# Smt. Zahida Anjum v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 508
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-26
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7948 of 2005
- **Bench:** Mrs. Jyotsna Sharma
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/smt-zahida-anjum-v-state-of-u-p-anr-50685
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-
Constitution
of
Indian,1950 - Article 141, 142, 226 & 227
- Criminal Procedure Code,1973 - Sections
125 & 482 - Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 - Section 3
- Petition filed by Wife - challenging the
impugned order passed in Revision as well as
for enhancement of maintenance u/section 125
Cr.P.C. - petitioner-wife was never divorced -
seeking maintenance from her husband - filed
application u/s 125 Cr.P.C. - Trial court allowed
application to pay Rs. 1500/- p.m. - two
revision petitions filed - one by husband for setaside & anr.by wife for enhancement of
maintenance - both Revision was decided by a
common judgment - revisional court allowed
the revision filed by husband & rejected the
revision filed by wife - Plea of divorce taken by
husband - court finds that, husband's claim of
pronouncing triple Talaaq must be proven and
that, irrespective of the claim, a wife retains the
right
to
maintenance
until
remarriage
-
judgment of the revisional court flawed and
directs a prompt reassessment of the wife's
maintenance claim, ensuring justice is served -
Held, - (i) Court of a firm view that judgement
passed by revisional court in Criminal Revision
filed by husband was bad in law and is therefore
liable to be set-aside - (ii) and issue of
enhancement of maintenance amount as was
claimed by wife in Criminal Revision opens up -
Hence, concerned court is directed to decide the
same as per law within a period of three months
from date of filing of certified copy of this
judgment - Petition allowed. (Para - 23, 24, 25)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

508 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Court and since the allegations in the first
information report constitute a cognizable
offence, the same cannot be quashed.

17. Accordingly, these writ petitions
fail and are hereby dismissed.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 508
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. JYOTSNA SHARMA, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7948 of 2005

Smt. Zahida Anjum ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rishikesh Tripathi

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Sri A.R. Dwivedi, Sri
Manish Dwivedi, Sri Prabhakar Tripathi

Criminal
Law
-
Constitution
of
Indian,1950 - Article 141, 142, 226 & 227
- Criminal Procedure Code,1973 - Sections
125 & 482 - Muslim Women (Protection of
Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019 - Section 3
- Petition filed by Wife - challenging the
impugned order passed in Revision as well as
for enhancement of maintenance u/section 125
Cr.P.C. - petitioner-wife was never divorced -
seeking maintenance from her husband - filed
application u/s 125 Cr.P.C. - Trial court allowed
application to pay Rs. 1500/- p.m. - two
revision petitions filed - one by husband for setaside & anr.by wife for enhancement of
maintenance - both Revision was decided by a
common judgment - revisional court allowed
the revision filed by husband & rejected the
revision filed by wife - Plea of divorce taken by
husband - court finds that, husband's claim of
pronouncing triple Talaaq must be proven and
that, irrespective of the claim, a wife retains the
right
to
maintenance
until
remarriage
-
judgment of the revisional court flawed and
directs a prompt reassessment of the wife's
maintenance claim, ensuring justice is served -
Held, - (i) Court of a firm view that judgement
passed by revisional court in Criminal Revision
filed by husband was bad in law and is therefore
liable to be set-aside - (ii) and issue of
enhancement of maintenance amount as was
claimed by wife in Criminal Revision opens up -
Hence, concerned court is directed to decide the
same as per law within a period of three months
from date of filing of certified copy of this
judgment - Petition allowed. (Para - 23, 24, 25)

Writ Petition Allowed. (E-11)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shamim Ara Vs St. of U.P., 2002 Crl.L.J. 4726

2. Shabana Bano Vs Imran Khan, 2009 AIR SCW
7490

3. Shayara Bano Vs U.O.I., Writ Petition No.118
of 2016

4. Radhey Shyam & anr.Vs Chhabi Nath & ors.,
(2015) 5 SCC 423

5. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & anr.Vs Special Judge
Magistrate & ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749

6. Saheda Khatoon Vs Gholam Sarwar, 2002
Cri.L.J. 4150

7. Danial Latifi & anr.Vs U.O.I., 2001 AIR SCW
3932

8. Major General A.S. Gauraya & anr.Vs S.N.
Thakur & anr., (1986) 2 SCC 709

9. Shenoy and Co. Vs Commercial Tax Officer,
[1985] (2) S.C.C. 512

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Jyotsna
Sharma, J.)

