination of
market value and reference court has
rightly rejected the reference in toto.
Insofar as rejection of certified copies of
the exempler sale deeds dated 9.12.1982
Ex. 4 submitted by the claimants is
concerned, he submits that the sale deeds
were rightly discarded as the contents of
the sale deed were not produced by
producing the vendor and vendee. He
submits that it is the discretion of the
authority / court to place reliance on the
same or not. He submits that in the present
case the SLAO as well as the reference
court did not find safe to place reliance on
the same in absence of examination of
vendor and vendee and therefore, no
interference is required in the impugned
judgment.

9. I have considered the rival
submissions and have perused the record.

10. In this appeal two questions arise
for consideration. One, whether the
exempler sale deed that has been relied on
by the SLAO for determination of the
market value, is part of the part of the
record or not, if not, can it said to be a
piece of evidence; two, whether certified
copy of the exempler sale deed dated
9.12.1982 relied on by the claimants was
acceptable in evidence even without
examining the vendor and vendee in view
of Section 51-A of the Act?

11. Apart from the rulings that have
been relied on by learned counsel for the
appellant I have also gone through the
judgments rendered in the cases of
Krishan Kumar vs. Union of India and
others 2015 (1) SCC 220, Himmat Singh
and others vs. State of M.P. and others
2013 (16) SCC 392, A.P. Housing Board
vs. K. Manohar Reddy and others 2010
(12) SCC 707, Lal Chand vs. Union of
India and others 2009 (15) SCC 769,
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition,
Gujarat and others vs. Madhubai
Gobarbhai and others 2009 (15) SCC
125, Cement Corporation of India
Limited vs. Purya and others 2004 (8)
SCC 270 (5 Judges Constitutional
Bench), Land Acquisition Officer and
Mandal Revenue Officer 2001 (3) SCC
530, Ram Phal and others vs. State of
U.P. and others 2019 (5) ADJ 649,
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
335
Vimal Kumar Misra and others vs.
Collector Mainpuri and others 2019 (4)
ADJ 463, Bajaj Hindustan Limited vs.
Rajendra Singh and others 2019 (1)
ADJ 271, Jasvir Singh vs. Land
Acquisition
Officer,
Rampur
and
another 2014 SCC Online All 15658 and
Indian Oil Corporation Limited vs.
Risal
Singh
and
others
Manu/Ph/0073/2019.

12. Before considering the arguments
regarding potentiality of the land and
proximity of exempler sale deed in time
and situation, it would be appropriate to
deal with the question as to whether the
exempler sale deed that has been relied on
by the SLAO for determination of the
market value, is part of the part of the
record or not, if not, can it said to be a
piece of evidence? Suffice to note that
exempler relied on by the SLAO for
determination
of
market
value
compensation of Rs. 1,16,666.67 per acre
in respect of Plot No. 261/1 area 0.03
acres, as admitted to Sri K.R. Singh,
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
Development Authority that this exempler
is not part of the record, therefore, could
not have been considered by the reference
court. Once the document is not part of the
record, mere availability of the details of
the documents could not have been treated
to be part of the evidence for the purpose
of determining market value as it is not a
piece of evidence in the eye of law. In
other words, on the part of the respondent
Development Authority, there was no
primary or secondary evidence available
on record and hence reliance placed on the
same was absolutely misplaced.

13. A reference may be made in this
regard to various provisions of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872. Section 3 of the
Evidence Act provides as to what is
"evidence". Chapter V contains provision
regarding documentary evidence. Section
61 provides that the contents of documents
may be proved either by primary or by
secondary evidence. Section 62 provides
what is primary evidence. Section 63
provides what is secondary evidence.
Section 64 clearly provides that documents
must be proved by primary evidence
except in the cases hereinafter mentioned
and Section 65 contains in which cases
secondary evidence can be given. For
ready reference, these provisions are
quoted as under:-

"3.
Interpretation
clause.-
...........