1. Heard Sri Rishikesh Tripathi,
learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri
Manish Dwivedi, learned counsel for
8 All. Smt. Zahida Begum Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
509
respondent no.2, Sri O.P. Mishra, learned
A.G.A. for the State and perused the
record.

2. By means of this criminal misc.
writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner- Smt.
Zahida Anjum has prayed for issuance of
writ of certiorari to quash the judgment and
order
dated
06.05.2005
passed
by
Additional District & Sessions Judge in
Criminal Revision No.173/2004 (connected
with criminal revision no.212 of 2004) and
also
seeking
issuance
of
mandamus
commanding respondent no.2 to pay
maintenance amount of Rs.5000/- per
month to the petitioner from the date of
application under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

3. Relevant facts giving rise to this
petition are as below:-

The
petitioner
moved
an
application seeking maintenance from her
husband-respondent no.2, Atiqur Rahman
before the Magistrate concerned in 2001.
The trial court passed an order on
30.06.2004 and awarded Rs.1500/- per
month in her favour as maintenance,
payable from the date of the order.
Challenging above order the petitioner as
well
as
respondent
no.2
preferred
separate criminal revisions, Criminal
Revision
no.212
of
2004
seeking
enhancement of maintenance amount by
the petitioner and Criminal Revision
No.173 of 2004 filed by her husband
seeking to set aside the maintenance
order. The learned revisional court
dismissed revision filed by the petitioner
and allowed the revision of respondent
no.2 quashing the maintenance order by
passing
a
common
order
dated
06.05.2005.

4. Following contentions are raised by
the petitioner:-

Petitioner was never divorced and
false plea of divorce was taken by her
husband in written statement for the
purpose
of
stalling
the
grant
of
maintenance. Respondent no.2, to stress his
plea of divorce could only file photocopy
of talaqnama that too at a very late stage of
the trial, hence the plea of divorce was
quite doubtful; learned trial court took
correct view that the petitioner was entitled
for maintenance; the petitioner was never
paid any amount of dower nor any other
amount to maintain her during "iddat"
period; learned revisional court wrongly
set-aside the order of Magistrate on the
basis of assumptions and conjunctures; the
view taken by revisional court was not
supported by the evidence on record.

5. On the other hand, respondent no.2
has averred that he divorced his wife by
pronouncing talaq three times (triple talaq)
in a Panchayat held on 20.04.2004; the
Panchayat was attended by father and
relatives of his wife; the plea of triple talaq
was categorically mentioned in his written
statement filed before the trial court; no
replication/additional reply to counter the
above averment was ever given by his wife;
he paid amount of dower and maintenance
for "iddat" period; that because she is a
divorcee, therefore, she is not entitled for
any relief under the provisions of section-
125 Cr.P.C.; section- 3 of Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act,
2019 shall apply in such circumstances.

6. The petitioner has filed "written
arguments" before this Court. In addition to
the contentions mentioned in para-4, it is
argued that:-
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) The plea of divorce is not
acceptable and further such plea cannot
impinge
upon
her
right
to
obtain
maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. in
the light of pronouncement of judgement of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shamim Ara vs.
State of U.P., 2002 Crl.L.J. 4726.

(ii) It was mandatory to attempt
for reconciliation between the parties,
hence, any divorce without such attempt is
illegal.

(iii) The revisional court gave the
findings ignoring both the points of law just
mentioned above.

(iv) If for argument sake, the
petitioner is considered as divorcee, she
has not re-married till yet. And therefore, in
view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Shabana Bano vs. Imran Khan,
2009 AIR SCW 7490, she is entitled for
maintenance so long she did not re-marry.

(v)
Grant
of
divorce
by
pronouncing triple talaq is illegal in view
of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Shayara Bano vs. Union of
India in Writ Petition No.118 of 2016,
therefore, triple talaq cannot be a ground
for denial of maintenance under Section
125 Cr.P.C.

7. First and foremost objection has
been raised by the learned A.G.A. and
learned counsel for the respondent no.2 that
a judicial order is not amenable to the
original writ jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. It is pointed out by the State that in
this case the prayer is to quash the
judgement and order dated 06.05.2005
passed in a revision.

8. To stress above point, judgement of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chhabi
Nath and others, (2015) 5 SCC 423 has
been referred to. The apex court in the
aforesaid judgment held that writ of
certiorari lies to bring decisions of an
"Inferior court", tribunal, public authority
or any other body of persons for review so
that the court may determine whether they
should be quashed or not. However,
expression "interference" the court is not
referable to the judicial courts Writ of
certiorari lies against patently erroneous or
without jurisdiction orders of tribunals or
authorities or courts other than judicial
courts. The Apex Court in para 25 further
observed as below:-

"25. All courts in the jurisdiction
of a High Court are subordinate to it and
subject to its control and supervision
under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is
constitutionally conferred on all High
Courts.
Broad
principles
of
writ
jurisdiction followed in England are
applicable to India and a writ of certiorari
lies against patently erroneous or without
jurisdiction
orders
of
Tribunals
or
authorities or courts other than judicial
courts. There are no precedents in India
for High Courts to issue writs to
subordinate courts. Control of working of
subordinate courts in dealing with their
judicial orders is exercised by way of
appellate or revisional powers or power of
superintendence under Article 227.Orders
of civil court stand on different footing
from the orders of authorities or Tribunals
or courts other than judicial/civil courts.
While appellate or revisional jurisdiction
is
regulated
by
statutes,
power
of
superintendence under Article 227 is
constitutional. The expression "inferior
court" is not referable to judicial courts."

9. Thus, it has been clearly laid down
that order of civil court could be challenged
under Article 227 of the Constitution of
8 All. Smt. Zahida Begum Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
511
India
and
not
under
original
writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.

10. At the same time, it is conceded
that a writ petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India may be maintainable
against such an order and that there is no
legal bar in converting the writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India to one under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India in the peculiarity of
the circumstances to serve interest of
justice.

11. I glanced over the facts and
circumstances of this case. The most
important facts which draw my attention
are;
the
petitioner
Zahida
filed
an
application under section- 125 Cr.P.C. with
a prayer to grant maintenance in the year
2001, the same was decided in the year
2004; the opposite party no.2 (her husband)
filed a revision in 2004 which came to be
decided on 06.05.2005; the wife (present
petitioner)
challenged
that
order
on
14.07.2005 and the matter is pending
before this Court since then i.e. last 17
years. All this while, this legal point was
neither raised nor realized that this writ
petition seeks to invoke powers under
Article
226
instead
of Article
227
Constitution of India . This is settled law
that non-mentioning or wrong mentioning
of provisions of law should not come in the
path of granting appropriate relief, if the
litigant otherwise is entitled for the same.
In my view, an ordinary litigant cannot be
expected of having too minute knowledge
of provisions of law. This question has
always
been
troubling
my
judicial
conscience that what a common man or
ordinary litigant has to do with the
provision of law under which he may be
entitled for relief. This should be the
concern of the Court of law or Court of
justice or his counsel/advocate. Where no
other deterrent except non mentioning or
wrong mentioning of law poses a hurdle in
the winding path to justice, the judge ought
to play its expected role. The Judge or the
Court shall be failing in its duty towards an
ordinary man/litigant by not looking for
solutions and dismissing the writ on
technical ground. In this view of the matter,
I find it fit to treat this petition as one
moved
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution of India.