"Evidence" - "Evidence" means
and includes-

(1) all statements which the
Court permits or requires to be made
before it by witnesses, in relation to
matters of fact under inquiry;

such statements are called oral
evidence;

(2)
[all
document
including
electronic
records
produced
for
the
inspection of the Court],

such
statements
are
called
documentary evidence;

61.
Proof
of
contents
of
documents.- The contents of documents
may be proved either by primary or
secondary evidence.

62. Primary evidence.- Primary
evidence means the documents itself
produced for the inspection of the Court.

Explanation
1-
Where
a
document is executed in several parts,
each part is primary evidence of the
document :

Where a document is executed in
counterpart,
each
counterpart
being
executed by one or some of the parties
336 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
only, each counterpart is primary evidence
as against the parties executing it.

Explanation 2- Where a number
of documents are all made by one uniform
process, as in the case of printing,
lithography, or photography, each is
primary evidence of the contents of the
rest ; but, where they are all copies of a
common original, they are not primary
evidence of the contents of the original.

63.
Secondary
evidence.-
Secondary evidence means and includes--

(1) certified copies given under
the provisions hereinafter contained;

(2) Copies made from the
original by mechanical processes which in
themselves ensure the accuracy of the
copy, and copies compared with such
copies.

(3)
copies
made
from
or
compared with the original ;

(4) counterparts of documents as
against the parties who did not execute
them;

(5) oral accounts of the contents
of a documents given by some person who
has himself seen it.

64. Proof of documents by
primary evidence.- Documents must be
proved by primary evidence except in the
cases hereinafter mentioned.

65. Cases in which secondary
evidence relating to documents may be
given.- Secondary evidence may be given
of the existence, condition, or contents of a
documents in the following cases:-

(a) When the original is shown
or appears to be in the possession or
power--

of the person against whom the
document is sought to be proved , or

of any person out of reach of, or
not subject to, the process of the Court or

of any person legally bound to
produce it,

and when, after the notice
mentioned in section 66, such person does
not produce it;

(b) when the existence, condition
or contents of the original have been
proved to be admitted in writing by the
person against whom it is proved or by his
representative in interest;

(c) when the original has been
destroyed or lost, or when the party
offering evidence of its contents cannot,
for any other reason not arising from his
own default or neglect, produce it in
reasonable time;

(d) when the original is of such a
nature as not to be easily movable;

(e) when the original is public
document within the meaning of section
74;

(f) when the original is a
document of which a certified copy is
permitted by this Act, or by any other law
in force in 40[India] to be given in
evidence ;

(g) when the originals consist of
numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot conveniently be examined in
court and the fact to be proved it the
general result of the whole collection.

In cases (a), (c) and (d), any
secondary evidence of the contents of the
document is admissible.

In case (b), the written admission
is admissible.

In case (e) or (f), a certified copy
of the document, but no other kind of
secondary evidence, admissible.

In case (g), evidence may be
given as to the general result of the
documents by any person who has
examined them, and who is skilled in the
examination of such documents."

14. Clearly, if the Development
Authority was placing reliance on a sale
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
337
deed, either original should have been
produced or its certified copy could have
been filed, which, as per Section 51-A of
the Act was acceptable in evidence
without examination of vendor and vendee
(as discussed in later part of this
judgment). Clearly, the contents of the
exempler sale deed, i.e. the document,
were not proved in accordance with the
aforesaid provisions of the Evidence Act.
In fact, admittedly, the document itself
was
not on
record.
Therefore,
the
conclusion
drawn
in
the
preceding
paragraphs is inescapable.

15.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent had submitted that the court
below rightly rejected the exempler sale
deed (Ex. 4) submitted by the claimants
and there was cogent evidence on record
to reject the reference in toto.

16. Insofar as the second question
and rejection of exempler sale deed dated
9.12.1982 submitted by the claimants in
respect of Plot No. 225 is concerned, as
held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Cement Corporation of India Limited
(supra) in view of Section 51-A of the Act
such documents are acceptable in evidence
even without examination of vendor and
vendee. Section 51-A of the Act is quoted
as under:-

"51 A. Acceptance of certified
copy as evidence- In any proceeding
under this Act, a certified copy of a
document registered under the Registration
Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), including a copy
given under section 57 of that Act be
accepted as evidence of the transaction
recorded in such-document."

17. Paragraphs 2, 18, 20.21, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37 and 39 of
the
Cement
Corporation
of
India
Limited (supra) are quoted as under:-

"2. In Kurra Sambasiva Rao's
case (supra), this Court held that by
introducing Section 51A in the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter LA
Act) the Legislature only facilitated the
parties concerned to produce a certified
copy of a sale transaction in evidence and
nothing more. This is what the Court
observed in the said case:

"Section 51-A only dispenses
with the production of the original sale
deed and directs to receive certified copy
for the reason that parties to the sale
transaction would be reluctant to part with
the original sale deed since acquisition
proceedings would take long time before
award of the compensation attains finality
and in the meanwhile the owner of the sale
deed is precluded from using the same for
other purposes vis-a-vis this land. The
marking of the certified copy per se is not
admissible in evidence unless it is duly
proved and the witnesses, viz., the vendor
or the vendee, are examined."

18. From the above, it is seen
that till the judgment of the three Judge
Bench in V. Narasaiah's case (supra), the
consensus of judicial opinion was that
Section 51A was enacted for the limited
purpose of enabling a party to produce
certified
copy
of
a
registered
sale
transaction in evidence only and for
proving the contents of the said document
the parties had to lead oral evidence as
contemplated in the Evidence Act.

20. The above view of the Court
in Kurra Sambasiva Rao's case, in our
opinion, is not the correct position in law.
Even prior to the insertion of Section 51A
of the Act the provisions of the Evidence
Act and the Registration Act did permit
the production of a certified copy in
338 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
evidence. This has been clearly noticed in
the judgment in Narsaiah's case wherein
the court relying on Sections 64 and 65(f)
of the Evidence Act read with Section
57(5) of the Registration Act held that
production of a certified copy of a
registered sale document in evidence was
permissible in law even prior to insertion
of Section 51A in the LA Act. We are in
agreement with the said view expressed by
this Court in Narasaiah's case.

21. In the above background the
question for our consideration would be,
what then is the real object of inserting
51A in LA Act?

24. The terms 'primary and
secondary evidence' apply to the kinds of
proof that may be given to the contents of
a document, irrespective of the purpose for
which such contents, when proved, may be
received. Primary evidence is an evidence
which the law requires to be given first;
secondary evidence is evidence which may
be given in the absence of that better
evidence when a proper explanation of its
absence has been given. However, there
are exceptions to the aforementioned rule.

25. Section 51A of the Land
Acquisition Act seeks to make an
exception to the aforementioned rule.

26.
In
the
acquisition
proceedings, sale deeds are required to be
brought on records for the purpose of
determining market value payable to the
owner of the land when it is sought to be
acquired.

27. Although by reason of the
aforementioned provision the parties are
free to produce original documents and
prove the same in accordance with the
terms of the rules of evidence as envisaged
under the Indian Evidence Act the LA Act
provides for an alternative thereto by
inserting the said provision in terms
whereof the certified copies which are
otherwise secondary evidence may be
brought
on
record
evidencing
a
transaction. Such transactions in terms of
the aforementioned provision may be
accepted in evidence. Acceptance of an
evidence is not a term of art. It has an
etymological
meaning.
It
envisages
exercise of judicial mind to the materials
on record. Acceptance of evidence by a
court would be dependent upon the facts
of the case and other relevant factors. A
piece of evidence in a given situation may
be accepted by a court of law but in
another it may not be.