12. In this regard I draw support from
another judgement of Supreme Court in
Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another vs. Special
Judge Magistrate and Others, (1998) 5
SCC 749, in which it has been held that:-

"Nomenclature
under
which
petition is filed is not quite relevant and
that does not debar the court from
exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise
it possesses unless there is special
procedure prescribed which procedure is
mandatory. If in a case like the present
one the court find that the appellants
could not invoke its jurisdiction under
Article 226, the court can certainly treat
the petition one under Article 227 or
Section 482 of the Code, it may not
however, be lost sight of that provisions
exist in the Code of revision and appeal
but sometime for immediate relief Section
482 of the Code or Article 227 may have to
be resorted to for correcting some grave
errors that might be committed by the
subordinate courts. The present petition
though filed in the High Court as one
under Articles 226 and 227 could well be
treated
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution."

In
view
of
the
facts
and
circumstances of the case, I am treating this
512 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petition as one under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India.

13. Two fold legal questions are
involved in this case. Firstly, whether the
revisionist (the instant petitioner herein)
could have been treated as a divorcee and
in case such a claim, if found acceptable,
whether she will be entitled for grant of
maintenance under section- 125 Cr.P.C.? I
went through the submissions of both the
sides and the laws pronounced by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Shamim Ara (supra),
Shabana Bano (supra) and Shayara
Bano (supra).

14. I choose to look at the law
chronologically; in Shamim Ara vs. State
of U.P. pronounced in the year 2000, the
Apex Court had to deal with the question of
pronouncement/proclamation of "Talaaq",
its proof and the repercussions in a case
before it. It may be noted that in that case
before the Apex Court, the contention was
that husband pronounced "Talaaq" on
11.07.1987; the plea was mentioned in the
written statement filed on his behalf on
05.12.1990; it was argued by the other side
that by filing a written statement in which
the fact of "Talaaq" has been mentioned,
the communication as to pronouncement of
"Talaaq" stood completed on that date
itself, therefore she shall be treated as
divorcee from the date of filing of written
statement. The Apex Court held as below:-

"16. We are also of the opinion that
the talaq to be effective has to be pronounced.
The term 'pronounce' means to proclaim, to
utter formally, to utter rhetorically, to declare
to, utter, to articulate (See Chambers 20th
Century Dictionary, New Edition, p.1030).
There is no proof of talaq having taken place
on 11.7.1987. What the High Court has
upheld as talaq is the plea taken in the
written statement and its communication to
the wife by delivering a copy of the written
statement on 5.12.1990. We are very clear in
our mind that a mere plea taken in the written
statement
of
a
divorce
having
been
pronounced sometime in the past cannot by
itself be treated as effectuating talaaq on the
date of delivery of the copy of the written
statement to the wife. The respondent No.2
ought to have adduced evidence and proved
the pronouncement of talaq on 11.7.1987 and
if he failed in proving the plea raised in the
written statement, the plea ought to have
been treated as failed. We do not agree with
the view propounded in the decided cases
referred to by Mulla and Dr. Tahir Mahmood
in their respective commentaries, wherein a
mere plea of previous talaaq taken in the
written statement, though unsubstantiated,
has been accepted as proof of talaq bringing
to an end the marital relationship with effect
from the date of filing of the written
statement. A plea of previous divorce taken in
the written statement cannot at all be treated
as pronouncement of talaq by the husband on
wife on the date of filing of the written
statement in the Court followed by delivery of
a copy thereof to the wife. So also the
affidavit dated 31.8.1988, filed in some
previous judicial proceedings not inter parte,
containing a
self-serving
statement
of
respondent no.2, could not have been read in
evidence as relevant and of any value."

15. The Calcutta High Court in
Saheda Khatoon vs. Gholam Sarwar,
2002 Cri.L.J. 4150, took a similar view
regarding proof of pronouncement of
"Talaq". In para-6 of the judgement, the
High Court observed as below:-

"It
will
be
a
dangerous
proposition to say that now that the O.P.
has given a statement in his written
objection to the effect that he divorced his
8 All. Smt. Zahida Begum Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
513
wife on any particular date, that statement
should be taken to indicate that the
alleged fact of divorce is thereby being
communicated to the wife. The question of
such
communication
through
the
averments in the pleadings could arise
only if it was held that the alleged giving
of divorce has been proved by the
husband. But since in this case it has been
held by him that the story of divorce has
not been substantiated by trustworthy
evidence,
the
question
of
its
communication loses significance."

16. I perused the judgement of the
revisional court; the learned revisional
court decided two revisions; one filed by
the wife and the other filed by the husband.
Even a casual glance on the judgement
given by the revisional court gives a clear
indication that revisional court re-evaluated
and re-assessed the evidence given by the
parties in the proceeding under section- 125
Cr.P.C. and gave a clear finding that the
husband
had
divorced
his
wife
by
pronouncing "Talaaq" three times, therefore
the wife shall not be entitled for any
maintenance under the provisions of
section- 125 Cr.P.C. and that from that
moment, the provisions of section-3 of
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act, 1986 shall come into play.
After evaluating evidence afresh, the
revisional court set-aside the judgement of
the trial court and allowed the revision filed
by husband and dismissed the revision filed
by the wife.

17. In my view, a legal question
therefore obviously arises whether it was
legally permissible for a revisional court to
re-evaluate the evidence afresh and setaside the judgement of the trial court and
reverse the finding? It may be noted that
the core issues involved in the case were
firstly whether the wife should be treated as
a divorcee, in other words whether the plea
of divorce taken by the husband was
proved? Secondly, whether even if she is
treated as a divorcee, her right to obtain
maintenance under section- 125 Cr.P.C.
came to an end?

18. In my view, on both the issues, the
findings given by the revisional court were
against law of precedents and against
settled principles of law. The judgement
was pronounced by the revisional court in
2005, therefore it was imperative upon the
revisional court to follow the judgement
given by Apex Court in Shamim Ara
(supra) in 2002. It may also be noted that
in Danial Latifi and Another vs. Union of
India,
2001
AIR
SCW
3932,
the
Constitution Bench had held by then that
even a divorced Muslim woman would be
entitled to claim maintenance from her
former husband as long as she does not remarry. The Constitution Bench observed
that being a beneficial piece of legislation,
the benefit thereof must accrue to the
divorced Muslim woman. That judgement
was followed in many of the subsequent
cases and the law still holds good. The
revisional court instead pronounced the
judgment as regard plea of divorce in
disregard of law laid down by Apex Court.
The laws pronounced by Apex Court are
binding
under
Article
142
of
the
Constitution of India on all judicial
authorities. The impugned judgement is
therefore not sustainable in law and is
liable to be set-aside.

19. The next question which remains
to be seen in this writ petition is what shall
be the effect of the judgement of the
Supreme Court in Shayara Bano vs. Union
of India (supra) on the issues involved in
this case. It may be recalled that in the
514 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
above noted case, the Supreme Court setaside the practice of "talaaq-e-biddat" i.e.
triple talaaq, by majority of 3:2.

20. Ordinarily, the law declared by
Supreme Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution of India shall be assumed to be
law from very inception unless expressly or
by
necessary
implication
indicated
otherwise.

21. In Major General A.S. Gauraya
and Another vs. S.N. Thakur and
Another (1986) 2 SCC 709, it has been
held in para-13 that :-

"The sweep of Article 141 of the
Constitution, so far as the Judgments of
this Court are concerned, came up for
consideration before this Court recently
in Shenoy and Co. v. Commercial Tax
Officer, [1985] (2) S.C.C. 512 to which
one of us was a party. It is not necessary
to refer to the facts of that case, in detail.
Suffice it to say that the contention that
the law laid down by this Court in an
appeal filed by the State would not bind
the other parties against whom the State
of Karnataka did not file appeals from a
common Judgment, was repelled by this
Court in the following words:

"....It is, therefore, idle to
contend that the law laid down by this
Court in that Judgment would bind only
the Hansa Corporation and not the other
petitioners against whom the State of
Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To
do so is to ignore the binding nature of a
judgment of this Court under Article 141
of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as
follows :

"The law declared by the
Supreme Court shall be binding on all
courts within the territory of India." A
mere reading of this article brings into
sharp focus its expanse and is all
pervasive nature."