28. Section 51A of the L.A. Act
may be read literally and having regard to
the ordinary meaning which can be
attributed to the term 'acceptance of
evidence' relating to transaction evidenced
by a sale deed, its admissibility in
evidence would be beyond any question.
We are not oblivious of the fact that only
by bringing a documentary evidence in the
record it is not automatically brought on
the record. For bringing a documentary
evidence on the record, the same must not
only be admissible but the contents thereof
must be proved in accordance with law.
But when the statute enables a court to
accept a sale deed on the records
evidencing a transaction, nothing further is
required to be done. The admissibility of a
certified copy of sale deed by itself could
not be held to be inadmissible as thereby a
secondary evidence has been brought on
record without proving the absence of
primary evidence. Even the vendor or
vendee thereof is not required to examine
themselves for proving the contents
thereof. This, however, would not mean
that contents of the transaction as
evidenced by the registered sale deed
would automatically be accepted. The
legislature advisedly has used the word
'may'. A discretion, therefore, has been
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
339
conferred upon a court to be exercised
judicially,
i.e.,
upon
taking
into
consideration the relevant factors.

29. In V.Narasaiah's case, this
Court correctly understood the said scope
and object of insertion of Section 51A in
the LA Act when it held thus :

"It was in the wake of the
aforesaid practical difficulties that the new
Section 51A was introduced in the LA
Act. When the section says that certified
copy of a registered document "may be
accepted as evidence of the transaction
recorded in such document" it enables the
court to treat what is recorded in the
document, in respect of the transactions
referred to therein, as evidence."

31. Thus, the reasoning of this
Court in Narasaiah's case that Section 51A
enables the party producing the certified
copy of a sale transaction to rely on the
contents of the document without having
to examine the vendee or the vendor of
that document is the correct position in
law. This finding in Narasaiah's case is
also supported by the decision of this
Court in the case of Mangaldas Raghavji
Ruparel (supra).

32. Therefore, we have no
hesitation in accepting this view of the
court in the Narasaiah's case as the correct
view.

35. A registered document in
terms of Section 51A of the Act may carry
therewith a presumption of genuineness.
Such
a
presumption,
therefore,
is
rebuttable.
Raising
a
presumption,
therefore, does not amount to proof; it only
shifts the burden of proof against whom
the presumption operates for disproving it.
Only if the presumption is not rebutted by
discharging the burden, the court may act
on the basis of such presumption. Even
when in terms of the Evidence Act a
provision has been made that the court
shall presume a fact, the same by itself
would not be irrebuttable or conclusive.
The genuineness of a transaction can
always fall for adjudication, if any
question is raised in this behalf.

36. Similar is the view taken by
this Court in V. Narasaiah's case wherein
this Court held thus :-

"the words "may be accepted as
evidence" in the Section indicate that there
is no compulsion on the court to accept
such transaction as evidence, but it is open
to the court to treat them as evidence.
Merely accepting them as evidence does
not mean that the court is bound to treat
them as reliable evidence. What is sought
to be achieved is that the transactions
recorded in the documents may be treated
as evidence, just like any other evidence,
and it is for the court to weigh all the pros
and
cons
to
decide
whether
such
transaction
can
be
relied
on
for
understanding the real price of the land
concerned".

37. Having noticed the scope of
Section 51A of the LA Act as understood
by this Court in V. Narasaiah's case to be
the correct interpretation, we will now
consider
whether
such
evidence
is
mandatorly binding on the authority or the
court concerned or it is only an enabling
provision.

39. While it is clear that under
Section 51A of the LA Act a presumption
as to the genuineness of the contents of the
document is permitted to be raised, the
same can be relied upon only if the said
presumption is not rebutted by other
evidence. In the said view of the matter we
are of the opinion the decision of this
Court in the case of Land Acquisition
Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer vs. V.
Narasaiah (supra) lays down the correct
law."
340 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 (emphasis supplied)

18. In view of the aforesaid Five
Judges constitutional Bench I do not wish
to burden my judgment by referring to
other judgments. Suffice to note that
subsequent to the aforesaid judgment the
stand taken by Hon'ble Apex Court as well
as by Hon'ble Division and Hon'ble Single
Judge of this Court on interpretation of
Section 51-A of the Act is consistent in
nature and is in the line of the aforesaid
judgment.

19. I have also noticed the fact that
the impugned judgment was passed by the
reference court on 19.2.2001 and till that
date the judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Special Deputy
Collector vs. Kurra Sambasiva Rao
1997 (6) SCC 41 was holding field as the
judgment in the case of Land Acquisition
Officer and Mandal Revenue Officer vs.
V. Narasaiah 2001 (3) SCC 530 was
rendered subsequently on 27.2.2001. In
such view of the matter, it cannot be said
that at that point of time the reference
court has taken illegal view in the matter
in rejecting the exempler sale deed dated
9.12.1982 (Ex. 4) submitted by the
claimants.
However,
in
Cement
Corporation of India Limited (supra)
after taking into account the contrary view
taken in the case of Kurra Sambasiva
Rao (supra) and V. Narasaiah (supra) it
has been held that such document is
admissible in evidence. A presumption as
to the genuineness of the contents of1-16
the document is permitted to be raised and
the same can be relied upon only if the
said presumption is not rebutted by any
other evidence.

20. There is a presumption of
genuineness regarding such registered
document in view of Section 51-A of the
Act, however, in Cement Corporation of
India Limited (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court
has also considered as to whether such
evidence is mandatorily binding on the
authority or court or it is only an enabling
provision. It was held that it is clear that
under Section 51-A of the Act a presumption
as to the genuineness of the contents of the
document is permitted to be raised, the same
can be relied upon only if the said
presumption is not rebutted by other
evidence. The view taken in V. Narasaiah
(supra) held to be the correct evidence.

21. In the present case, from perusal
of record, I find that there was no evidence
in rebuttal regarding such presumption.
The evidence that was considered by the
reference court is, admittedly, not on
record of the reference court.

22. In such view of the matter, it is
clear that on one hand, now the law is
settled that the certified copy of the
registered sale deed (Ex. 4) dated
9.12.1982 could not have been rejected
merely because vendor and vendee were
not examined, and on the other hand, the
court below has relied on the contents of a
document, which is not on record and
therefore, there is no evidence in rebuttal
in the eye of law to form opinion or basis
for the compensation awarded.

23. In Vinod Bansal (supra)
Hon'ble Apex Court after dealing with the
provision of Section 51-A of the Act
remanded back the matter to the reference
court for fresh disposal. Paragraphs 7, 8
and 9 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted
as under:-

"7. Since there was conflict of
decisions as regards receiving of certified
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
341
copies of sale deeds in evidence in view of
Sections 51-A of the Act and the position
of law not being clear, the learned Single
Judge of the High Court took the view that
Section 51-A of the Act nowhere provides
that
certified
copy
of
a
registered
document not properly proved can be
admitted in evidence; Section 51-A of the
Act only makes a certified copy of the
document obtained from the registering
officer admissible in evidence without
production of their originals; but unless
either the vendor or the vendee has been
examined as witness to testify not only the
consideration paid but also their specific
knowledge and the circumstances in which
the sale deed came to be executed,
nearness to the lands, etc. the sale deeds
cannot be relied on to determine the
market value of the acquired lands. The
learned Single Judge also held that the
learned Additional District Judge had not
committed any illegality in saying that the
sale deeds were not admissible in
evidence.

8. Having heard the learned
counsel for the parties and after perusing
the orders of the Reference Court, the
learned Single Judge and the impugned
orders, particularly, keeping in view the
legal position as to the admissibility of
certified copies of sale deeds in evidence
in the light of the legal position stated by
the Constitution Bench in Cement Corpn.
of India Ltd. v. Purya aforementioned, we
are satisfied that the matters are required
to be remitted to the Reference Court for
fresh disposal.

9. The Reference Court has to
reappreciate the evidence which it had
considered
earlier,
uninfluenced
by
observations made in the judgments of the
learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court, including the
certified copies of the sale deeds in the
light of the Constitution Bench decision in
Cement Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Purya5
explaining the position of law in relation
to Section 51-A of the Act. The parties
shall not be permitted either to produce
any additional documents or lead any
further evidence except rebuttal evidence
in regard to certified copies of the sale
deeds already produced to the extent
indicated in the Constitution Bench
judgment Court."