22. In Shayara Bano vs. Union of
India (supra), the Supreme Court took a
view that such a practise of triple talaaq,
though largely prevalent in certain sects of
the Muslim community, but it was never
legal or supported by Sharia.

23. Hence, in the matters, where the
issue of rights of the parties are yet to be
adjudicated, the law pronounced by the
Supreme Court shall be applicable. In this
case, the issues involved herein cannot be
treated as already adjudicated, hence the
law laid down by the Supreme Court would
apply.

24. The matter can be seen from
another perspective as well; firstly, that
merely saying in a written statement that
the husband pronounced triple talaaq on
such and such date, could not have been
taken at its face value and that the husband
had a burden to prove the same. Secondly,
even if for the sake of arguments, it is
assumed that the husband was able to prove
that he indeed divorced his wife by
pronouncing trible talaaq, wife's right to
obtain maintenance shall continue till she
does not re-marry. In such circumstances,
from whatever angle the matter is taken up,
the wife had right to obtain maintenance
and a reasonable amount for subsistence,
which should have been paid to her within
the prescribed time, but could not be
limited for that period only. She was having
right to obtain maintenance for the period
subsequent to "iddat" period as well.

25. On the basis of above discussion,
I am of a firm view that the judgement
dated 06.05.2005 passed by the revisional
court in Criminal Revision No.173 of 2004
8 All. Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Maratha & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
515
was bad in law and is therefore liable to be
set-aside. It may be noted as a matter of
precaution that the
consequent upon
setting-aside the judgment of the revisional
court, the issue of enhancement of the
maintenance amount as was claimed by the
wife in Criminal Revision No.217 of 2004
opens up. As the matter is probably one of
the oldest, hence the concerned court is
directed to decide the same as per law
within a period of three months from the
date of filing of certified copy of this
judgment.

26. Accordingly, this petition is
allowed.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 515
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 20.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SHIV SHANKER PRASAD, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 10919 of 2023

Deepak Kumar @ Deepak Maratha & Anr.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Syed Imran Ibrahim, Sri Praveen Kumar
Singh, Sri Manish Tiwari (Sr. Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A.

Criminal
Law
-
Constitution
of
Indian,1950 - Article - 226 - UP Gangsters
and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act,
1986 - Sections 2, 2(b), 2(b)(iv) & 3 -
Public Gambling Act, 1867 - Sections 3 & 4
- Petition - challenging the impugned FIR
lodged under the Gangsters Act - based on the
single case pending under section 3/4 P.G. Act, -
wherein accused-petitioner was on bail -
Definition of word "Gang" - court finds that,
charge-sheet
in
base
case
against
the
petitioners had been filed on 29.04.2023 and
the impugned FIR has been lodged against
them on 30.06.2023 - Court do not find any
illegality in manner in which the first information
report had been lodged - Moreover, allegations
in first information report, in considered opinion,
contain ingredients of a cognizable offence -
held, provisions of the Gangsters Act can be
slapped against a person on the basis of a
single case - hence writ petition, dismissed.
(Para - 10, 11, 13)

Writ Petition Dismissed. (E-11)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Anjani Kumar
Mishra, J.
&
Hon'ble Shiv Shanker Prasad, J.)

1. Heard Shri Manish Tiwari, Learned
Senior Advocate for the petitioners and
Shri Pankaj Saxena, learned AGA for the
State.

2. Challenge in the writ petition is to
the first information report dated 30.6.2023
giving rise to Case Crime No. 441 of 2023
under Section 2/3 of the U.P. Gangsters and
Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act,
1986, Police Station-Kasganj, DistrictKasgang.

3. The submission of learned counsel
for the petitioners is that the offences
alleged in the first information report do
not fall within the category of offences
specified in the Act of 1986. In any case,
the petitioner does not fall within the
definition of the word 'gang' as occurring in
Section 2(b) of the Act. Another ground
taken in the writ petition is that the
proceedings under the Gangsters Act are
mala fide. No cognizable offence is