(emphasis supplied)

24. In the case of Dyagala
Devamma (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court
while considering the landmark judgment
Hon'ble
Apex
Court
in
Chimanlal
Hargovinddas
vs.
Special
Land
Acquisition Officer, Poona and another
1988 (3) SCC 751 reiterated what broad
principles of law relating to acquisition of
land under the Act should be kept in
consideration to determine the proper
market value. The factor which must be
taken into consideration to assess the
valuation of land under the Act were laid
down in paragraph 4 of Chimanlal
Hargovinddas (supra), which is quoted
as under:-

"4. The following factors must
be etched on the mental screen:

(1) A reference under section 18
of the Land Acquisition Act is not an
appeal against the award and the Court
cannot take into account the material relied
upon by the Land Acquisition officer in
his Award unless the same material is
produced and proved before the Court.

(2) So also the Award of the
Land Acquisition officer is not to be
treated as a judgment of the trial Court
open or exposed to challenge before the
Court hearing the Reference. It is merely
342 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
an offer made by the Land Acquisition
officer and the material utilised by him for
making his valuation cannot be utilised by
the Court unless produced and proved
before it. It is not the function of the Court
to suit in appeal against the Award,
approve or disapprove its reasoning, or
correct its error or affirm, modify or
reverse the conclusion reached by the
Land Acquisition officer, as if it were an
appellate court.

(3) The Court has to treat the
reference as an original proceeding before
it and determine the market value afresh
on the basis of the material produced
before it.

(4) The claimant is in the
position of a plaintiff who has to show that
the price offered for his land in the award
is inadequate on the basis of the materials
produced in the Court. Of course the
materials placed and proved by the other
side can also be taken into account for this
purpose. (5) The market value of land
under acquisition has to be determined as
on the crucial date of publication of the
notification under sec. 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act (dates of Notifications
under secs. 6 and 9 are irrelevant).

(6) The determination has to be
made standing on the date line of valuation
(date of publication of notification under
sec. 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical
purchaser willing to purchase land from
the open market and is prepared to pay a
reasonable price as on that day. It has also
to be assumed that the vendor is willing to
sell the land at a reasonable price.

(7) In doing so by the instances
method, the Court has to correlate the
market value reflected in the most
comparable instance which provides the
index of market value.

(8) only genuine instances have
to be taken into account. (Some times
instances are rigged up in anticipation of
Acquisition of land). (9) Even post
notification instances can be taken into
account (1) if they are very proximate,(2)
genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has
not motivated the purchaser to pay a
higher price on account of the resultant
improvement in development prospects.

(l0)
The
most
comparable
instances out of the genuine instances have
to
be
identified
on
the
following
considerations:

(i) proximity from time angle,

(ii) proximity from situation
angle.

(11)
Having
identified
the
instances which provide the index of
market value the price reflected therein
may be taken as the norm and the market
value of the land under acquisition may be
deduced by making suitable adjustments
for the plus and minus factors vis-a-vis
land under acquisition by placing the two
in juxtaposition.

(12) A balance-sheet of plus and
minus factors may be drawn for this
purpose and the relevant factors may be
evaluated in terms of price variation as a
prudent purchaser would do.

(13) The market value of the
land under acquisition has there after to be
deduced by loading the price reflected in
the instance taken as norm for plus factors
and unloading it for minus factors (14)
The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to
(13) has to be undertaken in a common
sense manner as a prudent man of the
world of business would do. We may
illustrate some such illustrative (not
exhaustive) factors:

Plus factors

Minus
factors

1. smallness of size

1.
largeness of area
1 All. Smt. Tasneem & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Ors.
343

2. proximity to a road. 2. situation in
the interior at a

distances from the Road.

3. frontage on a road.

3.
narrow strip of land with very small

frontage
compared to death.

4. nearness to developed area.

4. lower level requiring the depressed
portion to be filled up.

5. regular shape

 5.
remoteness from developed locality

6.
level
vis-a-vis
land
under
acquisition
6.
some
special
disadvantageous factor
which
would
deter a purchaser

7. special value for an owner of an

adjoining property to whom it may

have some very special advantage.

(15) The evaluation of these
factors of course depends on the facts of
each case. There cannot be any hard and
fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the
best and most reliable guide.